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Reforming hudud ordinances to reconcile Islamic criminal law with international human 
rights law 
ABSTRACT 
International human rights laws are grossly violated by the hudud ordinances, with their 
extremely cruel punishments, including stoning for adultery, beheading for apostasy, and 
amputation for theft. Pakistan, Sudan, Brunei Darussalam and Saudi Arabia, for example, 
follow the doctrines of the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence and enforce hudud 
ordinances, thereby violating some of the core international human rights law instruments to 
which they are State Parties. Orthodox Muslims generally defend the hudud ordinances, 
claiming that they are divine and immutable.  
This study refutes the aforementioned claim and demonstrates that it is legitimate and 
possible to reform hudud punishments to reconcile them with international human rights law. 
The thesis differentiates between Shariah and Islamic law. It argues that Shariah refers to the 
divine rulings recorded in the Qur'an and correct Sunnah, while Islamic law is not fully 
divine, for it includes also such prescriptions that have been developed by the human effort of 
Islamic jurists. 
The thesis demonstrates that reformation is an Islamic concept that requires that Muslims 
read the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah in the context of their own time and 
environment. It is postulated, therefore, that the rulings of Islamic law need to be examined in 
the light of the Qur'an, the correct Sunnah and the Islamic core values promoted in them. 
These include several internationally protected human rights, such as the right to life, 
equality, and freedom of religion.  
The thesis points out that the main purpose of Shariah is to serve the benefit of the people 
and to protect them from harm. To this end, Shariah has provided the Islamic principles of 
reality and necessity. These require that the reality of life and the needs of the people be 
considered at all times. If necessary for the sake of the people, the principles allow for 
exceptions to be made to even definite provisions. It, further, demonstrates how these 
principles can be applied to reform the hudud ordinances to reconcile them with international 
human rights law. 
Mark A. Gabriel, 18 August 2016 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
I Background of the research 
This research deals with Islamic criminal law, particularly the set of crimes and punishments 
known as hudud ordinances,1 and investigates the complex relationship between them and 
international human rights laws. Human rights can be considered as one of the most valuable, 
and yet vulnerable, gifts to humankind. That human rights have been protected by 
international law and acknowledged by the majority of the world population as a legal basis 
for their domestic laws, is one of the most remarkable achievements of our time. This research 
demonstrates that Shariah’s core values have in fact much common ground with 
internationally protected human rights. Unfortunately, though, Islamic criminal law, 
particularly the set of hudud ordinances with its extremely harsh and cruel punishments, 
clashes with both Shariah’s purposes (maqased al-Shariah) and with international human 
rights in a fundamental and severe way. The punishments foreseen by the hudud ordinances 
include beheading by the sword for leaving Islam, stoning to death for adultery, public 
flogging for fornication and defamation, amputation of limbs for thievery, and crucifixion, 
beheading, amputation of limbs, or exile for the crime of haraba (fighting against Allah and 
His Messenger). International human rights laws ban such punishments. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),2 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)3 and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)4 unanimously declare that ‘no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.5 Hudud 
punishments, further, violate the principle of equality, which is one of the most fundamental 
human rights. The UDHR stresses that ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ and that these 
                                                 
1 The Arabic term ‚hudud‘ (sing. hadd) can be translated as boundary or limit and refers to the boundary that 
identifies what is prohibited and what is permissible. Hudud ordinances are known as a set of crimes that 
concern the right of Allah and that have specific punishments. 
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
271 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entry into force 23 March 1976. 
4 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984; entry into force 26 June 1987. 
5 UDHR art 5; ICCPR art 7; CAT, arts 1 (1) and 16(1). 
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rights ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.6 Further, hudud ordinances 
violate the religious freedom, protected in art 18 of the UDHR. 
Several publicly professed Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan 
and Brunei Darussalam are members of the United Nations and are among the signatories of 
the main international human rights treaties or conventions, yet they officially practice hudud 
ordinances as part of their criminal justice system. They compromise their legal responsibility 
of protecting human rights within their territory by failing to bring their domestic criminal law 
into line with international human rights laws. Muslim countries that practice Islamic law 
usually defend the practice of hudud ordinances, arguing that they are divinely assigned, and 
therefore perfect, infallible, mandatory and immutable.7 Consequently, amending hudud 
ordinances to ensure consistency with international conventions is not an option to them. This 
claim is based on a widespread failure to distinguish between Shariah and Islamic law. 
Orthodox Muslims view Islamic law as a God-given system that is superior to any human-
made law, including the international laws of human rights.8 Human rights organisations and 
activists who call upon Muslim countries to adjust their national laws and make them 
compatible with international human rights laws are, therefore, usually viewed by orthodox 
Muslims as infidels who call on Muslims to court heresy.9 
Due to the worldwide rise of radical Islamic groups, who strive to implement Islamic law, 
the threat to human rights through the application of the hudud ordinances is steadily 
increasing. The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ contributed significantly to an increase in the power 
of radical Islamic groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia10 and the 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), all of which practice hudud ordinances. The methods 
used by these radical Muslims groups are extremely inhumane and excessive. The practice of 
the cruel hudud punishments harms the reputation of Islam and Muslims worldwide and 
causes them to be criticised as barbaric and antiquated. This contributes to the worldwide rise 
                                                 
6 UDHR op cit note 2 ‘Preamble’. 
7 ‘Al-Sudiya tudafe an al-Shariah wa Uqubat al Eadam bemagles huquq al inssan’ CNN Arabic News 6 March 
2014, available at http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/03/06/saudi-execution-un, accessed on11 April 2016; 
'Saudi Arabia: Spike in executions’ Human Rights Watch 1 June 2015, available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/01/saudi-arabia-spike-executions, accessed on 11 April 2016. 
8 Muhammad al-Ghazali Huquq al-Insan beina Taalim al-Islam wa ‘Elan al-Umam al-Mutahida (2003) 7;  
Yusuf al-Qaradawi Shariat al-Islam Salehah lel Tatbiq fi Kul Zaman wa Makan 5 ed (1997) 11&17; 
Abdul Aziz Bin Fawzan al-Fawzan ‘Human rights in Islam’ Ahl al-Hadith 19 December 2010, available at 
http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=232211, accessed on 3 January 2014. 
9 Wahba al-Zoheily in an exclusive interview on Islamweb, interviewed by Mohammed Nafisa, 4 August 2002, 
available at http://articles.islamweb.net/media/index.php?page=article&lang=A&id=20484, accessed on 
10 January 2014; Shahrul Mizan Ismail The Dilemma of Hudud and International Human Rights: Proposing a 
Benevolent Mechanism (2006) 7.  
10 Al-Jazeera ‘Shabab-Mojahed[in]-Somal’, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8lm2LNJ8uk, 
accessed on 1 April 2014.  
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of what is known as Islamophobia. This can be seen, for example, in the statement of Donald 
Trump, who suggested during his United States presidential election campaign that Muslims 
should be banned from entering the United States. Since Muslims represent over 20 per cent 
of the world’s population, this is an issue of great importance and worldwide relevance.11 This 
shows how urgent it is to reform the hudud punishments to counter the damage done to the 
reputation of Muslims and to respond to the practice of hudud punishments by radical Islamic 
groups and by several Muslim countries. 
Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the public debates as to whether or not 
violence is justified by Islam have never ceased or been responded to effectively. Some view 
Islam as a peaceful religion and claim that ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’, yet others see radical 
Islamic groups such as ISIS as representatives of the true Islam. Whilst the non-Muslim world 
strives to understand which of the two opposing views is the correct one, even within the 
Muslim world similar debates take place. The set of hudud ordinances, with its harsh and 
cruel punishments, is often at the heart of such discussions.12 
In contrast to orthodox Muslims, who defend hudud ordinances as being divine and 
immutable, secular Muslims promote the separation of religion and state and call for Islamic 
law to be disregarded and for hudud ordinances to be abolished.13 The view of many moderate 
Muslims who recognises Shariah as divine, but strive for more freedom, is becoming more 
prevalent in the Muslim world. Many of these moderate Muslims are fully loyal to Shariah, 
but at the same time admit that the hudud ordinances are in conflict with human rights and 
that this conflict needs to be dealt with. Among the moderate voices are those of Majid 
al-Gharbawi,14 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd,15 Gamal al-Banna,16 Taha Jabir al-Alwani17, Abdullahi 
                                                 
11 According to the December 2012 Global Religious Landscape report from the Pew Research Center’s Forum 
on Religion & Public Life ‘[t]here are about 1.6 billion Muslims, or 23% of the world’s population, making 
Islam the second-largest religion.’ Pew Research Center – Fact Tank – June 7, 2013, available at 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-
think/, accessed on 14 March 2014. 
12 Mohammad Hashim Kamali ‘Punishment in Islamic law: A critique of the hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia’ 
Arab Law Quarterly (1998) 13 (3) 203–234. 
13 Some of the most famous advocates of secularism in the Muslim world are (or have been) Ahmad Lutfi al-
Sayyid, Ismail Mazhar, Qasim Amin, Taha Hussein, Abdel-Aziz Fahmi, Michel Aflaq, Suharto, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Fouad Zakaria, Faraj Foda, Shaker al-Nabulsi and Sayed Mahmoud Qimni 
(Egypt), Michel Aflaq (Iraq), Suharto (Indonesia), Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Turkey), Shaker al-Nabulsi (Jordan).  
Faraj Foda Qable al-Suqut (1992) 153–4. 
Anwar Sadat was known for his slogan: ‘No religion in politics and no politics in religion.’ See documentary 
about Anwar Sadat Al-Jazeerah Arabic TV, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWKkWDRnwW4, 
accessed on 4 May 2014. 
14 Majid al-Gharbawi Ishkaliyat al-Tajdid (2000). 
15 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd Al-Tafkir fi Zaman al-Takfir: Didda al-Jahl wa-al-Zayf wa-al- Khurafah 2 ed (1994). 
16 Gamal al-Banna Al-Fiqh al-Jadid (1999). 
17 Taha Jaber al-Alwani Nahw al-Tajdid wal Ijtihad (2006). 
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An-Na’Im and Tariq Ramadan.18 They suggest that the way to solve the conflict between 
hudud ordinances and human rights is that the hudud ordinances should be reformed or not be 
practiced at all.19 
In the eyes of orthodox Muslims, however, a call to ignore hudud ordinances is 
unacceptable. Moderate and secular Muslims, who promote the protection of human rights, 
are often accused by orthodox Muslims of taking part in a large-scale western conspiracy 
against Muslims and Islam.20 This is because the western world continues to be perceived by 
many orthodox Muslims as an adversary and a colonial power. It is partly for this reason that 
many orthodox Muslims do not acknowledge the universality of human rights, for they 
consider them to be an invention of the colonial powers and a weapon in their hands that is 
used in the struggle against Islam and Muslims.21 Human rights activists are often perceived 
in Muslim countries as opponents of the ruling system. Since human rights activists defend 
the rights of all people — regardless of their religion or political opinion — they are often 
believed to seek to change the system and faith. 
Orthodox Muslims often defend their position, claiming that Islam has been protecting 
human rights long before the establishment of the international human rights bodies.22  
Any approach to ignore or freeze hudud ordinances is thus not very promising, for in 
those countries where they are practiced currently, it is very unlikely that such an appeal 
would ever be considered. Further, it is important to note that, if hudud ordinances were 
simply set aside, committed or radical Muslims can have them re-enforced at any time, as 
happened, for example, in Egypt. When the Egyptian regime under Jamal Abdul Nasser put 
an end to the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood that had been fighting for the implementation 
of Islamic law during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the matter seemed to have been settled, 
                                                 
18 Tariq Ramadan Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2009). 
19 Tariq Ramadan ‘An international call for moratorium on corporal punishment, stoning and the death penalty in 
the Islamic World‘ (2012), available at http://tariqramadan.com/an-international-call-for-moratorium-on-
corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/=, accessed on 1 November 2015. 
20 Muhammad al-Ghazali ‘Al-shari’a wal qaanun al-wad’ay: Al-estamar al-tashariay fi biladina’, available at 
https://www.nfaes.com/Articliesfiles/cb66049e.doc, accessed on 20 January 2014. 
21 When interviewed by Hajar Diab, Mohammad Mujahid, deputy head of the National Center for Middle East 
Studies, said: ‘The West uses human rights as a pretext to implement the scheme of ‘Greater Middle East.’ 
The interview was published by Al-Ahram al-Massai in Cairo on 20 January 2011, available at 
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=416340&eid=1226, accessed on 2 April 2014. 
Abdul Hussein Shaaban, the well-known human rights advocate in Iraq said: ‘Human Rights are American 
weapons’ viz Abdul Hussein Shaaban ‘Huquq al-Insan Silah Amriki’ Libya-al-Mostakba 14 April 2013, 
available at http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/33165, accessed on 2 April 2014. 
Abdul Hafiz Abdul Rahim Mahbub Huquq al-Insan fi Zel al-Nizam al-Alami al-Jadid (2004) available at 
http://uqu.edu.sa/page/ar/85694, accessed on 2 April 2014. 
22 Abdulaziz Bin Abdullah al-Khudairi ‘Human rights between Shari'a and the international human rights 
conventions’ 7308 (2013) Al-Eqtesadia, available at http://www.aleqt.com/, accessed on 5 February 2014. 
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and the enforcement of Islamic law was no longer an issue – at least for a long time. About 
half a century later, however, after the Arab Spring, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to 
power with Muhammed Mursi as the new Egyptian president, Islamic law was about to be re-
implemented. Even though the new government under Mursi did not last for long, since it was 
overthrown in a military coup, the rise of committed and radical Muslims in Egypt and the 
neighbouring countries continued. It was only shortly after the defeat of conservative Muslims 
in Egypt that the world witnessed the rise of the radical Sunni group known as ‘Daaesh’ or the 
‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS). ISIS declared the re-establishment of the Islamic 
caliphate and immediately started applying Islamic criminal law and hudud ordinances. 
Within the first 24 hours after the declaration of its establishment, the world news announced 
that two women had been sentenced to the death penalty by stoning.23 After having occupied 
Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, ISIS called upon the Iraqi Christian community in that city 
to convert to Islam, pay jizya or face ‘death by the sword’.24 Remarkably, ISIS, which claims 
to practise Islam at its best, caused hudud ordinances to appear as the centrepiece of Islamic 
law. This can explain why many moderate and secular Muslims hesitate to apply Islamic 
criminal law.  
The situation in the Middle East as described shows that the approach of putting hudud 
punishments under a moratorium does not necessarily solve the problem in the long term. In 
this thesis it is argued, therefore, that in order to end the violation of human rights by hudud 
ordinances, it is necessary to bring a real reconciliation of Islamic criminal law with 
international human rights standards through a reformation of the hudud punishments. Since 
Shariah itself can be seen as promoting human rights, a focus on Islamic core values can help 
to reconcile the conflict of hudud ordinances with international human rights law. 
                                                 
23 Johnlee Varghese ‘Two women stoned to death for adultery by ISIS in Syria’ International Business Times, 
India Edition 20 July 2014, available at http://ibtimes.co.in/two-women-stoned-death-adultery-syria-by-isis-
604894, accessed on 20 July 2014. 
‘ISIS stoned second woman in 24 hours’ Al-Madina 20 July 2014, available at http://www.al-
madina.com/node/546089/“ د ددد”-دددد- ددد دد- ددددد- دد ددد دد- ددد د-24-دد دد .html, 
accessed on 20 July 2014. 
24 Hamdi Alkhshali and Joshua Berlinger ‘Facing fines, conversion or death: Christian families flee Mosul’ CNN 
20 July 2014, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/19/world/meast/christians-flee-mosul-
iraq/index.html?hpt=imi_c2, accessed on 20 July 2014. 
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II Research question and description of the problem 
The crucial question of this research is whether it is possible and legitimate to reform hudud 
punishments so that Islamic criminal law can be reconciled with internationally recognised 
human rights, and if so, how this can be achieved. 
Hudud ordinances violate the internationally protected human rights in several ways and 
their enforcement harms the image and reputation of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of the 
world. Orthodox Muslims, however, firmly reject any attempt to reform them, since they 
believe that hudud ordinances are divinely assigned and thus divine, infallible, mandatory and 
immutable and that they concern the right of Allah. Consequently it is believed that they 
cannot be questioned, amended, or forgiven. Efforts to reform them are, therefore viewed as 
an act of heresy and an assault on Allah’s rights and Islamic identity.25 Further, orthodox 
Muslims defend the harsh hudud punishments by declaring that their main purpose is 
deterrence.26 
The main challenge to a possible reformation of hudud punishments is constituted by 
those punishments that have indeed been assigned in the Qur'an. These include the 
punishment for theft (to ‘cut the hand’),27 and the punishment for the crime of haraba that is 
‘execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile 
from the land’.28 Since these punishments are mentioned explicitly in the Qur'an, they form 
part of what is known as definite provisions. They are, consequently, considered to be 
immutable.  
The other hudud prescriptions that have no legal basis in the Qur'an or correct29 Sunnah, 
but have been developed by Islamic jurists, such as the stoning for adultery, or execution for 
apostasy, are, nevertheless, considered to be part of the set of hudud ordinances, and are 
consequently claimed to be divine and immutable, even though they are based in the main on 
weak ahadith and on the jurists’ human interpretations and opinions. 
                                                 
25 Al-Zoheily op cit note 9. 
26 Jamal Bader al-Dawlah ‘Mafhum al-uqubah fi al-fikr al-qanuni al-Islami al-Muqaran’19 November 2011, 
available at https://drsabrikhalil.wordpress.com/2011/11/19/دددد د- دد ددددد-دد -ددد دد-
دددددد دد- دد دد د/, accessed on 1 February 2016. 
27 Surah 5:38. 
28 Surah 5:33. 
29 ‘Correct’ Sunnah refers to the Arabic term sahih. Correct Sunnah or correct ahadith refers to the collection of 
ahadith that have been widely accepted to be ‘correct’ in contrast to those that are considered to be weak or 
false. Such acceptance depends mainly on the reliability of narrators, respectively the chain of (oral) 
transmission (isnad) from its source until it was written down, and whether or not the text (matn) is compatible 
with the teaching of the Qur'an. 
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It is shown that one of the reasons behind several of the hudud prescriptions that conflict 
with human rights and with the core values of Shariah is a reading of the famous concept of 
the five indispensables (religion, life, intellect, offspring and property) that wrongly elevates 
the protection of religion above the protection of individuals’ rights. 
III Limitation of the research 
The suggestions for reforming the hudud ordinances developed in this thesis focus mainly on 
the punishments – rather than on the crimes – since the bulk of human rights violations result 
from the nature of the punishments meted out, and the methods used to execute them. Since 
the crimes of hudud ordinances are mentioned in the Qur'an as violations of Allah’s orders, 
calling for their legalisation will be a great challenge. As for the punishments, by contrast, 
there are many reasons why they need to be reformed and justifications to do so. 
The thesis, further, focuses on the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence and is thus limited 
to the Islamic internal dimension. The study does not include the question of the practical 
implementation of the presented suggestions for reform. It is very likely that the presented 
suggestions will be challenged by both the Muslim community as well as by the governments 
of Muslim countries. One of the major challenges for the promotion of human rights in 
Muslim countries is presented by the lack of integrity of some of the main promoters of 
international human rights,30 including the United States of America31 and some European 
countries, who seem to apply a double standard when it comes to defending international 
human rights.32 More sincerity in the international discourse would, therefore, be desirable. 
Approaches to promote the implementation of the suggested reformation need to be 
discussed separately in a further research project. An open dialogue among the Muslim 
communities is one of the key factors required to reach acceptance for the suggestions 
                                                 
30 A case of hypocrisy and corruption can be seen even with the United Nations as the main key player of human 
rights protection. For the sake of not losing the financial support of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, Saudi 
Arabia was deleted from the United Nations’ blacklist of countries that are violating human rights.  
Tyler Durden‘UN admits extortion behind removal of Saudi Arabia from child-killer blacklist’ Zero Hedge 10 
June 2016. 
31 The United States of America, for example, still practices the death penalty in several of its states even though 
International human rights laws promote the complete abolition of the death penalty, and they have tortured war 
prisoners in the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, thus violating 
the ban on tortue enshrined in international human rights laws.  
32 Western countries seem to compromise the protection of human rights if this benefits their national interest. 
Their foreign policy shows that they have the tendency to turn a blind eye to the human rights violations of 
countries with which they have friendly diplomatic relations that they do not want to put at risk. Rudolph Peters 
Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century 
(2006) 182.  
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developed in this thesis, as is the creation of a public opinion that is in favour of a reform of 
hudud punishments. The purpose of this thesis is to open such a dialogue among the Muslim 
population by breaking the taboo that bans any discussion of hudud ordinances. This thesis 
provides the necessary information and arguments to stimulate the internal discourse on the 
topic.  
IV Main argument 
It is argued in this thesis that it is legitimate, necessary and possible to reform hudud 
punishments and to bring them in line with international human rights laws.  
The claim that hudud punishments cannot be negotiated since they are divinely assigned 
and thus perfect and infallible is refuted in this thesis on several grounds. One of them is that 
several of the hudud prescriptions have no legal basis in the Qur'an. They have been 
developed by Islamic jurists — either without a legal basis in the Sunnah or with a weak one. 
Some of them even contradict the Qur'an.  
It is argued that it is the failure to distinguish between Shariah and Islamic law that is 
mainly responsible for the claim that the hudud punishments are immutable. The thesis 
clarifies the difference between Shariah as referring to the divinely assigned rules and 
prescriptions recorded in the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah and Islamic law as including 
additionally the rulings developed by the Islamic jurists. Since these are based on human 
interpretations and opinions, they are not divine or infallible. It is argued that they can 
therefore be questioned and can require re-interpretation. 
The notion that hudud ordinances refer to a fixed set of a specific number of crimes and 
their punishments is refuted on two grounds. It is stressed that the notion of this set cannot be 
found in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. Besides, it does not match the list of crimes 
mentioned in the Sunnah as ‘the seven most destructive sins’.33 Further, there is not even full 
agreement among the different schools of jurisprudence as to the exact number of crimes to be 
listed as hudud crimes. 
Another argument refuted in this thesis is the claim that hudud punishments concern the 
right of Allah and can therefore not be questioned, amended or forgiven by anyone other than 
Allah himself. It is argued that this claim is based on the false presumption that the term 
                                                 
33 The seven ‘worst sins’ listed in the hadith are: ‘Associating others with Allah (Shirk); witchcraft; killing a soul 
whom Allah has forbidden us to kill, except for a right that is due; consuming orphans' wealth; consuming Ribâ; 
fleeing from the battlefield; and slandering chaste, innocent women.’ Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 1 at 177 hadith 
262. 
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hudud refers to punishment. It is demonstrated that the term hudud refers to the crime, or the 
boundary identifying what is prohibited and what is permissible. The notion of the right of 
Allah does therefore not hinder the amendment of hudud punishments. 
The thesis, further, demonstrates that reformation is not an assault on Allah or Islamic 
identity, for it is, in fact, an Islamic concept deeply rooted in the Qur'an and the correct 
Sunnah. One of the key texts concerning reformation is the famous Farewell Sermon of the 
Prophet Muhammad.34 In it the Prophet urges Muslims to abide by the teachings of the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah, and by the core values promoted in them. It is argued that the Sermon can be 
understood as a call on Muslims of all generations to apply and adjust the teachings of the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah in a way to fit with their own time and environment, thus to do ijtihad.  
The study points out that the Islamic core values that are stressed in the Farewell Sermon 
and protected in the Qur'an and the Sunnah have much in common with internationally 
protected human rights. They include the protection of life and property, justice, equality, and 
freedom of religion. The thesis, therefore, advocates a re-reading of the concept of the five 
indispensables in a way that reflects the qur'anic promotion of freedom of religion and 
Shariah’s purpose to serve the benefit of the people.  
The thesis demonstrates that Shariah — known to be flexible enough to suit all times and 
environments — is flexible enough to reform hudud punishments. This is thanks to the 
Islamic principles of reality and necessity (fiqh al-waqa and fiqh al-darurah), the principle of 
doubt and the method of ijtihad. It is argued that those prescriptions that have been assigned 
explicitly in the Qur'an, such as the public flogging for adultery or ‘cutting the hand(s)’ for 
theft, can be reformed by applying the Islamic principles of reality and necessity. These 
principles make it possible to consider the realities of life and the needs of the people. They 
allow for exceptions to be made, even in respect of definite provisions, if these are necessary 
to secure the benefit of the people or to protect them from harm. 
Those prescriptions that have been developed by Islamic jurists in the application of the 
method of ijtihad can be reformed by re-interpreting the primary sources of Islam by applying 
the same method, ie ijtihad. It is argued, further, that those prescriptions that have no legal 
basis in the Qur'an or correct Sunnah and that contradict Shariah, such as the punishment of 
                                                 
34 ‘The Last Sermon (Khutbah) of Prophet Muhammad (Farewell Sermon)’ (English translation of the sermon) 
available at http://www.iqrasense.com/about-islam/the-last-sermon-khutbah-of-prophet-muhammad-farewell-
sermon.html, accessed on 11 August 2016. 
The longest and perhaps most complete version of this sermon is given by Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal in his 
Musnad, hadith 19774; other parts and versions can be found in Sahih al-Bukhari, hadith 1623, 1626 & 6361; 
Sahih Muslim, hadith 98; Sunan at-Tirmidh, hadith 1628, 2046 & 2085; See also Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 
at 450 no 1739. Another English translation is available at http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/sermon.html, 
accessed on 12 September 2014. 
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execution for apostasy and the stoning for adultery, should be eliminated completely, for the 
Islamic principle of doubt calls for the suspension of hadd punishments if there is any doubt 
that justifies its suspension. 
It is demonstrated, thus, that it is possible to develop — in a religiously and culturally 
sensitive manner — suggestions for a reform of hudud punishments that are compatible with 
international human rights laws and that are in full compliance with Shariah and serve the 
fulfilment of its purpose by securing the benefit of the Muslim community. It is argued that a 
reformation according to the suggestions proposed in this thesis can do much to protect the 
human rights of the people in those Muslim countries, where hudud ordinances are currently 
practiced and it can help repair the damage done to the reputation of Muslims worldwide. 
V Significance and contribution of the study 
The unique contribution of this research is that it reconciles hudud punishments with 
international human rights laws in a religiously and culturally sensitive manner. It offers 
suggestions for a reformation of hudud ordinances that are in full compliance with Shariah. 
The suggestions for reformation developed in this thesis consider the realities of life of the 
Muslim society in the twenty-first century, including the internationally recognised human 
rights standards, and at the same time preserve the Islamic scholarly rules and standards. 
In so doing, a bridge is built between the two extreme positions, namely that of secular 
Muslims, who call for the hudud ordinances to be ignored or for a moratorium to be placed on 
them, and that of orthodox Muslims, who put hudud ordinances above international human 
rights. The aim of this thesis is to bridge the gap between Muslim countries that still apply 
hudud ordinances and, in doing so, violate international human rights laws, and those that care 
about the protection of human rights and, consequently, reject hudud punishments.  
The suggested reform of the hudud punishments will be of assistance to the Muslim 
countries where they are currently applied, and also to those where they are currently not 
practised, but where radical Muslims might gain more influence in the future. In contrast to 
the appeal to freeze or abolish hudud ordinances pronounced by several secular and moderate 
Muslim scholars, the suggestions for reformation proposed in this thesis provide a long-term 
solution for the conflict between hudud ordinances and international human rights laws. 
Another major contribution of the thesis to the topic under discussion is that it clarifies 
the distinction between Shariah and Islamic law and lays out that it is mostly Islamic law, its 
rules and regulations — especially the hudud prescriptions developed by Islamic 
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jurisprudence — that are responsible for the conflict with human rights and that result in 
Islam and Muslims being rejected as being a major threat to world peace, justice and security. 
The Qur'an and the correct Sunnah, conversely, actually promote values that are comparable 
with human rights. Consequently, it is not necessary for a good and committed Muslim to 
follow blindly all the antiquated and inhumane rules and prescriptions that have been 
developed by Islamic jurists over the centuries and that have become part of Islamic law. The 
thesis demonstrates that Shariah itself encourages Muslims of all generations to apply the 
teachings of the Quran and Sunnah in a way to fit with their own time and environment. This 
includes that they might have to re-interpret the primary sources or to clear the Islamic law 
from the humanly developed rulings that no longer fit with the reality of contemporary life, or 
that contradict the primary sources of Shariah, its core values or main purpose. Shariah 
explicitly declares that its main purpose is to be of benefit to the people and to protect them 
from harm. Shariah allows and requires that the reality of life and the needs of the people be 
considered, and it provides the necessary tools that allow for this. These allow for exceptions 
even from divinely assigned prescriptions, and from what is generally prohibited, if this is 
necessary for the benefit of the people and to prevent them from harm. The clarification of 
these difference, thus, can help to restore the image and reputation of Muslims in the world 
and it can help and encourage contemporary Muslims to search for ways to reconcile also 
other areas of Islamic law with international human rights standards, while remaining faithful 
to Shariah. 
VI Methodology 
This research follows a comparative approach, comparing the hudud ordinances with 
international human rights laws in order to identify areas of conflict between them. From the 
perspective of international human rights laws, the main international human rights 
conventions and treaties (as listed under Sources) are considered, giving special attention to 
the articles promoting dignity, equality, physical integrity, freedom of opinion and expression 
and freedom of religion, and banning all forms of cruel and inhuman punishments. From the 
perspective of Islamic criminal law, the primary sources of Shariah, namely, the Qur'an and 
Sunnah, are considered, as are the writings of the different Islamic schools of jurisprudence.  
A hermeneutical and analytical approach is used to examine the meaning of the term 
‘hudud’ (sing. hadd), as presented by the Qur’an and Sunnah, and a comparative approach is 
used to contrast it with the use of the term employed by Islamic jurisprudence and 
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contemporary scholars. An analytical and comparative approach is also used to compare the 
traditional definitions of the individual hadd crimes and punishments with the ones found in 
the Qur’an and Sunnah for the purpose of analysing their legal justification and evaluating 
whether they can be considered divinely assigned or rather developed by human effort. In 
addition, the definitions and interpretations pertinent to hudud ordinances according to the 
four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali schools, are 
compared.35  
The thesis, further, contains an analysis of the practical application of hudud ordinances 
in Muslim countries, giving special attention to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan and Brunei 
Darussalam as representative countries of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. 
An analytical approach is applied to investigate the concept of reformation in Islam. This 
analysis is used to demonstrate that Islam promotes reformation by applying the concept of 
ijtihad (independent reasoning).36 Special emphasis is placed on the Islamic legislation of 
necessity (fiqh al-darurah) and the legislation of reality (fiqh al-waqa).37 
Further, the wide-ranging views relating to hudud ordinances and human rights are 
analysed by considering the different views and positions across the Islamic world — from 
orthodox to moderate and secular Muslims. Special attention is given to already established 
approaches aiming to solve the conflict between Islamic criminal law and human rights.  
Finally, it is proposed that the hudud punishments can be reformed in a way that the 
conflict between Islamic criminal law and international human rights law can be reconciled. 
Suggestions for such a reform of hudud punishments are developed in application of the 
Islamic legislation of necessity and of reality are applied. 
VII Sources 
The study is based on primary and secondary sources of Islamic criminal law and 
international human rights law. The Qur’an and Sunnah — as the primary sources of Islamic 
                                                 
35 The study focusses on the four main schools of Sunni schools of thought since it is the Sunni tradition that 
represents the very majority of Muslims worldwide. Further, it is the Sunni Muslims who play a key role in the 
contemporary world, since they have a major influence on world politics, on international relations, on war and 
peace and on the violation of human rights. 
36 Yusuf al-Qaradawi Al-Ijtihad fi al-Shariah al-Islamiyah (1996) 84. 
In the hadith the principle of ijtihad was presented by the Prophet’s companion Mu’az, who was sent to Yemen. 
Answering the Prophet’s question as to what he would do if he were to rule in a legal dispute, Mu’az explained 
that his rule would depend upon what is written in the word of Allah, and if he would not find the answer in the 
book of Allah or the Sunnah he would use ijtihad.  Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah I'lam al-Muwaqqain an Rabb al-
Aalamin (1991) vol 1 at 155. 
37 Al-Alwani op cit note 17 at 52. 
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law — are examined with a special focus on the provisions that are relevant to the hudud 
ordinances. If not otherwise noted, quotations from the Qur'an are taken from the translation 
of Yusuf Ali, since it is one of the most popular ones. Further, the thesis draws from qur’anic 
commentaries, including Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Sufiyan al-Thawir38 and Tafsir al-Tabari39 
Concerning the Sunnah, particular focus is placed on the set of the six correct books of 
ahadith, ie Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Abu Dawud, Sunan Ibn 
Majah, and Sunan al-Nasa’i. 
When discussing hudud ordinances according to the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, 
the thesis considers the writings of well recognised early scholars. The Hanafi scholars 
include Muhammad bin Framuz al-Hanafi (Al-Durar al-Hikam fi Gurar al-Ahkam), Mahmud 
Bin Ahmad al-Aini (Al-Binayah fi Sharh al-Hidayah), Umar Bin Ibrahim Ibn Najm (Al-Naher 
al-Faeq fi Sharh Kenz al-Daqaeq) and Ibn Mazah al-Bukhari (Al-Muheat al-Burhani le-
Masael al-Mabsut). The Hanbali scholars include Ahmed Bin Abdul-Halim Ibn Taymiyyah 
(Al-Saarim al-Maslul ala Shatim al-Rasul), Abdul Ghani al-Nabulsi (Hashiat al-Libdi ala 
na’il al-Maareb fi al-Fiqh al-Hanbali), Majd al-Din Abi al-Barakat (Al-Muharar fi al-Fiqh 
al-Hanbali), Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi (Umdat al-Fiqh fi al-Mazhab al-Hanbali), Ali Bin 
Suleman al-Merdawi (Al-Ensaf fi Marefat al-Rajah min al-Kilaf) and Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah (I’lam al-Muwaqqi’in). The Maliki scholars include Kalil Ibn Ishaq al-Mi 
(Muktassar Kalil fi Fiqh al-Imam), Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Qarafi (Al-Zakerah), Abdulalah Bin 
al-Jalab al-Basri (Al-Tafriyah), Bahram al-Dumeri (Al-Shamel fi Fiqh al-Imam Malik), and al-
Qadi Abdulwahab al-Bagdadi (Al-Maaunah ala Mazhab al-Imam). The Shafei scholars 
include Muhammad Bin Idris al-Shafei (Al-Um), Ismael al-Masri al-Mazni (Muktasar al-
Mazni fi Ferua al-Shafeiyah), and Yahya Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (Minhaj al-Talibin).  
Also referred to are the writings of contemporary scholars, such as, Sayed Sabeq (Fiqh 
al-Sunnah), Abdul Rahman al-Jaziri (Al-Fiqh ala al-Mazaheb al-Arbaa), Abdul Qadir Audah 
(Al-Tasheriat al-Jinai al-Islami Muqaranan bil Qanun al-Wadai), Salih Bin al-Fawzan 
(Mulachas al-Fiqh al-Islami), and Mohammed al-Zoheily (Al-Muatamad fi al-Fiqh al-
Shafi'i). 
The research does not rely on the writings of Orientalist scholars, such as Joseph Schacht 
or Noel J. Coulson, because these writers are considered by orthodox Muslims as the 
intellectual wing of the Western crusaders‘ who aim to discredit Islam.  
                                                 
38 Al-Thawri, Sufyan Tafsir Sufyan al-Thawri (1983). 
39 Muhammed Ibn Jarir Jami al-Bayan Al-Tabari fi Ta’wil ay al-Qur'an (Tafsir al-Tabari) (1997). 
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In the discussion of the definitions of Shariah, fiqh and hudud, the writings of different 
orthodox and moderate authors are referred to, including those of Abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri,40 
Shukri al-Daqaq and Abdul Fattah,41 Masfar bin Ali al-Kahtani,42 Raghib al-Sirjany,43 Gamal 
al-Banna,44 Tariq Ramadan45 and Taha Jabir al-Alwani.46 
When looking at the different Muslim positions toward hudud ordinances the writings of 
orthodox, moderate and secular scholars are considered in this study. The orthodox position is 
represented by scholars, including Saleh al-Otaibi,47 Imad Ali Gomaa,48 Ibn Othaimeen49 and 
Abdul Wahab.50 The moderate scholars include Majid al-Gharbawi,51 Gamal al-Banna,52 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,53 Tariq Ramadan54 and Marwan Ibrahim Qaisi.55 The arguments 
of secular Muslims include those of al-Sadiq al-Nayhum,56 Khalil Abdul Karim57 and Fouad 
Zakaria.58 The study considers authors, such as Mahmoud al-Zeyni59 and Muhammad Nasr al-
Din al-Albani, when discussing the Islamic legislation of reality (fiqh al-waqa) and the 
legislation of necessity (fiqh al-darurah).60 When examining the primary and secondary 
sources of Islamic law, books, articles and research papers relating to Shariah in general and 
                                                 
40 Abdul Rahman al-Jaziri Al-Fiqh ala al-Mazaheb al-Arbaa 2 ed (2003). 
41 Shukri al-Daqaq and Mahmoud Samir Abdul Fattah Al-Ahkam al-Asasiyah li-al-Shari’a al-Islamiyah (2002). 
42 Masfar Bin Ali al-Kahtani‘Al-istid’lal be maqased al-Shari’a fi al-nawazel al-mustajadda’ (research paper 
presented to the International Scientific Conference at Yarmouk University and the International Islamic 
University of Science Amman, Jordan, 22-23 December 2013). 
43 Raghib al-Sirjany ‘Al-hudud fi al-Islam’ 14 December 2011, available at http://islamstory.com, accessed on 
20 January 2014. 
44 Al-Banna op cit note 17. 
45 Ramadan op cit note 18. 
46 Al-Alwani op cit note 17. 
47 Saleh Bin Ali al-Otaibi Al-Elan an al-Hudud al-Sharaiyah wa Atharoho fi al-Radeh al-Aam (2000). 
48 Imad Ali Jumah Al-Mulakhasat al-Fiqhiyyah al-Mujazara 2 ed (2003). 
49 Ibn Othaimeen Fatawa Ibn Othaimeen, available at https://www.ibnothaimeen.com/noor.shtml, accessed on 
19 January 2014. 
50 Muhammad Abdul Wahab Al-Durar al-Sunniyah (1991) 10. 
51 Al-Gharbawi op cit note 14. 
52 Al-Banna op cit note 16; Gamal al-Banna Tajrid al-Bukhari wa Muslim min al-Ahadith al-Latti le-Tulzim 
(1997); Gamal al-Banna Jenayat Qabilat Hadathana (2008). 
53 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law (1990).  
54 Tariq Ramadan ‘Stop in the name of humanity’ (2005) Globe and Mail, London, available at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/stop-in-the-name-of-humanity/article735465/, accessed on 
10 August 2015. 
55 Marwan Ibrahim al-Qaisi Human Rights in Islam (2005), available at 
http://arablib.com/harf?view=book&lid=3&rand1=WU1rOVA1JnJmajNz&rand2=aEk5YTA3UihQJTg0, 
accessed on 1 June 2016. 
56 Al-Sadiq al-Nayhum Islam didd-Islam (2000). 
57 Abdulkarim Khalil Al-Gesur al-Tarikia lel Shari’a al-Islamiya – Nahw Fiqhr Islamiy Jadid (2004). 
58 Fouad Zakaria Al-Haqiqah wal Wahm fi al-Harakah al-Islamiyah al-Muaserah (1986). 
59 Mahmoud al-Zeyni Al-Darura fi al-Shari’a al-Islamiyah wa Tatbiqaa’tiha: Dirasa Murqarana (1993). 
60 Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani So’al wa Jawab hawl Fiqh al-Waka 2 ed (2001). 
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the hudud ordinances in particular are relied on to determine the different interpretations 
presented by the Islamic jurists of the Sunni tradition. 
The primary sources of international human rights law considered in this thesis include 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN Convention against Torture 
(CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Reference is also 
made to secondary sources such as books, articles and research papers in both English and 
Arabic that discuss international human rights law in general, and the relationship between 
Islamic law and human rights in particular. 
VIII Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 is introductory in nature. It lays the foundation of the research by a presentation of 
the relevant definitions pertinent to Islamic criminal law and the hudud ordinances. It 
describes the primary and subsidiary sources of Shariah, explains the role of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and describes the difference between Shariah and Islamic law.61 It 
explores the meaning of the term hudud (sing. hadd) and points out the contradictions 
between the prescriptions given by Shariah and those developed by Islamic jurisprudence. In 
doing so, the chapter refutes the claim that hudud ordinances are a fixed set of entirely divine 
— and thus infallible and non-negotiable — prescriptions. The chapter demonstrates that it is 
legitimate and necessary to reconsider and re-interpret the prescriptions regarding hudud 
ordinances, since they do not correctly reflect the prescriptions of the primary sources of 
Shariah, namely the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It is with this in mind that the chapter draws the 
distinction between what can be considered as ‘divine elements’ and those that cannot be 
considered divine, since they are based on human opinion and understanding, and that can 
consequently be questioned. This will be the basis for the main part of the thesis, namely to 
question and re-interpret the elements that are in conflict with principles of human rights. 
In Chapter 3 the twofold nature of the research controversy is identified. This is, in the 
first instance, the human rights violations caused by hudud ordinances, and in the second, 
Islamic reservations that make Muslim countries reluctant to make their national criminal law 
compatible with international human rights laws. One of the main obstacles is a deep distrust 
                                                 
61 Ahmed Berwal ‘Al-farq beina al-Shariah wal fiqh wal qanun’ (2007), available at 
http://www.startimes.com/f.aspx?t=6655790, accessed on 14 April 2014.  
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of Muslims for the west in general. It is for this reason that orthodox Muslims usually reject 
international human rights laws as a western invention and deny their universality. At the 
same time, they claim that human rights were observed by Islam well before the international 
human rights bodies were established.62 In doing so, they point to the Islamic concept of the 
five indispensables that protects religion, life, intellect, offspring and property.63 It is argued 
that there is enough common ground between the Islamic and the international understanding 
of human rights to support the notion of their universality. The chapter also discusses the 
different positions held by orthodox, moderate and secular Muslims in respect of hudud 
ordinances and human rights. 
Chapter 4 discusses the hudud ordinances according to the four main Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence, namely the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali schools.64 The first part of the 
chapter, which is introductory in nature, gives an overview of the development and the 
geographical distribution of the four Sunni schools. It also looks at the practical application of 
hudud ordinances in four representative Muslim countries that apply hudud ordinances fully 
countrywide, namely Saudi Arabia (Hanbali school of jurisprudence), Pakistan (Hanafi 
school), Sudan (Maliki school) and Brunei Darussalam (this has just started implementing 
hudud ordinances according to the Shafei school of jurisprudence). The focus will be on their 
national criminal law and international concerns regarding human rights violations in these 
countries. 
The second, and main, part of the chapter discusses the legal prescriptions of hudud 
ordinances according to the four Sunni schools and investigates the different opinions and 
regulations concerning each crime’s definition — and the punishment and legal requirements 
needed for a suspect to be convicted. It begins by giving an overview of the differing numbers 
of hudud crimes held by the four Sunni schools and explains the main reasons that led to the 
differing views.  
The argument presented in the chapter is that there are great differences and 
contradictions in the views and opinions held by the four schools, and that the notion of a 
divinely assigned and thus perfect and infallible fixed set of hudud ordinances can therefore 
                                                 
62 Mohammed Salam Madkoar ‘Human rights from an Islamic worldview: An outline of Hudud, Ta'zir & Qisas’, 
available at http://www.islamawareness.net/Shariah/sh_article002.html, accessed on 2 February 2014; 
Al-Khudairi op cit note 22. 
63 This very well-known principle was originally developed by Imam Abi Hamid al-Ghazali. Thereafter Imam 
Shatibi, who wrote the most famous book on this topic (Makased al-Shariah), included honour as one of the five 
indispensables, while Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Rida later considered that as many as ten different categories 
were relevant. This concept will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. 
64 Whilst all four schools agree on the basic fundamental teachings, differences concerning secondary issues can 
be found. 
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hardly be maintained. The weaknesses and contradictions of the hudud prescriptions exposed 
in this chapter demonstrate the necessity to amend and reform them. 
Chapter 5 discusses the Islamic concept of reformation and demonstrates that this is 
deeply rooted in both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Quran introduces reformation as a call 
to Muslims to renew their faith and restore the religion to its genuine condition as designed by 
its creator in the first place. This includes a return to the core values of Islam that include 
justice, and equality, peace and harmony, forgiveness and mercy and the protection of life and 
property. 
The chapter introduces religious texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah pertinent to the topic of 
reformation. One of these is Allah’s promise to send reformers on a regular basis to renew the 
religion. A particular focus is on the famous Farewell Sermon of the Prophet that is a key text 
pertinent to reformation. In this sermon the Prophet urges his followers to keep and protect 
the afore-mentioned core values of Islam and he declares the Qur'an and the Sunnah to be the 
ultimate guidelines for Muslims. He points out that Muslims of today might be able to 
understand them even better than the Muslims of his own time. The sermon can be understood 
as a call to Muslims of all times, including those of today, to examine and verify for 
themselves what Shariah really teaches. A Muslim’s ultimate aim should, therefore, be to 
filter Islamic law in the light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and, if necessary, to re-interpret 
them while taking their core values into account. 
The chapter, further, discusses the notion of the purpose of Shariah (maqased al-
Shariah), and introduces the principles of necessity and of reality (fiqh al-darurah and fiqh al-
waqa) that allow for exceptions to what is prohibited, if these are necessary to secure the 
benefit of the people. It is due to these principles that Shariah is known to be flexible enough 
to suit at all times and in all environments. 
The chapter critically discusses two main obstacles preventing Islamic jurists from 
amending hudud ordinances. The first of these derives from an interpretation of the notion of 
the five indispensables that elevates the protection of religion above the protection of the 
individuals’ rights. It is argued that this reading is incorrect, and that human efforts to protect 
the religion, in fact, violate Shariah. The second obstacle, also refuted in the chapter, is the 
claim that hudud ordinances cannot be questioned since they concern the rights of Allah.  
In Chapter 6 suggestions are developed to reform hudud punishments in order to make 
them compatible with international human rights standards. The chapter consists of three 
parts. The first is introductory in nature; in it is explained why hudud punishments need to be 
amended. Further, a widespread contemporary Muslim theory is introduced, according to 
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which hudud ordinances can be applied in a perfect society only.65 Also discussed is the 
purpose of punishment, especially the aspect of deterrence that is considered by orthodox 
Muslims as the main aim of the hudud punishments.66 It is due to this understanding that the 
hudud punishments assigned by Islamic jurisprudence are so cruel and emphasise the use of 
torture.67 
The second part discusses the legal challenge in respect of amending hudud ordinances 
The most important of these challenges derives from the understanding that hudud ordinances 
are part of what is known as ‘definite texts’ (nusus qataiyah) that are immutable and cannot 
be questioned.68 It is also shown that Shariah proves to be flexible enough to overcome this 
seemingly insurmountable obstacle, thanks to the principles of necessity and reality and the 
principle of doubt.69 Several examples are introduced from the Qur'an and the Sunnah that 
demonstrate that the Prophet and his companions and successors applied the aforementioned 
principles and suspended hadd punishments if this were necessary for the benefit of the 
people.  
In the second part a re-reading of the five indispensables is suggested, more specifically 
a re-interpretation of the protection of religion since it is its current interpretation that is 
responsible for some of the hudud punishments developed by Islamic jurists that severely 
violate human rights and contradict some of the core teachings of Shariah.  
In the third and main part of the chapter the hudud ordinances are discussed individually, 
and suggestions for alternative punishments are developed in a religiously sensitive manner. 
For those hudud punishments that have been developed by Islamic jurists in the application of 
ijtihad, the chapter is similarly used to develop alternative suggestions. For the hudud crimes 
with punishments assigned in the Qur'an and thus considered as ‘definite’ prescriptions, the 
principles of reality and necessity and the principle of doubt are applied to develop alternative 
punishments that are compatible with international human rights standards and that serve the 
fulfilment of the purpose of Shariah by securing the benefit of the people. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and includes a summary of the main findings and 
recommendations from an academic and legal perspective. 
                                                 
65 Muhammad Abu Zahra Al-Uqubah fi al-Shariah al-Islamiyah (2003) 27. 
66 Al-Dawlah op cit note 26. 
67 Etim E Okon ‘Hudud punishments in Islamic criminal law‘ (2014) 10 (14) European Scientific Journal 227. 
68 Yusuf al-Qaradawi Al-Fiqh al-Islami beina al-Asalah wal-Tajdid (1999) 45. 
69 Ibrahim Abu Suleiman Abdul Wahab Fiqh al-Darurah wa Tatbiqatuhu al-Muaserah (2003). 
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CHAPTER 2 – ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW  
I Introduction 
Any attempt to reform Islamic criminal law in order to make it compatible with international 
human rights laws has above all to focus on reforming hudud punishments, for it is their 
harsh, cruel and humiliating punishments that are the cause of the main conflict with human 
rights. Orthodox Muslims, however, usually block out any attempt of questioning or 
reforming hudud punishments. They claim that hudud ordinances are a fixed set of a specific 
number of crimes and punishments that cannot be questioned, amended or forgiven since they 
are divinely assigned, infallible and non-negotiable.70 This chapter aims to refute this claim on 
several grounds. It is argued that the claim is based on the failure to distinguish between 
Shariah and Islamic law. Since the two terms are often used interchangeably, several hudud 
prescriptions are falsely believed to be divine, even though they have no legal basis in the 
Qur'an or the correct71 Sunnah. Some of them can even be argued to contradict the Qur'an.72 It 
is stressed therefore, that it is very important to distinguish between Shariah and Islamic law.  
The first part of this chapter, therefore, clarifies the difference between Shariah as 
referring to the divinely assigned rules and regulations recorded in the Qur'an and the correct 
Sunnah, and Islamic law as including additionally the rulings developed by the Islamic jurists. 
Since these are based on human interpretations and opinions, they are not divine or infallible. 
In this first part of the chapter, the primary, secondary, and some of the subsidiary sources of 
Shariah are introduced.  
The second part of the chapter discusses the role of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
including the historical development of the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence.  
The third part of the chapter refutes the claim that the set of hudud ordinances consists 
of a specific number of divinely prescribed crimes and their punishments. It points out that 
there is not one specific number of crimes that all Islamic scholars agree on.  
Further, the meaning of the term hudud (sing. hadd) is explored. This definition is 
significant, because the claim that hudud punishments cannot be amended or forgiven by 
anyone else than Allah himself, is based on the presumptions that hudud refers to the right of 
                                                 
70 The Muslim orthodox position which defends this claim is discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
71 ‘Correct’ Sunnah refers to all the ahadith (sing. hadith) that have been acknowledged as authentic and reliable. 
Viz op cit 29. A further explanation will follow in this chapter.  
72 Umar Suleiman al-Asqar Al-Madhkal ela al-Sharia wa al-Fiqh al-Islami (2005) 16. 
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Allah,73 and the term hudud refers to punishment. This chapter demonstrates that the term 
hudud does not refer to the punishments, but to crimes, or to the limit or boundary identifying 
what is prohibited and what is permissible. 
Thirdly, this part of the chapter points out the contradictions between the hudud 
prescriptions developed by Islamic jurisprudence and the prescriptions found in the Qur'an. 
This comparison demonstrates that not all hudud punishments have been divinely prescribed.  
This chapter, thus, demonstrates that it is legitimate and necessary to reconsider the set 
of hudud punishments developed by Islamic jurisprudence, since it does not correctly reflect 
the prescriptions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and cannot be considered fully divine or 
infallible.  
II Shariah versus Islamic law 
The failure to distinguish between Shariah and Islamic law is one of the main factors that 
strengthens the argument of orthodox Muslims that hudud ordinances are divine, infallible, 
immutable and non-negotiable. However, here it is stressed that it is very important to 
understand the differences between them. It is Shariah that indeed can be considered to be 
divine and infallible, for it refers to the legal provisions contained in its primary sources, 
namely the Qur’an, and the correct Sunnah.74 The Qur'an is considered to be the perfect word 
of Allah, and the correct Sunnah contains the life record of the Prophet Muhammad and is 
considered to be divine since the Qur'an declares that the Prophet was guided by divine 
inspiration.75 
The Arabic term Shariah refers to ‘the straight path’76 or ‘the right way’ mentioned in 
Surah 45:18.77 The Qur’an describes this path as being designed by Allah to guide believers in 
their daily lives. Shariah is a complete system that governs all aspects of life.78 It is 
considered eternal, and as being flexible and fitting for all times, places and circumstances.79 
                                                 
73 Abdullah Ahmad Qaderi Al-Hudud wa al-Sultan (1986) 19. 
74 Muhammad Abu Zahra Shariaht al-Quran min Dalael Eajazuh (1961) 17.  
75 Surah 53:2-5. 
76 Abdullah Saleh ‘Madchal lielm al-fiqh al-Islami’ available at 
http://www.islamfeqh.com/Nawazel/NawazelItem.aspx?NawazelItemID=1176, accessed on 17 July 2014. 
77 Surah 45:18. 
78 Abdullah Saleh has described Shariah as ‘a complete system that governs all aspects of life’ and ‘the set of 
provisions that was revealed to the Prophet’. See Saleh op cit note 76. 
El-Shahat Ibrahim Mansour declares: ‘Shariah consists of the infallible provisions that derive from the definitive 
and consistent [holy] texts that confirm the divine orders.’ El-Shahat Ibrahim Mansour Al-Madekal fi Shariah al-
Islamiya (2007) 13. 
79 Taha Jaber al-Alwani Nahw al-Tajdid wa al-Ijtihad (2008) 60. 
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Islamic law, by contrast, is based not only on Shariah but also on Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh),80 the legal science of interpreting Shariah which is based mainly on human reasoning 
(ijtihad).81 Islamic law can, therefore, not be considered infallible or fully divine, for it 
encompasses not only to the divinely assigned rules and regulations presented in the Qur’an 
and in the Sunnah (Shariah), but also to all those developed by the human interpretations of 
the Islamic scholars and jurists (fuqaha, sing. faqih)82 in their attempts to interpret the 
provisions of Shariah whenever a problem or question arises that is not explicitly answered in 
the Qur’an or the Sunnah. Since these provisions developed by Islamic jurists throughout the 
centuries are based on human understanding and opinions, they are not infallible.83 This is 
particularly so since the Islamic jurists can be influenced by political and other interests. They 
can be wrong and be questioned,84 especially if they contradict the primary sources of 
Shariah.85 Many moderate Muslims, therefore, point to Islamic jurisprudence as the main 
problem causing the clash of Islamic law with human rights.  
Since the legal opinions issued by the fuqaha (fatwas) become part of Islamic law, 
Islamic law can be described as the law that is based on Shariah and Islamic jurisprudence.86 
(a) Sunni primary sources of Shariah 
The first two primary sources of Shariah are the Qur’an and the correct Sunnah. 
i. Qur’an 
As mentioned earlier, the Qur’an is considered to be the infallible word of Allah.87 The 
Qur’an declares that it was revealed through the angel Gabriel88 to the Prophet Muhammad, as 
the ultimate, divine guideline to lead Muslims in their daily life.89 The Qur’an is considered to 
cover all the necessary guidelines for this life and the life to come. Thus, it is dealing with 
                                                 
80 El-Shahat Ibrahim Mansour describes Islamic law as the law that is based on Islamic Shariah and Islamic 
jurisprudence. See Mansour op cit note 78. 
81 Mohammad Hashim Kamali Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (2008) 16, 41 and 100. 
82 El-Shahat Ibrahim Mansour describes Islamic law as the law that is based on Islamic Shariah and Islamic 
jurisprudence. Mansour op cit note 78. 
83 Muhammad Ali al-Masri ‘Hal al-ijtihadat a fiqhiyah juz min al-Shariah al-islamiyah’ (2014) Al-Gabha al-
Salafia, Cairo, available at http://gabhasalafia.com/archives/3527#.U3W32l6Qz1o, accessed on 16 May 2014. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Hureyah Taglapt Al-Fiqh al-Islami Beyna al-Assalah wal Tajdid (unpublished PhD thesis University of Banha, 
2008) 37.  
86 El-Shahat Ibrahim Mansour describes Islamic law as the law that is based on Islamic Shariah and Islamic 
jurisprudence. Mansour op cit note 78. 
87 Surah 2:2. 
88 Surah 2:97.  
89 Surah 16:89. 
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matters of religion but also covering all aspects of life, from eating and drinking to social life, 
economy, the judiciary and politics.90 
According to Surah 122, the Qur’an, written in classical Arabic,91 was sent down in Arabic so 
that the people could learn wisdom. The Prophet Muhammad is believed to have been able to 
impart it to different Arab tribes in seven different Arabic dialects.92 The Qur’an is believed to 
have been revealed intermittently and through the concept of tangeem that means ‘gradually’, 
according to the events and incidents in the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the early 
Muslim community.93 The Qur’an is believed to have been transmitted consistently from 
generation to generation with the same word pronunciation and free from corruption.94 The 
Qur’an itself declares that it is perfect and free of any error,95 and in Surah 15:9 Allah 
declares that He will protect it from any human corruption.96 
ii. Sunnah 
The Sunnah, as previously mentioned, refers to the record of the Prophet Muhammad’s life 
example,97 especially those aspects that have not been mentioned in the Qur’an.98 
The Sunnah contains all the reports (ahadith) of what the Prophet said or did, including 
the statements and deeds of his companions, that have been approved by the Prophet either 
silently or explicitly. Accordingly, three categories are distinguished: The Sunnah of sayings, 
                                                 
90 Al-Daqaq and Fattah explain: ‘The Quran is considered to be the infallible word of Allah that was given as a 
final revelation containing Allah’s guidelines for Muslims for this life and the life after. Concerning this life, 
these guidelines are considered to cover every aspect of the daily life and every function of the Muslim society 
from eating and drinking to the system of government. These guidelines include not only religious and social life 
but also politics, economy and [the] judiciary.’ Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 13–25. 
91 Al-Daqaq and Fattah explain that the ‘word and the meaning of the Quran… was revealed from Allah through 
his angel Gabriel to His Messenger, the Prophet Muhammad (see Surah 26:195). The text of the Quran is 
classical Arabic. Therefore whenever the Quran is translated from Arabic into a different language, this 
translation is not acknowledged as the Quran, but as a translation of the meaning of the Quran. The original is 
designed, constructed and formed in classical Arabic.’ Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41. 
92 Nizamuddin Hassan Bin Mohammed Alnaisaburi Garaeb al-Quranwa Ragaeb al-Furqan (1996) 9.  
93 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 13–25. 
94 Al-Daqaq and Abdul Fattah explain that the 'Quran is believed to have been transmitted by the method of 
tawatur, which means ‘transmission based on knowledge and certainty’. Ibid. 
95 Surah 39:28 ‘as a discourse in the Arabic tongue, free of all deviousness, so that they might become conscious 
of God.’  
96 Surah 15:9 ‘We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and We will assuredly guard it (from 
corruption).’ 
97 Muhammad al-Shawkani Ershadal-Fuhul ela Tahqeq Elm al-Usul (1998) 128. 
98 Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi Al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shariah (2004) vol 4 at 2. 
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the Sunnah of deeds, and the Sunnah of confirmations, also known as ‘the sayings and deeds 
of the companions’ (afaal wa aqaul assahabi).99 
Since the life example of the Prophet Muhammad is declared to be the ultimate example 
for Muslims, and a perfect pattern of conduct,100 it is considered to have the same authority as 
the Qur'an.101 The Qur’an points out that Muslims should obey the Prophet Muhammad to the 
same extent as they obey Allah.102 
It is important to note, though, that not all ahadith have the same level of authority. The 
‘correct Sunnah’ refers to all the ahadith that have been acknowledged as authentic and 
reliable. The reliability of an individual hadith depends to a great extent on the level of 
reliability of the chain of (oral) transmission (isnad) from its source until it was written down. 
Depending on several factors, including the reliability of the chain of narrators, some ahadith 
are considered to be weak or even wrong, while others are widely accepted as ‘correct’. Many 
ahadith, as early as the first century AH, had been rejected as fabricated and faked. The 
science of hadith,103 therefore, developed rules and guidelines to distinguish whether or not a 
specific hadith can be considered correct (sahih) or not.104 
Three types of ahadith can be distinguished105 namely, hadith mutawater,106 hadith 
mash’hur,107 and hadith ahad.108 The most reliable type of hadith is the hadith mutawater. 
This describes ahadith about the Prophet narrated by one or several of his companions and 
transmitted by a chain of narrators, all of whom are known to be fully honest, reliable and 
trustworthy. This kind of ahadith has the same authority as a qur’anic verse. Hadith mash’hur 
                                                 
99 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 28–9; According to al-Amidi ‘sunnah is referring to the rituals that have 
been transmitted from the Prophet and it can refer to what has been delivered by the Messenger concerning legal 
evidence which cannot be read in the Qur’an and this includes his sayings, his deeds and his confirmations.’ Abu 
al-Hasan Ali Bin Salim al-Amidi Al-Ahkam (2003) vol 1 at 169. 
100 Surah 33:21. 
101 Al-Alwani op cit note 79.  
102 Surah 4:80 and Surah 59:7. 
103 The science of hadith deals with the study of the collection of ahadith including the study of the collection of 
ahadith and their organisation as established by the early Islamic scholars. 
104 Saadia Musa Omar and Iqbal Abdul Baqi ’Significant changes in the meaning and role: A study of hadith’ 
(2012) 5 Journal of Science and Islamic Research, available at 
http://islamicjournal.sustech.edu/content_details.php?id=487&chk=619c9ce75eeb8879f40035dc3ada6416, 
accessed on 27 September 2014. 
105 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 28. 
106 Hadith about the Prophet narrated by one or several of the companions of the Prophet and transmitted by a 
chain of narrators that are all known to be fully honest, reliable and trustworthy. This kind of hadith has the same 
authority as a qur’anic verse.  
107 Hadith about the Prophet narrated by one or several of the companions of the Prophet and transmitted by a 
chain of narrators, with most of the narrators, especially the last one, known to be trustworthy. Just one or very 
few of the narrators are questionable. 
108 Hadith about the Prophet narrated by one or several of the companions of the Prophet and transmitted by a 
chain of narrators that does not reach the level of hadith mutawater. Ahadith ahad are hadith that are not 
considered fully authentic. 
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refers to ahadith with a slightly limited level of reliability, as there is no full assurance of the 
reliability and trustworthiness of all the narrators, even if most of them, including the last one, 
are known to be trustworthy. Hadith ahad is the weakest type of hadith as it is not regarded as 
trustworthy.  
The ahadith that have been acknowledged as correct have been put together in six 
famous collections of authenticated ahadith. The two most famous are Sahih Bukhari and 
Sahih Muslim. The Arabic term Sahih means ‘correct, true or valid’. The other four are the 
Sunan al-Nasa’i, Sunan Ibn Majah, Sunan at-Tirmidhi and Sunan Abu Dawud. 
The correct Sunnah is, as previously mentioned, considered to be divine. This 
understanding is based on Surah 53:2-5 that states when referring to the Prophet Muhammad: 
‘This fellow-man of yours has not gone astray, nor is he deluded, and neither does he speak 
out of his own desire that [which he conveys to you] is but [a divine] inspiration with which 
he is being inspired.’ Not all the provisions of the Sunnah, however, can be considered to be 
divine. In particular, those that contradict the Qur’an are not. It is due to the existence of a 
large number of weak — and even false ahadith — that the expression ‘correct Sunnah’ is 
commonly used to specify that the weak and false ahadith are excluded. 
Weak ahadith (ahadith ahad) play a considerable role in the dispute between orthodox 
and moderate Muslims concerning hudud ordinances, as moderate Muslims do not 
acknowledge ahadith ahad as legitimate evidence to justify the punishments proposed in any 
of the hudud ordinances.109 Since the offences covered by the hudud ordinances are serious 
crimes with serious punishments, the legal evidence to support them has to be strong and fully 
trustworthy. The hadith narrated by Ikrimah110 and recorded by Imam Bukhari that says 
‘whoever changes his religion, kill him’, for example, is a hadith ahad.111 This kind of hadith 
should therefore not be acknowledged as sufficient evidence to legitimise the death penalty 
for the crime of apostasy. When dealing with hudud crimes and their punishments, it is 
therefore important to discern whether a hadith can be considered reliable and correct (sahih) 
or not. 
 It is the debated use of ahadith ahad as the legal basis for hudud punishments that is 
the first and fundamental aspect that weakens the Islamic claim that these punishments are 
divine and infallible. Another weakness of hudud ordinances results from the wide 
                                                 
109 Sayyid Qutb Fi Zelal al-Qur’an (2010) vol 6 at 4008.  
110 Sahih al-Bukhari vol 9 at 84 hadith 57. 
111 Taha Jaber al-Alwani ‘Okazat al-siyasiin al-mufalisin: Al-hudud’ 25 May 2014, available at  
http://www.alwani.net/ةبتكم_ت لااقم لا/ت لااقم_ة يرك ف_ةعونتم/item/489تازاكع_نييسايس لا_نيُسفلملا.html, 
accessed on 27 September 2014.  
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interpretations of Islamic jurists, who in their attempt to interpret the divine sources of 
Shariah, use many different methods of interpretation. 
(b) Secondary and subsidiary sources of Shariah 
Islamic jurisprudence takes into consideration a number of secondary sources of Shariah. The 
two most important ones are the principle of analogical deduction (qiyas) and the consensus 
of the Islamic scholars (ijma). Some orthodox scholars, especially scholars of the Hanbali 
school, consider these two principles even as part of the primary sources along with the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah. They call them al-usul al-arbaa (the four primary sources).112 
i) Analogical deduction (qiyas) 
The principle of analogical deduction (qiyas) is used to determine a ruling for cases that are 
not mentioned in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, by applying analogical deduction from similar 
cases mentioned in them. An example of its early use concerns the consumption of alcohol. 
The Qur’an speaks about the prohibition of al-khamr (alcohol made out of dates or other 
fruits — not including grapes). Although wine (nabiz) is not mentioned, Muslim jurists used 
the concept of analogical deduction to declare that wine will be treated the same way as other 
alcoholic drinks (al-khamr).113 
ii) Consensus of the scholars (ijma) 
The consensus of the scholars (ijma) refers to the agreement of the qualified Islamic scholars 
(mujtahids) on a specific legal stipulation.  
Besides the two aforementioned sources of Sunni jurisprudence, there are several other 
subsidiary sources, including the sayings of the companions (qawl al-sahabi), traditional 
customs (al-urf) and the Shariah of those from past times (Shara man qablana) that will not 
be discussed in detail here. The following three subsidiary sources, however, are of special 
interest to this research, since they are designed to consider the public interest and the benefit 
of the people and thus reflect the main purpose of Shariah.114 These are the principle of 
consideration of the public interest (al-masalih al-mursalah), the juristic preference (istihsan) 
and the blocking of means (sadd al-zara’i).  
                                                 
112 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 11. 
113 Ibid at 35–6. 
114 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 43. 
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iii) Consideration of public interest (al-masalih al-mursalah) 
The method of consideration of the public interest (al-masalih al-mursalah) that has been 
addressed by both the Qur’an and the Sunnah, provides an effective tool for Islamic jurists to 
consider the public interest of Muslim society whenever they have to handle cases and 
disputes that arise from changing life circumstances over time.115 Al-masalih al-mursalah 
allows jurists to develop provisions that benefit the people or protect them from harm. This is 
an important consideration as far as Islamic legislation is concerned, since it reflects the main 
purpose of Shariah.116 
iv) Juristic preference (istihsan) 
The principle of juristic preference is another tool that allows Islamic jurists to choose what 
will be best for the people whenever they have to pass a verdict.117 The Arabic term istihsan 
means ‘preference’, and in Islamic jurisprudence the term refers to the principle that gives the 
Islamic scholars (mujtahidin) the liberty to use their own preference vis-à-vis a specific 
judgment, thereby allowing them to choose the option which they deem best for the people. 
The principle of istihsan sets the benefit of the people as one of the highest purposes 
(makased) of Shariah.  
v) Blocking of means (sadd al-zara’i) 
The definitions of this principle presented by Muslim scholars differ slightly from each other, 
but in summary the common idea is that the principle of blocking of means (sadd al-zara’i) is 
designed to protect Muslim society from harm and to achieve what is beneficial for it by 
closing any door that can lead to harmful results for the people. In other words, the principle 
aim is to prevent causes that can lead to evil.118 Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah says that: ‘Doors 
                                                 
115 An example for al-masalih al-mursalah can be seen in a hadith that reports that the Prophet gave the people 
who were pollinating the palm trees the liberty to do what they deem best. He stressed that they do not have to 
follow his opinion except if he says something about Allah. Sahih Muslim, hadith 2361. 
116 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 43.  
117 Saad Bin Matar al-Otaibi ‘Usus al-siasa al-sharaiah: Al-istahsan’ Said al-Fawaed, available at 
http://www.saaid.net/Doat/otibi/27.htm, accessed on 27 September 2014; 
Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 39. 
118 Al-Shatibi op cit note 98 at 114;  
Ibn Taymiyyah explains sadd al-zara’i as: ‘the method to know the cause, which, in the eyes of Islamic scholars, 
is, what led to the forbidden act.’ Ibn Taymiyyah Al-Fatawa al-Kubra (1987) vol 3 at 139. 
Al-Quraafi said: ‘Sadd al-zara’i is the method that is using the permissible or the prohibited to achieve the 
beneficial.’ Ahmed Ibn Idris al-Quraafi Al-Furuq (1998) vol 2 at 61;  
Khaled Ali Suleiman Bani Ahmed 'Qaedad sadd al-zara'i‘ (2009) 25 Majalat Gameat Dimashq lel Alum al-
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that can lead to evil should be closed and doors that can lead to a benefit should be opened.’119 
Some scholars, including Imam al-Qaraafi, say that the method of sadd al-zara’i allows using 
whatever method is necessary to achieve what is beneficial, or to block what is harmful to the 
people.120 
All three principles reflect the qur’anic teaching that the benefit of the people and 
protecting people from harm is the main purpose of Shariah.121 Another closely connected 
famous Islamic principle further states explicitly that ‘harm must be removed’ (al-darar 
yusal). This principle derives from a correct hadith, that states that harm must be removed (la 
darar wa la derar).122 
This principle can be seen also in Ibn Kathir’s interpretation of Surah 7:157, according 
to which the Qur’an declares that one of the main reasons for the coming of the final Prophet 
is to take away the burdens that previous religious leaders have placed on the shoulders of the 
people.123 Ibn al-Qayyim explained this principle in his own words, as follows:  
Sharia is founded upon wisdom and welfare for the servants in this life and the afterlife. In its 
entirety it is justice, mercy, benefit, and wisdom. Every matter which abandons justice for 
tyranny, mercy for cruelty, benefit for corruption, and wisdom for foolishness is not a part of the 
Sharia even if it was introduced therein by an interpretation.124 
Since the above principles are designed to help Islamic jurists to develop rules and regulations 
that serve the benefit of Muslim society, this thesis suggests that if these sources were applied 
in a correct and positive way, it will be possible to experience the hermeneutic flexibility of 
Shariah first hand. If it is presumed that human rights benefit society, it can be contended that 
the abovementioned sources allow for an interpretation of hudud ordinances different from 
that currently widely accepted by orthodox Muslims. Chapter 6 will further explore how these 
sources can be applied to reconcile Islamic law with international laws of human rights.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Iqtisadia wal Qanuniyah 734, available at http://www.damascusuniversity.edu.sy/mag/law/images/stories/705-
742.pdf, accessed on 27 September 2014. 
119 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 vol 3 at 108. 
120 Al-Quraafi op cit note 118, vol 2 at 42. 
121 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 43.  
122 Yahya Ibn Sharaf Al-Nawawi Shareh Maten al-Arbaaun al-Nawawiyah fi al-Ahadith al-Sahehah al-
Nabawiyah 4 ed (1984) 87. 
123 Ismail Ibn Umar Ibn Kathir Tafsir Ibn Kathir (2002) vol 3 at 489. 
124 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 at vol 3 at 14. 
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III Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
As previously mentioned, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) can be described as the understanding 
of the Islamic scholars and jurists who try to interpret the rules and regulations of Shariah 
whenever a problem or question arises that is not answered explicitly in the Qur'an or the 
Sunnah. In order to develop a new legislation for an issue, the Islamic scholars (mujtahid) 
practice ijtihad (independent reasoning).125 This means that they bring the utmost effort to 
reach a legal practical opinion through elicitation.126 In other words, the Islamic scholars have 
to apply the spirit and basic principles of Shariah by using their logic or other methods of 
interpretation, including the aforementioned methods of qiyaz (analogical deductions), ijma’a 
(consensus of opinion), istihsan (juristic preference), masalih al-mursalah (consideration of 
public interests) and sadd al-zarai (blocking of means).127  
Al-Alwani explained that in order to find an answer for a legal case, an Islamic scholar 
has to search first in the Qur'an, and if he cannot find an answer there, he should apply the 
Sunnah, and if he cannot find an answer there, he should use his own opinion (apply 
ijtihad).128 
This is the commonly used practice of Islamic scholars when searching for a ruling 
concerning an issue not explicitly covered by the primary sources.129 It goes back to the 
Prophet Muhammad, his companions and the first four caliphs.130  
One of the first examples of the application of ijtihad is reported in a hadith that speaks 
about the Prophet’s companion Mu’az. When the Prophet Muhammad sent him to Yemen to 
rule the Muslim community there, the Prophet asked him how he was planning to handle legal 
cases. Mu’az answered that he would rule them according to the book of Allah. When the 
Prophet asked what he would do if he cannot find an answer in the Qur'an, Mu’az replied that 
he would use the Sunnah. When asked, what he would do, if he could not find an answer in 
the Sunnah, Mu’az declared that he would apply his own opinion and apply ijtihad. The 
                                                 
125 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 36 at 84.  
In the hadith the principle of ijtihad was presented by the Prophet’s companion Mu’az, who was sent to Yemen. 
Answering the Prophet’s question as to what he would do if he were to rule in a legal dispute, Mu’az explained 
that his rule would depend upon what is written in the word of Allah, and if he would not find the answer in the 
book of Allah or the Sunnah he would use ijtihad. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36. 
126 Al-Shawkani op cit note 97. 
127 ‘Fatawa about the concept of sadd al-zarai’ Dar-Alifta 7 March 2012, Cairo, available at http://www.dar-
alifta.org/ViewFatawaConcept.aspx?ID=113&LangID=1, accessed on 16 May 2014. 
128 Al-Alwani op cit note 17 at 62. 
129 Gamal al-Banna ‘Al-islah al-islami al-manshud’ 18 (Symposium 27-29 September 2004, Cairo), available at 
http://www.islamiccall.org/Dirasat_IslahManshud.htm, accessed on 10 June 2014; 
Al-Alwani op cit note 17 at 52. 
130 Gamal al-Banna Qadiat al-Fiqh al-Jadid (2008) 40. 
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Prophet praised him for his answer.131 Shariah praises any effort made to apply ijtihad as 
honourable132 and praiseworthy, and declares that any effort of interpretation will be 
rewarded, even if the interpretation is wrong; and if it is correct it will be doubly rewarded.133 
Ijtihad can be described as the mechanism to implement the teachings of the primary 
sources to all the practical legal questions that arise in the life of the Muslim society.134 
The field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is an ‘extremely large and very complex topic 
of Islamic studies’.135 It can also be described as the area of legal study pertaining to the 
stipulations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah concerned with the duties, rights and 
responsibilities of the Muslim community.136 
The wide and complex field of Islamic jurisprudence that is based on the different 
understandings and opinions of Islamic scholars and jurists and draws from different sources 
and methods of interpretation led to the development of different interpretations and thus to 
the emergence of different schools of jurisprudence. In the following section the historical 
development of the field of Islamic jurisprudence and the main four Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence are described.137 
(a) The historical development of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
The development of the field of Islamic jurisprudence began after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad, when the extension of the Islamic state took on a completely new dimension and 
                                                 
131 Yusuf al-Qaradawi Nahw al-Ijtihad fi al-Shariah al-Islamiyah (1996) 84; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit 
note 36. 
132 Mohamed al-Tahar Ibn Ashour Maqased al-Shariah al-Islamiyah (2000) 408. 
133 Muhammad Ibn Ismail al-Bukhari Sahih al-Bukhari translated by Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1997) vol 9 at 
271 hadith 7352. 
134 Throughout Islamic history there have been some Islamic scholars who rejected practicing ijtihad. Many of 
them claim(ed) that ‘the door of ijtihad has been closed’. There is however no general consensus on this view. 
Many scholars agree that ‘ijtihaad is an integral part of Islamic legal theory’ and they believe in ‘ijtihad’s 
importance in Muslim’s daily life’. Salih Kesgin ‘A critical analysis of the Schacht’s argument and 
contemporary debates on legal reasoning throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence’ (2011) 4 (19) The 
Journal of International Social Research, available at www.sosyalarastirmalar.com, accessed on 12 August 
2016. 
135 The Islamic Dictionary explains Islamic jurisprudence as ‘an extremely large and very complex topic of 
Islamic studies. The meaning of the Arabic term ‘fiqh’ is ‘understanding’, ‘comprehension’, ‘knowledge’, or 
‘jurisprudence’. A jurist is called a ‘faqih’ (plur. fuqaha) which means an expert in matters of Islamic legal 
matters. A ‘faqih’ passes verdicts within the rules of the Islamic law, namely Shariah.’  
Islamic Dictionary, available at http://www.islamic-dictionary.com/index.php?word=fiqh, accessed on 11 June 
2014.  
136 The broadly recognised traditional definition of the term fiqh describes it as ‘the knowledge of the practical 
legal provisions which are gained from its detailed evidences (Al-a’elem bil ahkam al sharaiyah al-amaliyah 
al-muktasaba min adelatiha al tafsiliyah)’. Hassan Abdul Ghani ‘Mana kalemat fiqh’, 17 February 2013, 
available at http://fiqh.islammessage.com/NewsDetails.aspx?id=6153, accessed on 17 July 2014. 
137 ‘Al-Madares al-Salafia al-Moasera: Qera’a fi al-tanaua wal elaka bil achar’ Al-Alukah Network 21 May 2011, 
available at http://www.alukah.net/web/triqi/0/32046/, accessed on 16 May 2014. 
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Islam spread to the whole of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. Many countries, including 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Iran, fell under the power and authority of Islam and the ethnic groups 
in these countries became subject to Shariah. The early Muslim scholars, therefore, had to 
introduce the rules and regulations of Shariah to this new Muslim community. They were 
required to apply and interpret the rules and regulations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah to the 
specific challenges, circumstances and the legal questions of their new Muslim co-religionists. 
The questions and cases that arose in the new Muslim societies had to be addressed in a way 
that it would reflect the purpose of Shariah.138 
In the development of the field of Islamic jurisprudence several stages can be 
distinguished. The lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad can be seen as the first stage, the time 
of the four successors until the middle of the first century after the Hijra (AH)139 as the 
second. During these first two stages, the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence is believed to 
have been laid. 
It was during the third stage that Islamic jurisprudence was identified as a separate 
science of study with its own methods, rules and regulations, and that Islamic schools of 
jurisprudence were established.140 This third stage started in the second half of the first 
century AH and lasted until the first half of the second century AH.  
In the fourth stage, Islamic jurisprudence was fully developed as a science and the 
Islamic scholars worked with diligence and great effort to develop new rulings by exploring 
the will and law of God and applying legal rules and principles (usul al-fiqh).141 By means of 
the elicitation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, the scholars undertook every effort to reach legal 
practical opinions to find a solution for every case or problem.142 This process of the scholars’ 
independent legal reasoning (ijtihad) reached its highest level at this fourth stage that 
commenced at the beginning of the second century AH and lasted until the middle of the 
fourth century AH.143 
The fifth stage is considered to be the golden era of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, for the 
different Islamic schools of jurisprudence had reached the peak of their development.144 This 
                                                 
138 Yasser al-Mashhadani ‘Dor al eraqeen fi tatweer al muasasah al qadaeyah’ Al-Fustat, available at 
http://efustat.blogspot.de/2013/07/blog-post_2377.html, accessed on 27 September 2014. 
139 ‘Anno Hegirae’ or ‘After Hijrah’. Hijrah means ‘emigration’. The Islamic calendar starts from the day the 
Prophet Muhammad emigrated (the hijrah) from the city of Mecca to the city of Medina in 622 AD. 
140 Taglapt op cit note 85. 
141 Wael B Hallaq ‘Was the gate of ijtihad closed?’ (1984) 16 International Journal of Middle East Studies 3–41.  
142 Al-Shawkani op cit note 97 at 250. 
143 Taglapt op cit note 85. 
144 Ibid. 
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stage started in the middle of the fourth century AH and lasted until the fall of Baghdad in the 
middle of the seventh century AH.  
The sixth stage, by contrast, is considered to be the weakest period in the history of 
Islamic jurisprudence due to the disappearance of the scholars’ independent legal reasoning 
(ijtihad). The scholars no longer developed new rulings, but instead practised the concept of 
taqlid. This means they followed the interpretations and decisions of earlier scholars without 
necessarily asking for evidence to support them or examining the reasons for these rulings.145 
This stage started from the second half of the seventh century AH and lasted until 1293 AH. 
Due to the number of possible ways and approaches to interpret the primary sources of 
Shariah, a number of different schools of jurisprudence emerged during the third and fourth 
stage of this development. This was when Islamic scholars worked with great energy to 
explore the will and law of God and to develop new rulings. 
(b) The four main Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei, and Hanbali schools are considered to be the main four Sunni 
schools of jurisprudence. The main differences between them can be seen in the methods of 
interpretations they use.146 
i) The Hanafi school 
The Hanafi school of jurisprudence was established by the Persian imam Thabit Ibn al-
Naoman, known as Imam Abu Hanifa (80–148 AH), who was born in the city of Kufa, 
present-day Iraq, and died in Baghdad.147 He was very cautious in respect of the use of  
ahadith and accepted only strong ahadith that had been transmitted by a fully reliable chain of 
narrators and did not contradict the Qur’an or the purpose of Shariah.148 He insisted that a 
hadith could be accepted only on the basis of strong evidence. For this reason, he relied 
heavily on the methods of analogical deduction (qiyas) and the jurist’s personal opinion (al-
raa’y),149 in which jurists build their own opinion on a matter by investigating the signs or 
indications that can be found in the Qur’an to draw their conclusions from it.150 According to 
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
146 Islamic Dictionary op cit note 135. 
147 Muhammad al-Ghazali Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah Beina Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Hadith (1989) 18. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Mohammed Hashim Kamali `The approved and disapproved varieties of ra'y (personal opinion) in Islam' 
(1990) 7 (1) American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 39–64. 
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Imam Abu Hanifa, both the methods of analogical deduction and the jurist’s personal opinion 
had to be based on one of the purposes of Shariah.151 
Although he left no written treatise on Islamic jurisprudence, his legacy was continued 
by his students, among them Abu Yussif and Imam Muhammad Ibn al-Hassan, whose own 
works continued to influence the further development of the Hanafi school.152 
ii) The Maliki school 
The Maliki school is named after its founder Imam Malik bin Anas (93–179 AH), who was 
also known as the Imam of Medina.153 He was the first Islamic scholar who wrote about the 
science of hadith, and thus became the leader of the school of hadith. He recorded the ahadith 
that he believed to be correct, but in so doing did not exclude the category of hadith ahad, 
accepting them as long as they did not contradict the Qur’an. As the author of the renowned 
‘al-Muwatta’, he wrote about both hadith and fiqh.154 
 The sources used by the Maliki school of jurisprudence are the Qur’an, the Sunnah, 
the consensus (ijma) of the companions in Medina (Ahl al-Medina), analogical deductions 
(qiyas), the consideration of the public interest (al-masalih al-mursalah), the blocking of 
means (sadd al-zara’i), presumption of continuity (al-istishab) and the juristic preference 
(al-istihsan).155 
iii) The Shafei school 
The Shafei school is named after Mohammed Bin Idris al-Shafei (150–204 AH), also known 
as Imam Ahl al-Sunnah.156 The Shafei school took the middle position, between the school of 
Abu Hanifa that is based on the concept of al-raa’y (personal opinion) and the school of 
Imam Malik, based on hadith.157  
                                                 
151 Osman al-Kamis ‘Ma al-farq beina ahl al-ra’y wa ahl al-hadith’ [‘Fatwa answering the question: “What is the 
difference between the people of opinion and the people of hadith?”’], available at 
http://www.almanhaj.com/vb/showthread.php?t=6431, accessed on 11 June 2014;  
Idris Bashir Al-Raa’y wa Atharoh fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (2006) 11. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Kamali op cit note 150.   
154 Forum of Islamic Jurisprudential Studies ‘Al-mazaheb al-fiqhiyah al-arbaa’, available at 
http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=138694, accessed on 20 May 2014. 
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 Imam Shafei relied on the method of personal opinion. This can be described as the 
‘thorough exertion of a jurist's mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question’.158 He 
developed the science of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that he described in his famous 
book, Al-Resalah (The Message), considered to be the first written work on the science of 
Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh).159 The sources of jurisprudence used by al-Shafei include 
the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the consensus of the companions of the Prophet160 and analogical 
deductions.161 
iv) The Hanbali school 
The Hanbali school was founded by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (164–241 AH) who dedicated his life 
to the study of hadith and fiqh. He was considered by many scholars as a scholar of hadith 
rather than of jurisprudence. Although one of his most renowned and influential teachers was 
Imam Shafei, he rejected Shafei’s teaching that focused on personal opinion because he 
considered the hadith to be more authoritative than personal opinion. He preferred to use even 
weak ahadith rather than analogical deductions.162 
The Hanbali jurisprudence is based on Ibn Hanbal’s method of elicitation (istinbat).163 
This, in the first instance, uses the text of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, secondly, the sayings of 
the companions and, thirdly, weak ahadith. Ibn Hanbal considered the Sunnah, including 
weak ahadith, as having the same authority as the Qur’an.164 
It is this use of weak ahadith that is responsible for several hudud prescriptions that have 
been developed by Islamic jurisprudence without any legal basis in the Qur'an and, even in 
contradiction to it. The death penalty for the crime of apostasy, for example, which has been 
endorsed by the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, is based on a hadith ahad that is not fully 
trustworthy and thus does not constitute sufficient justification for such a severe punishment. 
Using a weak hadith as the legal basis for the death penalty for apostasy is a severe violation 
of Shariah, especially as neither the Qur’an nor the correct Sunnah contains any evidence to 
support such a punishment for apostasy. In fact, quite the contrary is true, as Shariah endorses 
                                                 
158 Intisar A Rabb ‘Ijtihad’ Oxford Islamic Studies, available at 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0354, accessed on 29 April 2016. 
159 Forum of Islamic Jurisprudential Studies op cit note 154.  
160 When the companions of the Prophet disagreed with each other, he used the saying that was in agreement 
with the Qur’an. 
161 Forum of Islamic Jurisprudential Studies op cit note 154. 
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freedom of religion.165 The Qur'an states in Surah 2:256 that there is no compulsion in 
religion. This is just one of many examples where the provisions developed by Islamic 
jurisprudence contradict Shariah as presented in the Qur’an and the correct Sunnah. 
The role of the Sunnah, more specifically, the use of weak and false ahadith and the 
difficulties in identifying whether or not a hadith can be considered fully reliable and correct, 
is one of the main reasons, why the wide field of Islamic jurisprudence is quite a controversial 
one. 
(c) The current debate over Islamic jurisprudence 
Many moderate Muslims view Islamic jurisprudence as being responsible for the clash of 
Islamic law with human right. One of the reasons for this view, as is described earlier, is the 
use of weak and false ahadith and the difficulties in identifying whether a hadith can be 
considered reliable or not. Another factor is that the rules and regulations developed by the 
fuqaha over the centuries reflect human opinions and interpretations and are, therefore, not 
infallible. 
It is for these reasons that many moderate Muslims call for a filtering of the Sunnah and 
the provisions developed by Islamic jurisprudence in the light of Shariah to identify the 
correct ahadith, allowing them to stand along with the Qur’an as a main source of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Gamal al-Banna, for example, calls for a filtering of the Sunnah. He stresses 
that the Qur’an is the first source of legislation and criticises Islamic jurisprudence for having 
wrongly elevated the Sunnah to be the first source of legislation over and above the Qur’an.166 
According to al-Banna, hadith have to be in full agreement with the Qur’an in order to be 
accepted as correct.167 He, therefore, recognises the Sunnah as the record of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s words and deeds only as far as they have been guided by the Qur’an. Al-Banna 
calls for the use of independent legal reasoning (ijtihad) and the principles of logic and 
personal opinion (al-raa’y), and praises the Hanafi school for its use of al-raa’y.168 
Taha Jaber al-Alwani is another moderate Muslim who calls for the Sunnah to be 
filtered by amending the elements of fiqh that contradict the Qur’an, although his view is 
somewhat different from that of mainstream moderate Muslims who see fiqh as the source of 
the problem. Al-Alwani sees a need for fiqh, as he believes that the Sunnah is necessary for a 
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correct interpretation of the Qur’an.169 He points to Surah 59:7: ‘So take what the Messenger 
assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you’, and Surah 4:80: ‘He 
who obeys the Messenger, obeys Allah.’ He sees these two verses as proof of the need for the 
Sunnah. He explains that the Qur'an can be correctly interpreted if such interpretation is based 
either on an explanation of the qur’anic text or on examples of an early practice of one of the 
qur’anic principles found in the Sunnah.170 
The approach of al-Banna and al-Alwani is sound, as it is in agreement with the Qur’an 
and with the teachings of the Prophet who warned against the spreading of any wrong 
information about him: ‘Do not tell a lie against me, for whoever tells a lie against me, then 
he will surely enter the Hell-fire.’171 
Some moderate Muslims go even further in their criticism of fiqh, rejecting it 
completely as they do not see any need for it. They believe that the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
explain all things sufficiently. Former Al-Azhar professor Ahmed Subhy Mansour is one of 
the scholars who reject fiqh utterly.172 He even argues that there is no need for the Sunnah. He 
sees the Qur’an as the sufficient and only source, and he rejects all supplementary sources as a 
corruption of the Word of God.173 This is what he understands from Surah 16:89 that declares: 
‘We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things.’ Mansour points out that the 
Qur’an has been revealed in a way that deals with all things, and therefore he sees no need for 
any other source.174 He also rejects Islamic jurisprudence altogether, calling it a fanatical 
Wahabi legislation, and instead promotes the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: 
We want to convince the Islamic world to accept the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
Islamic laws, according to the real core of Islam. By doing so, these resolutions could be the 
main source of legislation in Muslim countries instead of Islamic jurisprudence, which actually 
means fanatical Wahabi legislations.175 
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Such a complete rejection of the Sunnah, however, is very likely to be completely rejected by 
the vast majority of the Muslim community, and can thus foster division and hinder efforts 
that support reformation.176 
Orthodox Muslim scholars, of course, defend the inherited rules and regulations of 
Islamic jurisprudence, since they believe that they have become part of Shariah.177 They 
actually consider the moderate Muslims’ call for reformation an assault upon Shariah as the 
God-given divine order, and therefore an assault upon Allah Himself.  
El-Shahat Mansour is one of the orthodox voices who defends Islamic jurisprudence as 
perfect and divine — he praises all the theories and rulings developed by the scholars, as a 
lighthouse to light the way for all who do research concerning private and public law.178 He 
believes that Islamic jurisprudence is fulfilling the public need perfectly, and praises it for 
leaving no question without an answer.179 He believes that any problem or issue experienced 
today is addressed in Islamic jurisprudence, and that there is no branch of law that Islamic 
jurisprudence does not cover. He supports his view with Surah 17:12 that states: ‘[A]ll things 
have We explained in detail.’180 
El-Shahat Mansour, seems to ignore the fact that there are many current issues in the 
current society of the twenty-first century that have not yet been resolved by Islamic law. 
Today’s society is overwhelmingly different from that of the seventh century, even if only 
technological developments and scientific achievements are considered. Islamic jurisprudence 
has to respond to the new questions and challenges of today that did not exist in the seventh 
century.181 
Mansour also seems to ignore that many of the stipulations developed by Islamic jurists 
do not necessarily suit all times and circumstances. Islamic jurisprudence of the time of the 
Prophet and his four successors has interpreted the Qur’an with a seventh-century way of life 
in mind and in the context of the specific culture and environment of Islamic society at that 
time. It is illogical, therefore, to apply the same kind of jurisprudence today in the twenty-first 
century, with its completely different environment. It is apparent, thus, that a new reading of 
the Qur’an from the perspective of the twenty-first century is necessary. The widespread and 
                                                 
176 Fahmi Howeidi ‘Hamlat tafkik al-Islam’ Al-Ahram (March 2005) 43212, Cairo, available at 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2005/3/29/OPIN1.HTM, accessed on 18 September 2015. 
177 Manarat (Official Islamic Website) ‘Fiqh wa Shariah’ 13 June 2014, available at 
http://www.manaratweb.com/هقف لا-ةع يرش لاو/, accessed on 24 October 2014 
178 Mansour op cit note 78. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 36 at 101.  
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common acceptance of the importance of the protection of human rights, as well as the fact 
that most Muslim countries have become signatories of international human rights laws, is 
just one of the new developments that have to be taken into consideration.  
In the light of the tremendous differences between the society of the seventh century 
and that of today’s world, the pronouncements of the early scholars cannot be accepted as 
fitting for all times, and as absolutely infallible and divine. This important conclusion should 
be kept in mind in the following discussion of Islamic criminal law, and particularly the very 
controversial area of hudud ordinances as the main focus of this research.  
IV Islamic law 
As mentioned earlier, Islamic law — in contrast to Shariah — includes not only the collection 
of rules and regulations presented in the Qur’an and the correct Sunnah, as the divinely 
assigned prescriptions, but also those that have been developed by the human understanding 
of the fuqaha throughout the centuries.182 Hence, whilst Shariah can be described as fully 
divine, Islamic law contains both divine stipulation and that that cannot be considered divine. 
What has been written in the Qur’an or the Sunnah without any interference from the jurists’ 
personal opinions — for example, the religious duties of prayer, charity or fasting, which are 
part of the fiqh of ebadat183 — reflect Shariah and can be considered divine.184 By contrast, 
the elements of Islamic law that contain personal opinions of the Islamic jurists, especially in 
discussing secondary issues, cannot be considered divine. For example, before a Muslim goes 
to prayer he or she has to practice the ritual of ‘washing’. This is mentioned in the Qur’an in 
Surah 5:6. The Qur'an, however, does not give any detailed descriptions of how the ritual 
should be practised. The Muslim jurists, therefore, had to come up with their own 
interpretations and explanations. So the concept of washing itself is seen as divine, but how it 
is done cannot be considered completely divine, as it is based on human and differing jurists’ 
opinions. For example, the Muslim jurists disagree about how and how much hair should be 
                                                 
182 Berwal op cit note 61. 
183 Fiqh al-ebadat is the jurisprudence dealing with all the rules and regulations concerning the Islamic concept 
of worship, including all related areas, such as purity, prayer, zakat, fasting, pilgrimage and other religious 
rituals and practices. 
Fiqh al-muamalat, by contrast, refers to three areas of law, namely Islamic criminal law, family law and 
commercial law, which includes all the rules and regulations concerning finances, banking, investment, trades 
and other social and economic matters. 
184 Al-Asqar op cit note 72 at 16. 
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washed — just the front part or the full head.185 Islamic law can thus be considered to contain 
both divine elements, and those that are not divine. 
The following section will focus on what is the core of this study, namely, Islamic 
criminal law, especially the hudud ordinances. The section aims to identify those 
pronouncements of Islamic law pertinent to hudud ordinances that cannot be considered 
divine, for they are based on human opinions and interpretations. The result of this 
exploration will be the basis of a re-interpretation and reformation of the identified 
pronouncements to be undertaken in Chapter 6. 
(a) Islamic criminal law 
In Islamic criminal law the general definition of a crime is any act that is forbidden by 
Shariah and for which Allah has ordained a punishment.186 A crime can be committed either 
by doing what is prohibited or by omitting to do what has been commanded.187 For an act to 
be considered a crime, the offender has to be an adult and responsible for his action.188 The 
Islamic jurists have introduced a common principle in Islamic criminal law called ‘la jaremah 
wa la uqubah bila naas’ that translates as ‘no crime nor punishment without text’. This 
principle is usually understood to mean ‘no crime without punishment being assigned’.189 
This leads to the crucial conclusion that Shariah has the final word concerning what can be 
considered to be a crime and which punishment should be applied.  
Islamic criminal law distinguishes three categories of crimes, namely, qisas, ta’zir and 
hudud. 
i) Qisas (retribution) 
The crime of qisas (retribution) is concerned with the physical assault upon a person, such as 
homicide, infliction of wounds and battery.190 The punishment prescribed by the Qur’an is a 
penalty according to the law of equality. This means if someone cuts off a part of the body of 
someone else, for example, his ear or hand, he has to be punished by the same harm or injury 
                                                 
185 Berwal op cit note 61. 
186 Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Mawerdy Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah (1989) 192; Abdul Qadir Audah Al-Tasheriat al-Jinai 
al-Islami Muqaranan bil qanun al-Wadai (2011) vol 1 at 634. 
187 Al-Mawerdy op cit note 186; Audah op cit note 186. 
188 Ibid at 10–11.  
189 Ibid at 634.  
190 Farhat J Ziadeh ‘Criminal law’ The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, available at 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0170, accessed on 24 October 2014;  
Abdul Rahman al-Jaziri Al-Fiqh ala al-Mazaheb al-Arbaa 2 ed (2003) vol 5 at 12–13. 
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that he committed against the individual, for example, if the offender kills a person, he has to 
be killed.191 Since a qisas crime is not considered a crime against Allah, it can, however, be 
forgiven or waived by the payment of compensation or blood money. The final decision on 
the form of punishment is up to the family of the victim. Since according to the law of 
equality, the punishment for qisas crimes is retribution, the punishments are usually not 
perceived as being exaggerated. The crime and punishment of qisas, as well as the option of 
compensation, is mentioned in the Qur’an in Surah 5:45 and Surah 2:178–9.192 
ii) Ta’zir (crimes with discretionary punishment) 
Ta’zir does not refer to a specific crime and has no fixed punishment. It includes all kinds of 
crimes that have no specific punishments prescribed for them, for example, eating the meat of 
a dead animal,193 taking interest (riba) or failing to respect Ramadan. Three different 
categories of crimes can be distinguished namely, ma’asi (sin), those against public interest 
(jara’im did al-maslaha al-a’mah) and those violating the Islamic religious duties 
(mukhalafat). 
The punishment for ta’zir crimes is discretionary. It is up to the imam or the judge to 
choose any form of punishment that serves the purpose of deterrence, which is what ta’zir 
means. The punishment can be, for example, a beating, imprisonment or admonition.194 
Muslim scholars disagree as to the nature and the limits of the punishment. The Hanafi school 
of jurisprudence declares that the punishment of ta’zir should not exceed ten lashes, while the 
Maliki school view is that, for the purpose of deterrence, a judge can order that the convicted 
criminal be beaten with even more than 100 lashes, as long as the whipping does not result in 
the death of the offender. Other scholars, including Hanbali scholars, believe that the 
punishment of ta’zir can even include the death penalty, including crucifixion.195 Although 
the focus of this thesis is the reformation of Islamic criminal law, ta’zir crimes will not be 
                                                 
191 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 217. 
192 Ibid at 219.  
Surah 5:45 ‘… Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal. 
But if any one remits the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of atonement for himself. And if any fail to 
judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are (No better than) wrong-doers.’ 
Surah 2:178–9 ‘… the law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for 
the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any 
reasonable demand, and compensate him with handsome gratitude…. .’ 
193 That have not been slaughtered for the purpose to be eaten, but that have died either a natural death or that 
have for example been killed in an accident or by another animal. 
194 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 219. 
195 Ibid. 
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discussed, since they, like qisas, are not considered crimes against Allah, and the punishments 
meted out for them are not fixed, and can be forgiven or compensated for.  
iii) Hudud (contravention of the limits set by Allah) 
Hudud crimes can be described as transgressions of the limits set by Allah.196 The term hudud 
(singular hadd) refers to the limit between what is permissible (halal) and what is prohibited 
(haram).197 In contradiction to this definition, however, hudud crimes are usually claimed to 
refer to crimes with specific, fixed punishments. They are believed to concern the rights of 
Allah and, consequently, it is argued that they cannot be compromised or forgiven by anyone 
other than Allah.198 This widespread understanding of hudud as fixed punishments that cannot 
be questioned or forgiven is based on the use of hudud as punishment — a crucial issue that 
will be further discussed and refuted later in this chapter. 
The Oxford Encyclopaedia lists six specific crimes (and their prescribed punishments) 
in its definition of hadd, namely ‘theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death 
by stoning or 100 lashes), making unproven accusations of illicit sex (80 lashes), drinking 
intoxicants (80 lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death)’.199 This 
reflects the common (mis)understanding that there is a specific number of hudud crimes with 
specific divinely prescribed punishments that together form a fixed set of infallible and 
mandatory ‘hudud ordinances’. 
The category of hudud crimes is therefore the main challenge to any attempt to 
reconcile Islamic criminal law with human rights. Since its punishments are considered to be 
fixed and mandatory, any attempt to amend or reform any element of this set of hudud 
ordinances is viewed as an assault upon Allah. 
The aforementioned widespread understanding of hudud ordinances, however, is based 
on several misconceptions that will be further discussed and clarified in the following section. 
(b) Hudud ordinances 
The afore described understanding of hudud ordinances as a fixed set of divinely prescribed 
and mandatory punishments that cannot be compromised nor negotiated since they concern 
                                                 
196 Ibid at 11. 
197 Sayed Sabeq Fiqh al-Sunnah 5 ed (1971) vol 2 at 355. 
198 Qaderi op cit note 73. 
199 The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, available at http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757, 
accessed on 24 October 2014. 
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the right of Allah, does not reflect the qur'anic teaching, as will be demonstrated in this 
section. The said definition implicates three premises that this chapter will refute:  
1. The set of hudud ordinances consists of a specific number of divinely prescribed 
crimes and their punishments. 
2. The term hadd refers to ‘punishment’, more specifically, to the punishment for crimes 
against the rights of God. 
3. The hudud punishments are divinely prescribed. 
If the above three premises were all fully correct, then it could indeed be concluded that the 
harsh punishments for hudud crimes, including the death penalty for apostasy and stoning for 
adultery, are prescribed by Allah and are thus divine and non-negotiable. If, on the other hand, 
as this chapter will show, they are not all fully correct, then it can be reasonably argued that 
that it is consequently legitimate to question and examine the set of hudud ordinances and to 
investigate ways to amend the punishments. This thesis actually argues that it is not only 
legitimate but even necessary and beneficial, to critically examine the set of hudud ordinances 
to identify the elements that can indeed be considered divinely prescribed and those that 
cannot. In the following section, these premises will be discussed in greater depth. 
i) The notion of the set of a fixed number of crimes 
The premise that hudud ordinances consist of a set of a specific number of crimes and their 
punishments can be refuted on the grounds that there is not one specific number of crimes that 
all Islamic scholars agree on. The comparison of the teaching and practice of hudud 
ordinances in the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence, to be undertaken in Chapter 4, 
will show that they do not all share the same understanding and definitions. The Hanafi 
school holds to five hudud crimes, the Shafei school to seven, the Maliki school to eight, 
whilst amongst the Hanbali scholars different views are found, with some holding to seven 
crimes, others to only five. The fact that there are many differences in the views of the 
different schools of jurisprudence concerning the exact number of crimes that are considered 
to be part of the set of hudud, disproves the notion of a specific number of clearly divinely 
assigned crimes and their punishments. 
The set of crimes and punishments proclaimed as hudud ordinances is not mentioned in 
the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. It can even be considered as contradicting Shariah, since the 
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correct Sunnah provides a list of seven crimes that are described as the worst sins, or the 
seven ‘destroyers’,200 that does not reflect the list of hudud ordinances.201 
ii) The debated meaning of the term hudud (sing. hadd) 
The second of the three aforelisted premises is that the term hadd refers to ‘punishment’, 
more specifically, to the punishment for crimes against the rights of God. 
It is noteworthy that the term hudud (or hadd) is generally used very ambiguously — 
sometimes it is used as referring to crimes, at other times referring to punishments. Even 
amongst Islamic scholars this is a much-debated issue. Interestingly, even the Oxford 
Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World contradicts itself on that matter. In its description of 
Islamic criminal law, more specifically the three categories of wrongs ‘that are punishable by 
the state with the object of deterrence’, the Encyclopaedia explains hudud as being ‘wrongs 
the contravention of which leads to a prescribed and mandatory202 penalty’.203 Here hudud are 
described as crimes. In its definition of hadd, however, the Encyclopaedia contradicts itself 
by describing it not as crime but as punishment, namely ‘[a] punishment fixed in the Quran 
and hadith for crimes considered to be against the rights of God’. This is just one example of 
the ambiguous use of the term hadd (or hudud). 
Despite this confusion, the claim that the term hudud refers to punishments can be refuted 
easily. The meaning of the term hadd in the Arabic language is ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’. A 
second meaning given by the Arabic dictionary is ‘prohibition’.204 The Qur'an confirms this 
meaning. The qur'anic verses that contain the term hudud are drawing the line (limit) between 
right and wrong, thus identifying what is permissible and what can be considered a crime. The 
term hudud is repeated 14 times in the Qur’an. In 13 out of the 14 verses, the term hudud is 
used in the sense of limits set by Allah, thereby identifying what is permissible (halal) and 
what is prohibited (haram). Once, namely, in Surah 9:97, the term hudud is used in the 
                                                 
200 The seven ‘worst sins’ listed in the hadith are: ‘Associating others with Allah (Shirk); witchcraft; killing a 
soul whom Allah has forbidden us to kill, except for a right that is due; consuming orphans' wealth; consuming 
Ribâ; fleeing from the battlefield; and slandering chaste, innocent women.’ Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 1 at 177 
hadith 262. 
201 Only two of the seven crimes listed as the seven ‘worst sins’ match the list of hudud ordinances, namely 
‘defamation of chaste women’ and apostasy. 
202 The idea of prescribed and mandatory punishment results from the common understanding that hudud crimes 
are crimes against the rights of Allah. 
203 Farhat J Ziadeh op cit note 190.  
204 Ibn Manzur Lisan Al-Arab (2008). 
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meaning of the ‘command’ of Allah.205 Remarkably, the Qur'an never uses the term hadd or 
hudud in reference to punishment. (The qur’anic terms used for punishment are jaza’ or ‘azab 
— not hadd.) The qur'anic verses that use the term hudud usually call on Muslims to keep the 
limits set by Allah and explain that whoever keeps these limits will be admitted to paradise, 
whilst whoever transgresses them will end in hell. For example:  
Those are limits set by Allah: those who obey Allah and His Messenger will be admitted to 
Gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever) and that will be the supreme 
achievement. But those who disobey Allah and His Messenger and transgress His limits will be 
admitted to a fire, to abide therein: And they shall have a humiliating punishment. (Surah 4:13–14) 
Those that … enjoin good and forbid evil; and observe the limits [hudud] set by Allah. (These do 
rejoice). … (Surah 9:112) 
[S]eek what Allah hath ordained for you… .Those are limits (set by) Allah. Approach not nigh 
thereto. Thus doth Allah make clear His Signs to men: that they may learn self-restraint. (Surah 
2:187) 
Those are limits set by Allah. And any who transgresses the limits of Allah, does verily wrong his 
(own) soul. (Surah 65:1) 
Now these are the bounds set by God; and grievous suffering [in the life to come] awaits all who 
deny the truth.’ (Surah 58:4 Asad translation) 
It is important to note that these verses say that those who transgress the limits set by Allah do 
harm to their own soul and they will be held accountable after death. There is no mention of a 
punishment during this lifetime. The qur’anic interpreters Ibn Kathir206 and al-Razi207 stress 
this aspect, pointing out that Allah will personally hold people who transgress His limits 
accountable in the afterlife, thus denying the need for punishment during this lifetime. Ergo, 
the Qur’an does not support the widespread understanding of hudud as punishment.  
The Sunnah confirms the meaning of hadd as referring to the ‘crime’. One hadith reports, 
for example, of a man who came to the Prophet and confessed that he had committed a hadd 
for which he wanted to be punished. When the Prophet heard that the man had joined the 
prayer, he told him that Allah had forgiven his hadd’.208 The hadith uses the term hadd in a 
                                                 
205 Surah 9:97 (Picktall) ‘The wandering Arabs are more hard in disbelief and hypocrisy, and more likely to be 
ignorant of the limits [hudud] which Allah hath revealed unto His Messenger. And Allah is knower, Wise.’ 
206 Tafsir Ibn Kathir (2002) vol 8 at 143. 
207 Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Umar al-Razi Al-Tafsir al-Kabir (2004) 30. 
208 Anas Ibn Maalik said: ‛I was with the Prophet, pbuh, when a man came and said: 'O Messenger of Allah, I 
have committed a hadd and want you to enforce its punishment on me. He [the Prophet] did not ask about it. He 
[Anas] attended the prayer and prayed with the Prophet, pbuh. When he [the Prophet], pbuh, did the prayer, he 
[the man] said: 'O Messenger of Allah I have committed a hadd of the Book of Allah. The Prophet said: Did you 
pray with us? He [the man] said yes. He [the Prophet] said: God has forgiven your hadd.’ 
Sahih al-Bukhari vol 8 at 426 hadith 6437. This hadith is narrated by both Bukhari and Muslim.  
See also Muhammad al-Shawkani Nail al-Autar (1993). 
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way that clearly refers to crime. This is just one of several similar examples that use the term 
hadd as clearly referring to the crime. 
By contrast, the ahadith that are used to support the claim that the term hadd can be used 
for punishment, are quite weak and do not provide sufficient evidence to prove that claim. 
The most famous hadith used to this end is one narrated by Abdullah and recorded in al-
Bukhari that quotes the Prophet as follows:  
Allah’s Apostle said, ‘The blood of a Muslim who confesses that none has the right to be 
worshipped but Allah and that I am His Apostle, cannot be shed except in three cases: In Qisas 
for murder, a married person who commits illegal sexual intercourse and the one who reverts 
from Islam (apostate) and leaves the Muslims.’209 
This hadith is a weak one, as it has a number of problems, both with the chain of narrators 
(isnad) as well as with its text (matn). The main problem of the hadith, however, does not lie 
with the text: far more troubling is the fact that most of the narrators who are links in the 
chain of narrators (isnad) are not considered reliable.210 Regardless of whether this hadith is a 
weak one, it is hard to understand how it can support the claim that the term hadd refers to 
punishment. The hadith does not provide convincing evidence to support that claim. 
Another famous hadith, often used to justify the meaning of punishment, is one that is 
used to defend the death penalty for apostasy. It declares ‘whoever changes his religion kill 
him’. This hadith is does not use the term hadd or hudud at all. It is not understandable, 
therefore, how it possibly can be argued this hadith can to support the use of hadd as 
punishment. Besides, the hadith is also weak, as its narrator Ikrimah was accused of lying by 
Ibn Omar, Saeed Ibn Jubayr and Anas Ibn Malik.211 
As can be seen from the above examples, there is little convincing evidence to support 
the claim that the term hadd can be used for punishment, since all the ahadith used for this 
purpose are weak.  
Nevertheless, the understanding of hadd as punishment is very widespread, as can be 
seen, for example, in some English hadith translations, which often translate the Arabic term 
                                                 
209 Sahih al-Bukhari vol 9 bk 83 hadith 17 narrated by Abdullah; Taha Jaber al-Alwani Ishkaliyat al-Riddah wal 
Murtadin min Sadir al-Islam ela al-Yum (2006) 193. 
210 The reliability of the first narrator, Abi Bakr Ibn Sheyba who died in 220 AH, was questioned by the early 
scholars al-Hakim and Abu Bakr Ibn Abi Dawud. Ibn Haban also said that Ibn Sheyba might be mistaken as 
regards this hadith. The second person in this chain, Hafs Ibn Gheath, who died in 194 AH, was accused by Abu 
Sarrah of having a bad memory, while Abu Dawud Ibn Rashid said of him that he was often mistaken. The third 
narrator, Abu Muawiyah al-Darir, was characterised by al-Hakim as being an extremist, even though Bukhari 
and Muslim referred to him. Ibn Maijn even said of al-Darir that he narrated false ahadith. The fourth narrator, 
Wakiyah, was described by Ibn al-Maddani as often being mistaken. The fifth narrator, al-Aamesh, who died in 
148 AH, was accused by al-Zahabi and al-Hakim al-Nisabori of committing fraud, and the last narrator, Masruk, 
was described by Abu Hatim as weak. Ahmed Subhy Mansour ‘Apostasy’ Ahl al-Quran, available at 
http://www.ahl-alquran.com/arabic/book_main.php?main_id=35, accessed on 28 September 2014. 
211 Al-Alwani op cit note 209 at 170. 
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‘hadd’ as ‘hadd punishment’ as can be seen for example in the following English translation: 
‘No one should be given more than ten lashes except in the case of one of the hadd 
punishments prescribed by Allah.’212 
When the above hadith is read in Arabic, it is very clear that the word hadd is 
synonymous with ‘crime’, just as it is in other ahadith. This example shows how widespread 
the (mis)interpretation of the term hadd as punishment is, and how misleadingly it is 
communicated.  
As mentioned before, even Muslim scholars are engaged in a major debate as to the 
question of whether the term hudud refers only to the crimes and the line between what is 
permissible and what is prohibited, or whether it also refers to the punishment. Several 
Muslim scholars, including Ibn al-Athir and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,213 state clearly that 
the term hudud refers only to a crime. Al-Zajaj, a scholar of Arabic language, points out that 
the root of the word hadd in Arabic is ‘prohibition’ and suggests, therefore, that ‘al-hudud are 
the crimes that Allah prohibited and that no one should commit’.214 Other scholars, including 
Imam Shawkani,215 Ibn al-Jauzy,216 and Sheikh Sayed Sabeq,217 support the interpretations of 
the term hudud as meaning both crime and punishment. Shawkani claims that Surah 2:187 
gives proof of its meaning as ‘crimes’.218 He also defines hadd as a specified punishment 
designed for violations of the rights of Allah.219 Ibn al-Jauzy describes hudud as referring to 
the limit between right and wrong and a set of punishments.220 Sheikh Sayed Sabeq stresses 
the meaning of hudud as ‘a set of punishments for certain kinds of crimes that have been 
established to prevent that the crimes will be committed again’.221 Abdul Qadir Audah, on the 
                                                 
212 Sahih Muslim English translation by Nasiruddin al-Khattab (2007) vol 4 at 485 hadith 4460.  
Another example occurs in a hadith that mentions the case of the Makhzüm woman who had committed theft. 
The English translation of the hadith speaks about ‘hadd punishment’,whereas the Arabic text of the hadith uses 
the term hadd when it quotes the Messenger of Allah who said: ‘Are you interceding about one of the hadd 
punishments of Allah?’ Sahih Muslim vol 4 at 459 hadith 4411.  
213 Yusuf al-Qaradawi ‘Al-hudud fi al-ghetab al-fiqhi al-muaser’ Al-Jazeera TV 1 April 2011 Sharia and Life 
Program, available at http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/1033246e-121f-4e87-927b-8116d8b9e544, 
accessed on 20 June 2014. 
214 Ibn al-Jauzy Zad al-Masir (2004) vol 1 at 193. 
215 Al-Shawkani op cit note 208 vol 7 at 250.  
216 Al-Jauzy op cit note 214 at vol 1 at 135.  
217 Sabeq op cit note 197 at 110. 
218 Al-Shawkani op cit note 208 vol 7 at 250.  
219 Al-Shawkani said that the ‘hadd is the punishment that is specified for the rights of Allah’. Al-Shawkani op 
cit 208 vol 7 at 132. 
220 Al-Jauzy op cit note 214.  
221 Sayed Sabeq Fiqh al-Sunnah 5 ed (1971) vol 2 at 110. 
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other hand, favours the definition of hadd as a punishment specified by Allah, namely that it 
is one that no one has the authority to change, as the punishment is Allah’s right.222 
However, if all the above information is taken into consideration it can be seen that 
neither the meaning of the term hudud in the Arabic language, nor its use in the Qur’an or the 
correct Sunnah can justify its use as referring to punishments. The aforementioned premise 
that the term hudud refers to ‘punishments’, more specifically, to the punishment for crimes 
against the rights of God has thus been refuted. 
i) Hudud punishments and their legitimation in the Qur'an or Sunnah 
The claim that all the punishments assigned for hudud crimes are divinely prescribed and thus 
holy, perfect and not negotiable can easily be refuted by examining each one of the six hudud 
crimes and their supposedly divinely prescribed punishment. A comparison of the widespread 
interpretations of Islamic jurists with the primary sources of Shariah reveals interesting 
contradictions. 
1. Apostasy (al-riddah) 
The traditional definition of apostasy (al-riddah), for example, is ‘leaving Islam willingly by 
saying or doubt or deed’.223 The orthodox Muslim scholar Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul 
Wahab has presented a definition of apostasy that is even wider than the aforementioned one, 
including, for example, failing to consider non-Muslims as infidels, considering any other 
guideline or judgment besides those of the Prophet, or disliking any of the Prophet’s 
teachings.224 
                                                 
222 Audah op cit note 186 at 78–9. 
223 Imad Ali Jumah Al-Mulakhasat al-Fiqhiyyah al-Mujazara (2004). 
A person can be convicted of having committed the crime of apostasy either by ‘saying’, for example by 
insulting Allah or His Messenger or His angels or by demonstrating disbelief, for example by ‘denying’ any of 
the basic teachings of Islam, or by ‘deeds’, for example by bowing down to an idol or by putting the Qur’an on 
the floor or in a dirty place. 
224 Sheikh Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahab issued a fatwa concerning the definition of apostasy when he was 
asked whether a Muslim who confesses the Shahada (Islamic creed) and professes his prayers and fasting, but 
behaves in a way that contradicts the Shahada by continuously committing sin, will still be considered as 
Muslim or rather as infidel. In his fatwa Abdul Wahab explained that there are ten things that will cause a 
Muslim to be considered apostate: if he does not believe that Allah is the only God, if he welcomes the idea of a 
mediator between Allah and the people as an advocate before God, if he does not to consider non-Muslims as 
infidels, if he considers any other guideline or judgment besides those of the Prophet, if he dislikes any of the 
Prophet’s teachings, if he mocks anything concerning Islam, if he professes magic, if he associates with non-
Muslims and assists them, if he believes it is not necessary to follow the Prophet or if he compromises the 
religion of Allah. Abdul Wahab op cit note 50, vol 1 at 5 (10–91). 
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The punishment for apostasy assigned by Islamic jurisprudence is the death penalty by 
beheading.225 The apostate is given only three days to repent and to return to Islam.226 If the 
apostate does not repent within these three days, he or she will be sentenced to death by 
beheading before the sunset of the third day.227 
The Qur’an mentions the crime of apostasy in Surah 2:217, and declares that if anyone 
leaves Islam (‘turns back from their faith’) and dies in unbelief, his life will bear no fruit and 
he will end in hell (‘they will be companions of the Fire and will abide therein’).228  
Hence, the verse points to a punishment in the afterlife, but no mention is made of any 
punishment for the crime during this lifetime.  
Also, in the correct Sunnah there is no evidence to support a punishment for apostasy 
during this lifetime.229 The al-Azhar scholar Ahmed Subhy Mansour confirms that there ‘is no 
punishment for apostasy in the Qur’an’.230 The ahadith used to justify the use of the death 
penalty for apostasy are all weak.231 The most famous of these is the one that declares 
‘whoever change[s] his religion, kill him’.232 As previously mentioned, this is a weak hadith 
that cannot be considered as sufficient justification for the death penalty, particularly since the 
Qur’an promotes religious freedom in Surah 2:256.233 
As can be seen from the above, neither the Qur’an nor the correct Sunnah prescribes any 
punishment during this lifetime for the act of apostasy. The punishment assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence is based on weak ahadith and reflects human interpretations and opinions and 
can therefore not be considered as divine or infallible. 
2. Adultery (zina) 
The crime of adultery (zina) is traditionally defined as ‘sexual intercourse of a man with a 
woman who is not his wife, or sexual intercourse of a woman with a man who is not her 
                                                 
225 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 372. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Abdul Wahab op cit note 50 vol 1 at 5 (10–91). 
228 Surah 2:217 ‘And if any of you Turn back from their faith and die in unbelief, their works will bear no fruit in 
this life and in the Hereafter; they will be companions of the Fire and will abide therein.’  
229 Al-Alwani op cit note 209 at 170. 
230 Ahmed Subhy Mansour ‘Hadd al-Ridha al-Mazaum’, available at http://www.ahl-
alquran.com/arabic/book_main.php?main_id=35, accessed on 1 July 2014. 
231 Suhaib Mustafa Aamedy ‘Jaremat al-Redah wa uqubat al-mutad fi al-fiker al-Islami al- Muasser’ 2 September 
2015, available at http://alhiwarmagazine.blogspot.com/2015/09/blog-post_92.html, accessed on 10 August 
2016. 
232 Al-Alwani op cit note 209 at 170. 
233 Surah 2:256 ‛Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil 
and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and 
knoweth all things.’  
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husband’.234 The punishment for adultery according to Islamic jurisprudence differentiates 
between two categories: free persons and slaves. As far as free persons are concerned, Islamic 
jurisprudence furthermore differentiates between married and unmarried persons. The 
punishment for a free married person is stoning to death, while the punishment for an 
unmarried person is flogging with 100 lashes and one year in exile. The punishment for a 
slave is a beating with 50 lashes. For Jews or Christians (Zimmi),235 the punishment is always 
death by stoning.236 The Qur’an mentions the crime of adultery in Surah 17:32: ‘Nor come 
nigh to adultery: for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other evils).’ The 
punishment assigned by the Qur’an is flogging with 100 lashes.237 Notably, the Qur'an does 
not distinguish between married or unmarried persons. Further, stoning to death or exile is not 
mentioned in the Qur’an or in the correct Sunnah. Consequently, the punishment for flogging 
can be seen as being prescribed by Allah, but the punishment of stoning to death and exile for 
one year cannot be considered divinely assigned. 
3. Defamation (qazf) 
The traditional definition of defamation (qazf) is ‘falsely accusing someone of having 
committed adultery or homosexuality or denying the sonship or daughtership of someone’.238 
The punishment prescribed by Islamic jurisprudence is a beating with 80 lashes if the victim 
were a free person, and with 40 lashes if the victim were a slave.239 The punishment of 
flogging with 80 lashes can be found in the Qur’an in Surah 24:4.240 
                                                 
234 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani op cit note 556. 
Concerning the required evidence to convict the suspect, Islamic jurisprudence says that the suspect must be 
convicted with no doubt either by personal confession four times repeated or through four male witnesses or by 
pregnancy.  
According to the traditional definition of adultery, ‘having sex with an animal’ is not considered to be hadd, but 
a ta’zir crime. The decision on the punishment for ta’zir is up to the judge. It can be time in jail or a blow across 
his face or it can be rebuked publicly or can be death by stoning. Jumah op cit note 223 at 139.  
235 Zimmi = Jews or Christians (often referred to as ‘dhimmi’, but in Arabic it is pronounced as ‘z’). 
236 Jumah op cit note 223 at 135.  
237 Surah 24:2 ‛The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication — flog each of them with a hundred 
stripes: Let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by Allah, if ye believe in Allah and the 
Last Day: and let a party of the Believers witness their punishment.’ 
238 Jumah op cit note 223 at 136.  
The suspect will be convicted of having committed the crime if he confesses the crime, or if the necessary 
evidence is presented, or if the accuser swears (al-le’an). The following requirements concerning the suspect 
must be fulfilled: He must have reached puberty, he must be mentally sane and he must have committed the act 
by free choice and he cannot be the father or grandfather of the victim. The requirements concerning the victim 
are that the victim must be a free person; he must be Muslim, mentally sane and be of good reputation. 
239 Bakr Bin Abdulah Abu Zayd Al-Hudud wal Tazirat ind Ibn al-Qayim (1994) 212. 
240 Surah 24:4 ‛And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses (to support 
their allegations) —flog them with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence ever after: for such men are wicked 
transgressors.’ 
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The crime of defamation (qazf) as well as its punishment can thus indeed be found in the 
Qur’an and the punishment of flogging can be considered as being divinely prescribed.  
4. Theft (sariqa) 
The traditional definition of theft (sariqa) is ‘stealing something that belongs to someone else 
from a locked place’.241 The assigned punishment for the act of theft according to Islamic 
jurisprudence is amputation of the hand at the wrist if the thief is convicted for the first time. 
If the thief steals again, his foot will be cut off at the ankle. If he commits the crime again, he 
will be imprisoned until he repents or dies.242 
The Qur’an mentions the crime of theft and its punishment in Surah 5:38.243 The 
punishment assigned in this verse is ‘cutting the hand’ of the thief, usually understood as the 
amputation of the hand. It is important to note, though, that the meaning of ‘cutting the hand’ 
is not fully clear. It could as well have a metaphorical meaning, referring to stopping the hand 
of the thief from reaching the money or the property of the people.244  
 In summary then, regardless of whether the punishment assigned in the Qur'an has a 
metaphorical meaning or whether it is refers to a physical amputation of the hand, Islamic 
jurisprudence went beyond the qur’anic definition by assigning further amputations and 
imprisonment for repeat offenders. The additional punishments for theft assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence that go beyond what has been prescribed in the Qur'an, can therefore not be 
considered (fully) divine. 
                                                 
241 Jumah op cit note 223 at 138.  
242 Ibid.  
For the suspect to be convicted of having committed the crime, two witnesses are required or the confession of 
the suspect (twice). The traditional regulations concerning the crime of theft furthermore require for a suspect to 
be convicted that he has stolen secretly, with no doubt, from a specific place, a specific amount with a value of at 
least a quarter denar. 
In the following exceptional cases an act of theft will not be considered to be hadd: a) If the theft took place in a 
time of famine; and b) if the stolen thing is water, alcohol, a Qur’an copy, a music instrument, a cross or idol, a 
statue, a book with drawings or non-Islamic material. 
For the punishment to be enforced on the suspect, he must fulfill the following requirements: a) The thief has to 
have reached the age of adolescence: b) he has to know about the prohibition: c) he must have done it by his own 
free choice; d) he must be sane; and e) the stolen object must be money.  
243 Surah 5:38 ‛As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from 
Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted in power.’ 
244 Mohammed Shahrur Al-Kitab wal-Quran (1990) 455. 
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5. Drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamer) 
The traditional definition of the crime of shurb al-khamer as developed by the Muslim jurists 
is ‘drinking any kind of drink that can cause the person to get drunk’.245 
The punishment for drinking assigned by Islamic jurisprudence is public flogging with 
80 lashes,246 provided that the offender is a free person.247 Concerning a free person, there are 
two different prescriptions in the Sunnah, the first requires 80 lashes, the second only 40.248 
The Qur’an mentions the crime of drinking or getting drunk in Surah 5:90249 that 
declares that intoxicants and gambling is an abomination to Allah. However, the Qur’an does 
not assign any punishment for it. In addition, there is no correct hadith to support the flogging 
for drinking alcohol. Consequently, the punishment by means of a public flogging for the 
offence of drinking alcohol cannot be considered divine.  
6. Fighting against Allah and His Messenger (haraba) 
The definition of haraba, according to Islamic jurisprudence, is waging war against Allah or 
His Messenger by word or deed, and spreading corruption on earth, including highway 
robbery.250 The punishment assigned by Islamic jurisprudence is exactly the one that has been 
assigned in the Qur’an in Surah 5:33 namely ‘execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of 
hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land’.251 Hence, the punishment for the 
crime of haraba assigned by Islamic jurisprudence can indeed be considered to be divinely 
assigned.  
A big difference between the qur'anic prescriptions and those developed by Islamic 
jurisprudence still exists, namely, in the definition of the crime on which these punishments 
                                                 
245 Jumah op cit note 223 at 137.  
For the punishment to be enforced, the following conditions have to be fulfilled: a) The suspect must have 
reached the age of puberty/adolescence; b) the suspect must have commit the act by free will; c) the suspect must 
have known the prohibition of the crime; and d) the suspect must be Muslim. 
246 In contrast to the Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of jurisprudence, which agree on a punishment of 80 
lashes, the Shafei school assigned only 40 lashes.  
247 Islamic jurisprudence assigns a different degree of punishment, depending on whether the crime has been 
committed by a free person or a slave. For the latter the punishment is only 40 lashes.  
248 Salih al-Fawzan Al-Mulahas al-Fiqhi (2005) vol 2 at 543. 
According to Sahih Muslim, the Prophet and Abu Bakr ordered that 40 lashes be given and Umrar ordered that 
80 lashes be given. Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 4 ch 8 at 482–4 hadith 4454 & 4457. 
249 Surah 5:90 ‘O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination by) arrows, 
are an abomination — of Satan's handwork: eschew such (abomination), that ye may prosper.’ 
250 Jumah op cit note 223 at 139.  
251 Surah 5:33 ‘The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might 
and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from 
opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the 
Hereafter.’  
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are imposed. The Qur’an defines the crime of al-haraba in Surah 5:33 as waging war against 
Allah and His Messenger and striving for mischief throughout the land. ‘Spreading corruption 
on earth’ or ‘striving for mischief’ is interpreted by Islamic jurisprudence as the rebellion of 
armed groups or individuals against the Muslim society by causing chaos and the bloodshed 
of innocents, including robbery and rape.252 
The addition to ‘waging war’, namely ‘by saying or deed’, that has been added by 
Islamic jurisprudence, gave a completely new meaning and dimension to the crime, as this 
definition can be interpreted extremely widely. In summary, it can be said that the extremely 
harsh and cruel punishments mentioned above are indeed prescribed by the Qur'an, however, 
according to Islamic jurisprudence it is meted out even for ‘waging war against Allah by 
word’, which does not fall under the qur'anic definition. 
It can be seen from the above review of all six hudud crimes and their punishments that 
there are many contradictions between the prescriptions developed by Islamic jurisprudence 
and those assigned in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. The claim that all the punishments 
assigned for hudud crimes are divinely prescribed and thus holy, perfect and not negotiable 
has thus been refuted.  
Further, when the above information is taken into account, namely the fact that the 
number of hudud crimes is not clear, and the fact that the term hudud does not refer to 
punishment, the claim that hudud ordinances are a fixed set of a specific number of hudud 
crimes and their divinely assigned, mandatory, perfect and immutable punishments has thus 
been proven to be wrong. As a result, questioning and examining the hudud ordinances, their 
harsh punishments and the legal justifications for those punishments cannot be seen as an 
assault upon Allah. It is legitimate and even necessary, therefore, to identify which 
punishments are divinely prescribed and which are not, and to explore as to how far they can 
be reformed.  
V Conclusion 
The claim that hudud ordinances with their cruel and inhuman punishments are divine and 
infallible and therefore immutable and non-negotiable253 is based on several misconceptions 
that have been clarified in this chapter. One of them is a widespread misunderstanding of the 
terms Shariah and Islamic law. It has been pointed out that Shariah refers to the provisions 
                                                 
252 Abdul Qadir Audah Al-Tasheria al-Jinai al-Islami Muqaranan bil Qanun al-Wadai (2008) 542.  
253 The Muslim orthodox position which defends this claim is discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
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given by Allah in the Qur’an and the correct Sunnah, all of which are considered to be divine, 
eternal and infallible. Islamic law, conversely, includes not only the Shariah prescribed rules 
and regulations but also those that have been developed by the fuqaha during the centuries as 
a human effort to interpret the God-given provisions, especially in cases that are not explicitly 
ruled on in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. All these rules and regulations reflect human opinions 
and interpretations, and can therefore not be considered infallible or divine.  
It has been pointed out that Islamic jurisprudence is a much-debated field, especially due 
to its use of weak or false ahadith. It is important, therefore to distinguish between the God-
given provisions of Shariah and the human-made interpretations and provisions developed by 
Islamic jurisprudence, which can be wrong and can even conflict with Shariah itself. The 
Islamic conflict with human rights derives mainly from the rules and regulations of Islamic 
law that have been developed by Islamic jurisprudence. This is also true for hudud 
ordinances, where significant differences can be seen between the rules and regulations that 
have been developed by Islamic jurisprudence and the provisions of Shariah. 
The punishment for apostasy assigned by Islamic jurisprudence, for example, has no legal 
basis in the Qur'an and even contradicts Shariah, for the Qur'an declares that there is no 
compulsion in religion. The punishment of stoning for adultery that has been assigned by 
Islamic jurisprudence contradicts the punishment for adultery assigned in the Qur'an. The 
punishment for drinking alcohol assigned by Islamic jurisprudence has also no legal 
justification in the Qur'an or correct Sunnah. For the crime of theft, Islamic jurisprudence has 
assigned punishments that go beyond what has been assigned in the Qur'an, and the haraba 
punishments assigned in the Qur'an has been assigned by Islamic jurisprudence to a wider 
range of crimes than those prescribed in the Qur'an. These examples disprove the claim that 
all hudud punishments have been divinely assigned.  
The widespread misconception that all hudud punishments are divine and infallible is 
based on the understanding that the term hudud means ‘punishments’ and that hudud refers to 
the rights of Allah and can therefore not be questioned, forgiven or amended. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, the interpretation of the term hudud as ‘punishment’ is not 
tenable since it contradicts its meaning in the Arabic language, and its use in the Qur’an. A 
reading of the correct Sunnah also shows that whenever the Prophet Muhammad used the 
word hadd, he was referring to a crime, not a punishment. 
The chapter has further refuted the notion that hudud ordinances refer to a fixed set of a 
specific number of crimes and their punishments. It has been pointed out that there is no 
agreement among the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence as to the number of crimes that can 
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be considered part of the set of hudud crimes. Further, there is no mention of such a set of 
crimes in the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah. Quite the contrary, Shariah actually provides in 
the correct Sunnah a list of seven crimes that are described as the worst sins, or the seven 
‘destroyers’, and this list does not match/reflect the list claimed as hudud crimes.  
By refuting the claim that hudud ordinances are a divine and non-negotiable set of 
crimes and their divinely assigned punishments, the chapter has demonstrated that questioning 
the widely accepted hudud ordinances should not be considered an assault upon Allah. In fact, 
it is the converse that is true. A critical examination of hudud ordinances actually serves 
Shariah, for exploring whether the hudud crimes and punishments assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence really reflect the will of Allah helps identifying inappropriate human 
(mis)interpretations. 
The chapter has demonstrated that Shariah is supposed to have the final word as to 
what can be considered to be a crime and which punishment should be meted out for it. It has, 
further, pointed out that the main purpose of Shariah is to serve the benefit of the people. 
Several sources of Shariah, including al-masalih al-mursalah, istihsan and sadd al-zara’i, are 
actually designed explicitly to operate for the benefit of people and to protect them from 
harm. Since it can be presumed that human rights benefit society, it can be assumed that 
Shariah would allow for a different, more human rights-based, interpretation of hudud 
ordinances than the one currently widely accepted. This is particularly so, since Shariah is 
known to be flexible enough to fit for all times and all circumstances.  
Chapter 6 of this thesis will further explore whether and how the principles of Shariah 
can be applied in a way to reconcile hudud punishment with the international laws of human 
rights. 
CHAPTER 3  
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS  
I Introduction 
In the fulfilment of the purpose of this research, which is to resolve the conflict between 
Islamic criminal law, particularly the hudud punishment, and international human rights laws, 
the aim of this chapter is to identify the twofold nature of the controversy, this being, in the 
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first instance, the human rights violations caused by hudud punishment, and the second being 
Islamic reservations preventing Muslim countries from bringing their national criminal law 
into line with international human rights laws. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the Islamic objections to international human 
rights laws that are based largely on their allegedly western origin.254 This view is exacerbated 
by the fact that western countries are regarded by orthodox Muslims as hypocritical, biased 
and applying double standards.255 It is partially for these reasons that orthodox Muslims 
usually question the universality of international human rights, one of the matters under 
discussion in this chapter.256 
Orthodox Muslims, who see international human rights laws as a western invention and 
deny their universality, often claim that human rights have been protected under Islam even 
before the United Nations under the leadership of western countries had been founded,257 and 
point to the famous Islamic concept of the protection of the five indispensables, designed to 
protect religion, life, intellect, offspring and property.258 This concept will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. The Cairo Declaration of Islamic Human Rights and the Arab Charter of 
Human Rights can be seen in the same light, namely as efforts to demonstrate that Islam 
protects human rights. 
The universality of human rights is defended in this chapter, where it is also argued that, 
despite the western influence in the development of international human rights laws, it cannot 
be denied.259 The history of the concept of human rights shall therefore be presented to 
demonstrate that human rights cannot be considered a purely western or modern invention, 
since their roots can be traced back more than 2000 years, and there is actually enough 
evidence to claim the Middle East as their cradle.260 It is pointed out, further, that Shariah 
protects several core values that can be compared to the human rights that are internationally 
protected. It is argued, therefore, that there is enough common ground between the Islamic 
and the international understanding of human rights to support the notion of the universality 
                                                 
254 Mohamed Ahmed Mufti & Sami Saleh al-Wakel Huquq al-Insan fi al-Fikr al-Syasi al-Gharbe wa al-Sharia 
al-Islami (1992) 5 & 36. 
255 Ibrahim al-Bayoumi Ghanem Al-Gharb fi Roeyat al-Harakah al-Islamiyah al-Messriyah (1999) 19. 
Zuhair al-Harthy ‘Alamiyat huquq al-insan wa izdiwajiyat al-gharb’ Al-Riyadh 7 September 2010, available at 
http://www.alriyadh.com/557760, accessed on 3 November 2015. 
256 Al-Khudairi op cit note 22; Mahbub op cit note 20.  
257 Al-Khudairi op cit note 22; Al-Qaisi op cit note 55 at 11. 
258 Madkoar op cit note 62. 
259 This does not mean to argue that human rights are absolute, timeless, or unchanging; any conception of 
human rights is specific to and contingent upon historical circumstances. Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights 
in Theory and Practice (2003) 1. 
260 Hossein Ansarian ‘Huquq al-inssan fi shariaht Hammurabi’ 14 October 2009, available at 
http://www.erfan.ir/arabic/6434.html, accessed on 16 April 2016. 
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of human rights.261 
Secondly, this chapter includes a discussion of the human rights violations caused by the 
application of hudud ordinances. The most obvious violation is the one caused by the ‘cruel, 
degrading or inhuman punishments’ assigned by these ordinances, since these are outlawed by 
international human rights laws.262 Other basic human rights that are violated by hudud 
ordinances include the principle of equality, the freedom of opinion and expression, as well as 
religious freedom.263 
Subsequently, the influence of Islamic jurisprudence on the conflict of hudud ordinances 
with human rights is expounded on in this chapter. The individual hudud crimes and their 
punishments are examined and it is pointed out that a significant portion of the prescriptions 
that conflict with human rights are not based on the Qur'an or correct264 Sunnah, but have 
been developed by Islamic jurists. 
Finally, the chapter looks at the different positions held by Muslims regarding human 
rights and the enforcement of hudud ordinances, to investigate their influence on the search 
for possible ways to reconcile the ordinances with human rights.  
II The conflict between the Islamic world and international human rights 
(a) Islamic reservations against international human rights laws 
Ever since the establishment of the international human rights bodies, the conflict between the 
theocratic system of Islamic criminal law, more specifically hudud ordinances, and the 
principles of international human rights laws has occupied the minds of not only human rights 
activists but also orthodox Muslims — who try to defend their conservative convictions,265 as 
well as moderate Muslims — who strive to find a way to resolve this controversy.266 
                                                 
261 Muhammad al-Ghazali Huquq al-Insan Beina Taalim al-Islam wa Elan al-Umam al-Mutahida (2005) 212. 
262 ICCPR art 7; CAT art 1 (1) and 16 (1). 
Khalid Abou El-Fadl Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari'ah in the Modern Age (2014) 302. 
263 Sudhir Kumar Singh Human Rights in Pakistan (2007) 68. 
264 ‘Correct’ (Arab. sahih) Sunnah refers to the ahadith that are considered reliable and authentic, in contrast to 
weak or false ahadith that are not acknowledged as (fully) reliable — mostly due to the chain of narrators (isnad) 
or due to problems in the text (matn).  
265 Abdullah Bin Abdul Mohsin al-Turki Huquq al-Insan fi al-Islam (1998) 8.  
266 Ismail op cit note 9 at 9. 
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i. The view of human rights as a western invention 
One of the main obstacles to such a resolution arises from the orthodox Islamic perspective 
that views international human rights as a western invention.267 Orthodox Muslims look at 
international human rights as a western, liberal, human-made and humanistic construct, and 
argue that since international human rights principles contradict Islamic and thus ‘God-given’ 
standards, they are based on human ‘injustice’, and are thus immoral and destructive.268 
Orthodox Muslims reject the western understanding of human rights, pointing out that 
Muslims have a completely different understanding and a different vocabulary concerning 
human rights.269 They point out that many aspects that the west considers as core human 
rights are viewed by the Muslims as an infectious disease that should be eradicated.270 
One of the main reasons why it is so difficult for Muslim countries to accept what they 
view as a western invention lies in their deep suspicion and rejection of the west in general, 
and in particular of the human rights policies of western countries,271 which are seen as biased, 
hypocritical and motivated by considerations of power politics rather than by a serious 
concern for human rights.272 Western countries are perceived to apply a double standard — 
especially when it comes to sanctions against countries because of human rights violations.273 
It is thought that they have the tendency to turn a blind eye to the human rights violations of 
countries with which they have friendly diplomatic relations that they do not want to put at 
risk.274 The United States (US) is especially criticised for applying double standards,275 since 
it does not fully comply with human rights norms, as some of its states impose the death 
penalty,276 even though international human rights laws promote the complete abolition of the 
                                                 
267 Mufti & Al-Wakel op cit 254 at 5 & 36. 
268 Ziad Ali al-Jerjawi Huquq al-Insan fi al-Tarbiya al-Islamiya wa Baad al-Falsafad al-Tarbawiya al-Gharbiya 
(1993) 15. 
Ali A Allawi The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation (2009) 197; Ismail op cit note 9 at 9. 
269 Ahmad Buhairi ‘Sheikh al-Azhar: Ala al-gharb an yahtarem nazrat al-Arab wal muslimin li manzumat huquq 
al-insan’ Al-Masry al-Youm 11 Feb 2014, available at http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/391897, 
accessed on 3 March 2014. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Al-Turki op cit note 265 at 20. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Mozar Razi ‘Al-elam silah fatak: Al-nifaq al-amriki wa siyasat ezdiwagiyat al-maayir al-gharbiyah’ Makal 
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death penalty.277 Further, members of its armed forces have tortured prisoners of war in the 
detention camp in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,278 thereby 
once more violating the ban on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, as articulated in the UDHR (art 5), the CAT (art 2 para 1), the ICCPR (art 7), and 
the ACHPR (art 5). Muslim countries, furthermore, criticise western countries, especially the 
United States (but also the European Union), for having subordinated their human rights 
policy to their national interests.279 This can be seen, for example, in their attitude towards 
Iran280 and Saudi Arabia. Even though the human rights violations in Saudi Arabia are not 
less than those in Iran,281 none of the western countries seem to be willing to jeopardise their 
good relations with Saudi Arabia,282 whilst Iran is criticised harshly.283 
Orthodox Muslims, further, are disturbed by the west’s influence and interference in 
Islamic countries, especially since the west is viewed as being immoral and irreligious.284 
Orthodox Muslims blame the west for trying to export their immoral principles, products and 
way of life to Muslim countries.285 In fact, they blame the west for causing — or at least 
significantly contributing to — all social, political and economic problems.286 They view 
western countries as colonisers who invaded the land of Islam, thereby replacing Shariah law 
with European secular law to govern the Muslim society.287 This argument refers to the 
process of modernisation that took place in the nineteenth century when Islamic criminal law 
was replaced by Western-type criminal codes in most parts of the Islamic world. It is only 
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since the last decades of the twentieth century that there has been a return to Islamic penal 
codes in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan.288 
It is understandable that, due to the historical role of western colonial powers, which 
wrongfully occupied other countries, the distrust felt by Muslims for western countries has 
still a great impact even today and causes orthodox Muslims, in particular, to view attempts to 
enforce laws of allegedly western origin on them as an assault on their Islamic identity and as 
a western ploy aimed at undermining Islam by attacking its strongest base: the Shariah.289 
The view of human rights as a western invention is furthermore based on the fact that the 
western countries have played a key role in the development of the international human rights 
bodies that are leading the effort towards the protection of human rights in our world today.290 
The roots of human rights principles can, however, be traced much further back. 
ii. The historical development of international human rights law 
The emergence of international human rights laws that are based on the concept of individual 
rights can indeed be seen as a result of the crucial developments that took place in the west. 
The American Revolution and the French Revolution, for example, spread the ideology of 
rationalism and humanism.291 This ideology derived from ancient Greece and the Roman 
Empire and was revived in Europe during the Renaissance.292 During the Age of 
Enlightenment, the ideas of rationalism and humanism were developed into the political 
sphere.293 Since this ideology is quite contrary to the theocentric ideology of Islam, this can 
explain why international human rights laws are considered a western product.  
This, however, is just part of the truth and can evoke a quite biased view. As a matter of 
fact, the roots of human rights principles can be traced much further back and some of them 
can be found in the Middle East, which interestingly is today the geographical area known for 
its human rights violations.294 The Middle East is known as the birthplace of the three major 
world religions, namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all of which influenced the world 
community and human rights significantly.295 Human rights can be considered as having 
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started in the Middle East and having spread from there all around the world, as several of the 
first known documents that protect human rights in some way or the other, including the 
Babylonian Cyrus Cylinder and the Code of Hammurabi, were born in Middle-Eastern 
countries.296 The Bible, which originated in the Middle East as well, can also be seen as a 
crucial source of human rights protection.297 Jews point to the Torah as the source of modern 
ideas of human rights,298 and Christians to the New Testament,299 while Muslims view the 
Qur’an as protecting human rights.300 The Ten Commandments, which are shared by all three 
Abrahamic religions, can be considered a common basic human rights document.301 Another 
root for human rights ideas can be found in the views of the Stoics of late antiquity, who 
shaped the idea of natural law.302 The oldest source of human rights seems to have been 
written by the ancient Egyptian pharaoh, Menes, whose true identity points to one of two 
kings, namely Narmer and Aha.303 One of the oldest ancient documents that still exists today 
is the Cyrus Cylinder of 539 BC that was produced in Babylon.304 The importance of this 
ancient document has been acknowledged by the United Nations (UN), and it has been 
translated into the six official languages that have been adopted by the UN.305 This ancient 
Babylonian charter, crafted on a baked clay cylinder in the Akkadian language in cuneiform 
script, includes several key elements of universal human rights, including freedom of 
religion,306 the prohibition of slavery,307 racial equality308 and protection from oppression.309 
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Its provisions actually match the first four articles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) of 1948 that speak about equality in dignity and rights, liberty and security of 
person and the prohibition of slavery.310 
The idea of human rights as presented by the Babylonian charter spread all over the 
globe.311 It reached the Far East via India and it reached Europe via Greece and Rome.312 The 
spread of the idea of human rights led to the rise of the concept of ’natural law’ that 
influenced the Magna Charta of 1215, which promoted the individual rights of people.313 This 
development contributed a major influence on the emerging concept of democracy.314 In the 
year 1628, the ‘British Petition of Right’ was drawn up to promote justice by granting people 
a fair trial.315 The United States Constitution, signed in 1787, became a powerful document 
protecting and granting many aspects of human rights.316 Two years later, in 1789, the French 
‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’ was introduced as a major step in 
advancing human rights in Europe,317 and in 1791, the ‘Bill of Rights’ was adopted as the first 
ten amendments to the US Constitution.318 
Mechanisms for human rights protection were thus set in place by the end of the 
nineteenth century, even though at that time they existed merely just on paper and were not 
yet practiced effectively.319 The two world wars of the twentieth century caused an 
unprecedented violation of human rights.320 Following the end of the Second World War in 
1945, representatives of 48 nations came together and produced the most powerful human 
rights document the world had ever seen: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.321 It 
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was passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 by 48 votes 
to none, with eight abstentions.322 Subsequently, the Human Rights Commission developed 
further human rights documents, including the two International Covenants on Human Rights: 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)323 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).324 These, together with the 
UDHR, are known as the International Bill of Rights.325 The aforementioned human rights 
documents promote equality and the respect for all human beings, giving wide-ranging 
protection for life, body, dignity and sanctity, as well as personal freedoms including freedom 
of thought, opinion, belief, religion, worship, and work and protect from violence, cruelty, 
injustice and arbitrariness.326 Today many countries around the world have incorporated the 
protection of human rights in their constitutions. 
iii. The Islamic world’s attitude towards international human rights laws 
Most Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan and Brunei Darussalam, that 
can be said to represent the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, have by now become 
signatories of the main human rights documents. Saudi Arabia adopted the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)327 
by accession on 23 September 1997 and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)328 on 7 September 2000. Pakistan 
became a signatory to the ICESCR (signed on 3 November 2004 and ratified on 17 April 
2008), the ICCPR and CAT (signed on 17 April 2008, ratified 23 June 2010) and the 
CEDAW (accessed to on 12 March 1996). Sudan adopted the ICCPR and ICESCR by 
accession on 18 March 1986 and signed the CAT on 4 June 1986. Brunei adopted the 
CEDAW by accession on 24 March 2006.  
Despite the fact that most Muslim states have by now become signatories to the main 
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human rights conventions and treaties, their hesitation to fully accept international human 
rights treaties can be seen in the number of documents that have not been signed. Sudan, for 
example, has not signed the CAT and the CEDAW, and Brunei Darussalam has not signed the 
CAT, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, Saudi Arabia has not signed the ICCPR and the ICESCR, 
as well as the CEDAW. Apart from that, their willingness to bind themselves to the 
obligations of the treaties that they had adopted has often been questioned due to the 
reservations that were entered upon signature or ratification.329 In fact, in respect of the 
CEDAW, more reservations aimed at nullifying treaty obligations have been entered on it 
than on any other human rights convention.330 Ann E Mayer, in a study titled Islamic 
Reservations to Human Rights Conventions,331 has analysed two representative reservations of 
Islamic countries to two important human rights conventions and established that at the end of 
the twentieth century Muslim countries shifted toward a greater acceptance of human rights 
conventions.332 Mayer noted, further, that whilst Muslim countries in the 1980s had usually 
asserted that Islamic law stood in the way of their endorsing provisions of human rights 
conventions, from 1996 they were moving away from the practice of entering Islamic 
reservations.333 Mayer concluded correctly that Muslim countries increasingly seem to try to 
convey the impression that an adherence to Islamic law was compatible with adhering to 
human rights.334 This stance, however, does not necessarily indicate whether Islamic law is 
compatible with international human rights law or not, or, in fact, whether they feel bound to 
it or not. It is rather reflective of political calculations,335 and a reaction to the pressure from 
inside and outside the countries. Muslim countries have indeed come under tremendous 
pressure internationally, especially since the west accuses the Islamic world and its Islamic 
law of being the main obstacle to a universal adoption of human rights.336 
This accusation is often countered by orthodox Muslims, who claim that Shariah is 
compatible with human rights, and that, in fact, Shariah has been protecting human rights 
even before the western human rights laws were developed.337 
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The Cairo Declaration of Islamic Human Rights developed in 1990 by the 19th Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers,338 as well as the Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted in 
1994 and amended in 2004, can be seen as attempts to demonstrate that Islam does protect 
human rights.  
At first sight, the Cairo Declaration looks very similar to the UDHR, and some 
paragraphs repeat almost exactly the UN Declaration. In art 1, paragraph (a), for example, the 
Cairo Declaration declares that ‘all men are equal… without any discrimination on the basis 
of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other 
considerations.339 This is almost the same wording of art 2 of the UDHR that declares that 
‘[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
The crucial difference, however, found in the restrictions giving priority to Shariah, for art 2 
of the Cairo Declaration declares that ‘it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shariah 
prescribed reason’, and art 24 declares that ‘[a]ll the rights and freedoms stipulated in this 
Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah’. Since the common and widespread use of the 
term Shariah in the Islamic world actually refers to Islamic law that includes, for example, the 
common understanding of hudud ordinances with its harsh punishments, the restrictions 
nullify the content of many of these articles that both seem — and claim — to protect human 
rights. Since the drafters of the Cairo Declaration most probably were referring to the 
common understanding of Shariah as being equal to Islamic law, the Declaration can 
consequently be seen as a sham. It gives a lie to any argument that there is no conflict 
between hudud ordinances and international human rights laws, an issue that will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
A first version of the Arab Charter on Humans Rights was adopted by the League of Arab 
States in 1994. However, none of the member states, ratified it, and thus the Charter was 
updated, and this amended version was adopted in 2004 and entered into force in 2008.340 The 
Charter expresses recognition of the importance of respecting human rights in the Arab world. 
The first version of the Charter confirmed the right to a life of dignity based on freedom, 
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justice and peace, and the amended version went even one step further, for it entrenched 
equality between men and women in the Arab world as well as the protection of children’s 
rights.341 The Arab Charter is, however, very inadequate, as it falls short of international 
standards and lacks of any of the human rights’ enforcement mechanism. It has an extremely 
limited system of monitoring state compliance with the Charter's provisions and has not 
established a judicial body — there is no Arab Court of Justice. 
 Despite the fact that Muslim countries increasingly claim to value human rights and 
pretend to adhere to international human rights law, violations of human rights in them are 
still reported on a regular basis in these countries. Attempts to enforce human rights 
compliance in these countries are very difficult. One of the biggest obstacles hindering 
Muslim countries’ compliance with international human rights laws is that Muslims often 
challenge the legitimacy of modern human rights.342 Because of their view that international 
human rights laws are a western invention, they question the idea of the universality of human 
rights.343 
iv. The debated universality of human rights 
Universality is one of the basic characteristics of human rights, as these apply, by definition, 
to all human beings regardless of their race, sex, religion or on the basis of any other 
distinction. The UDHR, adopted by the international community more than 65 years ago and 
still the pre-eminent document in the growing corpus of human rights instruments, explains 
that universality of human rights means that every human being is entitled to rights enshrined 
in it, that every human being is entitled to the same rights, and that these rights apply to every 
human being as an individual, protecting it from the collective.344 Furthermore, human rights 
are fundamental, as they protect basic and essential elements of human existence and are 
indivisible. 
Although the rights set forth in the UDHR have been incorporated into many 
constitutions in the world, and although the universality of human rights was reconfirmed by 
the Vienna UN World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,345 there is no universal 
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agreement as to the concept of the universality of human rights. Some states oppose the 
concept by claiming the priority of their own particular interests, namely the sovereignty of 
the state over the human rights of individuals. Some states, however, claim that their own 
constitution and their religious system take priority over the universality of human rights,346 
especially as regards the private sphere and personal life, questions of religion and culture and 
rights concerning family, children and marriage, 
Those orthodox Muslims who deny the universality of international human rights laws, 
because of its alleged western origin often point out that Islam had been protecting human 
rights well before the establishment of international human rights.347 This claim, however, can 
actually be seen as confirming or supporting the notion of the universality of human rights. 
According to the Islamic conservative understanding, Islam promotes human rights by 
protecting the core values of a Muslim society, known as the five indispensables, namely 
religion, life, intellect, offspring and property.348 According to this understanding, Islam 
protects these indispensables through its principles, legal framework, code and ethics, all of 
which are viewed to secure peace, freedom, security and a fruitful happy life for each 
individual and the entire society.349 The Qur’an and the Sunnah are considered to protect these 
values through manifold regulations, providing a proper context for these rights for all 
humanity.350 Orthodox Muslims point out that it is for the purpose of defending these values 
that Islamic law has provided a worldly punishment in addition to that meted out in the 
hereafter.351 They stress the superiority of Islamic law above international human rights law, 
demonstrating its efforts to protect the dignity and the freedom of all people.352 This Islamic 
understanding of human rights is based on the Islamic theocratic worldview. Orthodox 
Muslims point to the qur’anic verses that declare that Islam is the only true religion from 
God.353 They praise the Islamic concept of human rights, which they describe being 
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completely different from the western concept,354 namely, as being based on God’s divine and 
perfect justice and thus being holy and perfect.355 
Even though orthodox Muslim scholars believe that the Islamic understanding of human 
rights is completely different from what they call the western concept, an examination of the 
core values promoted in Shariah, demonstrates that it actually protects several human rights 
that can be compared to the internationally protected human rights. The Quran speaks, for 
example, about the protection of the sanctity of life,356 the dignity of all people,357 the 
principle of fairness, justice and respect,358 the right to privacy,359 and even of freedom of 
religion.360 The fact that the Qur’an mentions several human rights that match those protected 
by international human rights laws and by ancient documents, supports the universality of 
human rights.  
Despite the demonstrated similarity between the human rights mentioned in the Qur’an 
and those being protected by international human rights laws, crucial differences between the 
two human rights concepts, as pointed out by orthodox Muslims, cannot be denied.  
v. The protection of religion as a limit to individuals’ human rights 
One of the main differences is concerning the protection of religion, which is viewed quite 
controversially.361 On the one hand, the Qur'an says that there shall be no compulsion in 
religion362 — meaning that everyone can freely choose whether to accept the faith in Allah or 
not.363 On the other, orthodox Muslims strongly believe that no Muslim has the right to leave 
Islam.364 They refute the aforementioned verse (Surah 18:29), claiming that it has been 
abrogated by Surah 9:5, which is known as the ‘verse of the sword’. 365 This claim, however, 
is often debated. Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, for example, refutes their claim in his commentary and 
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declares that ‘there is no evidence to support this claim’.366 Orthodox Muslims thus deny the 
protection of the ‘freedom of religion’ found in the Qur'an and instead they uphold the 
‘protection of religion’, which is one of the five indispensables, the one being in opposition to 
the other.367 In contrast to freedom of religion, that is, the ‘freedom (of the individual) to 
change the religion or belief’ as defined in art 18 of the UDHR, the ‘protection of religion’ 
actually limits individual’s rights, if their behaviour contravenes the requirements of the 
religion. The death penalty for apostasy, for example, can be seen in this light, for the 
justification given for it is the protection of religion.368 Orthodox Muslims argue that no 
Muslim has the right to choose whether to follow the Prophet or not, and most of all, that no 
Muslim is granted the right to leave Islam.369 The ‘crime’ of leaving Islam is defined in a 
fatwa as being fulfilled not only if a Muslim abandons Islam by refusing to practice it or 
denying his commitment to it but also if he or she expresses a dislike for any of the Prophet’s 
guidance, advice or teachings, or believes that people have the right to choose whether to 
follow the Prophet or not, or show any kind of loyalty to non-Muslims rather than to Muslims, 
or refuse to consider as an infidel someone, who according to their understanding of Islam, is 
considered one.370 Other fatwas declare that it is the duty of all Muslims to hate non-Muslims 
and to consider them as enemies and to be disloyal to them,371 and that believing in freedom 
of religion is the greatest form of apostasy.372 This view clashes fundamentally with the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, protected by art 18 of the UDHR, and is perhaps 
the best example of the extent to which the orthodox Muslim understanding of Islam 
contradicts several of the most basic human rights principles protected by international human 
rights laws and supported by Shariah itself. 
The main area of conflict between Islamic law and international human rights laws can 
be found in hudud ordinances, as will be seen in the following section. 
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(b) The conflict of hudud ordinances with international human rights laws 
i. Cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment 
Hudud ordinances violate the norms of international human rights in many ways. One of the 
most obvious areas of conflict relates to the ‘cruel, degrading or inhuman punishments’ such 
as stoning, flogging, amputating limbs, cross amputation, crucifying and beheading, all of 
which are outlawed by art 5 of the UDHR, art 7 of the ICCPR and arts 1 (1) and 16 (1) of the 
CAT, as has been repeatedly pointed out by human rights writers.373 
The actual scope and definition of the phrase ‘torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishments’ has been subject to some critical debates, especially since pain or suffering 
arising from lawful sanctions has been explicitly excluded from the definition of torture in art 
1 of the CAT.374 Other articles of international human rights laws, however, prohibit the 
implementation of torture and any forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment with no 
exception.375 The Human Rights Committee (HRC), moreover, explicitly notes in its General 
Comment 20 to art 7 of the ICCPR that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ and that the said prohibition extends to 
‘corporal punishment, including excessive chastisement ordered for a crime’.376 This means 
that, because hudud punishments can be considered ‘corporal punishments and excessive 
chastisement ordered for a crime’, they are subject to the prohibition of ‘cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment’ according to the ICCPR, even although they might fall within the 
exclusionary clause of the CAT.377 
Furthermore, all the hudud penalties are executed in public, which is humiliating and 
degrading and thus outlawed by the aforementioned articles. The public enforcement of a 
punishment further harms the inherent dignity of a person, which is one of the basic human 
rights protected throughout the different human rights documents.378 Closely connected to the 
aforementioned right is the concept of ‘privacy,’ which is inherent in much of international 
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human rights law, and guaranteed explicitly as a right in the ICCPR (art 17). Criminalising 
consensual sexual relations between two unmarried people can thus be seen as an infingement 
of the right to privacy.  
ii. Discrimination — a violation of the principle of equality  
The principle of equality is one of the very basic human rights. Article 2 of the UDHR 
declares that ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion…’. The right to 
not be discriminated against is also guaranteed in art 26 of the ICCPR, which states:  
‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.’ 
 
Hudud ordinances infringe the right to equality in several ways as the Islamic law makes 
distinctions, especially as regards religion and sex, discriminating especially against non-
Muslims and women. Non-Muslims are discriminated against because they face harsher 
punishments than Muslims, for example, for the crimes of adultery or defamation. The details 
and differences between the prescriptions of the four Sunni schools will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Women are discriminated against and treated unequally in several ways. 
First, they are not acknowledged as witnesses to testify in cases concerning hudud crimes.379 
The discrimination of women, probably the most serious of the violations of international 
human rights law, however, concerns the hudud prescriptions that declare that a woman who 
became a victim of rape (zina al-jabr) bears the onus of proof.380 Thus, according to the 
hudud law concerning adultery, for the offender to be punished the victim has to prove the 
validity of her claim by providing either four eyewitnesses or the confession of the offender. 
In other words, it will be almost impossible for her to receive justice and, if she cannot prove 
her case, she is quite likely to end up being the one to be punished for the crime of 
defamation. 
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iii. Violation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
Hudud ordinances also clash with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
protected by the UDHR (art 18) and guaranteed in the ICCPR (art 18(1)). Criminalising the 
act of leaving Islam (apostasy) and converting to another religion is an infringement of art 
18(2) of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.’  
Similar to the aforementioned right is the freedom of opinion and expression that is 
protected by the UDHR (art 19) and by the ICCPR (art 19), both of which state in their first 
paragraph that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference’. The 
crime of haraba (fighting against Allah and His Messenger) as defined by Islamic 
jurisprudence, includes any word or deed critical of Allah, the Prophet Muhammad or Islam, 
and consequently leads to the punishment of persons for holding an opinion critical of 
Islam.381 This is a clear violation of the freedom of opinion. What makes it even worse is the 
fact that the different kinds of punishment assigned for the crime of haraba are extremely 
harsh and cruel — they range from crucifixion and cross amputation to imprisonment and 
banishment.382 
iv. Death penalty 
The inherent right to life is the most basic human right and thus requires the highest level of 
protection.383 Its protection is enshrined in art 6 of the ICCPR, one of the key documents 
laying out international standards in regard to the death penalty. Article 6, para 1 of the 
ICCPR states that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’ and the second paragraph 
states that in countries which have not yet abolished the death penalty, its implementation 
should be confined to only the ‘most serious crimes’. International human rights laws actually 
promote the complete abolition of the death penalty.384 It was for that purpose that, in 1989, 
the UN Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was formulated.385 Ten years later, in 1999, 
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the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) passed a resolution calling on all states that 
still practice the death penalty to progressively restrict the number of offences for which it 
may be imposed with a view to completely abolishing it. In 2005 the UNCHR approved the 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/59 on the question of the death penalty.386 This called for all 
states that still maintain the death penalty to abolish it completely and, in the meantime, to 
establish a moratorium on executions. This call was repeated by the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) in 2007 in Resolution 62/149.387 Human Rights Watch points out that the penalty is 
unique in its cruelty and finality, and it is inevitably and universally plagued with 
arbitrariness, prejudice, and error and should therefore be banned in all countries and under all 
circumstances.388 
Hudud ordinances assign the death penalty for a number of crimes including adultery. 
Since adultery can hardly be considered a ‘most serious crime’, the assignment of the death 
penalty for this type of act would be in conflict with art 6 (2) of the ICCPR. This is regardless 
whether or not there are other countries, including the United States of America, who still 
adhere to the death penalty and usually justify its use as a deterrent. Globally, however, there 
is a clear trend towards abolition.389 One of the main reasons for the international call to 
abolish the death penalty is the potential for errors and the wrongful conviction and execution 
of innocent persons. Today, most countries have either abolished the death penalty or do not 
practice it. The number of countries who still practice the death penalty is shrinking 
constantly.390 
v. Procedural abuses  
Another area of human rights violations in relation to hudud ordinances relates to issues of 
procedural abuses.391 The processes administered when hudud ordinances are followed do not 
offer the accused the basic right to a fair trial that is protected by international human rights 
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law. The practice of hudud ordinances gives suspects no opportunity to defend themselves or 
to appeal, request a retrial, or call or examine witnesses. This practice violates the right for an 
accused to defend him- or herself,392 the right to the assistance of a lawyer in pre-trial 
proceedings,393 and the right to appeal.394 Further, hudud ordinances also violate the right to 
equality before the law and courts, guaranteed in ICCPR art 14 (1), since women and non-
Muslims are treated differently than male Muslims, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter 4.395 The principle of presumption of innocence, protected in ICCPR art 14 (1), is 
violated for example by the Maliki school’s prescription that a thief has to be punished as any 
other thief, even if he claims ownership of the stolen object.396     
vi. Conflicts of the individual hudud crimes with international human rights laws 
As can be seen from the above, the bulk of human rights violations results from the 
punishments and from procedural abuses. Conflicts between hudud ordinances and 
international human rights laws, however, also exist as to the definitions of some of the 
crimes. While the crime of theft, for example, is also considered a crime by international 
human rights law, criminalising apostasy severely violates international human right laws, as 
previously mentioned. In addition, adultery and drinking alcohol are not considered a crime in 
most countries.  
Adultery and defamation are two of the most controversial hudud crimes, since their 
application leads to many different human rights violations, including many aspects of 
discrimination. While defamation can also be considered a human rights violation under 
international law, the definition of defamation in the ICCPR and the one in the Qur'an are 
different. According to art 17 para 1 of the ICCPR ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.’ In contrast to the ICCPR, the qur'anic definition of the 
crime of defamation in Surah 24:4 refers only to the protection from false accusations of illicit 
sexual intercourse. Further, in Surah 24:4 it is only women who are protected from being 
falsely accused. This could be seen as discriminatory against men. The definition of the crime 
of defamation, as developed by Islamic jurists by contrast, does not use this distinction and 
applies the protection from defamation to both men and women equally. Interestingly, 
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however, it is this alternation of the definition that leads to the discrimination of women, as 
can be seen in Chapter 4, where the hudud prescriptions according to the four Sunni schools 
of jurisprudence are discussed in detail. 
The crime of haraba (fighting against Allah and His Messenger) as defined by Islamic 
jurisprudence, includes several different crimes. It refers to acts of war against Muslim 
society, physical violence such as public robbery, killing or rape, and even to insults against 
the Prophet and statements or deeds critical of Islam. The different kinds of physical violence 
are all consistent with international human rights laws. Criminalising statements critical of the 
Prophet Muhammad or Islam, by contrast, and punishing persons for holding an opinion 
critical of Islam, is a clear violation of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
The individual crimes are to be discussed in more detail in the following section, as well 
as in Chapters 4 and 6. The following section will discuss the influence of Islamic 
jurisprudence, to demonstrate its crucial role in the conflict of hudud ordinances with human 
rights. 
(c) The influence of Islamic jurisprudence on the conflict of hudud ordinances 
with human rights 
Western human rights experts, who complain about the human rights violations in Muslim 
countries, usually point to Shariah as the main source of the conflict.397 Muslim countries that 
raise objections against international human rights and put reservations to human rights 
articles, on the other hand, also point to Shariah as hindering them to accept international 
human rights laws.398 Both arguments, however, are not fully correct, since the main obstacle 
is not Shariah, but Islamic criminal law that has been developed by Islamic jurisprudence.399 
This reflects the great confusion and misunderstandings both in the west as well as in the 
Islamic world about the use of the term Shariah in contrast to Islamic law that has been 
described in Chapter 2. The term is very often used to refer not only to the Qur’an and Sunnah 
but also to the rulings of Islamic jurists that in many cases contradict the teaching of the 
Qur’an and correct Sunnah.400 A review of the individual hudud ordinances shows that in 
most cases the clash between these and human rights is not caused by Shariah as recorded and 
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presented mainly in the Qur’an and correct Sunnah, but rather by the rules, regulations and 
provisions of Islamic criminal law as developed by Islamic jurisprudence.401 Many of these 
prescriptions are based on weak ahadith that cannot be considered to be fully reliable — be it 
due to their deficient chain of narrators (isnad) or the weaknesses of the text (matn).402 
i. Apostasy (al-riddah) 
For the crime of apostasy, for example, Shariah did not prescribe any punishment to be 
enforced during this lifetime.403 The Qur’an warns Muslim believers not to leave Islam404 and 
points out that an apostate’s life will bear no fruit and that whoever leaves Islam will bear the 
consequences in the afterlife, as he will end in hellfire.405 Islamic jurists, however, assigned 
the death penalty for the crime of apostasy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the punishment for 
apostasy as defined by Islamic jurisprudence declares that the apostate has only three days to 
repent and return to Islam. If he does not repent, he has to be beheaded by the sword before 
sunset of the third day.406 The ahadith used to justify the use of the death penalty for apostasy 
are weak, and can thus not be considered as a sufficient source to justify it.407 The most 
famous one is the hadith according to which the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘Whoever 
change[s] his religion, kill him.’408 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is a weak hadith, since 
Ikrimah, who is one in the chain of narrators, is considered to be untrustworthy.409 Further 
examples will be discussed in Chapter 6. One of them reports, for example, that the Prophet 
ordered some people to be killed, who ’after having embraced Islam’ had stolen the Prophet’s 
camels and killed the shepherds.410 This case, as with most of the other examples, 
demonstrates that they were not killed not only for leaving Islam but (also) for physically 
attacking the Prophet, Islam or the Muslim community. In all cases in which someone was 
killed after having left Islam, it was rather for political reasons, or for leaving the Muslim 
society and for fighting against the Muslim community. Notably, there is no hadith that 
reports that the Prophet ever had anyone killed for leaving Islam. 
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Very clear evidence that demonstrates that the Prophet did not kill apostates, can be seen 
in the hadith that reports about a Bedouin man who wanted to turn away from Islam and came 
repeatedly to the Prophet to ask him for a release from his oath of allegiance.411 The hadith 
reports that the Prophet refused to cancel the oath, but he let him walk away and was 
unperturbed by his departure.  
From these examples it can be seen that the death penalty by beheading that has been 
assigned by Islamic jurists has no strong legal basis in Shariah. Not only did Islamic jurists 
prescribe a particularly harsh and cruel punishment, in contradiction to Shariah, but, at the 
same time they even widened the definition of the crime of apostasy in a way that it no longer 
speaks only about the act of leaving Islam,412 but even includes any expression of doubt as to 
any aspect of the basic teaching of Islam. The definition developed by Islamic jurists, 
describes apostasy as ‘leaving Islam willingly by word or doubt or deed’.413 This 
interpretation will mean that a Muslim, who, for example, doubts that Allah is a merciful God, 
will be guilty of the crime of apostasy and sentenced to death.414 Denying any of the basic 
principles of Islam or insulting the Prophet would be considered apostasy by word.415 The 
offence of apostasy by deed is fulfilled by abandoning any religious duty, especially by 
neglecting the prayer, provided that it is not just on account of laziness that he neglects it, but 
due to a denial of the divine order.416 This wide definition of the crime, which even includes 
any doubtful or critical statement, contradicts the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion that are guaranteed by the 
international laws of human rights. Not all scholars share this interpretation.  
Ahmed El-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, for example, and other Shariah scholars 
including Abdul Hai Azab, Taha Jabir al-Alwani and Muhammad Salim al-Awa reject the 
above interpretation, since they do not believe that the Prophet killed any apostate. In their 
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opinion apostasy can be considered as a crime only if the apostate represents a danger to the 
state or the society by waging war.417 
ii. Adultery and fornication (zina) 
Islamic jurisprudence assigned the punishment of stoning to death for adultery committed by 
married persons and flogging with 100 lashes and one year of exile for those unmarried.418 
The penalty of exile and death by stoning that have been assigned by Islamic jurisprudence, 
have no legal justification in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah.419 The Qur’an warns Muslims 
not to commit zina, which is usually translated as ‘adultery or fornication’, and assigns a 
flogging of 100 lashes. Since the Arabic original text uses only one term for the crime, 
namely zina, there is logically no distinction between adultery and fornication. Consequently, 
also in respect of the punishment, no distinction is made as to the marital status of the accused 
(Surah 17:32 and 24:2).420 There is no single evidence in the Qur'an that would support 
stoning to death as the punishment for adultery committed by married person; on the 
contrary,421 there are several verses in the Qur’an that contradict this punishment, including 
Surah 5:32 that warns against killing a person unless for explicitly prescribed reasons:‘[I]f any 
one slew a person — unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land — it would 
be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the 
life of the whole people.’ 
The different ahadith that are employed to defend the punishment of stoning for adultery 
are all either weak (ahad) or contradict the Qur’an.422 They cannot, therefore, provide 
sufficient evidence to justify the punishment of death by stoning, a particularly cruel and 
inhuman punishment that violates international human rights laws.423 Muslim scholars 
disagree as to whether or not stoning to death has ever been prescribed by Allah or not.424 
Two main approaches are employed to justify the imposition of the death penalty by stoning. 
One group of scholars claims that the Qur’an once contained a verse prescribing stoning to 
death, known as ‘the verse of the stoning’ (ayet al-ragm), and that the verse got lost and can 
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no longer be found in the Qur’an, but that its meaning and the legal provision is nevertheless 
still valid.425 The proponents of this opinion refer to a weak hadith that speaks about stoning 
to death, saying: ‘Al-Sheikh and al-Sheikha [married man and women] if they commit zina 
(adultery or fornication), stone them as a punishment from Allah.’426 This hadith is believed 
to refer to the above mentioned ‘verse of the stoning’. There are two different ahadith that 
explain how the said verse got lost, both of which, however, are weak.427 According to the 
first one, the second caliph, Omar Ibn al-Khattab, explained that the qur’anic ‘verse of the 
stoning’ got lost during the time of collection and writing the Qur’an.428 Omar explained that 
he did not dare to put it back in the Qur’an since he was concerned if it he would do so, 
people might complain that he had added it, thus, for the sake of peace and to avoid conflict, 
he did not add it back to the Qur’an.429 Another hadith says that Aisha also spoke about the 
(lost) qur’anic verse of the stoning; according to this hadith Aisha said: ‘The verse of the 
stoning … was revealed, and the paper [that this verse was written in] was with me under my 
pillow. When the Messenger of Allah died we were preoccupied with his death, and a tame 
sheep came in and ate it.’430 This hadith seems to confirm Omar’s claim that the verse of the 
stoning indeed existed. Yet, as Aisha’s report is recorded in twelve different versions that 
contradict each other, it cannot be considered as strong enough evidence to serve as a legal 
justification for a penalty as severe as death by stoning. Most importantly, however, the two 
ahadith that are used to attempt to prove the alleged qur’anic verse of the stoning can be 
refuted by the Qur’an itself, as Allah declared in Surah 15:9431 that He guards his word, the 
Qur’an, from any error or corruption. It can be argued, therefore, that according to this claim 
Allah would never allow such a crucial qur’anic verse to accidently disappear from the 
Qur’an. 
A second group of scholars does not refer to the Qur’an as a legal basis for the stoning to 
death, but relies mostly on two different ahadith, both of which are weak as well, since they 
are reported in different, contradictory versions and since they contradict the provisions of the 
Qur'an.432 The first of these two ahadith reports the case of an unmarried man who committed 
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adultery with a married woman, and states that the Prophet ordered the woman to be stoned to 
death.433 According to this hadith, the Prophet Muhammad declared that he would judge the 
case according to the book of Allah and then he ordered that the man be beaten with one 
hundred lashes and banished for a year. As for the woman, Muhammad reportedly ordered 
that she be interrogated about the accusations, and if she confessed she should be stoned. As 
she did, indeed, confess, she was stoned to death. Interestingly, the Prophet announced that he 
would to judge the case according to the book of Allah, yet the Qur’an does not contain any 
ruling that would explain or justify the Prophet’s sentence of stoning. Consequently, it can be 
argued that the hadith cannot be correct since it contradicts the Qur'an. It is therefore not 
reliable enough to be used as a legal justification for such a severe punishment. 
The second hadith which is used to support the stoning for adultery speaks about 
monkeys.434 According to the hadith, its narrator Amr Ibn Maimon reported:  
I saw in [the time of] ignorance [ie before Islam] a monkey who committed zina with another 
monkey. [As a consequence] the other monkeys gathered together and stoned her and I did stone 
her with them.435 
This hadith completely contradicts common sense, as everyone knows that monkeys are 
animals that have no law or criminal awareness and cannot be taken as an example to follow 
and to justify human behaviour. Using this kind of hadith as a legal justification for stoning a 
person to death appears rather a quite desperate attempt to justify what can hardly be justified. 
It also ignores the sanctity of human life that is protected by Shariah.436 
As we can see from the above information, the correct Sunnah does not provide sufficient 
evidence to justify the punishment of stoning to death for adultery committed by married 
persons. As previously mentioned, the Qur'an, on the contrary, provides strong evidence to 
disprove the punishment of stoning to death. It has been mentioned further that a punishment 
for married adulterers that is different from the one for non-married ones thus contradicts 
Surah 24:2, for the verse does not differentiate between married or unmarried adulterers, or 
between a man and a woman. The term used in Surah 24:2 that Y. Ali translated as ‘their 
punishment’, is athabahuma in the original Arabic text. This does not refer to ‘punishment’ in 
general, but speaks rather of the specific nature of punishment, that, according to this verse, is 
specified as a flogging, namely with 100 lashes.437 It is noteworthy that the punishment for 
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defamation ascribed by the Qur'an is of the same nature as for adultery or fornication, namely 
flogging. This can be seen in Surah 24:4 
And those who launch a charge [of adultery] against chaste women, and produce not four 
witnesses (to support their allegations), – flog them with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence 
ever after: for such men are wicked transgressors … . 
In other words, the Qur’an is very clear and consistent when speaking about this very specific 
kind of punishment for zina, namely flogging.  
Another argument that can be used to counter the punishment of stoning can be seen in 
Surah 33:30 and Surah 4:25. These speak of two specific groups of married women for whom 
the punishment for immoral conduct is either half or double the normal punishment. Thus, for 
the wives of the Prophet it is the double of punishment given to other sinners;438 while non-
free women receive only half the penalty.439 If the punishment for adultery by married women 
would be stoning to death, this would raise the question of how it can be possible to enforce 
half or double the punishment of death by stoning. This illogicality can be understood only as 
a rejection of stoning as a form of punishment. Further, Surah 24:3 declares that an adulterer 
can marry another adulterer only.440 This verse also rejects the punishment of death by stoning 
due to the very obvious contradiction that if adulterers were stoned to death, they could not 
marry again. 
 In summary, it can be seen from the above that the very harsh and cruel punishment of 
stoning to death cannot be seen as divinely assigned and infallible, but it results from the 
human interpretations of the Islamic jurists, that are not infallible. The main conflict with 
international human rights, therefore, does not result from Shariah, but from Islamic law, 
hence from the work of Islamic jurisprudence. 
iii. Drinking (shurb al-khamr) 
The punishment for drinking alcohol is another example that shows that the conflict with 
international human rights is not caused by Shariah, but by the prescriptions developed by 
Islamic jurists, thus by Islamic law. Shariah does not prescribe any punishment during this 
lifetime for the crime of drinking, even though it condemns drinking alcohol, just as it 
condemns gambling. The reasons for the prohibition of drinking alcohol can be seen in the 
negative effects that can result from its excessive consumption, both on peoples’ personal 
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lives and on their relationship to their family and the rest of the society. Further, it can cause a 
person to forget about the existence of God. Surah 5:90 says that intoxicants and gambling are 
an abomination [to Allah].441 Islamic jurisprudence, however, prescribes as punishment a 
public flogging with 80 lashes for a free person and 40 for a slave. In contrast to the Hanafi, 
Maliki and Hanbali schools of jurisprudence, who agree on a punishment of 80 lashes, the 
Shafei school assigns only 40 lashes. The reason why the exact number of lashes is debated 
by Muslim scholars is that Islamic jurists base the punishment on two contradicting ahadith. 
One of them speaks about 40 lashes, the other one about 80.442 Islamic jurists, further, specify 
that the beating has to be carried out by men and without interruption, in order to cause fear 
and torture for the purpose of deterrence.443 None of these prescriptions can be found in the 
Qur'an.  
iv. Theft (sariqa) 
In the case of the crime of theft, the qur'anic prescription itself clashes with international 
human rights law, since the punishment for the crime of stealing assigned in the Qur'an is 
‘cutting the hand’ which is usually understood as the amputation of the thief’s hand.444 
Notably, in the same breath, the Qur'an mentions that a thief can be forgiven if he repents.445 
Islamic jurisprudence, by contrast, does not grant the thief the right to repent. On the contrary, 
the jurists have developed additional punishments for repeat offenders, from the amputation 
of further limbs (cross amputation), to decapitation, as well as imprisonment. The different 
kinds of additional punishments that have been developed by Islamic jurisprudence are cruel, 
degrading and inhuman, and are therefore banned by international human rights laws. They 
are based mainly on weak or abrogated ahadith that cannot be used as sufficient evidence to 
justify these kinds of harsh punishments. One of these ahadith reported by Abu Hurairah can 
be considered a weak hadith and has been transmitted through an anonymous narrator.446 
According to this weak hadith the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘If someone committed theft cut 
off his hand, if he stole a second time, cut off his leg, if he stole once again, cut off his (other) 
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hand if he stole again, cut off his (other) leg.’ This hadith contradicts the Qur’an for the 
amputation of a foot or leg is not mentioned in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. 
There is, by contrast, a correct hadith that quotes the Prophet on the issue of the thief’s 
repentance.447 The hadith confirms the aforementioned qur’anic concept of repentance and 
sets as a condition for the acceptance of repentance that the stolen object has to be returned. 
The Prophet said: ‘The hand is responsible for what it has taken until it is given back.’ Imam 
Shafei and Imam Ahmad, therefore, require that the thief returns to its owner what he has 
stolen.448 Some Islamic scholars agree that this is the only requirement for the repentance to 
be accepted. If the stolen object was damaged, they ask that it has to be fixed by the thief.449 If 
the object cannot be repaired or recovered, Surah 2:280450 is interpreted451 as saying that he 
should be given enough time to do so, and that it would actually be best if the debtor were 
released from his obligation. Hence, this verse can be seen as evidence of the merciful attitude 
of Shariah. Nevertheless, the crime of theft gives one of the strongest proofs to support the 
claim of human right activists, who see Shariah as the problem causing the human rights 
violations. Since the punishment of ‘cutting the hand’ is based on the Qur'an and can 
consequently be considered a ‘definite prescription’, it is indeed one of the main challenges 
for any attempt to reform hudud ordinances. Chapter 6, however, will demonstrate that even 
the punishment of amputation is not inevitable. This is particularly so, since the meaning of 
‘cutting the hand(s)’, usually interpreted as an amputation of the hand, is not fully clear. 
‘Cutting the hand(s) does not necessarily mean ‘cutting off the hand(s)’. It could as well have 
a metaphorical meaning. Further, even if it were understood as amputation, Chapter 6 will 
demonstrate that Shariah provides ways and tools to allow for exceptions from such 
prescriptions, if this is necessary to adjust to the reality of life and to protect the benefit of the 
people. 
v. Fighting against Allah and His Messenger (haraba) 
The significance of the influence of Islamic jurisprudence is perhaps best illustrated in respect 
of the crime of haraba. This crime is probably the one that results in the harshest of all the 
punishments within the framework of hudud ordinances, and the harshest mentioned in the 
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entire Qur’an, for the assigned punishment is ‘execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of 
hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land…’ (Surah 5:33). These are 
extremely cruel, inhuman and degrading penalties and thus violate international human rights 
laws.452 However, these extremely harsh penalties have to be seen in their context and in 
relation to the crime that they are meted out for, namely for actions that can be considered 
acts of war.453 Surah 5:33 assigns these harsh punishments to those who ‘wage war against 
Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land’…. 
The Qur'an interpreters explain that this speaks of physical action, such as war waged with 
weapons, in which killing and robbery takes place.454 In other words, the crime of haraba 
refers to acts of war against a Muslim nation and to acts of physical violence harming the 
safety of the public, hence, acts reflecting a high criminal energy on the part of the offender. 
This can explain the harshness of the punishment. When the life example of the Prophet 
Muhammad is looked at to see when he applied this punishment, it can be seen that he used 
this harsh punishment only once, namely in his conflict with the Jews of Medina, more 
specifically the tribe of Beni Qurayza, who had declared war against the Prophet Muhammad 
and his followers.455 Al-Alwani points out that the reason why the Prophet chose this kind of 
punishment is that it was one that was being applied amongst the Israelites at that time.456 It 
can be argued, thus, that the Prophet chose to beat his enemy at their own game. It is 
noteworthy, that this was the only historical incident that the Prophet used that punishment. It 
can be argued, therefore, that this kind of punishment can be applied, if at all, only in very 
exceptional situations, such as war against a Muslim nation. Hence, the cases that these very 
harsh and cruel punishments can be imposed are quite limited.  
The main problem with this hudud prescription is that Islamic jurists have extended the 
definition of the crime to include any act or statement that can insult or bring harm to Allah or 
His Messenger, to Muslims or to Islam.457 This extended definition has opened a wide field of 
human rights violations, for it includes even any statement critical of Islam. The following 
two statements demonstrate just how widely the crime of haraba is interpreted by Islamic 
scholars.458 Ibn Taymiyyah declares: ‘If anyone said that the robe of the Prophet is dirty, 
telling that to insult the Prophet, he has to be killed.’ Imam Ahmad has asserted that: 
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‘Anyone, [whether] Muslim or infidel, who curses the Prophet or belittles him, has to be 
killed and has no option of repentance.’459 This very wide definition of the crime of haraba 
violates the freedom of opinion and the freedom of expression, and leads to the fact that the 
harsh haraba punishment will no longer be limited to cases of very severe physical attacks 
against a Muslim nation or its public safety, but will be applied even in cases such as the one 
of the Danish cartoonist who drew a disrespectful image of the Prophet.460 The widening of 
the definition of the crime of haraba has opened the door for a terrible abuse of the harsh 
haraba punishment, and makes it easy for radical Islamic groups to justify all kinds of 
violence and atrocities against whoever they consider enemies of Islam, even if it is just 
because of statements, literature or films critical of Islam.  
A second problem caused by Islamic jurists is the fact that they developed many different 
and, at times, contradictory hadd definitions in relation to the crime of haraba.461 Sometimes 
it is not even clear to which of the qur’anic verses they refer. The definitions range from 
‘highway robbery’ or ‘armed robbery’ and ‘rape’ to ‘rebellion’, all mixed up at times with the 
crime of ‘apostasy’. Al-Alwani has complained of the great confusion that has been created 
by the jurists, and wondered how they came up with the idea to mix the crime of haraba with 
apostasy and rebellion.462 
The striking contradictions between Shariah and the interpretations of Islamic 
jurisprudence, mentioned above, are usually completely ignored in the international debate 
about the violations of human rights in Muslim countries. It is due to this fact that there is 
great confusion, both in the west as well as in the Islamic world. Human rights’ experts 
wrongly claim that Shariah is the main source of the conflict;463 and orthodox Muslims 
wrongly defend hudud ordinances as divine and infallible, claiming that the set of hudud 
crimes and punishments have been divinely prescribed in the Shariah.464 
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(d) The different Muslim positions towards hudud ordinances and human rights 
i. The orthodox Muslim view — defending hudud ordinances and rejecting reforms 
Orthodox Muslims defend hudud ordinances and reject any attempt of reformation.465 They 
argue that Islam proposes a society of justice and that criminal behaviour, therefore, cannot be 
tolerated, especially since it is viewed as violating God’s sovereignty.466 They stress the 
importance of securing a peaceful social life by protecting society from criminals.467 They 
argue that in order to prevent crimes from occurring, severe punishments are justified and 
necessary for the purpose of deterrence.468 This confidence in the effectiveness of hudud 
punishments as a deterrence has become a deeply-held conviction of orthodox Muslims. This 
is particularly so since the punishments are believed to have been divinely ordained and 
designed by Allah as a measure of deterrence.469 Questioning the allegedly divinely ordered 
hudud punishments is therefore considered a questioning of the underlying divine wisdom 
that they are based on and thus a denial of the divinity of the Qur’an.470 Human rights 
activists, who call for an abolition of hudud ordinances, unsurprisingly are viewed by 
orthodox Muslims as blasphemers.471 This is particularly so since they see human rights as 
universal and thus superior to what orthodox Muslims consider divine revelation.472 The 
belief of human rights activists that human judgment could determine whether a punishment 
decreed by God is appropriate or not, is considered to contradict the Islamic theocentric 
worldview, particularly since Shariah is considered to be infallible and superior to any 
human-made law, including international human rights laws.473 Orthodox Muslims would 
never consider subordinating their Shariah-based laws to international human rights laws or 
to bow to the pressure of human rights activists, whose views are known to be based on 
humanistic thinking.474 It is for this reason that orthodox Muslim scholars usually reject any 
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approach to reform Islamic criminal law as an attempt to sabotage with the aim of 
demolishing their fundamental religious and moral principles.475 
Orthodox Muslims seem to completely ignore the realities of life, and the developments 
and changes that have taken place in the Muslim society over time, including the changing 
ways of people’s lives. They also neglect the principle of ijtihad and the use of logic, and fail 
to recognise that universal human rights can be in agreement with Shariah. 
ii. Secular Muslim view — calling for the separation of religion and state 
Secular Muslims care very much about the realities of life, about human rights and about the 
gift of logic and common sense.476 They believe that using human logic and common sense is 
the best way to lead a society towards a healthy development.477 Accordingly, they view 
human rights as a product of human logic.478 Secular Muslims promote the separation of 
religion and state and reject codifying and applying Islamic law, including the hudud 
ordinances.479 They view religion as a bad dogma, which dictates and abuses people by using 
the name of God.480 
The renowned Arabic secular writer Khalil Abdel-Karim is one of the voices advocating 
the separation of state and religion.481 Abdel-Karim points out to the strong influence that pre-
Islamic Arabic traditional law had on the Islamic teaching as presented in the Qur'an and 
practiced by Muhammad.482 He concludes that this is why Islamic law that might have been 
suitable to a society of the seventh century does not fit with that of the twenty-first century.483 
Orthodox Muslims reject this secular view completely and would not even consider as 
Muslim a person who holds this kind of opinions.484 
                                                 
475 Al-Zoheily op cit note 9; Ismail op cit note 9 at 7. 
476 Khalil op cit note 55 at 423. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Saleh Bin Muhammad Bin Umar al-Dimeji Mawqif al-Libraliyah fi al-Bilad al-Arabiyah min Muhakimat 
Addin (2011) 793; Zakaria op cit note 58 at 157. 
480 Zakaria op cit note 58 at 141. 
481 Karim’s work focuses on a critical study of Islam as a religion and system, giving special attention to social 
and economic issues. 
482 Khalil op cit note 57 at 423. 
483 Ibid. 
484 Mansour Obohafy Al-Elmaneun wa Ansanat al-Quran (2010) 75. 
© Mark A. Gabriel –– Ph.D. Research –– University of Cape Town 
86 
iii. The moderate Muslim position — striving to build bridges 
Moderate Muslims including members of the Sufi movement485 view human rights as being 
part of the Islamic teaching, even though Islamic holy texts do not speak about them as 
explicitly as universal human rights laws do.486 They consider Shariah as the perfect divine 
constitution that, if interpreted and applied correctly, can lead to a good level of compliance 
with international human rights laws.487 They view Islamic jurisprudence as being responsible 
for the conflict between Islamic law and international human rights laws.488 In their opinion, 
Islamic scholars and jurists do not pay the necessary attention to the requirements and 
challenges of modern life and society.489 
Most moderate Muslims, therefore, support and promote attempts to reform Islamic law, 
for example, by filtering the rules and regulations of Islamic law and/or by re-interpreting the 
primary, secondary and subsidiary sources of Shariah, using the concept of ijtihad to make 
Islamic law relevant to our current context. 
The Egyptian, Gamal al-Banna, for example, proposes to sift the Sunnah using a specific 
guideline based on the Qur’an.490 He suggests that any report that is in conflict with human 
rights and freedom of religion or one that insults or belittles women should be rejected.491 The 
famous Sudanese scholar, An-Na’im, views the shift in the content of the Islamic message 
from the qur’anic legislation of Mecca to the one of Medina as one of the main reasons why 
Islamic law violates some of the most fundamental international human rights.492 He, 
therefore, stresses the importance of understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah in their historical 
context.493 The famous Libyan writer, al-Sadiq al-Nayhum, considers contemporary Islam a 
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corrupted form of Islam, one created by the Muslim jurists whose interpretations misrepresent 
the true Islam and lead to the abuse of Muslim women.494 Al-Nayhum, therefore, calls for a 
return to the original Islam, preached and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad himself.495 
The Swiss Muslim scholar, Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of the Egyptian founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna, went one step further, declaring hudud punishments as 
an invention of Islamic scholars.496 His article titled ‘Stop, in the name of humanity’,497 in 
which he called publicly to put a moratorium on hudud penalties, has been the subject of 
harsh criticism from conservative Muslims.498 
Most of the previously mentioned moderate Muslims, though, are completely loyal to 
Shariah and are driven by a sincere desire to renew the true teaching of Islam. Sadly, they and 
their views face much rejection from orthodox Muslims.499 An-Na’Im, who is one of the most 
famous moderate scholars of Islam and human rights, has also often been harshly criticised by 
conservative Muslims.500 His is one of the voices promoting the universality of human rights. 
He stresses that, despite the secular western origins of human rights defined by the UDHR, 
human rights indeed are truly universal.501 He justifies his claim by pointing to the fact that 
‘the moral or philosophical foundations and political justification of the conception of human 
rights as defined by the UDHR can be found in different religious and cultural traditions’.502 
An-Na’Im even sees some common ground between Islamic law and the human rights laws 
and points out that ‘the historical formulations of Shariah provided a protection for certain 
human rights’. He notes the Muslim claim that: ‘[H]istorical formulations of Shariah have 
always secured human rights in theory, though such a situation may not have materialized in 
practice.’503 
                                                                                                                                                        
only temporarily at that time, due to the given circumstances, and that they are not to be seen as a final or 
conclusive repeal of the earlier texts.  
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’Im ‘Translators’ introduction’ in Mahmoud Mohamed Taha The Second Message of 
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494 Al-Nayhum op cit note 56 at 103 & 229.  
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498 Tariq Dalouani 'Tariq Ramadan wa dawatoho le taleq al-hudud’ 31 March 2005 Majalat al-Asser, available at 
http://alasr.me/articles/view/6504, accessed on 17 April 2016. 
499 Ahmed Host Faqihi ‘Hakaza takalama Nasr Hamed Abu Zeyd’ Okaz Newspaper 13 July 2010, available at 
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The Jordanian scholar, Marwan Ibrahim Qaisi, like An-Na’im, attempts to build a bridge 
between Islam and human rights by promoting an understanding of human rights that 
corresponds to international human rights laws yet is based on Shariah.504 He, however, goes 
somewhat further by declaring that the universality of human rights and equal dignity for all 
mankind can be based on the Qur’an.505 He stresses that ‘[h]uman dignity is the cornerstone 
of the human rights topic’ and that ‘human rights in Islam derive from that great element’. In 
so doing, he refers to Surah 17:70 that says that Allah has ‘honoured the sons of Adam’ and 
explains that:  
[T]reating someone unjustly is violating his human dignity and if the human dignity of a person 
has been violated, his human rights are violated. This gift of dignity is shared by the entire 
human race without distinction by their beliefs, colours, culture, age or social position.506 
Those Muslims, who have stayed loyal to their community and their religious inheritance, can 
be seen as the biggest hope for reformation in the Islamic world. These are the Muslims who 
strive to help the Muslim community and the rest of the world by building bridges of common 
understanding. This is also what al-Gharbawi concluded from his study of the difficulties that 
hinder reformation in the Islamic world. He puts his hope in those Muslims who are willing to 
modernise, but not necessarily westernise.507 
What most of these moderate Muslims have in common is an understanding that the 
cause of the conflict between the Islamic world and international human rights is not with 
Shariah, but with Islamic jurisprudence. 
III Conclusion 
Human rights are considered to be derived from the inherent dignity of the human person. 
Consequently, everyone is entitled to the same rights and freedoms, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language or religion. This is the widely accepted 
understanding of human rights, as recorded in the UDHR and other international human rights 
documents. Despite the fact that these human rights documents were written as recently as 
within the past century, it can still be argued with confidence that human rights are universal, 
since the notion of human rights can be traced back over thousands of years and can be found 
in different times and religions.  
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507 Al-Gharbawi op cit note 14 at 89. 
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Nevertheless, human rights are still facing great challenges today. The notion of their 
universality, which is one of the most basic characteristics of human rights, is often 
challenged, especially by orthodox Muslims who view international human rights laws as a 
western liberal product and an assault on the Islamic identity. Interestingly, orthodox Muslims 
stress, at the same time, that Islam promotes human rights, namely by protecting the five 
indispensables. This claim, however, can actually be seen as supporting rather than refuting, 
the notion of universality. In fact, Shariah can indeed be seen as protecting human rights, 
since the Qur'an promotes several human rights that can be compared to those internationally 
protected, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5. These commonly shared human rights 
include justice and human dignity, the right to life, property and privacy.508 
Nevertheless, the Muslim orthodox understanding of Islam and Islamic law contradicts to 
the core several of the basic human rights principles protected by international human rights 
laws — especially the principles of equality, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as 
well as the protection from bodily harm and torture. The greatest challenge to human rights in 
the Islamic world is Islamic criminal law — especially hudud ordinances as developed by 
Islamic jurisprudence, for they violate international human rights principles in many ways. 
This, to a great extent, is due to their cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments that are 
outlawed by international human rights laws. Hudud ordinances also discriminate against 
women and non-Muslims and violate freedom of religion, opinion and expression, as well as 
principles of due process and fair trial. 
Interestingly, both human rights activists and orthodox Muslims usually point to Shariah 
as the main reason for the conflict. Human rights activists view Shariah as the main obstacle 
and source of human rights violations in Muslim countries, while Muslim countries often 
object to international human rights law based on alleged contradictions to Shariah. Both 
sides, however, are not fully correct in this regard, as the main obstacle is not Shariah, but the 
rulings and prescriptions developed by Islamic jurisprudence. Notably, the most critical hudud 
prescriptions that clash significantly with international human rights are not based on the 
Qur'an or the correct Sunnah, but on the interpretations of Islamic jurists that cannot be 
considered divine or non-negotiable since they are based on human understanding.  
Orthodox Muslims, however, defend hudud ordinances and claim that are divine and thus 
non-negotiable — a claim that has already been refuted in the previous chapter — and they 
employ the argument of the deterrent function of harsh punishments. 
                                                 
508 See ch 5 (I) (b) for Islamic legal source; international human rights laws: UDHR arts 1,2,12 &17; ICCPR arts 
3, 4 & 6; CEDAW art 3; ICESCR art 7 & 2 (2). 
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Secular Muslims, on the contrary, are critical of religion and thus call for a moratorium 
on hudud ordinances, something that for orthodox Muslims is not an option at all.  
Many moderate Muslims acknowledge that there is a great need to do something about 
the conflict of hudud ordinances with human rights, while at the same time they are fully loyal 
to Shariah and acknowledge it the perfect divine constitution. They believe that if interpreted 
and applied correctly, Shariah can lead to a good level of compliance with international 
human rights laws. These moderate Muslims call for a re-interpretation of the primary, 
secondary and subsidiary sources of Shariah to make Islamic law relevant in the 
contemporary context. Despite their loyalty to Shariah, these moderate Muslims usually 
suffer rejection by orthodox Muslims. Even distinguished Muslim writers have been easily 
labelled by conservative Muslims as renegades and neo-colonialists.  
If devout Muslims with a sincere desire to renew the true teaching of Islam are criticised 
so harshly, simply because they try to reconcile Islamic law with international human rights 
law, it is logical that it will almost be impossible for human rights activists or organisations 
(especially the non-Muslim ones) to convince or force conservative Muslims to adhere to 
standards of international human rights laws. This is why it is so important that efforts to solve the 
conflict of hudud ordinances with international human rights standards come from inside Muslim 
society and, most importantly, that the orthodox Muslims’ arguments are taken seriously and 
responded to appropriately. It is for this purpose that this thesis presents an approach that aims at 
resolving the conflict, taking the conservative views very seriously and trying to develop a 
way of settling the conflict based on arguments that are fully loyal to Shariah.  
CHAPTER 4  
HUDUD ORDINANCES ACCORDING TO THE FOUR SUNNI 
SCHOOLS OF JURISPRUDENCE 
I Introduction 
This chapter discusses the hudud ordinances according to the four main Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence, namely the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali schools.509  
                                                 
509 Whilst all four schools agree on the basic fundamental teachings, differences concerning secondary issues can 
be found. 
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The first part of the chapter discusses the legal prescriptions of hudud ordinances 
according to the four Sunni schools. The section starts by pointing out the different views as 
to which crimes should be considered to be part of hudud ordinances. Interestingly, the four 
schools disagree on the exact number of crimes to be part of the set of hudud ordinances, even 
though they all share the understanding of hudud ordinances as a specific and perfect set of 
divinely prescribed crimes and punishments.510 While the Hanafi school believes that the set 
of hudud ordinances consists of five hudud crimes and their punishments, the Shafei school 
holds to seven crimes, and the Maliki school to eight. Amongst Hanbali scholars different 
views are found. Some hold to seven crimes, others to only five. This chapter will, therefore, 
first give an overview of the differing lists of hudud crimes held by the four Sunni schools and 
explain the main reasons that led to the different views. It follows with a discussion of each 
one of the hadd crimes individually. The purpose of this is to compare the diverse views on 
the ordinances according to the four Sunni schools and explore the legal prescriptions 
articulated by these schools. A special focus will be on the different opinions and regulations 
concerning each crime’s definition, the punishment meted out for it, and the legal 
requirements for a suspect to be convicted. 
The chapter aims to demonstrate that there are so many different opinions held by the 
four Sunni schools — several of which even contradict the Qur'an — that the notion that 
hudud ordinances refer to a divinely prescribed and thus perfect and infallible set of 
punishments, can hardly be maintained. By exposing these weaknesses of the hudud 
ordinances, the chapter aims to demonstrate the necessity to amend and reform them. 
The second part of the chapter looks at the practical application of hudud ordinances in 
the Muslim world. It starts by giving an overview over the development and the geographical 
distribution of the four Sunni schools.  
It looks, then, at four representative countries that apply hudud ordinances fully in the 
entire country, namely Saudi Arabia that fully applies the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, 
Pakistan as a representative of the Hanafi school, Sudan that applies the Maliki school and 
Brunei Darussalam that has just started implementing hudud ordinances according to the 
Shafei school of jurisprudence. The focus will be on their national criminal law and the 
international concerns regarding human rights violations in these countries.  
                                                 
510 Mohammed al-Zoheily Al-Muatamad fi al-Fiqh al-Shafei 3 ed (2011) vol 5 at 145. 
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II The legal prescriptions of hudud ordinances according to the four Sunni 
schools of jurisprudence 
The number of hadd crimes that the four schools consider to be part of the set of hudud 
ordinances differs between five and eight. The five hudud crimes that the Hanafi school holds 
to are those that all four schools agree on, namely, illicit sexual intercourse (zina), defamation 
(qazf), theft (sariqa), drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr) and highway robbery (qata al-
tariq).511 The seven crimes that the Shafei school holds to, include, in addition, rebellion (al-
baghi) and apostasy (al-riddah).512 The Maliki school adds an eighth crime, for it is the only 
school that considers fighting against Allah and His Messenger (haraba) as a hadd crime.513 
Within the Hanbali school there are divergent views, as some scholars consider rebellion and 
apostasy as hudud crimes, whilst others view them as ta’zir crimes. Accordingly, some of the 
Hanbali scholars hold to five hudud crimes, others to seven.514 
One of the main reasons for these differences is the confusing interpretations of the 
crimes of haraba (fighting against Allah and His Messenger), qata al-tariq (highway robbery) 
and al-baghi (rebellion). Some scholars even link apostasy and theft to the aforementioned 
crimes, by describing apostasy as a form of rebellion and comparing the crime of theft to 
highway robbery.  
Interestingly, all four schools consider the crime of highway robbery (qata al-tariq) as a 
hadd crime, even though its legal justification is not as clear as the crime of fighting against 
Allah and His Messenger (haraba) that is listed as a hadd crime by only the Maliki school and 
some Hanbali scholars.  
The reason for the confusion evolving around the use and definitions of the crimes of 
haraba, qata al-tariq and al-baghi is that they are all drawn from the same legal source, 
namely Surah 5:33. This assigns to ‘those who wage war against Allah and his Messenger, 
and strive with might and main for mischief through the land’ the punishment of ‘execution, 
or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land’. 
The first crime mentioned in that verse is ‘fighting against Allah and His Messenger’. 
The term haraba is derived from yuharibuna, meaning ‘those who fight’. Harb means war. 
This crime is therefore probably best interpreted as a ‘[d]eclaration of war against an Islamic 
                                                 
511 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 12–13. 
512 Audah op cit note 186 at vol 1 at 79; Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 12. 
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state’,515 or as referring to ‘acts of war’.516 The background of this understanding was 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 2, where it was explained that some scholars widened the 
definition to ‘waging war against Allah and His Messenger by saying or deed’.517 This 
definition includes any act or statement that can insult or bring harm to Allah or his 
Messenger, or to Islam, or to Muslims.518 Widening the definition of the crime of haraba to 
this extent gives it a completely new dimension, especially when considering the extremely 
harsh and cruel punishments assigned for it.  
The second part of the crime described in the above verse speaks of those ‘who strive 
with might and main for mischief through the land’ (Yusuf Ali translation) or ‘who … spread 
corruption on earth’ (Muhammad Asad’s translation, usually closer to the original Arabic text 
than the popular Ali translation). It is on this part that the hudud crimes of highway robbery 
and rebellion are based. The Arabic text of the verse uses the term yufsidun, best translated as 
‘people who spread corruption’.  
The crime known as highway robbery (qata al-tariq) is based on the understanding of 
‘those who … strive … for mischief through the land’. It is often defined as ‘going out to 
hijack the people, stealing their money or terrorising them or killing them publicly by use of 
force’,519 or as the rebellion of armed groups or individuals against the Muslim society by 
causing chaos and bloodshed of the innocent, including robbery and rape.520  
The Arabic term qata al-tariq, which translates as highway robbery, is not found in Surah 
5:33, but derives from Surah 29:29:  
Do ye indeed approach men, and cut off the highway?- and practise wickedness (even) in your 
councils?’ … ‘Bring us the Wrath of Allah if thou tellest the truth. 
Even though the name of the crime is not used in Surah 5:33, the punishments assigned for 
highway robbery are those given in Surah 5:33.521 Given that all four schools list qata al-tariq 
as a hadd crime and assign for it the punishment of Surah 5:33, they apparently agree that the 
above verse in Surah 29:29 speaks of the same crime as that mentioned in Surah 5:33. 
The crime of rebellion (al-baghi) is based on the same text of Surah 5:33, particularly on 
its reference to ‘spreading corruption on earth’.522 This is usually defined as rebellion against 
                                                 
515 Okon op cit note 67 at 229. 
516 Tafsir Ibn Kathir (1999) vol 3 at 96. 
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the imam (or his assistants or his governors), whether from lacking submission or disobeying 
him.523 Some scholars describe the rebellion as not just referring to the imam, but ‘against 
constituted authority [that can be] either a political leader or economic order’.524 This 
understanding is less common and significantly wider than the first.  
Again, the name of the crime, al-baghi, does not derive from Surah 5:33 but from a 
different verse, namely Surah 49:9, one that calls on conflicting parties to solve their conflicts 
peacefully if possible:  
If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of 
them transgresses beyond bounds against the other then fight ye (all) against the one that 
transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies then make peace 
between them with justice and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just). 
The term al-baghi (rebellion) comes from bagha, a word that refers to ‘transgress beyond 
bounds’. In contrast to highway robbery, the crime of rebellion refers to physical attacks 
motivated by hermeneutic reasons, ie due to disagreement on interpretations of religious texts. 
The struggle of the group of Khawarij, who fought against the fourth caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib 
because of religious and political disagreement, is a good example for such an act of rebellion. 
The punishment assigned for the crime of rebellion is the same as the one for highway 
robbery, namely the one described in Surah 5:33. 
Since the three crimes of haraba, highway robbery and rebellion share the same legal 
basis and the same punishment, and especially since their definitions greatly overlap, it is not 
quite comprehensible as to why the Islamic jurists have defined them as three different 
crimes. They are so closely connected to each other that it is almost impossible to identify 
exact distinct definitions, as can be seen below. 
It can be argued that the crime of haraba includes both qata al-tariq (highway robbery) 
and al-baghi (rebellion). This can be justified by the aforementioned understanding of haraba 
as waging war against the Muslim society525 including any act that harms or aims to destroy 
the state or to undermine the structure of the state or society, including threatening the public 
safety and order by using violence, killing and rape.526  
It is due to these overlapping definitions of the three crimes that the penal codes of the 
four countries discussed in this chapter use the terms in such a confusing way. Pakistan527 and 
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Brunei, for example, include robbery in their list of hudud crimes, but call it haraba — Brunei 
calls it hiraba. Pakistan lists the crime of rebellion separately; Brunei does not include 
rebellion in its list of hadd crimes. The Saudi528 and the Sudanese penal codes529 list haraba, 
qata al-tariq and al-baghi separately. 
In the following section, the hudud crimes will be discussed individually, exploring and 
comparing the different views and opinions of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, 
especially concerning their definitions, requirements for conviction and punishments.  
(a) Illicit sexual intercourse (zina) 
The hadd crime of illegal sexual intercourse is based on Surah 17:32 and 24:2. The two verses 
speak of the crime of zina, usually translated as ‘adultery and fornication’. Islamic scholars 
usually speak of ‘adultery’ when referring to extra-marital sex between married persons and 
of ‘fornication’ when referring to sexual intercourse between those who are not married. It is 
important to note that such differentiation cannot be found in the Qur'an. The relevant two 
qur'anic verses speak only about one crime, namely zina, and prescribe one specific 
punishment for it, namely flogging with 100 lashes. In contrast to this qur'anic text, Islamic 
jurists assigned different punishments depending on whether the crime is committed by a 
married or unmarried person. All four Sunni schools agree on the punishment of stoning to 
death for adultery between married persons, and flogging with 100 lashes and a year in exile 
for illicit sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.530  
The Hanbali school believes that for a married adulterer both punishments, namely 
flogging and stoning, should be combined. According to them, the flogging with 100 lashes 
should be carried out on the first day, and on the second day the convict should be stoned to 
death.531 The Maliki,532 Shafei533 and Hanafi534 schools, by contrast, reject combining 
flogging and stoning, since they believe that the stoning sentence abrogates flogging.  
The Shafei and Hanbali schools agree that unmarried convicts should be exiled for a year 
after the flogging.535 The Maliki school agrees to banish male offenders, whilst they reject 
                                                 
528 Shaima Atta ‘Criminal law in Saudi Arabia’ Qatar Law Forum 19 February 2010, available at 
http://www.mn940.net/forum/forum29/thread8833.html, accecced on 23 December 2015. 
529 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 12&13. 
530 Muhammad Bin Framuz al-Hanafi Al-Durar al-Hikam fi Gurar al-Ahkam (2008) vol 2 at 63. 
531 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 60. 
532 Abdulalah Bin al-Jalab al-Basri Al-Tafriyah (1987) vol 2 at 221–4. 
533 Ismael al-Masri al-Mazni Muktasar al-Mazni fi Ferua al-Shafieyah (1998) 342. 
534 Muhammad Amin Ibn Abidin Al-Dur al-Mukhtar Shariah Tanweer al-Absar (2003) vol 6 at 5-53. 
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exile for female offenders, since they believe that women could be led astray during exile.536 
The Hanafi school rejects the punishment of exile completely, since is not mentioned in the 
Qur'an, and the only legal basis for this practice is a weak hadith (hadith ahad).537 
In cases in which a married person commits adultery with someone who is single, the 
schools disagree as to the sentence. The Shafei538 and Maliki539 schools say that only the one 
who is married (muhsan) should be stoned to death, whilst the one who is not married should 
not be stoned but flogged with 100 lashes.540 In other words, according to the Shafei and 
Maliki schools, each one will be punished according to his own crime and circumstances. The 
Hanafi541 and Hanbali542 schools, by contrast, hold that the punishment of stoning should be 
applied only if both parties are married. If one is not married, neither of them should be 
stoned, but both should be flogged with 100 lashes.  
The question as to whether or not the death penalty by stoning should be meted out on 
non-Muslims also depends greatly on the definition of the term muhsan.543 Islamic jurists 
usually use the term as referring to married in contrast unmarried. The term is used in 
Surah 5:5 in its description of what kind of woman is lawful for a Muslim. Here, the term 
muhsan refers to a chaste (muhsana) woman, in the sense of a woman who does not commit 
adultery or fornication.544 The four schools disagree on whether a non-Muslim can be 
considered muhsan. Whilst the Hanafi and Maliki schools hold the opinion that only Muslims 
can be considered muhsan,545 according to the Shafei and Hanbali schools, non-Muslims can 
be also considered muhsan.546 Consequently, according to the Hanafi and Maliki schools, 
non-Muslims will never be stoned for adultery, since they are not considered muhsan. The 
Hanbali and Shafei schools, however, enforce stoning, even on non-Muslims. Enforcing 
hudud ordinances on non-Muslims also can be seen as a violation of religious freedom.  
                                                 
536 Al-Qadi Abdul Wahab al-Bagdadi Al-Maaunah ala Mazhab al-Imam Malik (1995) 1374. 
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539 Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 922–6. 
540 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 56. 
541 Umar Bin Ibrahim Ibn Najm Al-Naher al-Faeq fi Sharh Kenz al-Daqaeq (2002) vol 3 at 135–43.  
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The Shafei school assigns stoning on any married adulterer, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim, independently of whether the other party is married or not. The Hanbali school 
assigns stoning on married adulterers, independently of whether they are Muslim or not, but 
only if both parties are married. So, even if both are non-Muslims they can be stoned. The 
Maliki school assigns stoning on all married Muslim adulterers, even if the other party is non-
Muslim or single, and, according to the Hanafi school, stoning to death will be imposed only 
if both adulterers are married Muslims; in other words, if the other party is either single or 
non-Muslim, a married Muslim who is convicted of adultery will not be stoned. 
The four schools disagree as to the punishment for Jews or Christians convicted of 
adultery or fornication. Since the Hanafi and Maliki schools do not acknowledge non-
Muslims as muhsan, they argue, according to the aforementioned, that in the case of adultery 
committed by Jews or Christians, the punishment of stoning should not be applied. Instead 
they suggest the use of ta’zir punishments on convicted Jewish or Christian adulterers. This 
means that the imam or judge shall decide on the punishment.547 The Shafei and Hanbali 
schools, by contrast, believe that the punishment of stoning for adultery and flogging for 
fornication can be imposed on Jews and Christians also, but only if they agree to be judged by 
the Muslim leaders.548 This opinion is based on two ahadith that report that the Prophet 
carried out the punishment of stoning on the Jews following the prescriptions of the 
Torah/Taurat,549 thus their own religious law.550 The Hanafi and Maliki schools do not accept 
the aforementioned ahadith as a justification for the stoning of Jews and Christians. They 
argue that the cases mentioned in them took place after the Prophet’s arrival in Medina from 
Mecca, thus at a time when the Prophet was commanded by Allah to apply the law of the 
Torah/Taurat.551 They conclude that this no longer applies today. 
All four schools agree that homosexuality is a punishable crime and the Shafei school 
believes that it should be treated as a zina crime. This means that a man, who is caught 
practicing homosexual acts, should be stoned to death if he is married; if he is not married, he 
should be flogged with 100 lashes. According to the Maliki and Hanbali schools, the two 
people who commit this act should be stoned to death, whether they are married or not. Only 
                                                 
547 Al-Hanafi op cit note 530. 
548 Lamin al-Nagi Al-Qadeam wal Jadid fi Fiqh al-Shafeai (2007) vol 2 at 219. 
549 The Taurat consists of the five books of Moses (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy) and 
is the main religious book of Jewish religion.  
550 Suleman Ibn al-Ashas al-Sagestani Sunan Abi Dawud (2009) vol 6 at 494. 
551 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 114. 
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the Hanafi school does not consider homosexuality as being part of the hadd crime of zina, 
but as rather ta’zir crime.552  
Concerning the practice of stoning, the four schools agree that the punishment of flogging 
should not be carried out on a very hot or very cold day, and that it shall not be carried out on 
a person who has a temporary sickness. The sick person should be given time to get well 
before the punishment is carried out.553 He or she shall be put in prison until well. The four 
schools agree, furthermore, that a man who is to be stoned shall not be tied up or put in a hole. 
Further, if he is able to escape, they should let him go. The woman, by contrast, is ordered to 
be put in a hole deep enough so that just her head is visible.554 It is argued that this is for her 
protection, so that neither her womb nor her chest is exposed.555 In effect, though, this practice 
is quite unjust, since women are given no chance to escape. 
The evidence needed to convict a female suspected of adultery is acquired either by a 
personal confession or by the testimony of four male witnesses or by pregnancy.556 The 
personal confession is to be repeated four times according to the Hanbali school. The other 
schools consider a one-time confession sufficient to convict the suspect. The four schools 
agree that the four witnesses must have seen the actual penetration. They also agree that the 
testimony has to be delivered orally, not written or in another way.557 The Hanafi, Maliki and 
Hanbali schools require that the witnesses’ testimonies be delivered at the same place during 
the same session; otherwise they will be considered having committed the crime of qazf 
(defamation).558 The Shafei school accepts the testimonies, even if they are delivered at 
different times or in different locations.559 
If the witnesses contradict each other concerning where the crime took place, the Maliki 
and Shafei schools hold their testimonies shall not be accepted and no punishment shall be 
enforced due to the aspect of doubt.560 This reflects the presumption of innocence (in dubio 
pro reo),561 which is an important principle in Islamic law. According to a famous statement 
of the Prophet Muhammad, recorded in a correct hadith, he said: ‘Idra’u al-hudud bi al-
                                                 
552 Abdulaah Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Ibn Qudamah Al-Kafi (1997) vol 5 at 370. 
553 Ibn Mazah al-Bukari Al-Muheat al-Burhani le Masael al-Mabsut (2004) vol 6 at 390–453. 
554 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 57. 
555 Ibid. 
556 Ahmed Bin Ali Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani Fath al-Bari fi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (1986) vol 4 hadith 6442. 
557 Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 922–6; Al-Nagi op cit note 548; Al-Maqdesi Ibn Qudamah op cit note 542. 
558 Al-Bukari op cit note 553. 
559 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 66–7. 
560 Ibid at 68; Muhammad Bin Idris al-Shafei Al-Um (2001) 1227. 
561 Fabián Raimondo General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
(unpublished PhD Thesis , Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL), 2007) 111. 
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shubuhat’ (Avoid hudud in case of doubt).562 Islamic jurists of the four schools agree on this 
general rule that in case of doubt a suspect cannot be sentenced. In reality, however, this 
important rule is often violated. The Hanafi and Hanbali schools, for example, do not see the 
contradictions of witnesses regarding where the crime took place as voiding the 
testimonies.563  
If a woman accused of adultery is found to be a virgin, the accusations of witnesses will 
be dropped and the suspect will be free. Interestingly, in such a case the four schools agree 
that she will be released and the testimonies will be rejected, but the witnesses will not be 
accused of qazf.564 This is a clear case of sexual discrimination and a violation of the right and 
dignity of the woman, since the false accusation against her is not punished. It is also a 
violation of the qur'anic prescriptions of qazf that ban false accusations of women and declare 
it a punishable crime.  
(b) Defamation (qazf) 
The four Sunni schools of jurisprudence agree that the crime of qazf refers to falsely accusing 
someone of illicit sexual intercourse (zina). They agree that this includes defamation of 
adultery or fornication, homosexuality, or denying the fatherhood or motherhood of 
someone.565 Concerning the punishment for the crime of qazf, the four schools agree that the 
offender is to be beaten with 80 lashes if the victim is a free person and with 40 lashes if the 
victim is a slave.566  
The four schools agree, further, that for the criminal offence of qazf to be fulfilled the 
accusation of zina has to be brought forth by a direct clear statement and by the free will of 
the offender.567 The offender has to be mentally sane and mature (having reached puberty) and 
also the victim has to be a mature and sane Muslim.568 He has to be of good moral standing, 
who has never been convicted of the crime of adultery before.569 In other words, a non-
Muslim is not protected from defamation. This is a clear case of discrimination based on 
religion. 
                                                 
562 Abu Isa Mohammad Ibn Isa al-Tirmidhi Sunan at-Tirmidh (2007) vol 3 at 208 hadith 1424. 
563 Ibn Najm op cit note 541; Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at vol 1 at 1727. 
564 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 68; Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514at 152–6; Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 
503–4. 
565 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 190. 
566 Jumah op cit note 223 at 136. 
567 Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 72. 
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid. 
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The four schools agree that the offender, ie the person who accuses someone of zina, has 
to prove his accusation by providing four witnesses.570 If the accuser is not able to provide the 
necessary witnesses, he has to be punished for the crime of defamation.571 This prescription is 
based on Surah 24:4.  
And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses (to 
support their allegations) — flog them with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence ever after: 
for such men are wicked transgressors. 
It is important to note, though, that this verse speaks only of the protection of women from 
being falsely accused of zina. The four Sunni schools, however, describe the crime of qazf in 
a gender neutral way. This interpretation is not justified by the Qur'an, and it can, in fact, be 
seen even as being in contradiction to it, for it is this interpretation that is responsible for, or at 
least contributes significantly to, the misuse of the verse in a way that can easily lead to the 
false conviction of innocent women, particularly of victims of rape. The problem is that if 
these prescriptions are used against a woman who was raped and who accuses her offender, 
she can easily end up being sentenced for the crime of qazf if she fails to provide four 
eyewitnesses. Due to the requirement to provide four eyewitnesses, who have seen with their 
own eyes the actual penetration, the attempt of a woman to prove her case is usually doomed 
to failure.  
Concerning the number of witnesses, all four schools agree that if there are fewer than 
four, their evidence will be invalid. According to the Maliki school, not only will their 
testimony be rejected, but they will be considered to have committed the crime of qazf and 
will be punished with 80 lashes.572 The Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafei schools, by contrast, agree 
that if there are less than four witnesses, their evidence will not be valid but they will not be 
accused of committing qazf.573  
Women, non-Muslims or slaves are not considered as being qualified to be witnesses. 
This is another case of discrimination. All the four schools agree that if a witness turns out to 
be a non-Muslim, a slave or a woman, his or her testimony will be rejected, and he/she will be 
sentenced with the qazf punishment.574  
                                                 
570 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 195; Al-Maqdesi Ibn Qudamah op cit note 542. 
571 Muhammad Bin Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 72. 
572 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 196. 
573 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 505–6; Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at vol 1 at 1736; Al-Hin & Al-Bugha & Al-
Shurbagy op cit note 520 at vol 8 at 65. 
574 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 207; Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 505–6; Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 225–6; 
Al-Bagdadi op cit note 536 at 1402. 
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If there are doubts as to the trustworthiness of the witnesses because they are known for 
their low moral standards,575 the Hanafi and Shafei schools agree that their testimony will be 
rejected, and the accusation will fall away. According to the Shafei school, the witnesses will 
be punished for committing the crime of defamation (qazf),576 while the Hanafi school does 
not require this.577 The Shafei prescription to punish such a witness just because he is not 
considered trustworthy, without any proofs that his accusations were false, violates the 
presumption of innocence.  
The majority of the Sunni scholars agree that the punishment for the hadd of qazf will be 
enforced only if the victim requires so. If the victim of the false accusations dies before the 
punishment is carried out, the Shafei and Hanbali schools say that the relatives of the victim 
inherit the right to demand the punishment of the offender.578 The Hanafi school, however, 
rejects this view and believes that if the victim dies the accuser will be free.579 This provision, 
however, violates justice and runs the risk that a person who was convicted of qazf might try 
to kill his victim in order to escape the punishment.  
(c) Theft (sariqa) 
All four Sunni schools agree on the traditional definition of theft as introduced in Chapter 2, 
namely, ‘stealing something that belongs to someone else from a locked place (herz)’.580 
Concerning the minimum value of the stolen object for the crime of theft to be 
punishable, the four schools hold differing opinions, based on several ahadith.581 According 
to the Hanafi school, the value of the stolen object has to be at least one dinar or 10 dirhams. 
The Maliki school’s view is that it should have a minimum value of three dirhams, the Shafei 
                                                 
575 This can refer to a bad reputation, or if a person has been convicted of a crime before, or if he was convicted 
of lying before. 
576 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 197. 
577 Ibn Najm op cit note 541. 
578 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 201. 
579 Ibn Najm op cit note 541. 
580 Jumah op cit note 223 at 138; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 vol 2 at 61–2; Al-Jaziri op cit note 
190 vol 5 at 138; Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at 152–6; Salih al-Fawzan Mulachas al-Fiqh al-Islami (2001) 
vol 2 at 620; Sayed Sabeq Fiqh al-Sunnah (1983) vol 2 at 410; Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani Belugh al-Muram min 
Adelat al-Ahkam 6 ed (2004) 389. 
581 One of the texts used as legal basis concerning the question of the minimum value of the stolen object is a 
hadith that quotes the Prophet Muhammad ordering a thief’s hand to be cut off for stealing an egg or a rope, 
while the term ‘egg’ (baiga), is understood as referring to an iron helmet. A rope was estimated to have cost a 
few dirham. Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 ch 7 at 407 hadith 6783. 
Another hadith narrated by'Aishah reports: ‘The Prophet said: "The hand of a thief should be cut off for stealing 
a quarter of a Dinãr."’ Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 ch 7 at 411 hadith 6790. 
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school requires a quarter dinar, and also the Hanbali school requires a quarter dinar or three 
dirhams.582 One dinar in the Prophet’s time was 4.25 grams of gold.  
Theft by embezzlement (ichtilas) is treated as any other kind of theft by the Hanbali 
school only. The Hanafi, Maliki and Shafei schools, by contrast, oppose this view due to the 
fact that, in the case of embezzlement, there is no locked place (herz) involved, and thus the 
definition of the hadd crime of theft is not fulfilled. The scholars who hold to this view 
suggest that embezzlement should be treated according to the punishment for ta’zir crimes.583  
Concerning the punishment for theft, the four schools agree that if a thief is convicted for 
the first time, his or her right hand has to be cut off. This punishment is prescribed in the 
Qur'an in Surah 5:38-39. The four schools, furthermore, agree that if the person is convicted 
for the second time, his or her left foot should be cut off.584 In this instance, all four Sunni 
schools go beyond the qur’anic prescriptions for theft, where no mention is made of the 
amputation of feet.  
For repeat offenders, who commit the crime of theft more than twice, the four schools 
disagree on the punishment. The Hanafi school rejects a further amputation, and assigns 
imprisonment as a punishment for third-time convicts. The Hanafi school, furthermore, 
requests that the thief replace the stolen object.585 Some of the Hanbali scholars agree on the 
rejection of any further amputation, stating that the dignity of the convict is more important 
than property or money.586 This position reflects the purpose of Shariah best, which is to 
reduce the burden on Muslims.587 The rest of the Hanbali scholars, as well as those of the 
Maliki and Shafei schools, by contrast, call for further amputations for repeat offenders.588 
They hold that if the thief is convicted for the third time, his left hand shall be cut off, and if 
he is convicted a fourth time, his right foot shall be cut off. They assign imprisonment only if 
he is convicted a fifth time.589 Interestingly, even the Hanbali, Maliki and Shafei schools 
eventually apply the punishment of imprisonment for repeat offenders. Notably, neither the 
                                                 
582 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 142. 
583 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 163; Abdulrahman al-Najdi Hashiat al-Raud al-Murabba ala Zad al-
Musaqna (1976) vol 7 at 355; Mahmmud Bin Ahmad al-Aini Al-Benayah fi Sharh al-Hidayah (1990) vol 6 at 
374; Al-Bagdadi op cit note 536 at 1413; Al-Mazni op cit note 533 at 344. 
584 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 138; Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 78; Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 932–41; 
Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 506–10. 
585 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 143; Al-Berni op cit note 545. 
586 Ibn Qudamah op cit note 552. 
587 Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at 156–60. 
588 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 146; Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 506–10. 
589 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 146; Kalil Ibn Ishaq al-Maliki Muktassar Kalil fi Fiqh al-Imam Malik 2 ed 
(2004) 252; Zakariyah al-Ansari Fateh al-Wahab Beshareh Manhaj al-Tulab (2001) vol 2 at 159. 
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amputation of feet nor imprisonment is mentioned in the Qur'an — nevertheless all four 
schools agree on these penalties.  
Whilst all four schools agree that the punishment of amputation has to be applied on any 
thief, no matter whether he is male or female, free or slave, Muslim or non-Muslim,590 some 
Shafei scholars reject the use of amputation in the case of a Muslim who steals from Jews or 
Christians (the ‘people of the book’), due to the alleged lack of equality between them and 
Muslims. The scholars who hold this view suggest treating the criminal according to qisas 
provisions instead.591 This discrimination against Jews and Christians by not protecting their 
property to the same extent as for that of Muslims violates art 17 of the UDHR that promotes 
equality. It also violates art 26 of the ICCPR that protects the property of all people.  
As previously mentioned, all four schools agree on the principle installed by the Prophet 
Muhammad that states that, in case of doubt, no hadd punishment shall be assigned. Cases of 
doubt are seen, for example, in instances when the theft took place among relatives, or if a 
poor person steals to secure his survival. Also, in times of war the hadd punishment of theft 
cannot be enforced.592 In the event that a thief claims ownership of the stolen object, the 
schools disagree as to the punishment. According to the Hanafi, Shafei and Hanbali schools, 
the hadd punishment shall not be applied in such cases, because of the aspect of doubt.593 The 
Maliki school, however, demands that the thief to be punished as any other thief, even if he 
claims ownership of the stolen object.594 This ruling violates the general principle of 
presumption of innocence. 
If a thief repents, the four Sunni schools agree that he can be forgiven as long as the case 
has not yet reached the imam.595  
According to the Qur'an (Surah 5:39), the thief is to be granted forgiveness if he repents 
and amends his conduct. According to the Sunnah, the Prophet Muhammad said that ‘the one 
who repents from sin is as he has no sin’.596 The qur'anic requirement of amendment of the 
conduct on the side of the thief includes that he returns the stolen object. This is also stressed 
in a correct hadith, according to which the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘The hand is responsible 
                                                 
590 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 138; Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 78; Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 932–41; 
Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 506–10. 
591 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 160; Zedan Abdulkarim Ahkam al-Zemyeen wal Mustamanin fi Dar al-Islam 
(1982) 332. 
592 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 139–140. 
593 Ibid at 184; Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 506–10; Muhammad Bin Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 78; 
Al-Maqdesi Ibn Qudamah op cit note 542 at 137. 
594 Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 932–47. 
595 They justify their opinion by a hadith of Ibn Safwan Omayah. Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 184. 
596 Ali Ibn al-Hasan Ibn Hibatallah Ibn Asaker Al-Tawba (2001) 41.  
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for what it has taken until it is given back.’597 The Shafei and Hanbali schools, therefore, 
require that the thief brings back to its owner what he has stolen. If the stolen object was 
damaged, they hold that it has to be fixed by the thief.598 If the thief cannot restore or recover 
the stolen object, both schools argue that Surah 2:280 can be interpreted as saying that he 
should be given enough time to do so, and that it would actually be best if the thief could be 
released from his obligation: ‘If the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for 
him to repay. But if ye remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if ye only knew.’ 
This merciful attitude strongly contrasts the aforementioned harsh view of Maliki, Shafei 
and some Hanbali scholars. 
(d) Drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr)  
The crime of shurb al-khamr is based on the qur'anic verse that declares that al-khamr is an 
abomination to Allah (Surah 5:90) since it can cause the ‘mind to be befogged.’599 It can be 
noted, that the definition of the crime is not fully clear, since different opinions and 
interpretations evolve around the meaning of al-khamr. In Chapter 2 it was explained that al-
khamr refers to alcohol made out of dates or other fruits — not including grapes — but even 
though wine (nabiz) is not mentioned, the Muslim jurists used the concept of analogical 
deduction to declare that wine will be treated the same way as other alcoholic drinks (al-
khamr).600 A definition of shurb al-khamr accepted by all four schools describes it as 
‘drinking any kind of drink that can cause the person to get drunk’.601 The English translations 
translate al-khamr in Surah 5:90 accordingly as intoxicant (Asad and Ali) or as strong drink 
(Pickthall). In their legal discussion of the crime of drinking, however, the Islamic scholars 
usually refer mainly to wine. This can be seen, for example, in the scholars’ discussion of the 
definition of alcohol where the four schools focus on the question as to at what point grape 
juice can be considered having transformed into wine. Since grape juice is usually fermented 
and transformed into alcohol after three days, the Hanbali school says that after this period it 
will be considered alcohol (khamr), and whoever drinks is will be subject to the hadd 
punishment.602 The Hanafi,603 Maliki604 and Shafei605 schools say that that as long as the 
                                                 
597 Sunan Abu Dawud (2010) vol 3 at 822; Sunan at-Tirmidhi (1977) vol 3 at 564. 
598 Abu Zayd op cit note 239 at 420. 
599 Surah 4:43. 
600 Al-Daqaq & Fattah op cit note 41 at 35–6.  
601 Jumah op cit note 223 at 137; Al-Fawzan op cit note 580. 
602 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 25; Al-Fawzan op cit note 580 at 540. 
603 Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Qarafi Al-Zakerah (1994) vol 12 at 200. 
604 Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 946–9. 
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grape juice has not yet fermented and does not yet have fermentation foam, it cannot be 
considered khamr and who drinks it will not be considered having committed the crime of 
drinking. The focus on wine is reflected also in the English translation of Surah 2:219, where 
Ali translates the term al-khamr as wine. Limiting the discussion to the definition of wine, 
though, is not logical since it ignores consumption of strong liquors. 
As punishment for the crime of drinking, the Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali schools assign 
beating with 80 lashes606 the Shafei school assigns 40 lashes.607 Both views, though, 
contradict the Qur'an, where no punishment is mentioned. 
According to the Maliki,608 Shafei609 and Hanbali610 schools, the criminal offence of 
drinking is fulfilled when a person drinks a kind of alcohol that can lead to drunkenness, 
independently of whether he or she has actually got drunk.611 The Hanafi school, by contrast, 
says that a person can be punished only if he/she actually got drunk. Drinking a glass of wine 
by itself cannot lead to punishment.612  
Concerning the evidence for a suspect to be convicted, the Maliki,613 Shafei614 and 
Hanbali615 schools say that even if a person does not smell of alcohol he or she can be 
convicted by witnesses alone.616 The Hanafi school’s view is that the smell of alcohol on a 
person is insufficient evidence for a conviction, for both a witness and the smell of alcohol are 
required to convict a person of the crime of drinking.617  
In the event of a person not smelling of alcohol but nevertheless confessing to having 
imbibed alcohol, the Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali schools declare that, due to such confession, 
he/she will be convicted and subjected to the punishment.618 The Hanafi school, by contrast, 
says that a confession alone without the smell cannot be considered sufficient evidence to lead 
to a conviction.619 
                                                                                                                                                        
605 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538at 513–14. 
606 Abdulah Bin Ahmad al-Nassafi Kenz al-Daqaq (2011) 355; Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 946–9. 
Al-Qarafi op cit note 603. 
607 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 13–14. 
608 Al-Maliki op cit note 589 at 255. 
609 Al-Hin & Al-Bugha & Al-Shurbagy op cit note 520 at vol 8 at 71. 
610 Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at 1745. 
611 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 19. 
612 Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 70. 
613 Al-Maliki op cit note 589 at 255. 
614 Al-Hin & Al-Bugha & Al-Shurbagy op cit note 520 at vol 8 at 71. 
615 Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at 1745. 
616 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 29. 
617 Al-Qarafi op cit note 603. 
618 Muhammad Bin Ibrahim al-Twagri Muktassar al-Fiqh al-Islami 11 ed (2010) 958, 984. 
619 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 30. 
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The four schools also disagree as to the method of punishment. The Shafei school’s view 
is that the convict should be beaten with branches of a palm tree or shoes or a piece of cloth or 
robe or with the hand,620 while the Hanafi and Maliki schools believe that a whip can also be 
used.621 Some scholars of the Hanbali school, though, permit the use of a whip only if the 
convict is rebellious and vicious.622 
In summary, it can be noted that concerning the hadd of drinking alcohol, there is great 
disagreement between the four schools and even the definitions of the crime are very unclear. 
It is clear, though, that the assignment of a punishment for drinking contradicts the Qur'an.  
(e) Highway robbery (qata al-tariq) 
The definition of qata al-tariq (highway robbery) that all four Sunni schools of jurisprudence 
agree on is ‘carrying a weapon and frightening the pedestrians or travellers on a public road 
(tariq)’. The Hanafi school holds the opinion that the criminal offence of qata al-tariq is 
fulfilled only if committed outside a city.623 According to the Shafei,624 Maliki625 and 
Hanbali626 schools, it does not make a difference as to whether the highway robbery is 
committed inside or outside the city — either way, the crime will be treated as a hadd crime 
and the offender shall be punished according to the prescriptions of Surah 5:33, ie with 
punishments ranging from execution, or crucifixion, to the amputation of hands and feet from 
opposite sides, to exile from the land.627 
The Hanafi, Shafei and Hanbali schools agree as to the following punishments for 
highway robbers:628 If an offender or group of offenders rob a victim and steal at least 10 
dirham, the offender(s) shall be punished for the crime of robbery by having both hands and 
feet cut off from opposite side.629 If a victim is killed without money being taken, the 
perpetrator(s) shall be punished for the killing by having his/their head cut off.630 If the 
offender(s) kill a victim and take his money, the imam has the choice of the following 
options, namely either to cross amputate his hands and feet and to crucify him, or to crucify 
                                                 
620 Abu Zayd op cit note 239 at 249. 
621 Al-Twagri op cit note 618. 
622 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 17–18. 
623 Ibid at 362. 
624 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 511–12. 
625 Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 232–3. 
626 Muhammad Bin Saleh al-Uthaimeen Muzakerat al-Fiqh (2002) vol 4 at 32. 
627 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 360; Al-Mazni op cit note 533 at 346; Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at 160–
2; Al-Twagri op cit note 618 at 975. 
628 Ibid; Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 85; Al-Ansari op cit note 589 at 163. 
629 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 360. 
630 Ibid. 
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him or behead him with a sword.631 If the offender(s) go out with the intention and means to 
commit the crime of highway robbery, but are arrested before having robbed or killed anyone, 
he/they shall be imprisoned until he/they repent(s).632 This kind of punishment is understood 
as an application of ‘being exiled from the land’, mentioned in Surah 5:33.633 
The Maliki school holds that if the robber killed a person he should not be cut or be 
‘exiled from the earth’ (ie be put in prison), but be killed and/or be crucified.634 If the offender 
did not kill anyone, the imam has four different options of punishment, namely to crucify and 
kill him, to kill him by the sword, to cross amputate or to imprison him. If the offender is a 
woman, the Maliki school holds that she shall be killed or cross amputated but she should not 
be crucified, nor be exiled or imprisoned.  
If a woman or an immature young man joined a group of highway robbers and agreed to 
kill and to take money from the victim, the Shafei,635 Maliki636 and Hanbali637 schools say that 
they cannot be spared from the punishment and they have to be killed. The Hanafi school, by 
contrast, argues that the woman should not be killed, but she should be cross amputated 
instead. For an immature young man there shall be no punishment whatsoever.638 
If the victim who was killed by highway robbers is not considered to be equal to the 
offender, ie if the victim is a non-Muslim or a child, the Maliki639 and Shafei640 schools hold 
that the offender has to be killed whether there is equality or not. The Hanafi641 and Hanbali642 
schools, by contrast, say that due to lack of equality the offender should not be killed, but 
should pay blood money to the relatives of the victim. This is a violation of the principle of 
equality. A child actually deserves even more protection, and the punishment should be more 
severe, not less.  
If the offender repents before being caught, there is an option of repentance.643 The 
Maliki644 and Shafei645 schools say that repentance can be accepted, if there is clear evidence 
                                                 
631 Ibid. 
632 Al-Twagri op cit note 618 at 975; Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 85; Al-Ansari op cit note 589 at 163. 
633 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 360. 
634 Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 232–3. 
635 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 511–12. 
636 Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 232–3. 
637 Al-Uthaimeen op cit note 626. 
638 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 364. 
639 Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 232–3.  
640 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 511–12. 
641 Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 85. 
642 Al-Uthaimeen op cit note 626. 
643 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 360; Al-Mazni op cit note 533 at 346; Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at 160–
2; Al-Twagri op cit note 618 at 975.  
644 Al-Basri op cit note 532 at 232–3. 
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of a real change in behaviour. The Hanafi and Hanbali schools do not require such evidence 
of real change for the repentance to be accepted.646 This is surprising, especially since 
highway robbery is quite a serious crime and considered to be against public interests and the 
rights of Allah. 
(f)  Fighting against Allah and His Messenger (haraba) 
As previously pointed out, the definition and prescriptions of the crime of haraba as 
developed by Islamic jurisprudence cannot be clearly distinguished from the afore-discussed 
crime of highway robbery, since it actually includes the crime known as highway robbery. 
The four schools agree on the definition of haraba, as waging war against Allah or His 
Messenger by saying or deed, and spreading corruption on earth, including highway 
robbery.647  
Interestingly, though, only the Maliki school and some Hanbali scholars list haraba as a 
hadd crime; the others treat it as ta’zir crime.648 
As previously mentioned, the addition to ‘waging war’, namely ‘by saying or deed’, gives 
a completely new meaning and dimension to the crime. The four Muslim Sunni schools agree 
that anyone who insults the Prophet has to be killed.649 Imam Ahmad said: ‘Anyone, 
[whether] Muslim or infidel, who curses the Prophet or belittles him, has to be killed and has 
no option of repentance.’650 This very wide definition of the crime of haraba violates the 
freedom of opinion and freedom of expression.  
All four schools agree, further, that for the criminal offence of haraba to be fulfilled, the 
offender has to be male, mature, and he must have used force. Furthermore, the crime must 
have been committed in public.651 Despite, and in contradiction to, this commonly shared 
definition, the Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali schools believe that if an immature young man or 
an insane person joins a group of men in committing the crime of haraba, he cannot be spared 
from the punishment, and has to be punished just as anyone else.652 Only the Hanafi school 
refuses to punish an immature or insane offender due to the above-mentioned definition. 
                                                                                                                                                        
645 Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 511–12. 
646 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 366. 
647 Jumah op cit note 223 at 139; Al-Dumeri op cit note 517 at 942-5. 
648 Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at vol 2 at 161; Ahmad Bin Muhamad Ibn Qudamah Al-Muqna fi Fiqh al-
Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (2000) 445. 
649 Ibn Taymiyyah Al-Sarim al-Maslul ala Shatim al-Rasul (2001) 32. 
650 Ibn Taymiyyah op cit note 381 at 421. 
651 Ibn Abidin op cit note 519, vol 3 at 232. 
652 Muhammad Arafa al-Disuqi Hashiat al-Disuqi ala al-Sharh al-Kabir (1881) vol 4 at 348. 
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Another contradiction to the aforementioned commonly shared definition concerns female 
offenders. If a woman is convicted of having taken part in committing the crime of haraba, 
the majority of the scholars of the four schools believe she should be punished in the same 
way as a man.653 The Maliki school believes as well that she should be punished, just not be 
crucified.654 Again, it is only the Hanafi school that holds that women should be spared from 
any punishment, if they have committed the crime of haraba together with a man.655 This 
opinion is based on the view that women have a softer nature than men and less criminal 
energy. Consequently, they are presumed not to be the main offenders.656 It can be presumed, 
also, that if a woman is convicted of having committed the crime of haraba by herself, she 
will be punished in the same way as a man. 
 As previously mentioned, the second part of the definition, namely, ‘striving for 
mischief’, or ‘spreading corruption on earth’ is interpreted in different ways. The Maliki 
school describes it as the rebellion of armed groups or individuals against the Muslim society 
by causing chaos and bloodshed of innocents, including robbery, and rape which is considered 
attacking the honour of a woman and her family657 or as ‘any assault against people’s honor 
by use of force for the purpose of stealing in a neighbourhood or attacking men’s wives 
within their own territory [or residence]’.658 This definition describes the crime of highway 
robbery. This shows the confusing use of the terms haraba, qata a-tariq and al-baghi.  
What increases the confusion even more is the fact that the Hanafi school conflates its 
understanding of haraba with the crime of theft. The Hanafi school describes the crime of 
harba as referring to highway robbery and calls it ‘the major theft’ (al-sariqa al-kubra), in 
contrast to the normal crime of theft (hadd al-sariqa), which usually happens secretly, whilst 
one of the main characteristics of the crime of haraba is that it is committed publicly and by 
means of force.659  
(g) Rebellion (al-baghi) 
The crime of rebellion (al-baghi) is listed as a hadd crime by the Shafei and Maliki schools 
and by some of the Hanbali scholars. 
                                                 
653 Masaud Bin Ahmad al-Kasani Badae’ al-Sanae’ fi Tertib al-Sharae 2ed (1986) vol 7 at 95. 
654 Ibn Abidin op cit note 519, vol 3 at 232. 
655 Al-Kasani op cit note 653 at 91. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Al-Hin & Al-Bugha & Al-Shurbagy op cit note 520 at vol 8 at 82; Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at 1764. 
658 Wazarat al-Aukaf wal Shu’un al-Islamiyah Al-Mausua al-Fiqhiyah al-Kuweitiyah (1983) vol 2 at 153. 
659 Muhammad Bin Ali Bin Muhammad al-Shawkani Fath al-Qadir al-Jamea beina Fan al-Riwaya wa al-
Dirayah min Aelm al-Tafsir (2010) vol 4 at 46. 
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All four Sunni schools agree that the crime of rebellion refers to rebellion against an 
imam.660 They also agree that all the commands of an imam should be obeyed and that all the 
provisions made by an imam or his assistants or his governors have to be followed. The only 
exception allowed is if his order is considered to be a sin against Allah.661 Disobedience or 
refusal to submit is, consequently, understood as rebellion against an imam and thus against 
Allah.662 Some scholars describe rebellion as referring to opposition to the ‘constituted 
authority’, which can also be a political leader or the economic order.663 
The four schools agree that the crime of rebellion is punishable by death,664 and that the 
prescriptions of Surah 5:33 apply.665 
If Muslims rebel against an imam or a political leader for hermeneutic reasons (ta’wil), 
the four schools agree that the imam should do his best to peacefully convince the rebels and 
to prove their point to be wrong. The imam is required to do whatever he can to find a way 
that can lead to peace and reconciliation. Surah 49:9 says that if two parties of believers have 
a conflict, they should make peace. Only if the rebellious group refuses to obey the leader and 
refuses reconciliation and if it starts fighting with arms against the leader, Surah 49:9 says: If 
they ‘transgress beyond bounds’ an imam has the right to fight them back until they surrender 
to the will of Allah.666 
This call to ‘fight for the hermeneutics of the Qur'an’ is mentioned in a correct hadith 
narrated by Abi Said al-Khidri that quotes the Prophet Muhammad, saying: ‘Amongst you 
who will fight for the hermeneutics of the Qur'an as I fought for its revelations.’667 Imam 
Shafei explained that the highest level of rebellion took place during the time of Ali Ibn Abi 
Talib, who responded to the many rebellions during his time by either signing peace 
agreements or by fighting.668 
Interestingly, the Hanfi school shares the aforementioned understanding, but additionally 
holds the view that qata’a al-tariq (highway robbery) can be considered as a form of 
rebellion. It argues that people who spread corruption (yufsidun) can be considered rebellious, 
                                                 
660 Ibn Najm op cit note 541 at 264–9; Kalil Ibn Ishaq al-Maliki Muktassar Kalil fi Fiqh al-Imam Malik 2 ed 
(2004) 247; Al-Nawawi op cit note 538 at 1715; Abi al-Barakat op cit note 514 at vol 2 at 163–4. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 368. 
663 Okon op cit note 67 at 229. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 367; Al-Merdawi op cit note 520 at 1769; Ibn Qudamah op cit note 552 at 
308. 
667 Ali Ibn Abi Bakr al-Haithami Magma al-Zawaed wa Man ba al-Fawaed (1994) vol 6 at 244 and vol 9 at 133. 
668 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 368; Al-Ansari op cit note 589 at 154. 
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whether or not they use arms: ‘People who rob the money of people and kill them and spread 
fear — these people are considered to be rebellious.’669 
(h) Apostasy (al-riddah) 
All four Sunni schools agree on the definition of apostasy (al-riddah) as ‘leaving Islam 
willingly by saying or doubt or deed’,670 as described in Chapter 2.671 While the Maliki and 
Shafei schools and some of the Hanbali scholars list it as a hadd crime, the Hanafi school and 
the majority of the Hanbali scholars treat apostasy as only a ta’zir crime. Nevertheless, they 
all agree that anyone who is convicted of committing the crime of apostasy must be killed,672 
and that the apostate is given only three days to repent and to return to Islam. If the apostate 
does not repent within these three days, he or she will be sentenced to death by beheading 
before the sunset of the third day.673 If the apostate returns to Islam and declares the 
confession of faith (shahada), all four schools674 accept such repentance and the person will 
be free. 
For the crime of apostasy to be proven and the suspect to be convicted, the four schools 
require the testimony of two just men. According to the Hanafi school, the judge should 
furthermore request evidence from the two witnesses to support the two just men’s 
accusation.  
According to the Maliki school, the apostate is to be given food and drink during his 
three-day imprisonment, and he should not be beaten or mistreated. An imam or judge shall 
exhort the apostate several times per day to return to Islam. If the apostate repents, his or her 
repentance will be accepted; otherwise he/she has to be killed before the sunset of the third 
day. For the purpose of deterrence his or her dead body shall be thrown into the desert or 
wilderness.675  
The call to repent (istitaba) is also practiced by the Hanbali school,676 and the Hanafi 
school views it as recommended, though not as obligatory.677 
                                                 
669 Al-Bukari op cit note 553 at 128. 
670 Jumah op cit note 221 at 140. A person can be convicted of having committed the crime of apostasy either by 
saying, for example by insulting Allah or His Messenger or his angels or by demonstrating disbelief, for example 
by denying any of the basic teachings of Islam, or by deeds, for example by bowing down to an idol or by 
putting the Qur’an on the floor or in a dirty place. 
671 Al-Samara’i op cit note 416 at 103–13.  
672 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 373. 
673 Ibid.  
674 Ibid at 384. 
675 Ibid at 374. 
676 Ibid 374 & 384 
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If a woman commits the crime of apostasy, the Shafei, Maliki and Hanbali schools agree 
that an imam shall exhort her to repent and if she refuses, her sentence shall be the same as 
that of a man.678 If the female apostate is a nursing mother, the Maliki school says that the 
sentence of death should be delayed until she has finished nursing her child, if there is no 
other mother who can nurse the baby.679  
According to the Hanafi school, a female apostate should be imprisoned until she returns 
to Islam or dies. During her imprisonment she will be beaten every day with 39 lashes. If she 
repents, she will be free, but if she refuses to repent, the beating will eventually lead to her 
death. If it is a man who has killed this woman, he will be free and should not have to pay 
blood money.680 
In the case of a minor turning away from Islam, the Shafei school holds he cannot be 
considered apostate. The Hanafi school, by contrast, believes that even a minor can be 
considered apostate. His punishment, though, should not be the death sentence, but 
imprisonment. According to the Maliki and Hanbali schools, it is not the age, but puberty, that 
will be the deciding factor, for if the minor has reached puberty he will be treated as an adult 
apostate.681 
Insulting the Prophet is viewed as falling under the crime of apostasy and whoever insults 
the Prophet has to be killed in accordance with the punishment for apostasy, and repentance 
cannot be accepted.682  
III The practical application of hudud ordinances in the Islamic world 
While most Muslim countries do not practice hudud ordinances at all, others, like Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan, have been practicing them for decades. In Saudi Arabia hudud 
ordinances have been practiced since the Saudi royal family began its reign in 1932.683 
Pakistan implemented hudud ordinances in 1979 and Sudan did so in 1991. Brunei 
Darussalam, by contrast, started to implement them as recently as 2014.  
                                                                                                                                                        
677 Ibid at 373. 
678 Ibid at 374. 
679 Ibid. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid at 383. 
682 Ibid at 378. 
683 Aziff Azuddin ‘10 things to know about hudud’ 19 March 2015, available at http://poskod.my/cheat-
sheets/10-things-know-hudud/, accessed on 5 July 2015. 
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In some Muslim countries hudud ordinances are practiced only in some of their 
provinces. In Nigeria, for example, they are enforced in twelve of its 36 provinces and in 
Indonesia they are practiced in the province of Ache only. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan and 
Brunei Darussalam, on the contrary, apply hudud ordinances in the entire country. This is why 
these four countries are of particular interest for the purpose of this research. This is the more 
so, since they are representative countries for the four Sunni schools of thought.  
In terms of the geographical distribution of the four main Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence,684 the Hanafi school is by far the largest. It was first established in Iraq and 
spread from there into Persia (now Iran), Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and North Africa. One of the 
key figures who helped to spread it through his writings was Imam Abi Yusif, who was the 
chief judge of the Abassi Islamic caliphate. Later the Hanafi school became the official school 
of thought (mazhab) of the Ottoman caliphate. Today, the Hanafi school is the predominant 
school of Muslims in Turkey, Iraq, India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma (now Myanmar), 
the Maldives, East Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe generally and Pakistan.  
Pakistan applies hudud ordinances according to the Hanafi school. It has one of the 
biggest Muslim populations in the world and it plays a key role in international relations 
between the Islamic world and the west. This is especially due to its relationship with 
Afghanistan, which for years has been considered the centre of radical Islam, having provided 
a safe haven for al-Qaeda. It was for that reason that the United States of America invaded 
Afghanistan and started a war that lasted for years, thereby dominating and fuelling the 
conflict between the Islamic world and the west. For years Pakistan has been in a very 
difficult position, since on the one hand it seeks to maintain good relations with the west and 
therefore tries to accommodates a more modern form of Islam,685 whilst on the other, it has to 
deal with the strong radical Islamic influence that arises both from within it — from radical 
Islamic groups and Islamic universities and schools (madrasas), and from outside from its 
neighbours. 
The Maliki school, was founded by Imam Malik, who spent his entire life in Medina. It 
was first taught and practiced in different places on the Arabian Peninsula. From there it was 
spread to Egypt, Sudan, and other African countries, including Nigeria, but also to some 
places on the Arabian Gulf, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, where the Maliki 
                                                 
684 There are other Sunni jurisprudential schools, including the school of Awzaa'I, the school of Layth Ibn Saad 
and the school of Zahereyah, but they are not very widely spread. 
685 Cameron MacKenzie ‘Building democracy in Pakistan’ 108, available at https://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-
issues-1/2002/6.pdf, accessed on 22 December 2015. 
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school became the official school of the state.686 Today the Maliki school‘s influence is found 
in almost the whole of Africa except for the north-east. 
Sudan, which fully applies hudud ordinances according to the Maliki school, is one of the 
largest and the most troubled countries in Africa. For decades the country was in the grip of 
civil war, until 2011, when a new state, South Sudan, came into existence. Sudan is known for 
its human rights violations and the Sudanese president is even wanted by the International 
Criminal Court for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. Sudan is populated by both 
Arab-speaking and non-Arab-speaking people, and a number of different ethnic groups, most 
of which have been Arabised. It is also acknowledged that a great number of human rights 
abuses take place in Sudan. 
The Shafei school spread in the Muslim world thanks to the journeys made by Imam 
Shafei, its founder who travelled especially between Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. 
After his death his students continued to spread his teaching. Today the Shafei school is the 
most popular school in Egypt and Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei 
Darussalam,687 and in southern Syria, Yemen, Somalia, the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Turkey 
and. In most of these countries, however, hudud ordinances are either not implemented at all 
— as is the case in Egypt — or are practised in only some provinces, as in Indonesia.  
Brunei Darussalam, one of the richest countries in Asia, is the only Shafei Muslim 
country that implements hudud ordinances nationwide. It started implementing the hudud 
ordinances only recently. 
The Hanbali school of jurisprudence has the smallest number of followers, who are 
concentrated in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia is the only major country that follows the 
tenets of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. There are a number of reasons why the Hanbali 
school did not spread to other Muslim countries as did the other three schools; one being that 
the Hanbali school lacks the element of ijtihad (independent reasoning). Since the Hanbali 
school focuses mainly on the text, without using personal opinion (al-raa’y), no flexibility is 
allowed to take into consideration the reality of people’s lives and contemporary 
challenges.688 In addition, the Hanbali school did not spread further because when it was 
established in the third and fourth centuries AH the other three main Sunni schools were 
already in existence and had been adopted by different Muslim countries. Thus, there was no 
country or political leader able to promote the Hanbali school’s jurisprudential principles. 
                                                 
686 Al-Jazirah ‘Al-Shariah fi al-Sudan: Al-tadbiq wal nataeg’ Al-Jazirah Newspaper 10 May 2014 iss 437, 
available at http://www.al-jazirah.com/culture/2014/10052014/tar4.htm, accessed on 1 July 2015. 
687 Mohammed Bin Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Ibn Battuta Rihlat Ibn Battuta (1987) 630. 
688 Abu Zayd Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun (1984) 448. 
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This was especially so since its scholars refused to participate in politics.689 In the eighteenth 
century, a Hanbali scholar cooperated with a politician for the first time. This was when 
Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahab worked together with the Saudi politician Muhammad Bin 
Saud, to establish the religio-political movement that became known as the Wahabi 
movement. The existence of extremely radical Wahabism eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the political state of Saudi Arabia with its judicial system based on the 
Hanbali school of jurisprudence.690 Today, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fully applies these 
teachings as the legal basis for its judicial system and hudud ordinances are incorporated in 
Saudi criminal law and practiced on regular basis. 
Saudi Arabia is one of the most influential Muslim countries in the world, and it is 
considered to be the spiritual centre of Islam worldwide for being its birthplace and the 
location of Islam’s most holy sites, including Mecca and Medina. More than two million 
people travel to Saudi Arabia every year for the hajj. Saudi Arabia supports all kinds of 
radical Islamic groups, such as the Salafi movement and terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, 
whose founder Osama bin Laden was a Saudi, as were most of the 9/11 hijackers. Saudi 
Arabia also plays a leading role in spreading Islam in the west by supporting Islamic 
organisations and societies and by funding the construction of Islamic centres and schools. 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Brunei Darussalam are all members of the United 
Nations and are among the signatories of some of the most important international human 
rights documents. These include the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),691 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),692 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),693 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).694  
 Besides, all four countries are state parties of the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam (CDHRI).695 Saudi-Arabia and Sudan are, further, committed to the Arab Charter of 
                                                 
689 Khalid al-Allal ‘Al-Hanabelah fi muqademat Ibn Khaldon’ Saaid al-Fawaed website available at 
http://www.saaid.net/bahoth/82.htm, accessed on 1 December 2015. 
690 Mohammed Ismail al-Muqadem Khwater Hawla al-Wahabyah (2008) 35.  
691 CAT adopted by the UN General Assembly on10 December 1984e and entered into force on 26 June 1987.  
692 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entry into force 23 March 1976. 
693 ICESCR art 27 adopted 16 December 1966 by the UN General Assembly and entered into force 3 January 
1976. 
694 CEDAW adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1979 and entered into force 3 September 
1981. 
695 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 Aug 1990, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum.Rts., 4th Sess., 
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993) [English translation], available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html, accessed on 16 April 2016. 
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Human Rights (ACHR).696 Sudan is also state party of the ‘African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (ACHPR),697 and Brunei is member of the ‘Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) and signed the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(AHRD),698 which is explicitly committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the UN Charter.  
Despite their official commitment to several human rights documents, Pakistan, Sudan, 
Brunei Darussalam, and Saudi Arabia are all known for violating international human rights 
laws in several ways.  
The practice of the harsh and cruel hudud punishments, for example, violates the ban on 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, articulated in the UDHR (art 
5), the CAT (art 2 para 1), the ICCPR (art 7), and the ACHPR (art 5). Criminalising apostasy 
by meting out the death penalty for it by beheading, violates the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion guaranteed in the UDHR (art 18), and the ICCPR (art 18). The 
freedom of thought, opinion and expression guaranteed in the ICCPR art 19 is, further, 
violated by treating insults against the Prophet or Islam as a crime (namely as ‘spreading 
corruption’). The practice of the hudud punishments, also leads to violations of several other 
rights, including the right to life, liberty, and security of person (ICCPR art 6 para 1, UDHR 
art 3, and ACHR art 5 para 1), the right to justice (CDHRI art 19 b), the right to a fair trial 
(UDHR art 10, and CDHRI art 19 e), the right to equality before the law (ACHPR art 3.1), 
basic human rights for women, guaranteed in CEDAW (art 3), the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of religion (UDHR art 2 and 7, ICCPR art 2, ACHPR art 2, and 
CDHRI art 2), the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (UDHR art 
9), and the right to be treated as equal before the law and entitlement without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law (UDHR art 7, CEDAW art 15 para 1, ICCPR art 
14 para 1, and ACHPR art 3). 
In the following section, the cases of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan and Brunei 
Darussalam will be discussed individually.  
                                                 
696 Saudi-Arabia and Sudan signed the Arab Charter on Human Rights on 22 May 2004. It entered into force on 
15 March 2008, University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, League of Arab States. 
Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 22 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), entered into 
force 15 March 2008, available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html, accessed on May 30, 
2016. 
697 Sudan signed the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on 27 June 1981 in the city of Nairobi. 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHR), entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf, 
accessed on 30 May 2016. 
698 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) adopted by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member 
States at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 18 November 2012, available at 
http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/other-20121217-165728-100439.pdf, accessed on 30 May 2016. 
© Mark A. Gabriel –– Ph.D. Research –– University of Cape Town 
117 
(a) The case of the Hanafi school in Pakistan  
In Pakistan, hudud ordinances were gradually implemented in the late 1970s. In 1977 the 
Pakistani government announced the official implementation of Shariah as the law in the 
country, in 1978 the Council of Islamic Ideology drafted the hudud law and in 1979 the 
Pakistani government enforced it. This hudud law defines hudud ordinances as crimes against 
Allah, society and the state.699  
Pakistan holds to six crimes, namely zina (adultery), qazf (defamation), sariqa (theft), 
haraba (robbery), baghi (rebellion) and shurb al-khamr (drinking intoxicants). In contrast to 
the official teaching of the Hanafi school that holds only to five hudud crimes, Pakistan has 
added the crime of baghi (rebellion). The crime of (highway) robbery is listed under the term 
haraba. 700  
The different punishments for hudud crimes prescribed by Pakistani law are stoning to 
death, amputation of hands, exile, flogging and crucifixion.701 In practicing these harsh and 
cruel punishments, Pakistan violates the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, articulated in the aforelisted articles of the 
CAT and the ICCPR, to both of which Pakistan has bound itself to with certain 
reservations.702 Pakistan became a signatory to the CEDAW (by accession on 12 March 
1996), to the ICESCR (signed on 3 November 2004 and ratified on 17 April 2008), and to the 
CAT and the ICCPR (signed on 17 April 2008, ratified 23 June 2010). 
Despite its commitment to all these human rights documents, Pakistan is known for its 
human rights violations that are to a big part a result of the practice of hudud ordinances. 
Human rights activists usually criticise the Pakistani penal code for the harsh punishment of 
stoning to death for adultery and rape703 and the humiliating punishment of flogging for 
fornication, drinking and qazf (false accusations).704 The Pakistani judicial system has also 
                                                 
699 Council of Islamic Ideology, ‘Hudud Ordinance 1979’, 15, available at 
http://cii.gov.pk/publications/h.report.pdf, accessed on 1 July 2015. 
700 Ibid at 151. 
701 Ibid at 152. 
702 Pakistan ratified the ICCPR and the CAT it in June 2010, with nine reservations in ICCPR and ten 
reservations in CAT. In June 2011, however, most of these reservations were withdrawn, including the 
reservations on Articles 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19 and 40 of ICCPR and arts 3, 4, 6, 12, 13 and 16 on the CAT. The 
remaining reservations include the one on art 8 CAT and the declarations on art 20 as provided in art 28 (1) and 
art 30 (1) CAT. See ‘Pakistan decides to withdraw most of reservations on ICCPR, UNCAT’ The Nation 23 June 
2011, available at http://nation.com.pk/national/23-Jun-2011/Pakistan-decides-to-withdraw-most-of-
reservations-on-ICCPR-UNCAT, accessed on 12 August 2016. 
703 Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘The Islamization of laws in Pakistan: The case of Hudud Ordinances’ (2006) 96 
(2) The Muslim World  287–304, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-
1913.2006.00129.x/pdf, accessed on 6 December 2015.  
704 Ibid.  
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often been criticised for its violations of the right to a fair trial, including convictions based on 
statements extracted under torture or other ill-treatment.705 In doing so, Pakistan violates the 
right to fair trial protected in the UDHR (art 10) and the CDHRI (art 19 e). The use of torture 
or other ill-treatment to extract convictions, further, violates the aforementioned ban on 
torture. 
One of the main areas of criticism concerns the discrimination of women.706 This is partly 
due to clause 8(b) of the zina ordinance that stipulates that women are not accepted as 
witnesses in hadd cases.707 Far more critical, however, is the requirement for women who 
were victims of rape to present four witnesses against the accused. If a woman fails to do this, 
she will be sentenced for the crime of qazf.708 Pakistan, therefore, is often criticised for 
wrongly punishing women for crimes they have not committed.709 As a result, victims of rape 
often do not dare to report their cases out of fear of themselves being accused of qazf or 
adultery. Many women who have reported their rapes710 are in prison while the men who 
violated them are free.711Another objection raised against the zina ordinance is that it does not 
distinguish between rape (zina bil-jabr) and adultery and fornication (zina bil-raza), although 
the former results in harsher punishments than the latter.712 
This treatment of women violates the prohibition of discrimination of women articulated 
in the ICCPR (art 2), and the CEDAW (art 2), as well as the equal rights for women before 
the law protected in the CEDAW (art 15 para 1) and the ICCPR (art 14 para 1). It also 
violates the protection of human dignity promoted in the ICCPR (art 10). 
                                                 
705 Amnesty International ‘Pakistan: Execution of minor highlights endemic problems in justice system’ 10 June 
2015, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/pakistan-execution-of-minor-highlights-
endemic-problems-in-justice-system/, accessed on 31 July 2015. 
706 Taqi Usmani op cit note 703 at 6. 
707 Ibid at 14.  
708 Shehla Zia ‘Hudud laws: Impact on women’ in Tarik Jan (ed.) Pakistan between Secularism and Islam, 
Institute of Policy Studies (1998) 327; ‘Report of the Commission of the Inquiry for Women August 1997’ 55–
75. 
709 Ibid at 317–37. 
710 Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women (1997) 71. 
711 Taqi Usmani op cit note 703 at 14. 
712 Ibid at 11; Asad Jamal ‘Extra-judicial executions in Pakistan: Killing with impunity’ Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, available at http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/10.pdf, accessed on 10 May 
2016. 
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(b) The case of the Maliki school in Sudan  
The implementation of hudud ordinances in Sudan in 1983 during the presidency of an-
Nimeiry caused much controversy. Internationally, there was an outcry about human rights 
violations caused by the implementation of these ordinances.713 
The Sudanese criminal law implemented in 1991714 is based on Shariah. In contrast to the 
official teaching of the Maliki school that holds to eight crimes and lists haraba, qata al-tariq 
and al-baghi separately,715 the Sudanese penal code identifies only seven different hudud 
crimes, since it does not list the crime of qata al-tariq separately.716 
In the first two years following Shariah being made state law, the hudud punishment for 
theft (amputation) was carried out on several hundred individuals, and in 1991, it was 
legalised officially in Sudanese criminal law.717 Amputation is one of the kinds of harsh and 
cruel punishments that is banned by the UDHR, the CAT, the ICCPR and the ACHPR to all 
of which Sudan has bound itself to.  
Sudan adopted the ICCPR and the ICESCR by accession on 18 March 1986 and signed 
the CAT (on 4 June 1986). It also became a member of the African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) that was entered into force on June 1986. Sudan is also 
among the signatories of the CDHRI and the ACHR. 
Despite its commitment to all these human rights documents, Sudan continued to practice 
hudud ordinances, thus violating many of the human rights they protect.718 One of the main 
areas criticised by human rights activists concerns the crime of rape. The onus of proof of a 
rape or gang rape is borne by the female victim seeking justice. Because it is almost 
impossible for her to provide proof in the form of four male Muslim witnesses, she usually 
ends up being the one being condemned for zina.719 
                                                 
713 Al-Jazirah op cit note 686. 
714 Sudan Criminal Code of 1991 (in English), available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/4d8b568d3792381cc12571100038b7d0/$FILE/Criminal%20Act%20-%20Sudan%20-%20EN.pdf, 
accessed on 22 December 2015; (in Arabic) available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=10737 
accessed on 22 December 2015. 
715 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 12 &13. 
716 Taha al-Makashifi al-Kabashi Tatbiq al-Shariah al-Islamia fi al-Sudan beina al-Haqiqa wal Eftira (1986) 15 
& 21. 
717 Sudanese Crimal Law of 1991 op cit note 714 arts 171–4. 
718 Such as the Banjul Charter art 4 (protection of life and integrity of a person) and art 5 (ban on torture, cruel, 
inhuman of degrading punishment and treatment).  
719 Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle ‘Sexuality, diversity, and ethics in the agenda of progressive Muslims’ in Omid 
Safi (ed) Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (2003) Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 
ch 8190–234. 
Martin Lau ‘Twenty-five years of hudood ordinances: A review’ (2007) 64 Wash & Lee L Rev 1291, available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol64/iss4/2, accessed on 2 February 2016. 
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This violates several internationally protected human rights guaranteed by the UDHR, 
and the ICCPR and even by the CDHRI and the ACHR, including the right to life, liberty, and 
security of person (art 3 UDHR, art 5 para 1 ACHR), the right to justice (art 19 b CDHRI), 
and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (art 9 UDHR). 
(a) The case of the Shafei school in Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei is the smallest one of all the Muslim countries that apply the tenets of the Shafei 
school of jurisprudence, but it is the only one of them that implements hudud ordinances in 
the entire country. 
When Brunei Darussalam’s new Penal Code came into force on 1 May 2014 it triggered a 
heated public debate inside the country and abroad,720 and was harshly criticised by human 
rights organisations. Amnesty International, for example, felt that the country had been taken 
‘back to the dark ages when it comes to human rights’.721 The Deputy Asia-Pacific Director of 
Amnesty International called the new penal code a mockery of the country’s international 
human rights commitments.722 
Brunei, in fact, is not only among the signatories of the Cairo Declaration since 1990, but 
has also adopted the CEDAW in 2006, and in 2012 it also became member of the 
‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN),at the same time reaffirming its 
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter.723 In 2015 it 
signed the CAT. As a state party of several of the UN Conventions, Brunei is also bound to 
the UDHR that is the basis of these international human rights treaties that Brunei has signed 
and acceded.724 
Despite its commitment to all these human rights documents, Brunei started the 
implementation of hudud ordinances in 2014, by incorporating Islamic laws into the existing 
criminal justice system.725 In October 2013, the new Brunei Shariah Penal Code was gazetted 
                                                 
720 Quratul-Ain Bandial ‘Implementation of Syariah law’ The Brunei Times 15 December 2014, available at 
http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national/2014/12/15/implementation-syariah-law, accessed on 26 November 2015. 
721 Amnesty USA ‘Brunei Darussalam: Revoke new Penal Code allowing stoning, whipping and amputation’ 
30 April 2014, Amnesty USA, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/brunei-darussalam-
revoke-new-penal-code-allowing-stoning-whipping-and-amputation, accessed on 1 August 2015. 
722 Ibid. 
723 ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ The Brunei Project,  available at 
http://www.thebruneiproject.com/the-universal-declaration-of-human-rights.html, accessed on 30 May 2016. 
724 ‘Brunei Darussalam: Fundamental rights and freedoms violated under the new Shari’a penal code’, Women 
Living Under Muslim Law, 11th November 2013, available at 
http://www.wluml.org/action/brunei-darussalam-fundamental-rights-and-freedoms-violated-under-new-shari’-
penal-code, accessed on 30 May 2016. 
725 Bandial op cit note 720. 
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by the Brunei government with the view to its being introduced in three phases.726 The first 
phase beginning on 1 May 2014 started with the implementation of ta’zir crimes punishable 
by fines and/or imprisonment. The offences listed under this section include failure to perform 
Friday prayer, disrespecting the month of Ramadan and propagating religions other than 
Islam.727 The second phase, started in 2015, covers more serious crimes and includes qisas and 
hudud crimes, with harsher punishments such as the amputation of limbs for theft, although 
the death penalty is excluded.728 A full enforcement of hudud ordinances, including death 
penalties, is part of phase three, that started in 2016. The so-called Shariah offences are tried 
by the Shariah courts, formerly limited to hear family matters like marriage and 
inheritance.729 
The list of hudud crimes in Brunei includes seven crimes and goes beyond those held by 
the official Shafei school.730 Only the five hudud crimes that all schools agree on are the 
same. The Brunei penal code lists them as: ‘zina (adultery), qazf (accusation of adultery, 
sodomy and rape), sariqah (theft), shurb (drinking) and hirabah (robbery)’. Brunei does not 
include apostasy and rebellion as taught by the Shafei school, instead rape and homosexuality 
are included. The Brunei penal code refers to these crimes as zina bil-jabar (rape) and liwat 
(sodomy). Liwat refers to homosexuality, as the qur'anic term for sodomy (luwat) covers male 
same-sex activities, but does not include lesbianism. The punishments assigned by the Brunei 
Shariah penal code include amputation of the hand for theft, death or amputation of the hand/ 
foot for robbery and stoning to death or whipping for adultery or rape.731  
The implementation of all these hudud punishments violates the ban on torture or to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment outlawed by the UDHR (art 5), the 
CAT (art 1 para 1) and the ASEAN (art 14).  
Generally, the penal code applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, for example in 
cases of theft, robbery, rape or homosexuality. Only specific offences, including apostasy, 
                                                 
726 Mohamad Tun Abdul Hamid ‘Implementation of hudud in Brunei: Differences between Brunei and 
Malaysia’, p 1 Protocol of his Public talk held on 11 February 2014 at the International Institute of Advanced 
Islamic Studies (IAIS), Islam and Civilisational Renewal website, vol 5, no 2, available at 
http://www.iais.org.my/icr, accessed on 20 November 2015.  
727 Bandial op cit note 720. 
728 Abdul Hamid op cit note 526 at 4–5; Quratul-Ain Bandial ‘Introduction of Syariah Penal approved in Brunei’ 
The Brunei Times/ANN 23 October 2013, available at 
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730 Brunei shari'ah penal code order (2013), available at https://www.bsp-
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December 2015. 
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adultery and drinking alcohol, are applicable only to Muslims.732 Some prescriptions apply to 
non-Muslims only, for example, ‘contempt of the Prophet [insulting the Prophet] by non-
Muslims’ and ‘deriding [disrespecting] the verses of the Qur’an or hadith by non-Muslims’.733 
Some acts, including adultery, are considered a punishable offence, only if committed by 
Muslims and not by a non-Muslim with a non-Muslim.734 Differentiating between Muslims 
and non-Muslims violates the principle of equality before the law protected in the UDHR (art 
7). 
Even though Brunei explicitly permits other religions, including Christianity, Buddhism 
and Hinduism to co-exist with Islam, Brunei is a declared conservative Muslim country, and 
in it every Muslim has to fulfil his or her religious duties. Despite the declaration in the 
Brunei constitution allowing that other religions ‘may be practiced in peace and harmony in 
any part of Brunei Darussalam’,735 human rights organisations keep expressing concerns 
about human rights here, especially in respect of religious freedom and restrictions on non-
Shafei and non-Islamic religious practice.736 Violations of the right to religious freedom 
constitute violations of the UDHR that protects this right in art 18.  
(b) The case of the Hanbali school in Saudi Arabia 
The teachings of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence are fully practised in Saudi Arabia, and 
constitute the legal basis for the Saudi judicial system. Hudud ordinances are incorporated 
into Saudi criminal law and practiced on a regular basis. The Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, also known as ‘the basic law of governance’, has been issued as a Royal Decree 
by King Fahd al-Saud and declaredly is based fully on Shariah.737 The penal code is also 
declaredly based on Shariah alone. It states that ‘[a]ny procedure which is contrary to the 
provisions of Islamic law or to the regulations that derived thereof, will be void’ (art 188) and 
                                                 
732 Abdul Hamid op cit note 526 at 4–5. 
733 Ibid.  
734 Ibid.  
735 Constitution of Brunei Darussalam, Part II, art 3 (1), available at http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanad
rutyunner/bruneydarusalam.pdf, accessed on 18 June 2016. 
736 ‘Amnesty International report 2014/2015: The state of the world’s human rights’ AmnestyUSA.org 
25 February 2015, 86–87, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/state-of-the-world-
20142015-0, accessed on 10 January 2016. 
737 ‘The Basic Law of Governance’ Royal order no A/90 of 27th Sha'ban 1412 AH (1 March 1992), available at 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/print/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx, 
accessed on 20 August 2014; The Saudi system regulating the government issued by the Saudi royal order no 8-
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that ‘[a]ny judgment which violates the text of the Quran or the Sunnah or the consensus 
[ijma] will be invalid’ (art 201). The Law of Criminal Procedure738 states in art 1 that 
[t]he courts shall apply the provisions of Shariah according to the Quran and Sunnah to all cases 
that come before it. Also the provisions issued by the guardian of the judiciary system may not 
conflict with the Quran and Sunnah. 
The penal code lists eight hudud crimes, namely theft (sariqa), highway robbery (qata al-
tariq) and fighting against Allah and His Messenger (haraba), illicit sexual intercourse (zina), 
defamation (al-qazf), drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr), rebellion (al-baghi) and apostasy 
(al-riddah).739 Notably, the three crimes of haraba, highway robbery, and rebellion are all 
listed individually. The punishments include the death penalty, stoning and cutting [off of 
hands or feet] and beating with lashes. 
The enforcement of these hudud punishments violates the ban on torture enshrined in the 
UDHR and the CAT, to both of which Saudi Arabia has bound itself to. The country adopted 
the CAT by accession on 23 September 1997, and signed and ratified the CEDAW on 7 
September 2000. Saudi Arabia is also among the signatories of the Cairo Declaration since 5 
August 1990, and a state party of the ACHR (signed 1 August 2004 and ratified on 15 April 
2009). 
Interestingly, the Saudi penal code claims to promote the protection of human rights. 
Article 26 states that ‘[t]he State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Shari‘ah’. 
The statement ‘in accordance with Shariah’, though, reflects that the protection of human 
rights is subordinated to Islamic law and is thus not contributing in any way to a protection of 
human rights against violations caused by hudud ordinances, as understood within the 
parameters of international law. 
The constitution also seems to promote due process. Paragraph 1 of art 220 states that 
‘[t]he sentence of death penalty, stoning or cutting [off hands or feet] cannot be carried out 
unless an order has been issued by the king or his assistance’; and para 2 states that: ’[t]he 
execution of the sentence of death, stoning, cutting [off hands or feet] or flogging has to be 
observed by representatives of the mayor of the city, the court and the religious and local 
police.’740 
                                                 
738 Law of criminal prodecure, Royal decree no (M/39) 28 Rajab 1422 AH [16 October 2001] Royal Embassy of 
Saudi Arabia, Washington DC, available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-
information/laws/CriminalProcedures2001-1of3.aspx, accessed on 20 August 2014. 
739 Shaima Atta ‘Criminal law in Saudi Arabia’ Qatar Law Forum 19 February 2010, available at 
http://www.mn940.net/forum/forum29/thread8833.html, accessed on 23 December 2015. 
740 The Islamic Penal Code of Saudi Arabia op cit note 738. 
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Despite the above, Saudi Arabia is one of the main countries known for their human 
rights violations, and especially for the excessive implementation of the death penalty: The 
death penalty is enforced for a number of different offences, including the crimes of apostasy, 
adultery of married persons, consensual sexual relations between adults of same sex, and acts 
that are considered to be terrorism-related offence and thus as acts of haraba (‘corruption on 
earth’). Saudi Arabia has one of the highest execution rates in the world. Between 1985 and 
2013 more than 2000 people were executed in Saudi Arabia.741 In 2015 alone at least 158 
people were executed.742  
Trial procedures in the Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system violate the aforedescribed 
right to a fair trial protected in the UDHR in several ways. According to Human Rights Watch 
reports, Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system makes it very difficult for a defendant to get a 
fair trial, even in capital cases. Suspects often have no access to a legal assistance.743 
Confessions are extorted under inhuman treatment and torture and convictions may be based 
on forced confessions.744 Trials often take place in secret and suspects are often not informed 
about the different steps of their trial.745 In case of an execution, family members are often not 
informed when or where it will take place. 
In summary, it can be said that the four representative countries that apply hudud 
ordinances according to the four Muslim Sunni schools violate human rights in many ways. In 
so doing, they violate their obligations to the human rights documents that they have 
committed themselves to. All the hudud punishments constitute a violation of the the right not 
to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  
IV Conclusion 
The cases of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan and Brunei Darussalam discussed in this chapter 
demonstrate that the application of hudud ordinances causes much conflict with international 
human rights laws. The main areas of criticism regard the excessive use of the death penalty, 
                                                 
741 ‘Saudi Arabia: Four family members executed for hashish possession’ Amnesty International 18 August 
2014, available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/35319/, accessed on 19 August 2014. 
742 ‘Death Penalty Database: Saudi Arabia’ Cornell Law school 4 April 2011, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Saudi+Arabia, accessed on 1 June 
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743 US Departemant of State ‘2014 International Religious Freedom Report’, available at 
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even for offences that are not considered capital by international law, the practice of the harsh, 
cruel and humiliating punishments of flogging and amputations, as well as due process 
violations and discrimination on the basis of gender and religion. 
Discrimination on the basis of gender or religion can be found in both the legal 
prescriptions of hudud ordinances, as well as in their practical application in Muslim 
countries. Discriminatory prescriptions can be found in most of the hudud crimes. The zina 
prescriptions, for example, discriminate against women, for the procedure of stoning makes it 
easy for men to escape, whilst for women escape is almost impossible. The prescriptions 
concerning theft discriminate against non-Muslims, for stealing from them is considered a 
crime less severe than stealing from a Muslim. Further, women and non-Muslims are not 
accepted as witnesses in hadd cases. Also the qazf prescriptions are very discriminatory, for 
defamation of a non-Muslim or a slave is seen as less severe than accusing a free Muslim. 
Furthermore, women, non-Muslims or slaves are considered not being qualified to be 
witnesses. If one of them testifies in a case of zina, not only will their testimony be ignored, 
but also they will be punished for qazf even if they did not bring forth any false accusation. 
Witnesses who falsely accuse women, by contrast, are not punished, even if their accusations 
are proven to be false. 
Interestingly, hudud ordinances violate not only international human rights standards, but 
also the important principle of presumption of innocence, which is a well-known and highly 
valued principle in Islam, especially since the Prophet Muhammad himself stated explicitly 
that, in case of doubt, there shall be no hudud punishment. The importance of preventing the 
faulty conviction of a suspect can also be seen in the fact that the Qur'an has defined the act of 
defamation as a crime by itself. Also the requirement of four eyewitnesses to convict a 
suspect of the crime of zina can be seen in that same light, namely as aiming to prevent the 
faulty conviction of a suspect. Nevertheless, this principle is much violated, both in the hudud 
prescriptions themselves and in the countries that apply hudud ordinances. Paradoxically, it is 
in the prescriptions of the very crime of qazf, as defined by the four different schools, that 
justifications are given for punishing witnesses who did no wrong, just because there are not 
enough witnesses to testify with them, or because they are not considered trustworthy enough 
because of their gender or religion. Pakistan, for example, is often criticised for faulty 
convictions, for there are numerous cases of rape, which women do not even dare to report for 
fear of becoming subject to the punishment for a crime they never committed — either qazf or 
zina. Women who became victims of sexual violence need and deserve protection from the 
state, yet, instead of being protected by the law, they can easily become victims of the judicial 
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system. What makes it even more unjust and discriminatory is that when a woman is falsely 
accused of adultery and proven to be innocent, her accusers will not be punished for the crime 
of qazf, even though their testimonies are proven to be false. 
The fact that hudud ordinances, as defined by the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence and 
as practiced in the four representative Muslim countries, violate the Islamic principle of 
presumption of innocence is a strong argument that disproves the claim that hudud ordinances 
are a divinely assigned and infallible set of crimes and punishments that cannot be questioned. 
It is this claim that is usually used as a justification of the enforcement of hudud ordinances. 
This chapter has demonstrated that even though all four Sunni schools agree on the notion of 
such a perfect set of hudud ordinances, they hold strongly differing views concerning their 
legal prescriptions. There are great differences between the four schools’ understandings 
concerning the definition of the crimes, the punishments and the requirements for a suspect to 
be convicted. More importantly, though, the prescriptions that the four schools hold to, 
contradict many of the qur'anic prescriptions in several ways.  
The disagreement between the four schools starts with the question of the correct number 
of hadd crimes to be part of the set of hudud ordinances, since the four schools disagree as to 
whether the crimes of apostasy, haraba and rebellion constitute hadd crimes or not. Not only 
the overlapping definitions of the crimes of haraba, qata al-tariq and al-baghi are very 
cloudy but also the prescriptions concerning the crime of drinking alcohol are very unclear 
and questionable. Contradictions and disagreement concerning the definition and punishment 
of the crime of drinking alcohol can be found both between the schools and also with the 
Qur'an itself.  
Interestingly, as for the crime of apostasy, all four schools agree on the death penalty, 
whilst by doing so, they all contradict the Qur'an, for it does not assign this punishment. The 
punishments of stoning and exile also have no legal justification in the Qur'an.  
Concerning the crime of theft, there is not only much disagreement between the four 
schools as to the punishment of repeat offenders, but also all four schools go beyond the 
qur'anic prescriptions with their punishment of the amputation of feet, which is not mentioned 
in the Qur'an. They also, interestingly enough, agree that imprisonment is the last option, even 
though this penalty is not mentioned in the Qur'an. Surprisingly, they chose the least severe 
punishment as the last option, whilst usually the punishment for repeat offenders is more 
severe than for first offenders. It would be more logical and more humane to choose the 
option of imprisonment as the first option, not the last. In the example of theft, it can also be 
seen very clearly how wide the range of the different positions is in dealing with the 
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individual hadd crimes and their punishments. The harshest position concerning theft assigns 
the cruel punishment of amputations for repeat offences, going as far as cutting off both hands 
and feet. However, there exists the option to forgive the offender if he repents, or to avert the 
hudud punishment if there is any case of doubt, for example, if the thief is very poor or if a 
country’s economic difficulties justify that.  
The fact that there is so much disagreement between the different schools of 
jurisprudence concerning the allegedly divinely prescribed hudud ordinances demonstrates 
how weak and questionable these prescriptions are. Interestingly, none of the four schools 
sticks to the qur'anic prescriptions concerning the hadd punishments, but all assign 
punishments that have no legal justification in the Qur'an. The argument that hudud 
ordinances are divine, infallible and non-negotiable can thus be refuted, the more so because 
they even contradict the qur'anic prescriptions. 
This thesis argues, therefore, that there is a great need to reform hudud ordinances. 
Among the reasons for this is that they violate human rights and are the source of opprobrium 
from the non-Muslim world, thereby damaging the reputation of Islam internationally. The 
following chapter discusses the importance of reformation from an Islamic perspective. 
CHAPTER 5  
THE CONCEPT OF REFORMATION IN ISLAM 
I Introduction 
The fact that Islamic law, particularly the hudud ordinances with their harsh and cruel 
punishments, clash significantly with internationally recognised human rights laws, has been 
discussed in depth in the previous chapters of this thesis. It has further been pointed out that 
many moderate Muslims call for reforming hudud ordinances by re-interpreting the primary 
sources of Shariah, the Qur'an and Sunnah. Orthodox Muslims, however, consider the idea of 
reforming them as blasphemy, since they view hudud ordinances as divine and infallible. 
Since the notion of ‘reforming’ is generally understood as modernising what seems to be 
outdated, orthodox Muslims presumably view the approach of many moderate Muslims as an 
attempt to compromise and violate Shariah. The truth, however, is that Shariah itself speaks a 
great deal about reformation and introduces it as a call to Muslims to renew their faith and 
restore the religion to its genuine condition as initially designed by its creator.  
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In this chapter religious texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah pertinent to the topic of 
reformation are discussed. One of these is Allah’s promise to send reformers on a regular 
basis to renew the religion.746 A particular focus is on the famous Farewell Sermon of the 
Prophet. This famous speech points out that Muslims of today might be able to understand 
Shariah even better than did their co-religionists of the Prophet’s time.747 Further, the Prophet 
stresses the importance of abiding by the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah as the 
ultimate guidelines for Muslims. The sermon can be understood as a call to Muslims of all 
times, including those of today, to examine and verify for themselves what Shariah really 
teaches, thus to practice ijtihad.748 From this, it can be concluded that a Muslim’s ultimate 
aim should be to examine Islamic law in the light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and, if 
necessary, re-interpret them while taking its core values into account.749 These values are 
articulated in the last sermon, and are to be discussed in this chapter.  
When exploring the Islamic concept of reformation as introduced in the Qur’an, the 
notions of islah (restoration), tagyir (change), tajdid (renewal), and ehyah (revival) are 
examined. The discussion of this concept, as reflected in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, 
demonstrates that both of these primary sources describe reformation as an essential 
mechanism to guarantee the survival of Islam by keeping it fresh and appropriate for 
Muslims’ life circumstances and to the reality of the changing environment in which they live, 
regardless of when they live(d).750 This chapter demonstrates that Shariah presents Islam as a 
living organism rather than a rigid and unchangeable system. It is argued, further, that the call 
for reformation and restoration can be understood as a call to clear Islamic law, including 
hudud ordinances, from those prescriptions that have been developed by the human effort of 
Islamic jurists and that have no legal justification in the Qur’an. This is particularly so if they 
contradict the Qur'an, as is the case, for example, with the punishment for apostasy.  
This chapter also discusses the purposes of Shariah (maqased al-Shariah), the primary 
one of which is to benefit the people and to protect them from harm. With the aim of 
protecting these purposes, Shariah provides two important principles, namely the 
jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqa) and that of necessity (fiqh al-darurah). According to 
these two principles, under exceptional circumstances what is prohibited can be permitted, 
namely, if there is a necessity that requires a person or people to secure the benefit of the 
                                                 
746 Muhammad Nasir ad-Din al-Albani Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahihah (1995) vol 2 at 148 no 599. 
747 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 68 at 30. 
748 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani op cit note 556 at vol 1 at 191. 
749 Muhammad Salim al-Awa Al-Fiqh al-Islami fi Tariq al-Tajdid 3 ed (2006) 52. 
750 Mohamed Osman Shabir Al-Takyif al-Fiqhi wa Tadbiqatuhu al-Amaliyah ala al-Waqaeh al-Mustajadah 
(2014) 6. 
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people, or if the reality of life requires it. The discussion of these two principles gives 
evidence of Shariah’s flexibility and the richness of the tools available to Islamic jurists in 
developing rulings appropriate for twenty-first century Muslims.  
This chapter also looks at the two main obstacles preventing Islamic jurists from 
amending hudud ordinances. The first of these is the fact that the protection of religion has a 
predominant role in Islam. This view derives from a reading of the concept of the five 
indispensables that elevates the protection of religion above the protection of the other four 
indispensables that protect individuals’ rights. It is argued in this chapter that this reading is 
incorrect, and that human efforts to protect the religion by violating the benefit of the people, 
thus violate Shariah. The second obstacle is the claim that hudud ordinances concern the right 
of Allah and can therefore not be forgiven or amended by anyone else besides Allah himself. 
This chapter refutes this claim on several grounds and points out to evidences in the Qur'an 
and Sunnah that stresses Allah’s desire to forgive and to make it easy for the people.  
This chapter thus demonstrates that it is Islamically legitimate and necessary to reform 
hudud ordinances to clear them from interpretations that are in conflict with the primary 
sources of Shariah, its purposes and its core values. In doing so, this chapter prepares the 
ground for Chapter 6 that aims to apply the principles of necessity and reality to reconcile 
hudud ordinances with international human rights law. 
II The concept of reformation in the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
The Qur'an and the Sunnah contain many texts that speak explicitly or implicitly about 
reformation. The Arabic term for reform is islah. This means to restore, repair or improve 
something that has been corrupted or broken, or to bring something from a bad condition to a 
good condition.751 Al-Ragaeb al-Asfahani interpreted the term ‘reform’ as ‘the good against 
bad’.752 The Qur'an discusses the Islamic concept of reform in a broader scope than the Arabic 
language itself, using in addition to the term islah (restoration), also the terms tajdid 
(renewal), ehyah (revival) and tagyir (change) to describe the idea of reformation and the 
connected aspect of positive change.  
The following hadith, for example, which is one of the key texts in the Sunnah concerning 
reformation, reports about a promise of Allah to send His people reformers on a regular basis.  
                                                 
751 Al-Raghib al-Asfahani Al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Qur'an (1412 AH) 489.  
752 Ibid.  
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(a) Allah’s promise to send reformers 
According to this hadith, as narrated by Abu Hurairah, the Prophet said: ‘God will send to this 
nation (Muslims) at the head of every hundred years someone to renew its religion (Islam).’753 
The main notion conveyed in this hadith is that the religion needs to be renewed on a regular 
basis in order to be revitalised. It is important to note that the ‘renewal’ of the religion, 
mentioned in this hadith does not imply changing Shariah, but refers to a call upon Muslims 
to return to the religion and to bring their lives into compliance with Shariah.754 Islamic jurists 
refer to this person both as mujaddid, thus a person who brings tajdid (renewal), and as 
musleh, a person who brings islah (reform).755 The hundred-year period mentioned in the 
hadith does not necessarily refer to a specific period of time, but can be understood as 
referring to the concept of continuity and recurrence on regular basis.756  
Islamic scholars agree that this hadith does not speak about prophets but about 
reformers.757 It can be understood as speaking about religious leaders who have the gift and 
ability to bring new inspiration to the believers, to call them back to God and to present the 
message of God to them in a fresh way, one that is relevant to their lives.758 The majority of 
Islamic scholars believe that the hadith refers to individuals who can be identified as 
reformers,759 whilst other scholars believe that it could as well refer to a collective. Some 
scholars, including Ibn Kathir, believe that this hadith must refer to Islamic scholars, since 
reformation can be done only by Muslim scholars who carry the knowledge of Islam.760 Some 
Muslim scholars have attempted to identify the specific reformers to which this hadith is 
referring. Sunni Muslims, for example, believe that Caliph Umar Ibn Abdel Azis was one of 
the mujaddidin,761 as was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.762 During the rise of the Iranian Islamic 
revolution in the late 1970s, Shia Muslims — and even many Sunni Muslims — were 
convinced that the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, was one of the reformers 
                                                 
753 Al-Albani op cit note 746. 
754 Seif-al-Din Abdul Fatah ‘The renewal’, available at http://arabi21.com/story/822581/دد ددد- ددد ددد-
ددددد د- ددد ددد- دد د دد ددددد,  accessed on 7 April 2015. 
755 Abdel Metaal al-Saidi Al-Mujadedun fi al-Islam min al-Qarn al-Awal ela al-Qarn al-Rabea Ashar (1996) 14.  
756 Abdul Fatah op cit note 754.  
757 Adnan Mohammed Umaamah Al-Tajdid fi al- Fikr al Islami (2001) 62. 
758 Al-Azim al-Abadi Awn al-Maabud Sharh Sunan Abu Dawud (2009) 1841.  
759 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani Fath al-Bari fi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (1995) vol 13 at 308. 
760 Mohammed Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Mohammed al-Sakhawy Al-Maqased al-Hassanah Fima Eshtuhera ala 
al-Alsenah (1985) no 235. 
761 Al-Abadi op cit note 758. 
762 Zahid Roussin ‘Manhag al-Afghani al-aqli fi defauho an al-Islam’ (2008) Magalat Gameat Demasheq, vol 24 
at 388, no1 & 2, available at http://www.damascusuniversity.edu.sy/mag/human/images/stories/3530000.pdf, 
accessed on 5 November 2015.  
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that the said hadith speaks about.763 Regardless of the question of the identity of the reformers 
mentioned in the hadith, the key message that can be understood from it is the notion that 
reformation is a life force for Islam as is the air to breathe for a human being.764  
The notion that the message of God needs to be refreshed and re-read in the context of 
the reality of life of each new generation can also be seen in the famous Farewell Sermon of 
the Prophet Muhammad.  
(b) The Farewell Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad 
The famous Farewell Sermon (khutab al-wada) of the Prophet Muhammad765 that he 
preached just before his death, in 632 AD, can be seen as one of the key texts on reformation, 
for it presents and explains the call for it. The Prophet commenced his sermon by pointing out 
its great importance and calling his audience to transmit his message to all those Muslims who 
could not hear his words directly:  
                                                 
763 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal Madafia Ayatollah: Qisat Iran al-Thaura 6 ed (2002) 167. 
764 Roussin op cit note 762.  
765 After praising, and thanking Allah he said: “O People, lend me an attentive ear, for I know not whether after 
this year, I shall ever be amongst you again. Therefore listen to what I am saying to you very carefully and 
TAKE THESE WORDS TO THOSE WHO COULD NOT BE PRESENT HERE TODAY. 
O People, just as you regard this month, this day, this city as Sacred, so regard the life and property of every 
Muslim as a sacred trust. Return the goods entrusted to you to their rightful owners. Hurt no one so that no one 
may hurt you. Remember that you will indeed meet your LORD, and that HE will indeed reckon your deeds. 
ALLAH has forbidden you to take usury (interest), therefore all interest obligation shall henceforth be waived. 
Your capital, however, is yours to keep. You will neither inflict nor suffer any inequity. Allah has Judged that 
there shall be no interest and that all the interest due to Abbas ibn ‘Abd’al Muttalib (Prophet’s uncle) shall 
henceforth be waived… 
Beware of Satan, for the safety of your religion. He has lost all hope that he will ever be able to lead you astray 
in big things, so beware of following him in small things. 
O People, it is true that you have certain rights with regard to your women, but they also have rights over you. 
Remember that you have taken them as your wives only under Allah’s trust and with His permission. If they 
abide by your right then to them belongs the right to be fed and clothed in kindness. Do treat your women well 
and be kind to them for they are your partners and committed helpers. And it is your right that they do not make 
friends with any one of whom you do not approve, as well as never to be unchaste. 
O People, listen to me in earnest, worship ALLAH, say your five daily prayers (Salah), fast during the month of 
Ramadan, and give your wealth in Zakat. Perform Hajj if you can afford to. 
All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any 
superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white 
except by piety (taqwa) and good action. Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the 
Muslims constitute one brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim 
unless it was given freely and willingly. Do not, therefore, do injustice to yourselves. 
Remember, one day you will appear before ALLAH and answer your deeds. So beware, do not stray from the 
path of righteousness after I am gone. 
O People, NO PROPHET OR APOSTLE WILL COME AFTER ME AND NO NEW FAITH WILL BE BORN. 
Reason well, therefore, O People, and understand words which I convey to you. I leave behind me two things, 
the QURAN and my example, the SUNNAH and if you follow these you will never go astray.All those who 
listen to me shall pass on my words to others and those to others again; and may the last ones understand my 
words better than those who listen to me directly. Be my witness, O ALLAH, that I have conveyed your message 
to your people”.’ See ‘The Last Sermon (Khutbah) of Prophet Muhammad (Farewell Sermon)’ (English 
translation of the sermon) op cit note 34.  
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O People! Lend me an attentive ear, for I do not know whether after this year I shall ever be 
amongst you again. Therefore, listen carefully to what I am saying and Take These Words to 
Those Who Could Not Be Present Here Today.  
One of the main points communicated in this important speech is the statement of the Prophet 
stressing that the Qur'an and the Sunnah are given as the ultimate guidelines for Muslims.766 
The Prophet called his followers to abide closely to their teachings:  
Reason well, therefore, O People, and understand words which I convey to you. I leave behind 
me two things, the QUR’AN and my example, the SUNNAH, and if you follow these you will 
never go astray.  
Further, the Prophet pointed out the core values of Islam, and urged his followers to keep, 
follow and protect them.767 The core values that will be discussed in more depth later in this 
section include justice, the protection of life and property and a spirit of brotherhood.  
When the Prophet reminded the people present to pass his message on to all Muslims, 
from generation to generation, he expressed his hope that ‘the last ones’ may be able to 
understand his words even better than the Muslims of his own time:768  
All those who listen to me shall pass on my words to others and those to others again; and may 
the last ones understand my words better than those who listen to me directly.  
This statement of the Prophet is of crucial importance, because it conveys the message that 
Muslims of later generations might have an even better understanding of his message than 
those of his own time.769 This implies that the right and the ability to understand and interpret 
the teachings of Shariah do not belong to the first generation of Muslims only, but that 
Muslims of all generations are urged to strive to understand the message found in Shariah’s 
primary sources, thus practicing ijtihad.770 This is among several texts in the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah that speak about the necessity and the right of Muslims of all generations to interpret 
the primary sources of Shariah and to apply them to their own time and circumstances.771 As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, ijtihad can be described as the mechanism used to implement the 
teachings of the primary sources to all the practical legal questions that arise in the life of the 
Muslim society.772 The Prophet repeatedly encouraged Muslims to apply their own opinion 
                                                 
766 Ismail Ibn Umar Ibn Kathir Al-Fusul fi Eghtesar Serat al-Rassul (2010) 214–18. 
767 Ibn Jarir al-Tabari Tarikh al-Tabari 2 ed (1969) 148–52. 
768 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 at 450 no 1739. 
769 Almuaferi Ibn Hisham Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah 2 ed (2009) 641–2. 
770 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 68 at 30. 
771 Al-Alwani op cit note 17 at 62. 
772 One of the first examples of the application of ijtihad is a hadith that reports about the Prophet’s companion 
Mu’az who was sent to Yemen to rule the Muslim commuity there. When Mu’az explained that he would rule all 
legal cases accoring to the book of Allah and if he would not find an answer in the Qur'an, he would use the 
Sunnah, and if he could not find an answer in the Sunnah, he would apply his own opinion and apply ijtihad, the 
Prophet praised him for this approach. Al-Qaradawi op cit note 131; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36. 
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and to listen to their heart.773 One hadith states, for example, that any effort made to apply 
ijtihad is honourable774 and praiseworthy and will be rewarded — even if the interpretation is 
wrong; and if it is correct it will be doubly rewarded.775 It can be concluded that Muslims, 
therefore, should not rely on the interpretations of early scholars or traditions only, but they 
should consider the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah to find out for themselves how to 
understand them in their own context.776 It is argued here that this implies the necessity and 
the right of contemporary Muslims to re-interpret the primary sources of Shariah and to apply 
them to their own time and circumstances, since contemporary Muslims know best how to 
apply the message of the primary sources in a way to fit with their time.777 According to the 
Islamic principle of ikhtilaf, different opinions and interpretations are seen as important 
because it creates an environment of pluralism and diversity, which is considered beneficial 
for a Muslim socieity.778 Since Muslims of today live in a completely different environment 
and reality from that of Muslims of the seventh century, they have to deal with challenges that 
were unknown to the early scholars.779 It can be concluded that Muslims of today are called to 
do ijtihad.780 They should examine the rulings of Islamic law and verify them in the light of 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah and the Islamic core values presented in them. These core values 
have been pointed out by the Prophet Muhammad in his Farewell Sermon as follows: 
i. Life and property  
The first core value that the Prophet pointed out to in his final sermon is the sanctity of human 
life. The Prophet explained that human life and property are sacred and holy.781  
                                                 
773 'Consult your soul, consult your heart. Righteousness is what is satisfying to your soul and your heart. Sin is 
what wavers in your soul and causes hesitancy in your chest, even if the people give you a judgment, and again 
give you a judgment.' Abdul Azim Abdul Qawi Al-Munziri Al-Targhib wal-Tarhib (2003) vol 2 at 557. 
774 Ibn Ashour op cit note 132 at 408. 
775 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 9 at 271 hadith 7352. 
776 Even though throughout the Islamic history there have been some Islamic scholars who claim(ed) that ‘the 
door of ijtihad has been closed’, there is no general consensus on this view. Many scholars agree that ‘ijtihaad is 
an integral part of Islamic legal theory’ and they believe in ‘ijtihaad’s importance in Muslim’s daily life’. Salih 
Kesgin op cit note 134. 
777 Ibid. 
778 The principle of ikhtilaf is based on a statement of the fifth caliph, Umar Ibn Abd al-Aziz, who declared that 
it was more beneficial for the Muslim community that the companions of the Prophet did not all have the same 
opinion. He explained that lack of diversity would cause hardship to the Muslim people. See Ibn Abd al-Bar 
Jamea bayan al-Elm wa fadluh (1994) vol 2 at 161 Dar Ibn al-Juzy, Al-Damam. 
779 Al-Gharbawi op cit note 14 at 10. 
780 Abdul Salam Figo ‘Al-ijtihad wa daruratuhu fi al-asser al-hader’ Majalat Dawat al-Haq, no 283, April 1991, 
Rabat, Morocco. 
781 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 at 450 no 1739. 
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In both the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the protection of life is accorded an extremely high 
priority. The Qur’an and the Sunnah make it very clear that the call of Allah and His 
Messenger is a call to live.782 This implies that no one has the right to take the life of others, 
let alone commit suicide. Since the protection of life is given so much importance, killing an 
innocent life is consequently clearly rejected. Killing is considered an act of corruption on 
earth. According to a correct hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah, the Prophet said that whoever 
kills himself will suffer tremendously in hell for all eternity.783 This matches the teaching of 
the Qur’an that says that no one has the right to kill others or themselves, since Allah has 
made life sacred (Surah 6:151, 4:29).784 The Qur’an makes it clear that Allah is the only one 
who has the right over life and who can take it away, since he is the creator who gave life — 
the sovereign God who has the ultimate authority over life and death (Surah 22:66, 36:78–
9).785 Surah 2:164 points out that Allah, as the creator of the universe, is the one who gives 
life on earth, including by sending rain to a dead land.786 It is only He who can bring the dead 
back to life (Surah 2:73).787 Surah 5:32 states that if a man kills an innocent person, it is the 
equivalent of the killing of all humankind. The same verse declares that when a man protects 
the life of his fellow men this act is considered the equivalent of giving a new life to all 
humankind or having resurrected all the dead.788 It is for this reason that Allah cancelled the 
pre-Arabian tradition of burying babies alive. The Qur'an says that on resurrection day Allah 
will ask these babies who did this to them, thus illustrating how angry He was about the 
killing of innocent lives (Surah 81:8–9). This is an important aspect that should always be 
kept in mind by anyone who deals with Islamic criminal law789 and — especially — with the 
death penalties that have been prescribed by Islamic jurists and that are not legally justified in 
the Qur'an or the Sunnah.790 Life is sacred and no one has the right to take that of another, 
except for Shariah prescribed reasons.791 Muslims are challenged by the Prophet’s last sermon 
                                                 
782 Surah 8:24. 
783 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 196 hadith 300. 
784 Surah 6:151 …take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law… .; Surah 4:29. 
785Surah 22:66; Surah 36:78–9. 
786 Surah 2:164. 
787 Surah 2:73. 
788 Surah 5:32. 
789 Salih Bin Fawzan al-Fawzan ‘Tahrem qatel al-nafs wal jenayah aliha’ Tariq al-Islam 17 December 2011, 
available at http://ar.islamway.net/article/9262/دد ددد- ددد- ددددد- دد دد دددد- دد ددا , accessed on 
7 November 2015.  
790 Abdul Rahim ‘Alam, rajm al-zani akbar garemah fi haq al-den wal inssan’ Hespress 16 July 2012, available 
at http://www.hespress.com/writers/58407.html, accessed on 7 November 2015. 
791 Exceptional cases where killing is permitted are, for example, the qisas punishment for murder or the haraba 
punishment. 
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to understand for themselves what the will of Allah really is.792 Since the protection of life is 
stressed in both the Qur'an and in the Sunnah, the will of Allah on this matter is clear. It is, 
therefore, the responsibility of Muslims of today to place the teachings of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah above contradictory prescriptions that have been developed by Islamic jurists.793 
The protection of property mentioned by the Prophet in his last sermon is also given 
priority, both in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This is why the Prophet instructs his audience to 
‘[r]eturn the goods entrusted to you to their rightful owners’.794 This injunction can also be 
seen in a correct hadith that calls for the return of entrusted goods to their rightful owner and 
condemns a failure to do so.795 This is also iterated in Surah 4:58, where the action of 
knowingly misappropriating entrusted things is viewed in the same way as a betrayal of Allah 
or His Messenger.796 
After having dealt with the duty of Muslims to protect life and property, the Prophet calls 
for people to be protected from physical harm and suffering.797 This can be compared to 
protection from torture and cruel and inhuman punishment that is outlawed by international 
human rights laws. The Prophet further points out that Allah Himself will take into account 
any violation of these rights in the afterlife: ‘Remember that you will indeed meet your 
LORD, and that he will indeed reckon your deeds.’ This reflects the qur'anic warning 
concerning the crime of apostasy where Allah points out that He will hold apostates 
accountable in the afterlife.798 
It is argued that Muslim scholars of today who are committed to carrying out the will of 
Allah and to following His Prophet, should take to heart what the Prophet requested in his last 
sermon and abide by the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. If they do so, and examine 
the hudud ordinances in the light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and their core values, they will 
be able to see the contradictions between the rulings developed by Islamic jurists and the 
teaching of Shariah.799 In respect of the crime of apostasy, for example, the prescription of the 
                                                 
792 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 at 450 no 1739. 
793 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 68 at 56. 
794 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 at 450 no 1739. 
795 ‘It was narrated from Abu Hurairah that the Messenger of Allah said: "The signs of the hypocrite are three: 
When he speaks he lies, when he makes a promise he breaks it, and when he is entrusted with something he 
betrays that trust."’ Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 156 hadith 211. 
796 Surah 4:58; Surah 8:27. 
797 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 2 at 450 no 1739. 
798 Surah 2:217. 
799 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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death penalty by execution violates Allah’s call to protect life and ignores the fact that He 
decided to judge this crime in the afterlife.800  
ii. Women’s dignity and rights 
The last sermon of the Prophet also speaks of the protection of women’s dignity and rights. 
The Prophet called men to treat women well, with kindness, fairness and justice and promotes 
mutual respect and care for each other. The Prophet further points out that both men and 
women have specific rights and obligations. It is contended here that this refers to the equality 
of men and women, for this reflects what is empathised in Qur'an.  
The Qur'an promotes equality between men and women in dignity and rights by pointing 
out that both men and women have been created from the same nature.801 It points out that 
since they are created from the same nature they deserve to be mutually respected and their 
relationship should be based on love, respect and care.802 The Qur'an, further, declares that 
both genders have equal right to participate in leadership and government.803 
The view of many orthodox Muslims who believe that men are superior to women is 
mainly based on a reading of Surah 4:34, a verse that can indeed be interpreted in different 
ways. The two Arabic terms that led to the differences in the interpretations are qawamuna 
and fadala. The aspect of ‘superiority’ is implied in the term fadala that translates as ‘prefer, 
choose, excel, surpass or outshine’. The term qawamuna literally means ‘to be in charge of’. 
Picktal’s translation that is the closest to its literal meaning, says: ‘Men are in charge of 
women, because Allah hath men the one of them to excel the other.’ It is important to note, 
though, that the verse does not (necessarily) refer to superiority in dignity or rights. It is 
actually more likely that it refers rather to the financial superiority of men. When the cultural 
and economic environment of the seventh century is taken into account, where men were the 
only caretakers and providers of a family, this understanding seems very convincing.804 Most 
qur'anic translators seem to agree on this understanding, for this is what is reflected in the 
different English translations that describe a man’s role as the provider, maintainer and 
protector of the family. When considering the aforementioned cultural and economic context, 
Asad’s translation seems a good interpretation of the real meaning of the verse: ‘Men shall 
                                                 
800 Nabil Qarqur 'Huriyat al-mutaqad wa hukm al-riddah fi al-Shariah al-Islamiyah’ Magalat al-Muntada al-
Qanuni 5 (2013) 5 254. 
801 Surah 4:1 and Surah 7:189. 
802 Surah 7:189. 
803 Surah 9:71. 
804 Mohammad Sohail Tqosh Tarikh al-Arab Qabla al-Islam (2009) 175. 
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take full care of women with the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on the 
former than on the latter, and with what they may spend out of their possessions.’ In addition, 
Picktal confirms that the verse refers to this economical aspect, when he points out that men 
‘spend of their property (for the support of women)’. 
The interpretation of Surah 4:34 as a justification of men’s superiority has also been 
refuted by the famous Egyptian Al-Azhar scholar, Sheikh Mitwali al-Sharawi, who argued for 
the equality between men and women by pointing to Surah 4:32805 and to the statement of the 
Prophet in his last sermon as evidence of this.806 
The main argument, though, to refute the superiority of men and to support the equality 
of men and women, are the aforementioned qur'anic verses that point out that men and women 
are equal in dignity and rights since they are created from the same nature. 
iii. Justice without discrimination 
Another core value mentioned in the Prophet’s last sermon was that of fairness and justice 
without discrimination.807 The Prophet calls his people to treat each other justly: ‘Treat others 
justly so that no one would be unjust to you.’808 It is noteworthy that such just treatment 
should apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims, and thus can be considered non-
discriminatory, since the Prophet called people to treat everyone justly and fairly — 
regardless of nationality, religion, colour, language, race or gender.809 This is stated explicitly 
by the Prophet, who points out that since ‘[a]ll mankind is from Adam and Eve’, no one is 
superior to others, whether they be Arab or non-Arab or black or white.810 Such a call to treat 
all without discrimination can also be seen in a correct hadith narrated by Abdullah Ibn Omr. 
Here the Prophet Muhammad is quoted saying that the best part of Islam is to feed the poor 
and to greet all people with peace whether you know them or not.811 ‘[W]hether you know 
them or not’, makes it clear that all people should be treated the same. 
                                                 
805 Surah 4:32 (Asad) ‘Men shall have a benefit from what they earn, and women shall have a benefit from what 
they earn. …’ 
806 Muhammad Metwali al-Sharawi Khawater Haula al-Quran al-Karim (1991) vol 4 at 2195. 
807 Ibn Kathir op cit note 766 at 214–18. 
808 Ibn Hisham op cit note 769. 
809 Al-Tabari op cit note 767. 
810 Safey al-Din al-Mubarakfuri Al-Rahiq al-Maghtum: Bahth fi al-Serah al-Nabawiyah (2007) 458–62. 
811 ‘It was narrated from 'Abdullah Bin 'Amr that a man asked the Messenger of Allah: "What part of Islam is 
best?" He said: "To feed others, and to greet with peace those whom you know and those whom you do not 
know."’ Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 136–7 hadith 160.  
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The Qur'an points out that the call to justice has been communicated at all times through 
the different prophets and Messengers.812 It was always the key topic in pre-Muhammed 
prophetic messages.813 Allah explains that He sent His Messengers with signs and with 
guidelines to help His people live in justice.814 This is iterated in Surah 5:8, in which Allah 
calls His people to be just and fair even when facing hatred and hostility. 
iv. Spirit of brotherhood  
Another key aspect that the Prophet points out in his last sermon is the call to brotherhood. 
The concept of brotherhood was quite revolutionary for its time, since it represented a new 
concept of social life that Islam brought to the Arabian Peninsula.815 It was a call to give up 
the traditional tribal hostilities and to treat each other in a spirit of brotherhood.816 This 
teaching established peace and justice amongst the community. In first instance, the call to 
brotherhood was a call to Muslims to treat each other fairly and justly:  
‘Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims constitute one 
brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless 
it was given freely and willingly.817 Do not, therefore, do injustice to yourselves.’818 
The next level was the call to be fair and friendly to everyone, regardless of his or her 
religion. In a correct hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah, Allah warns of hostility with one’s 
neighbour (regardless of religion):819 ‘He will not enter Paradise, whose neighbour is not safe 
from his evil conduct.’820 Another correct hadith reports that the Prophet Muhammad realized 
that the revelations he received concerning the right attitude towards one’s neighbour 
increasingly called to treat each other in a spirit of brotherhood, to such an extent that at some 
point he declared that he would not be surprised if the next revelation would call people to 
share their inheritance with their neighbour.821 
                                                 
812 Ali Mohyi al-Din al-Qaradaghi ‘Al-adel fi al-Quran’ Qaradaghi.com 14 July 2009, available at 
http://www.qaradaghi.com/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=608:2009-07-14-14-07-
53&catid=107:---q-q---&Itemid=13, accessed on 7 November 2015. 
813 Yusuf al-Qaradawi ‘Justice’ Qaradawi.net 26 October 2015, available at 
http://qaradawi.net/new/articles/6349-2015-10-26-03-45-10, accessed on 7 November 2015. 
814 Surah 57:25; Surah 7:29.  
815 Khalid Mustafa 'Huquq al-eghuah al-islameyah wal inssaneyah' Manaratweb.com 20 October 2015, available 
at http://www.manaratweb.com/دددد- ددددد د- دد دددد دد د- ددددد ددد دد/ , accessed on 7 
November 2015. 
816 Surah 3:103. 
817 Al-Tabari op cit note 767. 
818 Ibn Kathir op cit note 766. 
819 Ali Ahmed Abdel al-Tahtawy Shareh Kitab Haq al-Jar lel Imam al-Zahabi (2005) 18. 
820 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 141 hadith 172. 
821 Al-Tahtawy op cit note 819 at 7. 
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Muslims of today, who are striving to apply the message of the Prophet appropriately in 
the twenty-first century, may therefore ask themselves in which areas they should give up 
their traditional hostilities and instead act in a spirit of brotherhood so that peace and justice 
may be established. 
As can be seen from the above information, the core values of the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
that the Prophet Muhammad points out in his Farewell Sermon, have much in common with 
the internationally protected human rights:822 the protection of life and property, the ban of 
discrimination and the promotion of equal rights and dignity for women are some of the very 
basic and important key values shared by both the primary sources of Shariah and 
international human rights law.823 It is these values that the Prophet Muhammad declared to 
be the ultimate guidelines for all Muslims at all times.  
In his Farewell Sermon, the Prophet Muhammad calls on people to abide by the teachings 
of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and the Islamic core values. This can be understood as an appeal 
to contemporary Muslims to examine the prescriptions of Islamic law, including the hudud 
prescriptions as developed by Islamic jurists, in the light of the abovementioned sources and 
the core values promoted in them.  
The need to restore and renew the religion articulated in the Farewell Sermon of the 
Prophet and in Allah’s promise to send reformers on a regular basis is a key topic that often 
appears in the Qur'an, as can be seen in the following section.  
(c) Reformation in the Qur'an  
The Islamic concept of reformation, as introduced in the Qur’an, includes the notions of islah 
(restoration), ehyah (revival), tagyir (change), and tajdid (renewal). All of these refer to 
Allah’s call to Muslims to reform their lives by turning away from evil ways and to start 
living according to the core values of their faith, doing good, acting justly, giving charity, and 
caring for orphans.824 This includes a call to restore and reconcile relationships and to forgive 
each other.825 The Qur'an points out that forgiveness and reconciliation leads to peace and 
harmony and is much better than taking revenge.826 Anyone who practices forgiveness and 
                                                 
822 Nassir Bin Butte Bin Nassir al-Khalidi Huquq al-Inssan fi Khutbat al-Wadae (unpublished MA thesis, 
Gamieat Nayif al-Arabia Lel-Eluum al-Amniyah, Riyadh, 2010) 177.  
823 CEDAW arts 1–4, 15; UDHR arts 1–3. 
824 Surah 2:83; Surah 4:8. 
825 Surah 4:114, Surah 49:10.  
826 Surah 8:1; Surah 42:40. 
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reconciliation is promised a good reward by Allah.827 Those who do good to others are 
promised a good life.828 Allah declares, further, that if people genuinely repent and amend 
their conduct, they will receive His forgiveness for their sins and injustice.829 He also 
promises those who reform their lives and act righteously that they will be free from grief and 
fear.830 He further promises to change their life’s circumstances for good (tagyir) if they 
recognise their wrongs, and make a genuine effort to reform their lives.831 
The Arabic term islah means to restore, repair or improve something that has been 
corrupted or broken.832 Allah promised people who would reform their lives that he would 
improve their circumstances and bring restoration (islah), positive change (tagyir) and tajdid 
(renewal) to their lives.833 He declares that His desire is to bring back life to his people and to 
bring revival (ehyah) to the religion to resurrect people’s lives like the rain brings new life to 
a dried-out land.834 The qur'anic call for reformation, thus, aims to see their individual lives as 
well as the society been restored.835  
The Qur'an and the Sunnah repeatedly point out that due to the natural phenomenon of 
decay836 and since people have the tendency to go astray and that societies are being corrupted 
repeatedly, every new generation needs to be redirected to the right way and given a fresh 
message from God — appropriate for their own time and situation.837 This is why Allah kept 
sending prophet after prophet with new inspiration to renew the faith of the people and to 
bring new life to the religion and positive direction to the society.838 It is noteworthy that the 
Qur'an does not just speak about ‘reminding’ people of Allah’s message, but rather about a 
‘new’ inspiration. This can be understood to mean that the message of God needs to be 
adjusted to the situation in which every new generation finds itself. Bringing new inspiration 
does not mean to bring a new or different message. It rather reflects the aspect communicated 
in the Farewell Sermon, in which the Prophet urged Muslims to read and understand the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah for themselves, in the light of the core values of Islam and adjusted to 
                                                 
827 Surah 8:1; Surah 42:40. 
828 Surah 16:97. 
829 Surah 6:54; Surah 16:119. 
830 Surah 7:35; Surah 6:48. 
831 Surah 13:11; Surah 21:105; Surah 7:170. 
832 Al-Asfahani op cit note 751 at 28. 
833 Surah 4:114. 
834 Surah 2:164. 
835 Surah 39:53–54.  
836 Salman al-Audah ‘The Quran is a book of change’ Islam Today 23 July 2011, available at 
http://www.islamtoday.net/salman/artshow-28-153640.htm, accessed on 24 August 2014. 
837 Surah 4:163; Surah 16:43. 
838 Surah 23:44. 
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their own time and environment.839 The Qur'an makes it very clear that Islam is not inflexible 
like a rock, but is rather like a living organism that reinvigorates itself on a regular basis 
through reformation.840 This is why Shariah is known to be flexible and fitting for all times 
and all circumstances.841  
The term tajdid (renewal) that is a crucial element of the concept of reformation means 
renewing what is corrupted and degenerated and thus returning it to its original condition.842 It 
can be argued that the call to reformation includes the call to restore and renew the religion to 
its original condition. This includes and justifies efforts to clear Islamic law from any human 
interpretation of Islamic jurists that contradicts the Qur'an and its core values, or that might 
have been appropriate in earlier times, but that do not fit any longer with their reality of life of 
contemporary Muslims. 
From all the above information about reformation in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, it can 
thus be seen that the core values delineated in the Quran are the protection of life and 
property, justice, forgiveness, mercy and reconciled relationships, which lead to peace and 
harmony. The promotion of these values logically leads to a rejection of the cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment of people. In other words, the explicit ban on cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishments formulated by international human rights law can be seen as a logical 
consequence of the values promoted by the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
The aforementioned fact can be considered a strong argument and legal justification to 
reform hudud punishments. This is the more so, since several of the hudud ordinances that 
clash with international human rights laws have been developed by Islamic jurists without 
legal basis in the Qur'an. Some are even in contradiction to it. As previously mentioned, 
cleansing Islamic law of any human interpretation of Islamic jurists that contradicts the 
Qur'an can be seen as the fulfilment of the call to restore and renew the religion to its original 
condition. 
In summary, it can be said that the Islamic call for reformation that aims to see the 
society restored and revived, acknowledges that every generation needs a fresh message from 
God that presents His eternal message adjusted to their time and life situation. The reality of 
the Muslim society in the twenty-first century is such that the protection of human rights can 
                                                 
839 Amina Wadud Quran and Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective (1999) 94. 
840 Mustafa Mahmoud Al-Quran Kaen Hai (1993) 4. 
841 Surah 2:173; Surah 2:286; Islamic scholars also use Surah 2:185 and Surah 4:28 to support the view that 
shariah is very flexible. 
842 Abdul Fatah defined tajdid as follows: ‘Through the act of renewal (tajdid) old things (qadeam) are brought 
back into its original form and become new (jadid).’ Abdul Fatah op cit note 754; Yusuf al-Qaradawi Min Azhl 
Sahwa Ra’shida (2001) 28. 
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be considered an internationally recognised standard, and that even most Muslim countries 
have become signatories of the main human rights documents. Hudud ordinances with their 
harsh and cruel punishments, however, clash significantly with internationally protected 
human rights and are therefore harshly criticised by the international community. Their 
enforcement brings harm to the Muslim society, since it violates human rights of individuals 
and causes Islam and Muslims to be criticised as being backward or barbaric.843 
Since the qur'anic call for reformation is a call to restore and renew the religion to its 
original condition, it can be understood as a call to clear hudud ordinances from 
interpretations that have been developed by Islamic jurists, that contradict Shariah and its 
core values and that do not fit with the reality of life in the twenty-first century.  
Efforts to clear Islamic law from prescriptions that cause harm to the Muslim society 
actually serve Shariah, since its main purpose is to serve the benefit of the people and to 
protect them from harm. This crucial aspect of the purpose and the flexibility of Shariah will 
be discussed further in the following section. 
III Shariah and reformation 
(a) The purposes of Shariah (maqased al-Shariah) 
The Qur'an and the Sunnah, both of which discuss the concept of the purposes of Shariah 
(maqased al-Shariah), clearly point to the benefit of the people as the main purpose of 
Shariah. The Qur'an states : ‘But teach (thy Message) for teaching benefits the Believers.’844 
The definition given by Ahmed al-Raissouni, and shared by most Muslim scholars and jurists 
says that maqased al-Shariah refers to ‘the purposes designed by Shariah for the 
accomplishment of the benefit of the people’.845 Imam al-Amidi’s definition further points out 
that serving the benefit of the people includes protecting them from harm: ‘Maqased brings to 
Muslims the beneficial or casts away from them what is harmful or both.’846 The call for 
preventing harm is not just a logical consequence of the call to protect the benefit of the 
people, but it is by itself an important Islamic principle. The Prophet Muhammad pronounced 
explicitly that ‘harm must be removed’.847 Islamic scholars have, therefore, defined the 
                                                 
843 Wafa Sultan A God Who Hates: The Courageous Woman who Inflamed the Muslim World Speaks out against 
the Evils of Islam (2011) 155.  
844 Surah 51:55. 
845 Ahmad al-Raisuni Nazariyat al-Maqased Aend al-Shatibi (1995) 19.  
846 Seif al-Din Ali al-Amidi Al-Ahkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 2 ed (1986) vol 3 at 296. 
847 Al-Nawawi op cit note 122 at 87.  
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principle of al-darar uzal (harm must be removed) that protects the benefit of the people by 
allowing for the removal of any kind of harm to society or individuals.848  
Knowing the purpose of Shariah helps one better understand the religious texts, and most 
importantly, it helps to interpret them correctly in a way to fit in with the realities of the time 
and the life situation of the people.849 This is essential, particularly for jurists whenever they 
have to develop new rulings. In order to deal with new cases and challenges that arise in a 
changing world in a way that meets the needs of changing circumstances, they should not 
depend on the religious texts alone, but they should apply the spirit of Shariah while having 
the main purpose of Shariah in mind.850 
In order to protect the benefit of the people, Shariah provides two powerful principles 
that allow for exceptions, thereby permitting what is generally prohibited if the circumstances 
require doing so to protect the benefit of the people. These two principles are known as the 
jurisprudence of necessity (fiqh al-darurah) and the jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqa). 
i. The jurisprudence of necessity (fiqh al-darurah) 
The jurisprudence of necessity (fiqh al-darurah) allows for exceptions from what is otherwise 
prohibited if there is a necessity to do so for the sake of protecting the benefit of the people.851 
This principle is known as al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat: ‘The necessities make the prohibited 
permissible.’852 If, for example, a prohibited action is used to save a person’s life, it becomes 
permissible.853 Surah 16:115 states: ‘[I]f one is forced by necessity, without wilful 
disobedience, nor transgressing due limits, then Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.’854 
The principle of necessity, for example, will allow Muslims on the point of death from 
starvation to eat a dead animal, something which is clearly prohibited in the Qur'an.855 An 
example of the application of this principle can be seen in a hadith that speaks about a man 
and his wife whose camel had died of a sickness, and when they asked the Prophet, he 
                                                 
848 Hasan al-Feki ‘Al-magmua al-muzahab fi qawaed al-mazhab’ (unpublished MA thesis, al-Jameah al-
Islamiya, Medina, 1993) vol 1 at 371–2. 
849 Abdul Rahman Bin Ali Ismail ‘Maqassed al-Shariah’ Islamtoday.net 4 December 2010, available at 
http://www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-86-142687.htm, accessed on 8 November 2015. 
850 Omr Ebeid Hasana Maqalat fi al-Tafkir al-Maqasedi (1999) 20.  
851 Hassan Khatab ‘Qaedat al-darurat tubeh al-mahzurat wa tatbiqatuha al-muaserah’ (2009) 165 (2) Magalat al-
Noazl Wal Ausul, available at http://iefpedia.com/arab/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ددددد - ددد ددد دد-
دددد- ددد دددددد- ددد دد ددددد- ددد دد ددد-د د- دد د دد- ددددد دد د- دد د- دد د دد-
ددد د.pdf, accessed on 8 November 2015. 
852 Badr Eddin al-Zarkashi Al-Manthur fi al-Qawaed (2000) vol 2 at 386. 
853 Ibid. 
854 Surah 6:119. See also Surah 2:173; Surah 5:3. 
855 Ibid. 
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allowed them to eat the camel’s meat, since they had nothing else to eat. He thereby made the 
prohibited permissible on the grounds of necessity.856 
The Muslim scholars developed many detailed definitions, as to what can be considered 
to constitute a necessity (darurah). They distinguish three categories: daruriat (necessities), 
hajiat (needs) and tahsinat (preferences).857 They defined, for example, that ‘a need can be 
treated as necessity’ (al-haja tanzil manzilat al-darurah),858 if there is no other way to 
eliminate situations or circumstances that threaten or harm the benefit of the people (masaleh 
al-nas) by making it difficult for them to live their lives and practice their faith. An example 
of this principle articulated in the Sunnah is found in a hadith that speaks about the Prophet’s 
using a silver cup, even though he previously had prohibited Muslims from drinking out of a 
golden or silver cup. Muslim scholars use this hadith as an example of how the Prophet 
treated the need (for a cup) as a necessity. Here again, due to the necessity the prohibited was 
made permissible.859  
The Qur'an speaks about the principle of necessity also in connection with religious 
duties. In Surah 2:185 the Qur'an stresses that all Muslims should fast during the month of 
Ramadan. In the same breath, however, the Qur'an allows for exceptions if this is necessary 
due to travelling or because of sickness.860 
The Qur'an points out explicitly that Allah aims to make it easy for people to keep the 
religious duties.861 Also in respect of the washing ritual in preparation for prayer, Allah wants 
to make it easy for people to fulfil their religious duty, thus in instances when no water is 
available for this ritual, clean sand or dust can be used in its place (tayammum).862  
These examples demonstrate the flexibility of Shariah and how the principle of necessity 
can be applied to fulfil its purposes by protecting the benefit of the people and making it easy 
for them to fulfil their religious duties.863  
                                                 
856 Al-Azim al-Abadi Awn al-Maabud Sharh Sunan Abu Dawud (1995) vol 10 at 47 and vol 2 at 724. 
857 Al-Shatibi Al-Muafaqat (1997) vol 2 at 8–11; Abi Hamed al-Ghazali Al-Mustasfa min Elm al-Usul (1993) vol 
2 at 481. 
858 Ahmad al-Zarqa Sharh al-Qawaed al-Fiqhijy 2 ed (1989) 155. 
859 Al-Asqalani op cit note 759 at vol 10 at 101 & 104. 
860 Surah 2:185 ‘Ramadhan is the (month) in which was sent down the Qur'an, as a guide to mankind, also clear 
(Signs) for guidance and judgment (Between right and wrong). So every one of you who is present (at his home) 
during that month should spend it in fasting, but if anyone is ill, or on a journey, the prescribed period (Should 
be made up) by days later. Allah intends every facility for you; He does not want to put to difficulties. (He wants 
you) to complete the prescribed period, and to glorify Him in that He has guided you; and perchance ye shall be 
grateful.’ 
861 Surah 22:78.  
862 Surah 4:43 and Surah 5:6; Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 1 at 235–6 hadith 348. 
863 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 vol 3 at 12. 
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ii. The jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqa) 
The jurisprudence of reality is another important principle designed to secure the benefit of 
the people. It calls on jurists to consider the reality of the environment and life circumstances 
of the people whenever a new legal provision is developed, to make sure that the new ruling 
will be appropriate and fitting for its time and environment.864 The principle of reality can 
also be applied to make exceptions from existing rulings if the realities of life and 
circumstances require it. One of the famous examples that demonstrate this is the historical 
account of the second caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, who during a year of famine placed a 
moratorium on the punishment of amputation of the hand meted out for theft.865 This example 
shows the great flexibility that the jurisprudence of reality can provide. It is a powerful tool 
used to fulfil the purpose of Shariah by protecting the benefit of the people.  
The clearest example of the application of the principle of reality can be seen in the life of 
the Prophet Muhammad. The differences between the legal provisions that were drawn up 
during his time in Mecca, and that in Medina give a clear picture of how both the Prophet and 
Allah Himself adjusted their teaching to meet the realities of the life of the Muslim 
community.866 Following the Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Medina (the hijra), the situation 
of the Muslim community changed significantly, as did the legal provisions. 
There are other examples of how Allah himself considered the reality of the life of the 
people.867 One of them is concerning the prohibition of alcohol. During the time of the 
Prophet alcohol consumption was very high. Allah, therefore, did not prohibit it instantly, 
since it would have been hard for the people to stop drinking any alcohol instantly, from one 
day to the next. Instead, Allah approached the issue gradually. Allah considered the reality of 
the people’s life and decided to make it easy for them. No indication is given as to alcohol’s 
permissibility the first time alcohol is mentioned in the Qur’an.868 It is referred to as a type of 
food only, and the verse mentions that it can be processed to produce a kind of liquor. This 
verse dates back to the Prophet’s time in Mecca. When in Medina he was asked about the use 
of wine and gambling His response was that Allah has declared drinking to be a sin, although 
                                                 
864 Maher Hussein Hashwah Fiqh al-Waqeh wa Atharoh fi al-Ijtihad (2006) 107.  
865 Ibid; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 vol 3 at 12. 
866 Abdullah Mohammed al-Jabouri Al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima wa Tagyir al-Fatwa, 29, Gameat Al-Shariqa, 
Shariqa, UAE, available at http://www.world-dialogue.org/MWL/fatwa/FCS4R3.pdf, accessed on 8 November 
2015. 
867 Ismail al-Jervi ‘Al-ejaz al-tashrie fi tahream al-khamer’ Gameat al-Eman Sana'a, 27 January 2013, available 
at http://www.jameataleman.org/main/articles.aspx?article_no=1768, accessed on 8 November 2015. 
868 Surah 16:67 ‘And from the fruit of the date-palm and the vine, ye get out wholesome drink and food: behold, 
in this also is a sign for those who are wise.’ 
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it was not prohibited at that time.869 Later Allah limited the use of alcohol declaring that 
Muslims should not approach their prayers ‘with a mind befogged’, but even then drinking 
alcohol was not completely prohibited.870 Eventually Allah prohibited gambling and the 
consumption of intoxicants declaring that both are an abomination of Satan's handwork, used 
by Satan to excite enmity and hatred between people, and to keep them from the 
remembrance of Allah and from prayer. The two relevant qur'anic verses were revealed 
during the Prophet’s time in Medina.871 This example of how the prohibition of alcohol was 
introduced gradually demonstrates the flexibility of Shariah and the extent to which Allah 
considered the realities faced by the people. 
Another example of the practical application of the principle of reality can be seen in the 
Sunnah, in a hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah. This is about a man who came to the Prophet 
confessing that he had sinned by having sexual intercourse with his wife during a fasting 
season. In the search for an appropriate punishment for this sin, the Prophet suggested that the 
man should release a slave as a penalty for his sin, or feed sixty people, but the man did not 
own a slave, nor could he afford to feed anyone. Finally, the Prophet offered the man a large 
basket of dates, instructing him to feed anyone poorer than he was. When the man declared 
that he was the poorest in his area, the Prophet instructed him to take the dates to his own 
family.872 This example shows how the Prophet considered the reality of the life 
circumstances of the man who had sinned, even to the extent that what was meant as a 
punishment eventually turned out be a blessing for the man.  
Imam al-Shafei — founder of the Shafei School of jurisprudence — also applied the 
principle of reality extensively in his life, adapting the teachings of Islam to the realities found 
in different places and different customs.873 Some of the provisions that he had previously 
developed during his time in Baghdad were later adapted while he was in Egypt, due to its 
different environment, people and customs.874 
The Prophet’s second successor, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, practiced the principle of reality 
when he revoked the tradition of paying financial support to ‘those whose hearts have been 
                                                 
869 Surah 2:219 ‘They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: "In them is great sin, and some profit, for 
men; but the sin is greater than the profit." They ask thee how much they are to spend; Say: "What is beyond 
your needs." Thus doth Allah Make clear to you His Signs: In order that ye may consider.’  
870 Surah 4:43 ‘O ye who believe! Approach not prayers with a mind befogged … .’ 
871 Surah 5:90 ‘O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination by) arrows, 
are an abomination, — of Satan's handwork: eschew such (abomination), that ye may prosper.’ 
Surah 5:91 ‘Satan's plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and 
hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer: will ye not then abstain?’ 
872 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 3 at 100 & 101 hadith 936. 
873 Ibn Abi Hatem Manaqeb al-Shafei (2003) 60. 
874 Ibid; Ali Ibn Musa al-Baihaqi Manaqeb al-Shafei (1970) vol 1 at 263.  
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(recently) reconciled (to Truth)’875 (sahm al-mualafa qulubahum), 876 a tradition started by the 
Prophet and continued by his first successor, Abu Bakr. Al-Khattab stopped these payments 
since the Islamic state was already established and therefore he saw no more need for them.877 
He felt that there were more urgent needs for which the money could be used.878 It is 
noteworthy that this tradition was based on an explicit order of Allah: ‘([T]hus is it) ordained 
by Allah …’ . This example demonstrates that the principle of reality can be applied, even in 
respect of explicit orders of Allah if this is necessary to secure the benefit of the people. 
These examples of the principles of reality and necessity demonstrate that Shariah gives 
jurists great liberty to amend legal provisions, if this is necessary to adjust to the realities of 
life of the people and to secure the purpose of Shariah, namely the benefit of the people; this 
includes taking any unnecessary burden from them. It can be argued, therefore, that these two 
principles can be applied to amend the harsh and cruel hudud punishments, since they do not 
fit with the reality of life of the Muslim community in the twenty-first century. They even 
cause harm to the reputation if the Muslim community. 
It is noteworthy here that the aforementioned examples have demonstrated that in times 
of necessity Allah allows for exceptions concerning the fasting or the washing, thus making 
compromises in respect of the religious duties, which are considered to concern the rights of 
Allah. The notion of the right of Allah is one of two main obstacles to reformation; the other 
is the notion of the protection of religion. Both of these will be discussed in the following 
section.  
(b) Two major obstacles for reformation 
i. The protection of the religion 
In contradiction to the main purpose of Shariah, namely to serve the benefit of the people and 
to protect them from harm, orthodox Islamic scholars view the protection of the religion as 
one of the main purposes of Shariah. They have declared that the main purpose of Shariah is 
the protection of the five indispensables, namely religion, life, intellect, offspring and 
                                                 
875 Surah 9:60 ‘Alms are for the poor and the needy, and … for those whose hearts have been (recently) 
reconciled (to Truth)… (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom.’ 
The Arabic text of this part of the verse is less specific than Yusuf Ali’s translation. Is speaks about a payment 
for the purpose ‘to bring the hearts together’or ‘a share for people to soften their hearts’ which is usually 
understood to refer to the purpose of helping and encouraging new believers in their new faith. 
876 Hashwah op cit 864 at 54–5. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Muhammad Beltaji Manhaj Umar Ibn al-Khattabfi al-Tashrea: Derassah Mustaweba le Fiqh Umar wa 
Tanzematah (1970) 180–1.  
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money.879 Al-Ghazali explains that ‘everything that protects these five indispensables is called 
maqased and everything that works against these five is called mafased [harm or 
corruption]’.880 The problem with this concept is that orthodox jurists have given the 
protection of the religion priority over the protection of the other four indispensables that refer 
to individuals’ rights.881 The protection of life, intellect, offspring and money serves the 
benefit of the people, works to protect them from harm,882 and is in line with the Islamic core 
values and with internationally protected human rights.883 The protection of religion, by 
contrast, contravenes the benefit of the people, since it can lead to harm to an individual in 
instances when one’s behaviour is considered violating the religion, as, for example, in the 
case of apostasy.884  
It is for the purpose of protecting the religion that Islamic scholars have, for example, 
prescribed an earthly punishment for apostasy, and that they have broadened the definition of 
the crime of haraba to include not only physical attacks against Islam or the Muslim 
community, but also anything that can be considered an insult to Allah or His Messenger and 
anything that might cause Muslims to leave Islam.885 Giving protection of religion priority 
over protection of the other four indispensables clearly contradicts the teaching of the Qur'an, 
for Allah makes it clear in the Qur'an that He Himself guards and defends the religion and that 
He is capable of doing so alone. He never requested Muslims to help Him to protect the 
religion. In Surah 15:16, He states that He has sent the religion, including the signs in the 
heavens, and that He will guard the religion. Similarly, in Surah 15:9 Allah states clearly that 
He is the one who revealed the Qur'an and that He will guard and defend it. In Surah 21:9 He 
promises to defend His people and to destroy their enemies, and in Surah 21:18 He declares 
that He will defend the truth against falsehood. In Surah 58:21 Allah proclaims that He and 
His Messengers will always be victorious: in other words, He is able to defend His religion 
and He does not need help from anyone else.886 
For Islamic scholars to assign an earthly punishment for what they consider violations of 
the religion, clearly contradicts Shariah, for Allah makes it clear that whether a person 
                                                 
879 Abi Hamed al-Ghazali Al-Mustasfa min Elm al-Usul (1997) vol 1 at 417.  
880 Ibid.  
881 Abdulaziz Abdullah al-Namlah Guhud Hieat al-Amer bel Maruf wal Nahi an al-Munkar fi Hefz al-Darurat 
al-Khames (2010) 12. 
882 Ismail op cit note 849. 
883 Mohamed Emara Al-Islam wa Huquq al-Inssan (1990) 52. 
884 Al-Namlah op cit note 881 at 16. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Surah 15:9 ‘We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and We will assuredly guard it (from 
corruption).’  
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worships Him alone or rejects the faith is an issue between that person and Him, and the 
consequences or reward will be in the afterlife. This can be seen in different holy texts, for 
example, in one hadith the Prophet explains: ‘Whoever dies not associating anything with 
Allah will enter Paradise, and whoever dies associating anything with Allah will enter the 
Fire.'887 Another one declares that: ‘No one in whose heart is faith the weight of a mustard-
seed will enter the Fire, and no one in whose heart is arrogance the weight of a mustard-seed 
will enter Paradise’’888  
Even though the Qur'an and the Sunnah make it clear that faith in Allah is crucial and 
decisive in terms of whether a person will enter paradise, Allah did not force people to follow 
Him.889 He points out in Surah 2:256 that there is no compulsion in religion890 and that it is 
not possible to force anyone to believe. This is iterated in Surah 18:20, where He declares: 
‘Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it).’ The protection of the religion, 
which is listed as one of the five indispensables, should therefore actually be read as the 
protection of the freedom of religion.  
Ergo, human efforts to protect the religion, including trying to force people to follow 
Islam and prescribing earthly punishments for religious violations, clearly contradict Allah’s 
teachings. From all the above texts, it can be seen that there is no justification for the scholars 
to elevate the protection of the religion above the protection of the other four indispensables 
or above the protection of the benefit of the people. Those hudud punishments that have been 
developed as a human effort to protect religion and that have no legal justification in the 
Qur'an, particularly the death penalty for apostasy, should therefore eliminated to reform and 
clear Islamic law by bringing it into compliance with Shariah and its main purpose to benefit 
the people. 
A second major obstacle that hinders efforts to reform hudud ordinances is the argument 
that they cannot be forgiven or amended since they concern the right of Allah. This notion is 
further discussed in the following section.  
                                                 
887 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 180 hadith 269. 
888 Ibid at 179–80 hadith 266. 
889 Surah 10:99 ‘If it had been thy Lord's will, they would all have believed,- all who are on earth! wilt thou then 
compel mankind, against their will, to believe!’  
890 Surah 2:256 ‘Let there be no COMPULSION IN religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects 
evil and believes IN Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth 
and knoweth all things.’  
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ii. The right of Allah 
The notion of the right of Allah is one of the main arguments used by Islamic jurists to oppose 
any attempt to question or amend hudud ordinances. Islamic jurists claim that the right of 
Allah makes it impossible to amend rulings, or to compromise or forgive punishments that are 
considered to concern the right of Allah.891 They argue that the hudud ordinances concern the 
right of Allah, and that therefore only Allah can forgive or change them.892 It is for this 
reason, that the right of Allah is often considered to be one of the main obstacles preventing 
Islamic jurists from amending the hudud ordinances. 
It is important to note that the notion of the right of Allah and its implications are a 
humanly developed concept, established by Islamic jurisprudence. The notion cannot be 
found in the primary sources of Shariah.  
Different views exist as to what is the definition of what exactly can be considered to 
concern the right of Allah. The majority of scholars contrast the right of Allah with ‘the right 
of man’.893 According to these jurists’ definition, hadd crimes concerning the right of Allah 
cannot be questioned, forgiven or dropped, whilst hadd crimes against the right of man, such 
as the crime of qazf, can be forgiven by the victim or its family.894 The crime of qazf is 
actually considered to refer to both the right of man and the right of Allah. It is thus believed 
that the offence against the victim can be forgiven, while the offence against Allah still has to 
be punished.895  
Some scholars, however, support a very wide definition and declare that everything 
concerning Islam can be considered to be the rights of Allah.896 The explanation given by the 
famous Islamic jurist, Imam al-Qarafi, includes both these definitions when he states that 
‘Islam is a right that belongs to Allah…’ and ‘the Islamic rituals are the right of Allah’.897 He 
concludes that ‘as this belongs to Allah, this can be forgiven only by Allah’.898  
In their definition of the right of Allah, Islamic scholars usually distinguish between two 
categories of rules and regulations, namely, the first category that deals with the right of Allah 
                                                 
891 Youssef al-Shubily ‘Fiqh al-hudud’, 2, Shubily.com, available at http://www.shubily.com/index.php?news=92, 
accessed on 9 November 2015.  
892 Ahmed Bin Abdel Halim Bin Abdul Salam Ibn Taymiyyah Al-Siasa al-Sharaiyah fi Islah al-Raey wal-Raiyah 
(1997) 125. 
893 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 at 108. 
894 Audah op cit note 252 at vol 1 at 618. 
895 Al-Quraafi op cit note 118 vol 1 at 140–142.  
896 Ibid at vol 3 at 184–5. 
897 Ibid. 
898 Ibid. 
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to be worshipped and all the religious duties; and the second category, which deals with the 
public interest.899  
This category deals with issues concerning the relationship of people with others, such 
as the prohibition of stealing, killing and defamation. 
Logically, it is hard to understand why the category of the public interest should be 
declared to concern the right of Allah, particularly since this argument is used to hinder 
amendments of hudud ordinances that would serve the benefit of the people. The fact that 
even issues that concern the public interest are considered to concern the right of Allah 
actually implies that the public interest is very important to Allah. The argument that the 
public interest is important to Allah is actually a confirmation of the fact that the benefit of the 
people is the main purpose of Shariah. 
The claim that punishments for violations of the public interest or safety cannot be 
forgiven, since they concern the right of Allah, is thus not logical. This is particularly so when 
considering that the benefit of the people is the main purpose of Shariah and when taking into 
account that Allah loves to forgive and hates to enforce hudud punishments. That Allah hates 
to punish people is demonstrated clearly in a hadith in which the Prophet advises ‘Avoid 
hudud from Muslims as much as you can and if there is any way to exit, let the Muslim go 
and don’t punish him. And if the Imam mistakenly forgives is much better then mistakenly 
punish.’900 According to another hadith, the Prophet says about the sins of adultery, theft and 
drinking alcohol that if the person who has committed such a sin repents afterwards, he/she 
will be forgiven.901  
The claim that violations of hudud crimes cannot be forgiven since they concern the 
right of Allah can further be refuted by the following argument in the Qu’ran, since Surah 
5:90 declares that drinking and gambling are an abomination to Allah. According to this 
verse, there is no justification to treat drinking any differently from gambling, or to treat 
drinking as an unforgivable hadd crime, whilst gambling is not listed as a hadd crime.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that those crimes that have been listed as hudud 
crimes are not described as such in the Qur'an. The notion of an allegedly fixed set of hudud 
crimes has little evidence to support it — it is not mentioned in the primary sources of 
Shariah and it actually even contradicts the Qur'an, as demonstrated in the example of 
                                                 
899 Al-Shatibi op cit note 98 at vol 2 at 318–320.  
900 ‘Aishah narrated that the Messenger of Allah said: "Avert the legal penalties from the Muslims as much as 
possible, if he has a way out then leave him to his way, for if the Imam makes a mistake in forgiving it would be 
better than making a mistake in punishment."’ Sunan at-Tirmidhi (2007) vol 3 at 208 no 1424.  
Muhammad Abdulrahman al-Mubarakfuri Tuhfat al-Ahuzi Sharh Sunan at-Tirmidhi (1984) vol 4 at 580, 688. 
901 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 155 hadith 208. 
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drinking and gambling. It also contradicts the list of crimes described as the seven worst sins 
in the Sunnah.902 
In addition, even if there were some validity in the argument that hudud ordinances 
cannot be amended since they concern the right of Allah, it would apply only to those 
punishments that have indeed been prescribed by Allah Himself, thus, those assigned in the 
Qur'an.903 It would not apply to those that have been added and developed by Islamic jurists 
based on the Sunnah. Secondly, if the argument were correct, the right of Allah would have 
been severely violated when Umar Ibn al-Khattab placed the moratorium on the punishment 
of theft, a punishment explicitly prescribed in the Qur'an.904 Interestingly, al-Khattab’s 
moratorium has never been criticised by Islamic scholars. Quite the contrary, it is usually used 
as example to demonstrate the great wisdom of al-Khattab.905 This can be considered clear 
proof that the right of Allah does not interfere with the application of the principle of 
necessity or reality. It also proves that it is possible to put a moratorium on hudud 
punishments, if the reality of life requires it for the benefit of the people. The protection of 
what is supposed to concern the right of Allah does not diminish the protection of the benefit 
of the people.  
Opponents of this view might argue that al-Khattab did not violate the right of Allah, 
since the crime of theft concerns the right of man, its punishment aiming at protecting 
people’s property. A denial that the punishment for theft concerns the right of Allah entirely 
refutes the claim that hudud ordinances are a fixed set of crimes that concerns the right of 
Allah.  
In summary, it can be said that the argument that hudud ordinances cannot be amended 
since they concern Allah’s right, has been refuted on various grounds.  
Those Islamic jurists, who believe that the right of Allah makes it impossible to make 
any amendments or to forgive violations of the rights of Allah, usually view Shariah as being 
firm like a rock, stiff and unchangeable. Al-Qarafi, one the contrary, believes that it is the 
weaknesses and rigorousness of the human heart that leads people to view the Shariah 
prescriptions as stiff and unchangeable like a rock. In his explanation of the right of Allah, Al 
                                                 
902 The seven ‘worst sins’ listed in the hadith are: ‘Associating others with Allah (Shirk); witchcraft; killing a 
soul whom Allah has forbidden us to kill, except for a right that is due; consuming orphans' wealth; consuming 
Ribâ [taking interest]; fleeing from the battlefield; and slandering chaste, innocent women.’ Sahih Muslim 
(2007) vol 1 at 177 hadith 262. 
903 Namely adultery, theft, haraba and qazf. 
904 Surah 5:38 ‘As to the thief, Male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from 
Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted in power.’  
Raed Nasri Jamil Abu Muanes Manhag al-Talil bel Hekmah wa Atharuhu fi al-Tashre al-Islami (2007) 481. 
905 Ibid. 
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Qarafi points to the hardness of the human heart. ‘Men are greedy and weak’, he declares, 
‘this is why they are sticking to hold on to their rights and cannot easily forgive’. He points 
out that Allah, by contrast, ‘is generous and His mercy equals His gift of forgiveness’.906 Al-
Qarafi seems to imply that the problem lies not with Shariah or with Allah — since He is 
generous and full of mercy and forgiveness —or with prescriptions concerning Allah’s right, 
but rather with the human heart. Shariah communicates clearly that the right of Allah is based 
on His forgiveness, for he loves to forgive and to show mercy, hates to punish and wants to 
make it easy for people. This is seen in both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Imam Ibn al-Qayyim 
explains that: ‘Shariah is based on the interests of the people, in life and after life, it is all 
just and mercy.’907 
Allah’s desire is to make things easy for people. This can be seen, for example, in the 
following hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah that quotes the Prophet thus:  
‘When one of you leads the people in prayer, let him make it brief, for among them are the 
young and the elderly, the weak and the sick. And when one of you offers prayers alone, let him 
pray as he likes.’908  
In other words, prayer leaders are called to show mercy and to make it easy for the people to 
perform their duty of prayer. 
Evidence of Allah’s forgiveness can be found in different places in the Sunnah. When a 
Muslim does the hajj, for example, all his previous sins and crimes will be forgiven.909 This is 
the case, too, when someone converts to Islam.910 Even if he has committed adultery before 
his conversion, the hadd punishment will be forgiven.911 Evidence that even hadd crimes can 
be forgiven, can be seen also in the Qur'an. Surah 25:68–71, for example, states that if a 
person repents and amends his or her conduct Allah forgives even the crimes of killing, 
adultery and worshipping gods other than Allah.912 Forgiveness of hadd crimes is also 
mentioned in a hadith that points out that faith in Allah is the key criterion that decides 
                                                 
906 Al-Quraafi op cit note 118 at vol 3 at 184–5. 
907 Said Ibn al-Qayyim I’lam al-Muwaqean (2015) vol 3 at 14–15.  
908 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 578 hadith 1046. 
909 Yahya Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi Al-Minhag Sharh Sahih Muslim (1972) vol 2 at 136–9. 
910 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal Al-Musnad (2008) vol 4 at 199, 204, 205; Muhammad Nasir ad-Din al-Albani Erwa al-
Ghalil (1985) vol 5 at 121; Jalaluddin al-Siuti Al-Ashba wal Nazaer fi Qawaed wa Forua al-Fiqh al-Shafei 
(1983) 223; Al-Nawawi op cit 909. 
911 Tafsir al-Qurtubi (1964) vol 7 at 402–3; Saad Ibn Muhammad al-Kubi Hashiyah ala al-Qaul al-Mukhtar fi 
Shareh Ghayat al-Ekhtesar li-Abi Shuja Muhammad Bin Qasim al-Ghuzi (2011) vol 4 at 4, 17; Muhammad Ibn 
Abdulah al-Khershi Sharh Mukhtaser Khalil 2 ed (1899) vol 8 at 82 ; Abdulah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudamah Al-
Mughni (1985) vol 12 at 297.  
912 Surah 25:68–70; Surah 25:70; Surah 25:71. 
Bader al-Din al-Aini Al-Binayah fi Sharh al-Hidayah (2000) vol 1 at 137–8; Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Juzy 
Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiya (2009) 100; Abi Ishaq al-Sherazi Al-Muhazab fi Fiqh al-Imam al-Shafei (1992) vol 1 at 
177 ; Ibn Qudamah op cit note 911 at vol 4 at 141. 
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whether a person will enter paradise. Even if a person has committed adultery or theft, Allah 
can forgive these sins and will still let the person enter paradise.913  
The same merciful attitude is reflected in the aforementioned hadith, according to which 
even the sins of adultery, theft and drinking can be forgiven if the offender repents 
afterwards;914 and in the hadith that calls to avoid hudud punishment as much as possible, 
since forgiving mistakenly is much better then mistakenly punish.’915 Allah also declared: 
‘My Mercy overpowers My Anger.’916 
It can be seen from these examples that Allah loves to forgive. He can even forgive 
hadd crimes. He loves to show His mercy and hates to punish people. His heart’s desire is to 
make it easy for people. This is what Islamic jurists should keep in mind when they deal with 
hudud ordinances. If they do not wish to violate Allah’s right, they should rather oppose and 
adjust the prescriptions pertinent to hadd crimes that have been developed and added by 
Islamic jurists, for these make life difficult for people and thus violate the purposes of 
Shariah. Since Allah’s desire is to make it easy for people and to protect life, prescribing 
punishments that have not been prescribed by Allah Himself can actually be considered as a 
violation of Allah’s right and a violation of the purposes of Shariah.  
As has been seen in the above section, it is especially the prescriptions concerning 
apostasy and haraba whose aim is to protect the religion that have no justification. There is 
also no justification for Islamic jurists’ reluctance to apply the principles of reality and 
necessity when it comes to the right of Allah. As mentioned earlier, hudud ordinances damage 
the reputation of Muslim society in the eyes of the world. The principles of necessity and 
reality, which are designed to protect the purposes of Shariah, should be practiced by Islamic 
jurists to bring hudud ordinances into line with the realities of the life of Muslim society in the 
twenty-first century. This includes an international call for Muslims to abide by international 
human rights standards. Any amendment of the hudud ordinances that will result in their 
compliance with international human rights laws will also be very beneficial for leaders of 
Muslim countries who seek good international relations, since it will prevent them from the 
temptation of violating, ignoring or rejecting Shariah. In summary, it can be said that this 
chapter has demonstrated that amending hudud ordinances by applying the principles of 
necessity and reality is not only acceptable from the perspective of Shariah, but it can be even 
considered necessity to secure the benefit of the Muslim society in this century.  
                                                 
913 Sahih Muslim English translation (2007) vol 1 at 181 hadith 271. 
914 Ibid at 155 hadith 208. 
915 Al-Mubarakfuri op cit note 900.  
916 Sahih al-Bukhari bk 59 hadith 5.  
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IV Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that reformation is an Islamic concept deeply rooted in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is thus not a human invention, nor a modern idea, much less a sign 
of a lack of loyalty to Islam. The Islamic call for reformation refers to a call to return to the 
religion and for renewal of the faith. It aims to see the society restored and revived. 
The Qur’an can be considered a book of reformation in its entirety, since it speaks about 
all the prophets and messengers whom God sent to his people to call them to reform their 
lives. The Qur’an and the Sunnah explain that people have the tendency to leave the godly 
ways of justice and to go astray, following selfish and destructive desires, which cause the 
decline of a society. The Qur’an declares that this is why people of every generation need 
fresh inspiration to renew and revive their faith — a fresh message of reformation, to present 
the eternal core values of the Qur'an and the Sunnah in a way adapted to the life situation and 
circumstances of their own time. This call for reformation does not aim to change Shariah, 
but rather to encourage Muslims to change and improve their lives, and to bring them into 
compliance with Shariah. The call for reformation is, thus, a call for them to turn away from 
evil ways, to renew their faith and to act according to the core values presented in the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah, namely, doing good to others, giving charity, acting justly and fairly, caring 
for orphans and restoring relationships through reconciliation and forgiveness, which leads to 
peace and harmony.  
The aspect of renewal (tajdid) of what has been corrupted and degenerated and to restore 
it to its original condition is an important element of the concept of reformation as presented 
in the Qur'an. It can thus been argued that the qur'anic call for reformation includes the call to 
restore and renew the religion to its original condition, which includes and justifies efforts to 
clear Islamic law from any human interpretation of Islamic jurists that contradicts the Qur'an 
or its core values and that fits no longer with the reality of life of contemporary Muslims. 
The same aspect can be seen in the famous Farewell Sermon of the Prophet, which is one 
of the key texts concerning reformation in the Sunnah. In it the Prophet points out several core 
values of Islam and stresses that the Qur'an and the Sunnah are given to Muslims as the 
ultimate guideline. In doing so he points out that Muslims of the future (that of the present), 
might understand them even better than the Muslims of his own time. According to this 
important statement, contemporary Muslims have the right and the ability to examine for 
themselves the message of the primary sources in order to determine how to best apply it in 
their own time. It is thus their responsibility not to follow blindly the interpretations of early 
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Islamic scholars and jurists, but to do ijtihad and to examine and filter the rulings of Islamic 
law in the light of the primary sources of Shariah and its core values and, if necessary, to re-
interpret them.  
The Islamic core values delineated in the Qur'an and Sunnah include the protection of 
life, protection of property, justice and fairness without discrimination, a spirit of 
brotherhood, an appreciation of women and their rights, mercy, forgiveness, reconciliation, 
peace and harmony. The promotion of these values logically leads to a rejection of a cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment of people. The explicit ban on cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishments formulated by international human rights law can thus be seen as the 
logical consequence of the values promoted by the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This can be 
considered a strong argument and legal justification to reform hudud ordinances.  
As previously mentioned, the Islamic call for reformation aims to see the society restored 
and revived. The benefit of the people is, in fact, the declared primary purpose of Shariah. 
The Qur'an and the Sunnah explain that the main purpose of Shariah is to serve the benefit of 
the people and to protect them from harm. The Prophet explicitly pronounced that ‘harm must 
be removed’.  
With the principles of reality and necessity, Shariah provided the necessary tools to 
protect these purposes. This is why Shariah is known to be flexible enough to suit all times 
and every environment. 
Hudud ordinances, as developed by Islamic jurisprudence, are a major source of harm for 
the society. Due to their extremely harsh and cruel punishments that clash with internationally 
protected human rights they are harshly criticised by the international community and cause 
Islam and Muslims to be labelled ‘backward’ or ‘barbaric’.  
This kind of damage to the image and reputation of Islam and Muslim society could — 
and should — be prevented, the more so since the harshest punishments for hudud crimes, 
including the death penalty for apostasy, are not even prescribed by Shariah, but derive from 
prescriptions developed by Islamic jurists. There is enough legal justification to amend them, 
especially since Allah repeatedly calls on Muslims to protect life, and further states clearly 
that only He has the right to give or take life. 
With the help of the principles of reality and necessity it will be possible for Islamic 
jurists to fix the image of the Muslim community by amending hudud ordinances in a way to 
reconcile them with international human rights standards.  
It is due to two major misconceptions that most Islamic jurists do not even dare to think 
of amending hudud ordinances. The first one of them is the belief that hudud ordinances 
© Mark A. Gabriel –– Ph.D. Research –– University of Cape Town 
157 
cannot be amended because they concern the right of Allah and therefore only Allah Himself 
can forgive or change them. Regardless of the fact that this claim can be refuted on several 
grounds, this chapter has demonstrated that even if it were valid, the notion of the right of 
Allah does not prevent the use of the principle of necessity or reality to amend hudud 
ordinances. This can be seen clearly in the example of Umar Ibn al-Khattab who put the 
punishment for theft on hold during the year of famine.  
The second factor that is preventing Islamic jurists from amending hudud ordinances is 
their view that the protection of religion has priority over the protection of individuals’ rights, 
ie over the benefit of the people. As demonstrated in this chapter, this view has no legal 
justification since Allah made it clear that He is the one who defends the religion and that He 
does not need any help to do so. Hence, there is no legal justification for any defence of the 
religion by human effort, such as assigning punishments additional to those prescribed by 
Allah. Human efforts to protect the religion, thereby violating the benefit of the people, are 
thus even a violation of Shariah. An example of this is the earthly punishment for apostasy, 
namely death by execution, as well as an expansion of the definition of the crime of haraba, 
when Allah had declared that He would hold people accountable in the afterlife. These given 
examples can actually be considered violations of the right of Allah, since Allah pointed out 
that the protection of life is one of the highest values in Islam and that there is no compulsion 
in religion. Shariah further clearly indicates that the right of Allah is based on His forgiveness 
and that He hates to punish and loves to forgive and to show mercy. 
The two aforementioned misconceptions, namely the view that the protection of religion 
has priority over the protection of individuals’ rights, and the view that whatever concerns the 
right of Allah cannot be forgiven or questioned, can tragically be seen as the main source of 
the countless atrocities committed worldwide in the name of Islam, including all the 
executions for apostasy. If Islamic scholars were to obey the call of the Prophet in his 
Farewell Sermon and put all efforts into understanding the primary sources of Shariah, they 
should be able to discover and fix the aforementioned misconceptions and return to the real 
purposes of Shariah, namely to serve the benefit of the people and to protect them from harm. 
As can be seen from the Prophet’s Farewell Sermon, it is the responsibility of Muslims of 
today to verify existing interpretations in the light of the primary sources of Shariah and its 
core values. Contemporary Islamic scholars and jurists should tackle the problems with hudud 
ordinances and clear from them those additional prescriptions that have been added by Islamic 
jurists without legal justification in the Qur'an and that contradict the main purpose of 
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Shariah, particularly those prescriptions that have been assigned as a human effort to protect 
the religion.  
In so doing, they would be able to reconcile the hudud ordinances to twenty-first century 
circumstances and reconcile them with international human rights standards, and thereby 
would serve the benefit of the people in several ways. It would protect the human rights, 
eliminate the harm caused by the additional punishments assigned by Islamic jurisprudence, 
help restore the image of the Muslim society in the eyes of the world community and 
therefore help the leaders of Muslim countries to maintain good international relations 
without having to compromise or ignore Shariah. Muslims would be able to live peacefully 
and practice their religion without the fear of being rejected for following a backward or 
barbaric religion. 
 In fact, clearing Islamic law from those prescriptions that contradict the spirit and the 
core values of Shariah would actually help protect and restore the religion, and it would make 
it easy for people to reform their lives and to live in righteousness. As has been seen in this 
chapter, Shariah’s call is to relieve people of any unnecessary burden and to provide a great 
opportunity to those who have fallen into sin, thereby making it possible for them to repent 
and to amend their behaviour. Shariah points out that forgiveness is available, even for hadd 
crimes. It aims to rescue people and to give them hope, mercy and life. 
The right of Allah, thus, is not a sufficient or legitimate justification to prohibit 
amendments to Islamic criminal law. Shariah allows for the application of the principles of 
reality and necessity whenever this is necessary to secure the benefit of the people or to 
prevent harm to them. It can be argued, therefore, that these two principles can be applied to 
avert the harsh and cruel hudud punishments, since they do not fit with the reality of life of 
the Muslim community in the twenty-first century and since they cause harm to the reputation 
of the Muslim community. The following chapter will explore further, how the hudud 
punishment can be adjusted to the reality of the twenty-first century in a religiously sensitive 
way while still securing the benefit of the people. 
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CHAPTER 6  
AN ATTEMPT TO REFORM HUDUD ORDINANCES 
I Introduction 
Hudud ordinances are strongly criticised by the international community due to their harsh, 
cruel and discriminatory punishments that are in conflict with internationally recognised 
human rights.917 Further, their enforcement damages the image and reputation of Islam and 
Muslims in the eyes of the world and causes them to be viewed as being backward or 
barbaric.918 Some of the hudud prescriptions clash with Shariah itself, for despite Shariah’s 
call to relieve people of any unnecessary burden, Islamic jurists have developed the hudud 
ordinances in a way that makes peoples’ lives even harder.919 For example, they have 
assigned the death penalty for apostasy, though Allah declares that He would hold apostates 
accountable in the afterlife.920 This not only contradicts the qur’anic prescriptions concerning 
apostasy but also ignores Allah’s repeated calls on Muslims to protect life and that He 
stressed that no one has the right to give or take life besides himself.921 Remarkably, some of 
the harshest punishments for hudud crimes, including the death penalty for apostasy, and the 
stoning to death for adultery are not prescribed by Shariah but have been developed by 
Islamic jurisprudence.922  
This chapter offers suggestions for a reform of hudud punishment in order to make them 
compliant with international human rights standards. In contrast to some moderate Muslim 
scholars who appeal for a complete moratorium on hudud ordinances, it is argued in this 
thesis that reforming hudud punishment by reconciling them with international human rights 
laws will be more beneficial on the long term, for if they were simply set aside they could 
easily be reintroduced at any time. Secondly, a call to abolish them will be a completely 
unacceptable option to orthodox Muslims and is therefore very unlikely to be considered in 
those countries that currently practice them. This thesis aims to bridge the gap between 
Muslim countries that still apply hudud ordinances and, in doing so, violate international 
                                                 
917 Lau op cit note 719. 
918 Fahd Bin Saleh Ajlan 'Hta la yatahadas al-nas ana Muhammad Yaqtul Ashabuh' Majalat al-Bayan (May-June 
2015) 336, available at http://ar.islamway.net/article/48137/ دد- ددددد- د دد دد-دد- دددد د- دد دد-
دد دد د د,  accessed on 1 February 2016. 
919 Al-Alwani op cit note 207 at 37. 
920 Surah 2:217. 
921 Surah 40:68. 
922 Ibid at 195. 
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human rights law, and those countries that care about the protection of human rights and 
consequently reject hudud ordinances. The suggestions for reformation provided in this 
chapter ensure the protection of human rights while providing enough evidence to justify 
them from an Islamic perspective. This chapter consists of three parts. The first is 
introductory in nature and explains why hudud ordinances need to be amended. It discusses 
the purposes of punishment and introduces the widespread contemporary Islamic theory 
according to which hudud ordinances can be applied in a perfect society only.923 Further, it 
discusses the aspect of deterrence, believed by orthodox Muslims to be the main purpose of 
hudud punishment.924 It is due to the focus on deterrence that the hudud punishments assigned 
by Islamic jurisprudence are so harsh and cruel.925 The chapter points out, further, that even in 
the Muslim world a paradigm shift can be noted. More and more Islamic scholars now stress 
the importance of the purpose of rehabilitation and appeal for the end to the use of corporal 
punishments.926 
The second part of the chapter discusses the legal challenge in respect of amending hudud 
ordinances. One of the main challenges derives from the Islamic understanding that certain 
texts, known as ‘definite texts’ (nusus qataiyah), are immutable and cannot be questioned, 
and that hudud ordinances are part of these definite texts.927 It is argued that, despite this 
seemingly insurmountable obstacle, Shariah, known to be flexible enough to suit all times and 
every environment,928 indeed provides enough tools and principles that allow its main purpose 
to be fulfilled,929 this being to serve the benefit of the people.930 The principles of necessity 
and reality, and the principle of doubt are introduced as powerful instruments that allow for 
exceptions, even in respect of definite texts, if the reality of the life of the people requires 
so.931 
This chapter suggests a re-reading of the concept of the five indispensables, which aims 
to protect religion, life, intellect, offspring and property, but in its current interpretation 
                                                 
923 Abu Zahra op cit note 65 at 27. 
924 Al-Dawlah op cit note 26. 
925 Okon op cit note 67 at 227. 
926 Muhammad Habash ‘Al-hudud min al-tazib al-jasadi ela al-eqab al-islahi' 31 December 2014, available at 
https://7al.me/2014/12/31/ دددددد- دد- ددددد دد- ددد ددد- ددد- ددد ددد-د/ , accessed on 
1 February 2016. 
927 Al-Qaradawi op cit note 68 at 45. 
928 Ahmed Mohamed Hunaiti ‘Al-thabat wal-murunah fi al-Shariyah al-Islamiyah’ 42 (2) 2015 413 Majalat al-
Shariah Wal Qanun. 
929 Umaamah op cit note 757 at 29. 
930 Al-Hunaiti op cit note 928.  
931 Abdul Wahab op cit note 69.  
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focuses on the protection of religion and thereby violates human rights principles and some of 
the core values and teachings of Shariah. 
The chapter also looks at several examples from the Qur'an and the Sunnah that 
demonstrate that Allah Himself considered the reality of the life of the people, and that the 
Prophet and his companions and successors applied these principles to suspend hadd 
punishments, if this was necessary for the benefit of the people. An example from the modern 
history of Islam shows how the aforementioned principles are applied in the contemporary 
Muslim community to ease the lives of Muslims. 
The third and main part of this chapter discusses the hudud punishments individually and 
develops suggestions to reform them and to bring them into compliance with international 
human rights standards. It is important to note that this chapter does not suggest changing any 
of the relevant qur’anic texts, for it is committed to respect the authority of Shariah. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, reforming Islamic law does not mean to ignore or 
violate Shariah. The Islamic call for reformation is rather an appeal to Muslims to abide by 
the qur'anic core values, including the protection of equality and life, and to make sure that 
the teachings of the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah are applied in a way to fit with the reality 
of life of the relevant Muslim society. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the Islamic concept of 
reformation can be understood as a call to cleanse Islamic law, including hudud ordinances, 
from interpretations that are in conflict with the primary sources of Shariah, its purposes and 
its core values.  
When developing suggestions to reform hudud punishment, this part of the chapter 
employs a twofold approach, since two categories of hudud ordinances can be distinguished. 
On the one hand, there are those hudud crimes with punishments assigned in the Qur'an and 
are thus based on texts that are considered as ‘definite’. This category includes the 
punishment of amputation for theft, flogging for adultery and defamation and ‘execution, or 
crucifixion, or amputation, or exile’ for the crime of haraba. The second category is 
represented by the hudud crimes with punishments that have been developed by Islamic 
jurists in the application of the method of ijtihad, namely the beheading for apostasy, flogging 
for drinking alcohol and stoning for adultery.  
For those hudud punishments that have been assigned in the Qur'an, the previously 
mentioned principles of Shariah, predominantly the principles of reality and necessity are 
applied. For those hudud punishments that have been developed by Islamic jurists in 
application of the method of ijtihad, this chapter similarly uses ijtihad when examining the 
legal justifications employed by early scholars with the aim of developing suggestions for a 
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re-interpretation. This chapter develops — in a religiously and culturally sensitive manner — 
suggestions for alternative punishments that fit better with international human rights 
standards and that serve the fulfilment of the purpose of Shariah by securing the benefit of the 
Muslim community. 
II Why amend hudud ordinances? 
It is argued that hudud ordinances as defined by Islamic jurisprudence and practiced in several 
Muslim countries do not fit with the reality of life of the twenty-first century. Many leading 
Muslim scholars share this opinion. One of them is the former mufti of Egypt, Ali Jumah, 
who declared that ‘Sharia commanded us not to apply the hudud when it missed its 
conditions’.932 In this statement, Ali Jumah refers to the widespread understanding that hudud 
ordinances can be applied in a perfect society only.933 This view derives from the 
understanding that punishment is just one of the three elements that need to work together to 
prevent and counter crimes to maintain a perfect society. The other two elements are the 
prevention of crimes through the regular practice of prayer, fasting, charity and good deeds, 
all of which are believed to restrain people from shameful and unjust deeds,934 and the 
cultivation of a high moral standard and a mature, godly public opinion.935 According to this 
understanding, a perfect society is one where all of its members practice prayers, fasting, 
charity and good deeds on a regular basis, and consequently do well and restrain themselves 
from doing shameful or unjust deeds. As a result, they will be able to discern what is good 
and what is evil. This will lead to the enjoyment of a high moral standard of the society, since 
people will enjoy what is good and detest what is evil. Consequently, there will be hardly any 
mischief. In such a perfect society harsh punishments are only an additional barrier to keep 
people from transgressing the line between good and evil. Deterrence, therefore, is viewed as 
the main purpose of punishment.936 
Orthodox Muslims hold that the hudud punishments have been ordained by Allah as a 
form of discipline for the criminal and deterrence for others.937 This is why the punishments 
are meant to be harsh, cruel and humiliating and why corporal punishments and torture are 
                                                 
932 Ali Jumah ‘Uqubat al-hudud beina al-taleq wal tadbeq’ On Islam 3 August 2011, available at 
http://www.onislam.net/arabic/madarik/culture-ideas/90481-alsharea.html, accessed on 7 August 2015. 
933 Abu Zahra op cit note 65 at 27. 
934 Surah 29:45, Surah 16:90 and Surah 9:103. 
935 Surah 3:104. 
936 Al-Otaibi op cit note 47 174. 
937 Ibid at 11. 
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emphasised. Enforcing punishments publicly can be seen in the same light.938 The criminal is 
viewed as a bad person who should be eliminated from society. Purification of the criminal in 
a sense of atonement or a penalty for one’s wrongs to improve his or her image in the eyes of 
Allah is another aspect included in the Islamic understanding of punishment.939 
Worldwide, theories and approaches dealing with punishment and its purposes have 
changed significantly over the centuries. Independently of the different opinions concerning 
the main purpose of punishment, penalty usually serves many different purposes at the same 
time, namely, the purpose of justice, special and general prevention, atonement, retribution, 
and compensation for the victim. While orthodox Muslims see deterrence as the main purpose 
of punishment, the western world emphasises that its purpose is the rehabilitation of the 
criminal.940 
Concerning the deterrent effect of hudud punishments, academic researchers have found 
that enforcing hudud punishments does not help to reduce the crime rate. The former Chief 
Justice of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad, discovered that ‘Muslim countries which 
have implemented Islamic capital punishments, or hudud, have not been successful in 
reducing crime rate’. He had compared several Muslim countries that practice hudud laws 
with non-Muslim nations, and noticed that those countries that practice hudud laws were far 
behind in terms of tackling crime and establishing peace and justice.941 Omr al-Faruk al-
Huseini also declared that exaggeration in the cruelty of the punishment could not prevent the 
commission of crimes.942 Another study concerning the deterrent effect of punishments shows 
that the death penalty is no more a deterrent than is long- term imprisonment.943 
A good example of how effective imprisonment can be is the case of the prison system in 
Norway. It is considered the most effective worldwide and is recognised as one of the most 
humane. The effectiveness of the system, in terms of prisoner rehabilitation, can be seen in an 
unusually low incidence of recidivism.944 The Norwegian prison system focuses on repairing 
                                                 
938 Ibid.  
939 Ibid at 147. 
940 James Gilligan ‘Punishment fails: Rehabilitation works’ The New York Times 19 December 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-productive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-
works, accessed on 1 February 2016. 
941 Md Izwan ‘Countries with hudud laws fail to reduce crime, says former top judge’ The Malaysian Inside 
11 February 2014, available at http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/countries-with-hudud-laws-
fail-to-reduce-crime-says-former-top-judge, accessed on 30 July 2015. 
942 Omr al-Faruk al-Huseini Mabade elm al-Ijram wa al-Ikab (2011) 151. 
943 Michael L Radelet & Traci L Lacock ‘Do executions lower homicide rates: The views of leading 
criminologists’ (2009) 99 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 504. 
944 The rate of prisoners who are re-arrested within five years after being released is as low as 20% in Norway, in 
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the harm caused by crime and on rehabilitating prisoners rather than on punishing them.945 
The aim is to make sure that by the time the prisoners are released into society, they are 
rehabilitated, not angry. The prison facilities, therefore, incorporate ‘cognitive-behavioural 
programs rooted in social learning theory’ that are ‘the most effective at keeping ex-convicts 
out of jail’.946 The initial sentences compared to those of other countries are quite low,947 but 
in the case where the person is considered not to be fully rehabilitated after the period of 
imprisonment, the sentence is imposed for another five years. In this way, the prison system 
can guarantee that prisoners are not released before being considered fully rehabilitated.948 
A paradigm shift from deterrence towards rehabilitation can be noticed, even in the 
Muslim world. Today, more and more Muslim scholars stress the importance of the 
rehabilitation of criminals with the purpose of returning them to the society as good and 
potentially fruitful members of the community.949 The scholars who hold to this view call for 
the protection of the human dignity of the criminal950 and stress that the punishment should 
not be viewed as an act of retribution or revenge against the criminal, but rather as a method 
to correct and rehabilitate him.951 Some scholars compare the criminal to a sick person who 
needs treatment and a period of rehabilitation.952 
This paradigm shift is accompanied by a call to examine every case individually, and to 
consider the psychological and environmental reasons, among others, that drew the offender 
to a life of crime.953 It is argued in this thesis, therefore, that it would be helpful to treat all 
hudud crimes with ta’zir punishments to be flexible enough to consider each case 
individually. This would be beneficial for the rehabilitation of criminals and, consequently, 
for the Muslim society as a whole. In this light it can be seen that some scholars, like Sheikh 
                                                                                                                                                        
2005 to 2010’ ( 22 April 2014) Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014, available at 
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Abdullah al-Alayli, are in favour of ta’zir punishments even for hudud crimes, since fixed 
punishments fail to consider the individual circumstances of each case.954 
Further, more and more Islamic scholars advocate the abandonment of cruel and harsh 
corporal hudud punishments and their replacement with prison sentences,955 the more so as 
they clash with the Qur'an itself that contains many reasons to reject the death penalty. One of 
them is that Islam promotes life and the Qur'an explicitly stresses the importance of the 
protection of human life in the eyes of Allah.956 
The method of carrying out the punishments publicly, furthermore, is very humiliating 
and thus a violation of human dignity. This humiliating method does not only hurt the convict 
and clash with international human rights principles but at the same time is in conflict with 
the Islamic call to protect human dignity and the sanctity of the human body, promoted by 
both the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah.957 
A call to put an end to corporal punishment, thus, comes from both inside and outside the 
Islamic world. The conflict between international human rights law and the corporal hudud 
punishments of flogging, amputation, stoning and crucifixion was discussed in Chapter 3. 
There it was pointed out that harsh and cruel punishments are outlawed by the international 
ban on torture, and that the death penalty by itself is condemned by international human rights 
laws that call to abolish it or, at least — as a first step — to put a moratorium on it. 
This call to end corporal punishments and the death penalty is countered by orthodox 
Muslims who claim that hudud punishments cannot be averted or amended, since they reflect 
explicit orders by Allah and are based on what is known as definite texts.958 Any attempt to 
amend hudud ordinances has, therefore, to deal with the predominant and challenging claim 
that the definite texts of hudud ordinances cannot be questioned or amended. This important 
question will be discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
954 Abdallah al-Alayli Ayna al-Chatta (1992) 92. 
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III The legal challenge and approaches to amending hudud ordinances 
(a) The challenge of the ‘definite’ texts 
The main obstacle for any attempt to amend hudud ordinances in order to put an end to their 
cruel corporal punishments is the notion that they are part of what is known as ‘definite texts’ 
(nusus qataiyaht al-dilala).959 Most Islamic scholars of the four Sunni schools believe that 
definite texts are immutable and cannot be re-interpreted, amended or compromised.960 The 
notion of the ‘definite texts’ is based on Surah 3:7 that points to the difference between the 
‘basic or fundamental’ verses ‘of established meaning’ in contrast to those that are 
‘allegorical’ and need interpretation. The verse speaks about the Qur'an as the book sent by 
Allah and explains: 
In it are verses basic or fundamental (of established meaning); they are the foundation of the 
Book: others are allegorical.  
About 90 per cent of the qur’anic texts are known to be texts of allegorical or presumptive 
meaning (nusus zaniyaht al-dilala) that require interpretation and the application of ijtihad to 
identify their real meaning.961 About 10 per cent of the qur’anic texts, however, are believed 
to be such ‘definite’ texts, thus having a clear, specific meaning. This is especially the case 
with all the texts that concern faith and rituals (fiqh al-ibadat). The principle of monotheism, 
the notion of paradise and hell and the principle of reward and punishment are all considered 
to be such definite texts, as are all prescriptions defining what is prohibited and permissible. 
This is why hudud ordinances are believed to be part of the definite texts.  
It is argued here that those hudud punishments that have indeed been assigned in the 
Qur'an can be considered to be definite texts, but those that have no legal justification in the 
Qur'an, consequently, cannot be claimed correctly as definite texts. As has been demonstrated 
in Chapters 2 and 3, the notion of huhud ordinances as a divinely assigned set of crimes and 
punishments can be refuted on several grounds. One of them is the fact that the set of crimes 
as defined by Islamic jurisprudence cannot be found in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. 
Quite the contrary, the set of hudud ordinances can even be argued to contradict Shariah, 
since it is not identical with the set of crimes described in a correct hadith as the seven worst 
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and abominable crimes known as the ‘seven great destructive sins’.962 The fact that the list of 
hudud ordinances does not match the seven crimes listed in the aforementioned correct hadith 
is a strong argument refuting the notion that the hudud ordinances are a divine set of crimes 
and punishments. The main argument, however, to refute the notion of hudud ordinances as a 
fixed set of divine prescriptions, is the fact that several of the punishments have no legal basis 
in the Qur'an, but have been developed by Islamic jurists.  
It can actually be argued that due to the notion of the immutability of the definite texts, 
the Islamic jurists should not have interfered with the qur'anic prescriptions concerning the 
hudud crimes in first place. Their assignment of earthly punishments in instances where Allah 
has declared that he would hold offenders accountable in the afterlife can be seen as a 
violation of Shariah. This is seen particularly as regards the crime of apostasy, and when the 
jurists have assigned punishments that go beyond what has been assigned in the Qur'an, such 
as assigning stoning for adultery, while the Qur'an has assigned flogging. The assignment of 
amputations for theft that are more severe than the amputation of the hand can be seen in the 
same light, namely as a violation of Shariah.  
Regardless of the questionable legitimacy of part of the hudud prescriptions, those hudud 
punishments that have indeed been assigned by the Qur'an — and can be considered to be 
definite texts — might seem to represent an insurmountable obstacle for any attempt to 
reform hudud punishment. This chapter, however, demonstrates that Shariah, known to be 
flexible enough to suit all times and every environment, has indeed proved itself to be 
sufficiently flexible to reconcile hudud punishment with the reality of the life of Muslims in 
the twenty-first century. This flexibility is present, thanks in particular, to the principles of 
reality and necessity. 
(c) The principles of necessity and reality (fiqh al-darurah, fiqh al-waqa) 
The principles of reality and necessity that were introduced in Chapter 5 are two strong 
instruments given by Shariah to secure its purposes (maqased al-Shariah), namely the benefit 
of the people and protecting them from harm. The principles explicitly allow for exceptions, 
ie, to make the prohibited permissible if there is a necessity (darura) to do so or if the reality 
(al-waqa) is such that it is required to secure the benefit of the people and prevent them from 
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harm.963 It is due to these principles that Shariah is praised because, thanks to the degree of its 
flexibility, it is able to suit all times and every environment.964 It is argued in this thesis that, 
with the help of the principles of reality and necessity, it is even possible to reform hudud 
punishment in such a way that they will be reconciled with international human rights 
standards and to be acceptable to the world of today. 
The principles of reality and necessity take note of the reality of life, which changes with 
place, time, reality and custom. While the majority of Muslim scholars view these four 
aspects as influencing the reality of life, the famous contemporary orthodox scholar Sheikh al-
Qaradawi lists six additional cases that can require and justify the amendment of definite 
provisions. These are (1) the increased level of sin and mischief (umum al-balwa); (2) the 
changes of the social, economic and political reality; (3) the changing of needs; (4) the 
changing of the abilities of the people; (5) the revolution of information; and (6) the changes 
of the way of thinking of the people.965 
It is argued in this thesis that the hudud prescriptions, as developed by Islamic 
jurisprudence and practiced in several Muslim countries, do not fit in with the reality of 
twenty-first century life. They are viewed by non-Muslims as a barbaric, medieval and a 
backward form of punishment. This understanding causes great harm to the reputation of 
Islam and the Muslim community. Ali al-Hail said: ‘The implementation of hudud [the 
traditional hudud ordinances] in our time of today does not serve Islam — it brings rather 
damage and harm.’966 The former mufti of Egypt, Ali Jumah, similarly declared that ‘[t]he 
current era is considered as [an] age of necessity’ and that ‘Sharia commanded us not to apply 
the hudud when it missed its conditions’.967 
It is argued here that it is necessary for Muslims to do whatever they can to protect and 
restore their image and reputation and that this includes reforming hudud punishment, since 
the reality of life of the Muslim world of the twenty-first century, including the commitments 
to abide by international human rights laws that have been signed by most Muslim countries 
(see Chapter 3), requires them to do so. 
Some Muslim scholars have stressed that it is very important not to think in terms of the 
methods of punishment in use in the Arabian Peninsula of the seventh century only, but to 
take into consideration where and how Muslims of today are living in every corner of the 
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world.968 The economic and social injustice and political corruption, for example, that shape 
the reality in many Muslim countries, are factors that have to be taken into consideration. 
They can require and justify exceptions, even from definite texts. It is argued that economical 
and social injustices in Muslim countries are themselves reason enough to avert hudud 
punishments. This conclusion can be draw from a comparison with times of war or famine. 
The correct Sunnah reports that the hadd punishment for theft was suspended during a time of 
famine.969 During a time of war it was also suspended to prevent Muslims from leaving Islam 
and joining the enemy’s camp.970 Ibn Khattab even explicitly ordered his governors to 
suspend the enforcement of all hudud punishment during times of war for the purpose of 
preventing those people who had committed hadd crimes from deserting to the enemy’s camp 
in order to escape the hadd punishment.971 The majority of Muslim scholars agree therefore 
that hudud punishments have to be suspended during times of war to avoid the possibility that 
Muslims will leave Islam.972 It is argued that this logic applies also to times of economic and 
social injustice. Another aspect of the reality of life of the twenty-first century is increasing 
globalisation and the influence of the internet and other media that make it even easier for 
Muslims to leave their faith if they feel pushed away from Islam because, for example, of its 
adherence to cruel and inhumane punishments. Sheikh al-Qaradawi stresses the importance of 
considering the realities of life and the purposes of Shariah. He is critical of the fact that 
many Islamic scholars and jurists ignore the jurisprudence of reality and do not give the 
reality of life the same attention as they do to the books of the ancient scholars. He concludes 
that this is why their fatwas are completely out of time and unrealistic.973  
Besides the principles of reality and necessity that allow for exceptions from definite 
texts, the principle of doubt is another principle given by Shariah to fulfil its purposes. 
(d)  The Islamic principle of doubt (shub’ha) 
The Islamic principle of doubt (shub’ha) aims to protect justice and protect people from the 
miscarriage of justice.974 It can be compared to the internationally known and respected 
principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’. The Islamic principle of doubt (shub’ha) is based on a 
statement of the Prophet Muhammad in which he declared that hudud punishments are to be 
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averted if there is any doubt (shub’ha): ‘Avert hudud (punishment) when there are doubts 
(shub’ha).’975  
According to a similar and closely connected hadith reported by Aisha, the Prophet 
declared that legal penalties should be avoided as much as possible. He actually encouraged 
his followers to look for any way to avoid the punishment:  
Avert the legal penalties from the Muslims as much as possible, if he has a way out then leave 
him to his way, for if the Imam makes a mistake in forgiving it would be better than making a 
mistake in punishment.976  
Umar Ibn al-Khattab also declared that dropping hudud punishments because of doubt was 
more loveable to him than enforcing them with doubt.977 The desire to avoid punishment can 
also be seen in the call of the Prophet to rather cover the sins of a fellow Muslim than expose 
them: 
Whoever relieves a Muslim of a burden from the burdens of the world, Allah will relieve him of 
a burden from the burdens of the Hereafter. And whoever covers (the faults of) a Muslim, Allah 
will cover (his faults) for him in the world and the Hereafter. And Allah is engaged in helping 
the worshipper as long as the worshipper is engaged in helping his brother.978 
The principle of doubt is, thus, very wide. According to it, hadd punishment should be 
avoided if there is the least doubt or if any kind of excuse can be found. The call to avert 
punishment as much as possible reflects the purpose of Shariah to serve the benefit of the 
people and to protect them from harm.  
A case of doubt, for example, can be seen in respect of the crime of theft, for the 
punishment assigned in the Qur'an is to ‘cut the hand’, is not fully clear. As will be discussed 
further in this chapter, it could have a metaphorical meaning as well, or refer to inflicting an 
injury. Consequently, it can be argued that — due to the aspect of doubt — the punishment of 
amputation has to be averted. 
The punishment of stoning for adultery can also easily be refuted by the principle of 
doubt, for the Qur'an does not mention stoning to death as a method of punishment, and the 
ahadith used as a legal justification for the stoning are mostly weak, and there is a lack of 
agreement (ijma) about it on the part of the jurists.979 
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While shub’ha means ‘doubt’, the way that this principle is used is very wide and 
encompassing. This can be seen, for example, in the aforementioned notion, shared by many 
Islamic scholars, that hudud punishment can be enforced only in a perfect society. This notion 
is based on the principle of doubt, for it derives from the view that social, political and 
economic injustices and corruption can be considered as constituting doubt and thus can 
justify the suspension of hudud punishments.980  
That hudud punishment as developed by Islamic jurisprudence conflict with Shariah that 
calls to protect life and promotes religious freedom can also be seen as an aspect of doubt. 
This requires that hudud punishments be averted, particularly since several of the hudud 
punishments have no legal justification in the Qur'an. 
In summary, it can be argued that the principle of doubt and the principles of reality and 
necessity require that the reality of the life of the people is taken into consideration so that it 
serves the aim of securing their benefit and protecting them from harm, and since the reality 
of life is such that the enforcement of hudud punishments seriously harms human rights and 
the reputation of Islam and Muslims, the said principles justify averting or amending the 
traditional hudud punishment. 
The following examples from the Qur'an and the Sunnah demonstrate that Allah himself 
considered the reality of life of the Muslim community and that the Prophet Muhammad, his 
companions and successors also applied the principles of reality and necessity or the principle 
of doubt to amend or avert even definite provisions if this was necessary for the benefit of the 
people or to protect them from harm.  
(e)  Examples of the amendment of definite texts 
Examples of the application of what is known as the ‘Islamic legal concept of amendment of 
definite provisions’ (tagyir al-ahkam al-qataiyah) can be seen in both the Qur'an and in the 
Sunnah, as well as in the modern history of Islam. 
i. Examples from the Qur'an and Sunnah for the amendment of definite provisions 
In the Qur'an, several examples are found that demonstrate that Allah himself repeatedly 
changed provisions that were based on definite texts that he had previously assigned. While 
this by itself cannot be taken as a justification for human efforts to amend definite provisions, 
it can show, however, that even definite provisions are not absolutely immutable and are not 
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above the benefit of the people. One example can be seen concerning the distribution of 
inheritance. First, Allah had ordered a person who was about to die to issue a last 
will/testament (wasiyah) with instructions in it how to distribute his goods after his death.981 
Later, however, Allah overruled his order by giving specific instructions as to the distribution 
of a deceased estate.982 It is assumed that the new ruling aims to guarantee justice, since a 
human will can be unjust. This example can be taken as evidence that Allah considered the 
life circumstances of people and, if necessary, even amended or cancelled his own previously 
given orders in order to better fit with the reality of life of the people. Thus he amended or 
cancelled definite provisions for the sake of the benefit of the people.  
Another example found in the Qur'an shows that Allah changed a hadd punishment that 
he had previously assigned, namely the punishment of house arrest that he had assigned for 
women ‘guilty of lewdness’ (fahisha).983 It was later abrogated by the verse that assigns 
flogging for adultery or fornication (zina).984  
In the Sunnah there are many examples that show that the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions and successors also repeatedly amended or suspended hudud punishments if this 
was necessary for the benefit of the people or in cases of doubt. Hence, they applied the 
principles of necessity, reality and doubt. One hadith reports, for example, that the Prophet 
Muhammad avoided harsh punishment and rejected killing a hypocrite for the sake of 
protecting the image of Islam. The correct hadith tells of a man named Abdullah bin Ubai bin 
Salul who is described as a hypocrite. When one of the followers of the Prophet Muhammad 
suggested killing him, the Prophet Muhammad refused to do so, explaining that he avoided 
imposing harsh punishment in order to protect his reputation and to prevent anyone from 
saying that Islam is a violent religion, or the Prophet a murderer.985 
Another correct hadith reports that the Prophet Muhammad forgave a hadd crime. 
According to the hadith a man came to the Prophet Muhammad to confess that he had 
committed a ‘legally punishable sin’ (a hadd crime). He did this three times and asked to be 
punished for his sin. After the third time, the Prophet replied that since the man had fulfilled 
the (salat) prayer together with the Prophet, his sin was forgiven.986 
Even the hadd punishment for theft assigned in the Qur'an can be suspended and 
forgiven, as can be seen in several ahadith, including the example of the caliph, Umar Ibn al-
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Khattab, who suspended the punishment for theft during the year of famine (see Chapter 5). 
Further, the Prophet Muhammad declared in a correct hadith, that the commission of the 
crimes of adultery and theft does not exclude a person from entering paradise.987  
Another example of the amendment of a definite ruling by one of the Prophet’s 
successors can be seen in the report on Umar Ibn al-Khattab who compromised the qur’anic 
prescription of the religious tax (jizyah). This tax was imposed on the Jewish and Christian 
subjects of Muslim rulers as an indication of their submission and humiliation (Surah 9:29). 
When the Arabic Christian tribe of Bani Taghlib declared that they were unhappy with the 
term jizyah due to its humiliating reference to submission, Umar Ibn al-Khattab granted their 
request to call the tax ‘charity’ or ‘alms’ instead of jizyah. He did this as he feared that if he 
did not they might rebel against him and join the enemy. In agreeing to their request, he 
compromised the qur’anic prescription that was, in fact, a definite order.988 Hence, al-Khattab 
took the liberty of departing from the qur’anic letters themselves and giving recognition to the 
main purpose of the text, ie, to preserve the power and authority of the Islamic state on the 
one hand, and ensure that the financial benefits of the tax would continue on the other, even 
though it was changed from jizyah to charity. 
ii. Example in the modern history for the amendment of definite provisions 
A contemporary example that shows how a definite provision was compromised for the sake 
of the Muslim people, can be seen in the fatwa issued by the Islamic European Council that 
allows Muslims living in Europe to compromise the prohibition of ribba (bank interest), for 
getting a loan from the bank to buy a house. This example shows that a definite prohibition 
based on both the Qur'an and correct Sunnah, actually listed as one of the seven great 
destructive sins, was compromised to serve the benefit of the people and to protect them from 
harm. The Islamic European council justified the fatwa on the grounds of changing times, 
place and reality. They considered that Muslims today are no longer living in Muslim 
countries only, and the reality of the Muslims living in Europe is such that they need to obtain 
loans from banks.989 
In summary, it can be concluded that the legal challenge presented by the definite texts is 
not insurmountable, since Shariah is indeed flexible enough to deal with all circumstances 
and to fit in all times and environments. The principles of reality and necessity and the 
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principle of doubt allow and require to consider the reality of life of the people and to have 
their benefit in mind.  
Before turning to discussing how these principles can be applied to the individual hadd 
crimes and punishments, it is necessary to look at the widespread interpretation of the five 
indispensables that is one of the reasons behind some of the very harsh and cruel hudud 
punishments.  
(f)  Re-reading the five indispensables 
The traditional reading of the notion of the protection of the five indispensables (religion, life, 
intellect, offspring and money) plays quite a misleading role, and contributes significantly to 
the conflict of hudud ordinances with human rights, as has been pointed out in Chapter 5. 
While the protection of the five indispensables is supposed to secure the purposes of 
Shariah,990 thus the benefit of the people, they are traditionally interpreted in a way that works 
counterproductively, since the protection of religion is given priority ahead of the other four 
indispensables, these being the protection of life, intellect, offspring and money. While these 
four indispensibles are in full compliance with the purpose of Shariah of securing the benefit 
of the people991 and with internationally protected human rights,992 the traditional 
understanding of the protection of religion can lead to violations of the rights of the 
individual.993 This is particularly the case when a person wants to leave Islam.994 It is 
presumably for the purpose of protecting their religion that Islamic jurists have established an 
earthly punishment for apostasy and that they have widened the definition of haraba from a 
physical fight against Allah or His Messenger to include even those statements critical of 
Islam or insulting to the Prophet Muhammad. Both of these hudud prescriptions, however, 
actually violate Shariah’s promotion of freedom of religion. Surah 2:256, for instance, states 
that there is no compulsion in religion, and Surah 18:20 declares, ‘Let him who will believe, 
and let him who will, reject (it).’ 
This traditional reading is what the contemporary radical Islamic groups understand. It 
clashes with the needs of the Muslim society in the twenty-first century and contributes 
significantly to the bad image that the Islamic community has in the eyes of the rest of the 
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world.995 Since the main purpose of Shariah is to serve the benefit of the people, it is argued 
that the protection of religion must also serve this purpose. The protection of religion should, 
therefore, not be elevated above the other four indispensables and should not be applied in a 
way to limit the human rights of people, but should rather protect them.996 Protection of 
religion, therefore, should be interpreted as the protection of freedom of religion, including 
freedom of opinion. Only with this reading will the concept of the five indispensables be fully 
compatible with Shariah, its purpose and core values. It is this reading of the protection of 
religion on which the suggestions for reforming hudud punishment developed in the following 
section are based. 
IV Suggestions for amending hudud ordinances 
This section develops suggestions for alternative punishments for each of the hudud crimes. It 
is argued that since hudud ordinances in their traditional form as defined by Islamic 
jurisprudence harm the reputation of the Muslim community in the world and clash with 
human rights principles, the negative impact on the Muslim community caused by their 
enforcement cannot be, and has to be countered for the benefit of the Muslim community. The 
traditional hudud punishment might have been appropriate in their own historical and cultural 
context, but today they clash with international human rights and damage the reputation of 
Islam and Muslims severely. Hence, they violate the benefit of the people, and thus clash with 
Shariah itself. In contradiction to some contemporary Muslim scholars who call on for a 
complete freeze or abolition of hudud ordinances, it is argued here that it will be more helpful 
in the long term to reconcile them with international human rights by reforming the 
punishments rather than simply calling for their abolition, for if they were simply set aside, 
they could easily be re-enforced any time. Further, it is assumed that an appeal for abolition is 
very likely to be rejected by orthodox Muslims for the reasons discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. One of these is that such an appeal would be considered as an assault on Islamic 
identity. This thesis is committed, therefore, to be fully loyal to Shariah and to take the 
religious and cultural background of conservative Muslims into consideration. It is argued that 
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none of the crimes, defined as such in the Qur'an, can be simply ignored or set aside as 
‘outdated’. 
The suggestions developed in this section are more compatible with international human 
rights standards while still being in full agreement with Shariah and its purposes, ie, to focus 
more on the rehabilitation of the offender, while still fulfilling the purposes of justice and 
deterrence.  
As previously mentioned, this thesis advocates treating all hudud crimes with ta’zir 
punishments to be flexible enough to consider each case, especially the severity of the crime, 
individually. The imposition of what are clearly unjust penalties can harm the reputation of 
Islam and should therefore be avoided. Further, ta’zir punishments allow for rehabilitation 
and thus serve the benefit of the individuals and the Muslim society. Since a ta’zir 
punishment gives the judge the liberty to choose any penalty he deems appropriate, a penalty 
range needs to be assigned for each crime to assure justice and to avoid arbitrariness. 
A legal justification for changing the hadd punishment to ta’zir punishment can be found 
in the hadith that reports that even the Prophet Muhammad declared that a hadd punishment 
could be compromised if this is necessary to prevent harm to the reputation of Islam.997 
The following discussion of the individual hudud crimes commences with an examination 
of those crimes whose punishments have been developed by Islamic jurisprudence. 
(a)  Hudud prescriptions developed by Islamic jurisprudence 
This section focuses on those hudud prescriptions that have been developed by Islamic 
jurisprudence without or with weak or questionable legal justification in the Qur'an or the 
correct Sunnah. These are the stoning to death of married adulterers, flogging with 80 lashes 
for drinking alcohol and the death penalty for apostasy. Just as these prescriptions have been 
developed by the application of the method of ijtihad, this section applies the same method to 
develop suggestions to reform them. 
Even though any effort made to use ijtihad is a human one, based on human opinions, 
and thus not infallible, Shariah praises any effort made to apply ijtihad as honourable998 and 
praiseworthy and declares that any effort of interpretation will be rewarded, even if the 
interpretation is wrong; and if it is correct it will be doubly rewarded.999 It is argued, 
therefore, that it is absolutely legitimate to reconsider the aforementioned hudud prescriptions 
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that have been developed by Islamic jurists, the more so as many of the ahadith that have 
been used as the legal basis and justification for the assigned penalties are weak and, 
therefore, not strong enough to justify harsh and cruel punishments.1000  
It is argued, further, that the effort to question and reconsider the hudud prescriptions 
developed by Islamic jurists, in fact fulfils the appeal of the Farewell Sermon, in which the 
Prophet Muhammad had stressed that it is the responsibility of Muslims of every generation 
to go back to the primary sources of Shariah and to interpret them in a way to suit their own 
time.1001 
i. Beheading for apostasy (al-riddah) 
The punishment of beheading for leaving Islam has no legal justification in the Qur'an or the 
correct Sunnah. According to Islamic jurisprudence, however, an apostate has only three days 
to repent and to return to Islam, otherwise the punishment of beheading by a sword has to be 
carried out before the sunset of the third day.1002 This punishment is based on several ahadith 
that are all weak and thus not sufficient evidence to support the death penalty. 
One of the famous texts used to justify the death penalty for apostasy is a hadith that 
gives a report of the Prophet Muhammad’s return from his famous night journey. The hadith 
reports that when the Prophet Muhammad shared his account of the journey, ‘some people 
said: “We believe in what Muhammad is saying.” Others turned away from the faith and 
Allah cut their necks along with Abu Gahel.’1003 It is important to note, though, that the 
apostates were not killed when they left Islam, but because they joined the camp of the 
enemy, these being the Meccan idol-worshipping tribe of the Quraish. Later, during the 
famous war of Badr, when many of the Quraish people were killed by the Prophet and his 
army, the apostates who had joined the Quraish were killed ‘along with Abu Gahel’,1004 the 
commander of the Quraish army. Hence, they were not killed for leaving Islam, but died as 
fighters (muharibin) when they were physically attacking the messenger of Allah and the 
Muslim community. Consequently, this hadith represents an example of the crime of haraba 
since it speaks about fighting against Allah and His Messenger and it is not a strong enough 
evidence to justify the death penalty for apostasy. It can even be seen as disproving the death 
penalty for apostasy since it shows that the Prophet did not go after the apostates and they did 
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not suffer any negative consequences from leaving Islam until they engaged in a physical 
struggle against the Prophet and his people.  
Another hadith concerning apostasy is the one narrated by Ibn Omr, according to which 
the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘[I]f a man says to his brother: You are kafir (infidel/apostate), 
one of them will [really] be [infidel/apostate].’1005 This means that either the accusation is 
true, or if it is false, the accuser will be considered a kafir for falsely accusing his Muslim 
brother. It is noteworthy that, according to this hadith, the Prophet did not assign any 
punishment. Consequently, this hadith also provides no justification for the punishment of 
infidels or apostates. It can even be seen as proving the opposite, namely, that apostasy has no 
worldly punishment. 
The most famous hadith used as justification for the punishment for apostasy is the 
hadith according to which the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘Whoever change[s] his religion, kill 
him.’1006 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is a weak hadith, since Ikrimah, who is one in the 
chain of narrators, is considered to be untrustworthy.1007 It is important to note that the hadith 
does not speak explicitly about leaving Islam or ‘the Muslim religion’. The statement 
‘whoever leaves his religion’ is neutral. Some scholars believe, therefore, that the Prophet 
speaks in general about believers leaving their faith, whatever their religion.1008 According to 
this interpretation, however, a Christian or a Jew who leaves his religion in order to become a 
Muslim would have to be killed. This, of course, contradicts the fundamental teachings of 
Islam that encourages all non-Muslims to accept Islam.1009 Some scholars hold that the hadith 
must be referring only to Muslims who leave Islam.1010 This interpretation, however, is not 
fully convincing, since the Prophet did not specify that the hadith refers to Muslim converts. 
Either way, since the trustworthiness of its narrator Ikrima has been refuted by many different 
contemporary Islamic scholars,1011 the hadith does not provide sufficiently strong evidence to 
legitimise the death penalty for apostasy. This is especially true, since in many verses the 
Qur'an warns against killing a person unjustly. Surah 5:32, for example, states that killing one 
person unjustly is like killing all mankind. 
Another hadith used as a justification for the punishment of apostasy states that a Muslim 
who ‘abandoned his religion and leaves his society’ will be free, in other words, he is to be 
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killed.1012 Hence, this hadith speaks about Muslims who change their religion and leave the 
Muslim society. Abu Bakr used the above hadith to justify his killing of tens of thousands of 
rebellious people during the famous war of conversion (harb al-riddah).1013 The reason for 
the battle was that after the death of the Prophet Muhammad when Abu Bakr became his 
successor, many Muslims rejected his leadership and stopped paying zakat.1014Abu Bakr, 
therefore, accused them of leaving Islam and the Muslim community and fought against 
them.1015 Hence, the people had not just abandoned their faith, but they had engaged in a war 
against the Muslim caliph. The hadith calls them al-murtadin al-muharibin (those who wage 
war). They died as fighters against Islam and the Muslim community, and not just for leaving 
Islam. Consequently the hadith does not justify killing apostates.  
Another hadith used to justify the death penalty for apostasy is the one that speaks about 
an incident during the time of the Prophet Muhammad when some people, who previously 
had embraced Islam, stole the Prophet’s camels and killed the shepherds. The hadith reports 
that the Prophet punished them by ordering their hands and feet to be cut, and their eyes to be 
branded with heated pieces of iron. It is important to note that there were different kinds of 
crimes involved. The hadith states: ‘Those people committed theft, murder, became 
disbelievers after embracing Islam and fought against Allah and His Messenger.’1016 
Consequently, the aforementioned hadith does not specify whether or which of the penalties 
were assigned for leaving Islam. The hadith is therefore not a strong enough evidence to 
justify the death sentence for apostasy.  
On the other hand, there is a hadith that recounts that a Bedouin man who had converted 
to Islam wanted to leave it when he fell ill with a fever. The hadith reports that the man came 
repeatedly to the Prophet Muhammad to ask him to release him from his oath of allegiance, 
but the Prophet refused. Notably, the Prophet did not kill the apostate; he just refused to 
cancel the oath until the Bedouin eventually walked away. The Prophet did not even get angry 
with him, quite the contrary, for although he did not approve of the Bedouin’s decision, he 
described his departure as a positive elimination of an impurity that ‘purifies what is 
good’.1017 
Remarkably, there is no hadith that reports that the Prophet ever had anyone killed for 
leaving Islam. In all cases in which someone was killed after having left Islam, it was rather 
                                                 
1012 Sunan al-Nisa’i (2005) hadith 4003, 4006. 
1013 Ibn Jarir al-Tabari Tarikh al-Rusul wal Muluk (1968) vol 3 at 249. 
1014 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam, and is referring to charity. 
1015 Al-Tabari op cit note 1013. 
1016 Sahih al-Bukhari (1999) vol 1 at 178–9 hadith 233. 
1017 Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 3 at 530 hadith 3355. 
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for political reasons, or for leaving the Muslim society and for fighting against the Muslim 
community. 
From all the above information, it can be seen that the Sunnah does not provide sufficient 
evidence to justify the death penalty for apostasy that has been assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence. Even though there is a great deal of evidence in the Qur'an and the correct 
Sunnah that declares that apostasy is a sin against Allah punished by Allah in the afterlife, no 
specific punishment for apostasy in this life can be found in the Qur'an or in the correct 
Sunnah.  
As the crime of apostasy has no punishment required in the Qur'an or in the correct 
Sunnah, it is argued here that there should be no punishment whatsoever for leaving Islam, 
and the crime of apostasy should not be treated as a hadd crime. The Hanafi school also 
suggests this. After all, both the Qur'an and Sunnah contain many instances in which it is 
shown how Shariah protects freedom of religion, of thought and expression. Surah 2:256, for 
example, states that there is no compulsion in religion. Even freedom to disbelieve is 
explicitly granted by the Qur'an: ‘Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it)’ 
(Surah 18:29).  
ii. Public flogging for drinking alcohol 
For the consumption of alcohol, Islamic jurisprudence has assigned an eighty lash public 
flogging. This has, however, no legal justification in the Qur'an or correct Sunnah. Islamic 
jurists base the punishment on two contradicting ahadith. One of them speaks about 40 lashes, 
the other one about 80.1018 Further, a hadith narrated by Anas Ibn Malik states that the 
Prophet Muhammad had prescribed ‘forty stripes with two lashes’ and Abu Bakr and Umar 
had prescribed 80 lashes.1019 
In contrast and in contradiction to the aforementioned hadith, a correct hadith quotes 
Muhammad’s cousin, Ali the fourth caliph. This states explicitly that no punishment has been 
assigned ‘for the drunk’.1020 Abdullah al-Shirqawi also denied that there was a punishment for 
drinking, and refuted the claim that the Prophet’s companions (ijma al-sahaba) mutually 
agreed that the appropriate punishment should be flogging.1021 
                                                 
1018 According to Sahih Muslim the Prophet and Abu Bakr ordered that 40 lashes be given and Umrar ordered 
that 80 be given. Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 4 ch 8 at 482–4 hadith 4454, 4457; Al-Fawzan op cit note 248. 
1019 Sahih Muslim bk 17 hadith 4226. 
1020 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 at 405 hadith 6778. 
1021 Abdullah al-Shirqawi Al-Tatawor Ruh al-Shariah (1996) 215. 
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Since there is no justification for the punishment of flogging for drinking alcohol in the 
Qur'an or the correct Sunnah, while the Sunnah provides strong evidence to refute the 
punishment of flogging, it is argued that drinking alcohol or being drunk should not be 
considered a hadd crime. It would even be legitimate to argue that there should be no 
punishment for drinking alcohol whatsoever.1022  
However, Muslim society, generally, and more so the conservatives within it, would 
never tolerate the legitimation of alcohol and its consumption. The rejection of alcohol is a 
widely recognised moral value in a Muslim community and the prohibition of drinking is very 
common and deeply rooted in Muslim culture.1023 Drinking alcohol is viewed as a behaviour 
that damages not only the health, but also more importantly the dignity and morality of a 
person.1024 It is also believed to cause a person to lose the respect in his Muslim community. 
Drinking alcohol is viewed as a source of all kinds of evil that easily can lead to abuse in the 
family and other crimes related to substance abuse.1025 Shariah declares that one of its aims is 
the protection of peace, health and security of the community and warns that alcohol can 
cause a ‘befogged mind’ and lead to immoral behaviour.1026 In a Muslim society drinking 
alcohol can therefore be considered a disturbance of public decency.  
Since the legalisation of alcohol and its consumption would never be tolerated in a 
Muslim society, especially by conservative Muslims, this thesis suggest that it should be 
treated as a ta’zir crime to give the judge the possibility of exercising his discretion, to 
consider all aspects of the crime and to choose the right punishment from a specific range of 
punishments that needs to be defined. 
A comparison of the prescriptions pertinent to alcohol in the penal codes of Egypt and 
Oman as two representative Muslim countries that do not practice hudud ordinances shows 
that there are major differences in how the matter is dealt with. The Egyptian law on drinking 
alcohol, for example, distinguishes between the offence of drinking or serving alcohol and the 
one of getting drunk in public.1027 It bans drinking or serving alcohol in public places except 
in hotels and tourist facilities (art 2) and sentences offenders to prison time of not more than 
six months and/or a fine of 200 Egyptian Pounds (art 5).1028 Surprisingly, the prison sentence 
for getting drunk in public is not higher, and the fine is even less: prison time is set at not less 
                                                 
1022 Muhammad Bin Ismail Al-San'aani Subul al-Salam al-Muwselah ela Belug al-Muram (1997) vol 4 at 30. 
1023 Saad al-Din Massad al-Hilali Al-Tansiel al-Sharei lel-Khame wa al-Mughaderat (2001) 30. 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ismail al-Jevri ‘Al-ejaz al-tashreiy fi tahream al-khamr’ Jameat al-Eman 27 January 2013, available at 
http://www.jameataleman.org/main/articles.aspx?article_no=1768, accessed on 25 January 2016. 
1027 Egyptian Law of Drinking Alcohol, no 63, 1 August 1976. 
1028 Ibid. 
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than two weeks and no more than six months, and the fine not less than 20 Egyptian pounds 
and not more than 100 Egyptian pounds. Even for repeat offenders the sentence it is the same, 
namely, jail time of no more than six months (art 7).1029 
The criminal law of Oman, on the other hand, does not distinguish between drinking 
alcohol and getting drunk. For both offences, jail time is not less than 10 days and no more 
than one year and/or fine (art 228).1030 The production, importation and selling of alcohol are 
viewed as being more serious, thus these activities accrue higher sentences of jail time, 
namely not less than six months and not more than three 3 years and/or a fine.1031 Both 
countries do not distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims regarding the consumption of 
alcohol.  
Any attempt to define a specific penalty range for the ta’zir punishment will therefore 
have to define whether punishment is to be assigned only for getting drunk or for drinking 
alcohol without getting drunk. Further, it needs to be specified whether only drinking in 
public should be outlawed or any kind of drinking, even in private homes, and how hotels and 
tourist facilities should be treated. 
As previously mentioned, there is no Islamic legal justification to treat the consumption 
of alcohol with hudud punishment. A legal justification for the ban on drinking alcohol in 
Muslim communities can be seen, however, in the fact that it constitutes a public disturbance. 
If the prevention of public disturbance is the main purpose for criminalising alcohol 
consumption, it can logically be concluded that only the consumption of alcohol in public 
should be criminalised. It is further argued that a drunk person can constitute a risk to the 
public safety and that someone who is drunk should deserve a more severe sentence than does 
drinking without being drunk.  
For a person who is convicted for the first time of drinking in public without being drunk, 
a warning can be sufficient to correct the wrongful behaviour and to prevent a repetition of 
the offence. It is argued, therefore, that in this case a fine and a suspended prison sentence 
will be appropriate and sufficient. However, if the same person is convicted again, it can be 
argued that he/she has proven not to be willing to change his/her behaviour and that he/she is 
likely to commit the offence again. In cases of recidivism, then, the punishment for repeat 
                                                 
1029 Ibid.  
1030 Sultanate of Oman, The Penal Procedure LAW, Royal Decree No 97/99, published in the Official Gazette, 
15 December 1999, ed 661, vol 28, available at http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Oman/Penal%20Procedure%20Law%20Oman%201999.pdf, accessed on 4 February 2016. 
1031 Ibid. 
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offenders should be significantly higher than for first-time offenders. A higher fine and/or 
imprisonment up to six months are suggested. 
For a person who is convicted for the first time of being drunk, the punishment could be a 
fine and a prison sentence of up to six months. If the convict is known for never having been 
drunk before, a fine and a suspended prison sentence can be sufficient to serve as a warning 
and to dissuade the person from repeating the offence.  
If the offender is already addicted to alcohol, a fine by itself is very unlikely to prevent 
him/her from drinking again, and even a prison sentence might not be the best way to help 
such a person to be rehabilitated and return to society as a decent member who is able to 
abstain from alcohol. In such a case, medical or therapeutic assistance might be needed. For 
the purpose of Shariah, namely to serve the benefit of the Muslim community, it will be best 
that the judge will diligently evaluate what punishment will be really necessary to prevent the 
offender from repeating the offence and what will help to restore him as a decent member of 
the society and to prevent exaggerated penalties. This is also important to prevent criticism 
from the Muslim community.  
. 
iii. Stoning for adultery 
The punishment of stoning to death for the crime of adultery has been assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence and has no legal justification in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. It is based on 
weak ahadith and many Muslim scholars, including Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, Sheikh 
Mohammed Abu Zahra, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sheikh Taha Jabir al-Alwani and Sheikh 
Mustafa al-Zarqa, therefore oppose the punishment.1032 It is also based on the differentiation 
made between the adultery of married and unmarried people that cannot be found in the 
Qur'an.  
Some of the legal justifications used to defend the punishment of stoning have been 
discussed in Chapter 3, where it was pointed out that the different ahadith that are employed 
to defend the punishment of stoning for adultery are either weak or contradict the Qur’an.1033 
One of the main legal sources being used to justify the stoning is a verse known as ‘the verse 
of the stoning’ (‘ayet al-ragm’) that is believed to have once been contained in the Qur'an.1034 
Some scholars believe that its legal ruling is still valid, even though the verse can no longer be 
                                                 
1032 Adnan Ibrahim is one the scholars who denied punishments of stoning, see his sermon at the Friday prayer, 
published on 18 May 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLGXw2-GYKQ, accessed on 
4 February 2016. 
1033 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 at 420 hadith 6813, 6818, 6819. 
1034 Ibn Qudamah op cit note 648 at 433. 
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found.1035 The famous, though weak, hadith that says ‘Al-sheikh and al-sheikha [married man 
and women] if they commit zina, stone them as a punishment from Allah’1036 is believed to 
refer to the verse of the stoning mentioned above. Those scholars who believe that the alleged 
verse has existed in the Qur'an employ two different ahadith to explain how it got lost. One of 
these ahadith reports that the verse simply got lost during the time of the collection and 
writing the Qur’an.1037 The other reports that the paper on which the verse was written was 
eaten by a sheep.1038 
This theory of the alleged verse of the stoning that claims that it got lost but is still valid 
is very weak, and this is not only because the two ahadith that explain the disappearance of 
the verse are weak, but especially because the Qur'an declares in Surah 15:9 that Allah guards 
over His word to protect it from any error or corruption. It is therefore illogical to believe that 
Allah would allow such an important verse to ‘accidently’ disappear from the Qur’an.  
Scholars who defend the punishment of stoning also point to the following two ahadith 
both of which are weak, since they are reported in different, contradictory versions and 
contradict the provisions of the Qur'an.1039 The first one of them reports a case of adultery 
between a married woman and an unmarried man. Interestingly, the Prophet Muhammad 
stressed that he would judge the case according to the book of Allah, but then he ordered that 
the woman to be stoned, even though the Qur'an does not provide any justification for 
punishment by stoning. The hadith, thus, is quite illogical, and it does not provide strong 
enough evidence to justify stoning, particularly since its authenticity is weak.1040 
Another hadith that is used to support stoning as the punishment for adultery contains a 
report of monkeys, who allegedly stoned another monkey for having committed adultery.1041 
This report, narrated by Amr Ibn Maimun, is a weak hadith and completely contradicts 
common sense, for it is illogical to use the behaviour of animals as a moral example, much 
less as a legal justification for a death penalty.  
The most famous ahadith used to justify stoning as punishment give accounts of two 
stonings ordered by the Prophet Muhammad. According to one of them, a man named Ma’iz 
(or Mu’az) was stoned by order of the Prophet Muhammad after having confessed that he had 
                                                 
1035 Salih Bin al-Fauzan ‘Had al-rajm fi al-zena thabet bel ketab wal Sunnah wal ijma’ Al-Fawzan 21 March 
2015, available at http://www.alfawzan.af.org.sa/node/15335, accessed on 4 February 2016. 
1036 Sunan al-Nisa‘i (2007) vol 4 hadith 273. 
1037 Ibid. 
1038 Sunan Ibn Majah (2007) 111–12 hadith 1944.  
1039 Sankur op cit note 427; Buhindi op cit note 427. 
1040 Sunan at-Tirmidhi op cit note 433.  
1041 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani op cit note 434 at vol 7 at 335 hadith 3849. 
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committed adultery. This hadith, however, is a weak one since one of its narrators, Ikrimah, is 
not considered to be trustworthy.1042  
The other famous hadith reports the case of a woman, known as the Gamidi woman,1043 
who was stoned by order of the Prophet Muhammad after having confessed that she had 
committed adultery and that she was pregnant. According to the hadith, the Prophet 
Muhammad gave her the opportunity to give birth, nurse and wean her baby before he gave 
the order for her be stoned. Many scholars, including Taha Jabir al-Alwani, do not accept this 
hadith as a proof of stoning as the punishment for adultery. They believe that, in ordering the 
stoning of the Gamidi woman, the Prophet Muhammad did not practice Islamic law, but 
‘shara man qablana’, ie the ‘law of the people before us [the Muslims]’, namely Jewish law 
that in the book of Deuteronomy imposes stoning.1044 Scholars explain that he did this since 
the qur'anic verse that assigns a punishment for adultery had not yet been revealed.1045 In 
other words, at that time no Islamic ruling existed concerning the punishment for adultery. 
The scholars who hold this view, point out that after that incident the Prophet never practiced 
this punishment again.  
In contrast to the aforementioned example, where the Prophet Muhammad applied Jewish 
law for lack of a relevant Islamic legal ruling, he also occasionally applied Jewish law when 
judging Jews. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad used to judge the Jews according to their 
own law, the Torah, is demonstrated clearly in a hadith that recounts an earlier incident in 
which an unmarried Jewish man and an unmarried Jewish women were brought to the Prophet 
Muhammad on a charge of committing sexual intercourse.1046 The hadith reports that the 
Prophet asked them about the legal punishment for adultery according to the Jewish Torah. 
After they had read the relevant verse in the Torah, namely the verse of the Rajm (stoning to 
death), the Prophet ordered that they be stoned to death.1047 
Further proof of the inappropriateness of stoning to death as a punishment is the fact that 
Muatazila and Khawarig, two early Muslim groups that were established in the first century 
AH and had considerable influence on Islamic theology, completely opposed the punishment 
of stoning.1048 They pointed out that stoning was used in the first days of Islam only, when the 
                                                 
1042 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 at 426 hadith 6824. 
1043 Anas Ibn Malik Muwatta Malik (1985) 819. 
1044 The Bible, Deuteronomy 21:18–21. 
1045 Taha Jaber al-Alwani 'Lerajm fi al-Qur'an' Alwani’s personal website 23 October 2014, available at 
http://www.alwani.net/ ددددد_ ددد دد ددد/ ددد دد د_دد ددد_ دد ددد د/ item/547-
دد _ ددد_دد_ ددد ددد. html, accecced on 4 February 2016. 
1046 Sahih al-Bukhari (1997) vol 8 at 423 hadith 6819. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 65. 
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Prophet Muhammad ordered that kind of punishment in imitation of the Jewish Torah. They 
explained that when the verse that assigns flogging for adultery (Surah 24:2) was revealed, the 
use of stoning was abrogated, and is therefore no longer applicable. 
The majority of the scholars1049 of the four Muslim Sunni schools, however, counter this 
argument and defend the stoning, pointing to a hadith of Abu Hurairah, according to which 
the Prophet Muhammad himself had carried out the punishment of stoning. The scholars who 
hold this opinion believe that the hadith of Abu Hurairah overrides the qur'anic verse that 
assigns flogging as punishment.1050 Muatazila and Khawarig, however, refute this opinion and 
pointout that the qur'anic verse that assigns flogging was revealed in the year 5 or 6 AH and 
that Abu Hurairah converted to Islam only later, namely after the year 7 AH. They conclude 
that the hadith of Abu Hurairah that reports that the Prophet Muhammad himself had carried 
out the punishment of stoning can therefore not be correct.1051 
In summary, it can be concluded that the legal justifications used to defend the 
punishment of stoning to death for adultery are all too weak to justify such a severe penalty. 
At the same time there are strong arguments against the punishment.  
Due to all the above-mentioned evidence, many Muslim scholars oppose the punishment 
of stoning. Among them are the Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra,1052 and the 
Lebanese Sheikh Abdullah al-Alayli,1053 who point out that all the ahadith used as its legal 
justification are weak. Sheikh Mustafa al-Zarqa opposed treating the punishment of stoning as 
a fixed or hadd punishment and advocated treating it as a ta’zir crime, leaving it up to the 
imam or judge to enforce the punishment or disregard it. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi shares 
this opinion.1054 Muhammad Abu al-Qasim Haj Ahmad views the punishment of stoning as a 
plot devised by the Jews and aimed at destroying the message and legacy of the Prophet 
Muhammad, which aims to take the burdens from people and to show mercy.1055 
As seen above, there is no agreement on this issue among the Islamic scholars. This casts 
doubt on the validity of stoning as a punishment and thus can be used as an argument against 
its application. In fact, when there is any uncertainty — as is the case here — the imposition 
of the punishment should be avoided. In the light of the above, it can be concluded and argued 
with confidence that the punishment of stoning for adultery should not be practiced at all.  
                                                 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Ibid. 
1052 Muhammad al-Ghazali Distur al-Wihda Athakafiyah (1997) 86. 
1053 Al-Alayli op cit note 954 at 81. 
1054 Mustafa al-Zarqa Fatawa al-Zarqa (2010) 394. 
1055 Muhammad Abu al-Qasim Haj Ahmad Jadaliyat al-Ghayib wa’al-Inthan wa al-Tabiyah al-Aalamiyah al-
Thaniyah (2004) vol 1 at 64. 
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The punishment for adultery that has been assigned in the Qur'an, namely a flogging with 
100 lashes, will be discussed separately in the following section. 
(b) Hudud punishments prescribed by the Qur'an 
This section focuses on the hudud prescriptions that are based on ‘definite texts’ and can thus 
be considered to be ‘definite provisions’, since they are assigned by the Qur'an. These are the 
flogging for adultery and defamation, amputation for theft, and execution, or crucifixion, or 
amputation, or exile for haraba.  
While theft is considered a crime also by international laws, the crimes of adultery and 
defamation for illicit sexual behaviour are not or no longer criminalised by many national 
laws and are considered by many to be outdated. Many moderate Muslim scholars, including 
Ziba Mir Hosseini,1056 appeal, therefore, that they no longer be criminalised. Averting the 
hadd punishment for adultery, fornication and defamation could indeed be justified by the 
principle of doubt. Here it is argued, however, that since these crimes are defined as such by 
the Qur'an, an appeal to legalise them would be viewed as an assault on the Qur'an and on 
Islamic identity. Further, it is important to note that the crimes of adultery and defamation aim 
to protect marriage and family, both being a crucial pillar and core values in any Muslim 
society. Legalising adultery would, therefore, be also considered an assault on the Muslim 
society. Since this thesis is committed to remain loyal to Shariah and to build a bridge rather 
than to attack or demolish Islamic culture, it does not suggest ignoring or abolishing the 
crimes of adultry and defamation, but develops suggestions for alternative punishments that 
are compatible with international human rights laws and that serve the Muslim community by 
protecting their human rights and the reputation of Muslims.  
i. Flogging (and one year exile) for adultery (and fornication) 
The traditional definition of the crime of zina is ‘sexual intercourse of a man with a woman 
who is not his wife, or sexual intercourse of a woman with a man who is not her husband’ 
(see Chapter 2).1057 As previously mentioned, Islamic jurisprudence differentiates between the 
act of adultery between married and unmarried people.1058 Islamic scholars usually speak of 
                                                 
1056 Ziba Mir Hosseini ‘Criminalizing sexuality: Zina laws as violence against women in muslim contexts‘ 
ZibaMirHosseini.com March 2010 at 16, available at http://www.zibamirhosseini.com/documents/mir-hosseini-
article-criminalizing-sexuality.pdf, accessed on 11 May 2016. 
1057 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani op cit note 556; Jumah op cit note 223 at 140. 
1058 Al-Hin, Al-Bugha & Al-Shurbagy op cit note 520 at 56. 
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‘adultery’ when referring to extra-marital sex between married persons, and of ‘fornication’ 
when referring to sexual intercourse between those who are not married. It is important to 
note that such a differentiation cannot be found in the Qur'an. The punishment of stoning to 
death assigned by Islamic jurisprudence for married adulterers has been already discussed and 
refuted. For unmarried people convicted of illicit sexual intercourse, Islamic jurisprudence 
assigns the punishment of flogging with 100 lashes and exile of one year. 1059 The year in 
exile is usually applied as a jail term.1060 The Qur'an imposes the punishment of a flogging 
with 100 lashes for the crime of zina, regardless of whether it has been committed by married 
or unmarried persons.1061 Whilst the flogging with 100 lashes assigned by Islamic 
jurisprudence corresponds to the punishment prescribed in the Qur'an, a penalty of exile for 
one year is not found in the Qur'an. Its prescription is based on the Sunnah.1062 
The reason for the assignment of the harsh punishment of flogging can be understood 
when considering that adultery violates the family and its honour that can be considered the 
heart and main pillar of Muslim society. The prohibition of zina is aimed at protecting 
marriage, children, the honour and reputation of the woman’s family, but also public decency 
and health.1063 It is aimed at preventing out of wedlock pregnancies, venereal diseases, 
illegitimate children, injustice in inheritance and depriving children of the honour of claiming 
genuine paternity.1064 Thus, it is designed to protect the dignity, morality and ethics of the 
people, as well as the stability of the family. From an Islamic perspective, extra-marital sexual 
relations are considered to be a serious violation of the normative principles of society, its 
social, religious, moral and legal norms and to demoralise the social order.1065 
While the importance of the protection of family explains why a harsh punishment has 
been assigned, it does not justify it. Flogging is one of the kinds of harsh and cruel 
punishments that is not compatible with international human rights standards and harms the 
reputation of Islam and the Muslim community worldwide. It also does not fit in with the 
reality of life in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the method of carrying out the 
punishments in public is very humiliating and thus violates human dignity. It therefore can be 
argued that the reality of life in the twenty-first century requires that the punishment is 
adapted in a way so that it fits in with more modern forms of punishment.  
                                                 
1059 Ibn al-Arabi Ahkam al-Quran (2003) 517. 
1060 Al-Hanafi op cit note 530 at 63. 
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Sahih Muslim (2007) vol 4 at 461 hadith 4414. 
1063 Okon op cit note 67 at 230. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Ibid. 
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Even though the Qur'an does not differentiate between the adultery of married persons 
and illicit sexual intercourse of unmarried persons, the approach of Islamic jurisprudence to 
do so is somehow understandable, since the two offences differ in terms of their severity. The 
adultery of two married persons is seen as bringing harm and shame to two entire families, 
particularly if the two persons involved have children, and thus it is seen as being more 
serious.1066 It cannot be compared, for example, with unlawful sexual relations between two 
unmarried people, particularly if they are engaged to each other and about to get married.  
Consensual relations between two unmarried people are not even considered a crime in 
many countries, including in rather liberal moderate Muslim countries like, for example, 
Tunisia. In other Muslim societies, by contrast, such illicit, albeit consensual, intercourse can 
be considered to constitute a disturbance of public decency once the offence is exposed. Its 
severity, though, depends on the cultural environment in which it takes place, and can differ 
from a country to another. In many Muslim countries, the aspect of honour plays a very 
important role that must not be underestimated. In some moderate Muslim countries like 
Egypt or Jordan, where hudud ordinances are not applied, the offence is still criminalised due 
to the concept of honour and public decency. In these countries a fine and/or jail sentences is 
usually assigned.1067 For conservative Muslim countries, for example, like Saudi Arabia, 
where hudud ordinances are practiced, legalising sexual intercourse of unmarried people is 
unacceptable for both religious and cultural reason. It is viewed as a punishable hadd crime, 
as a public disturbance, and causing damage to the reputation of the involved families.1068 The 
fact that because of unlawful sexual intercourse of unmarried people, a child could be born 
out of wedlock is another major reason why the action is considered a serious crime. A child 
born out of wedlock will be seen as a tremendous shame for the family, one that can affect the 
future of the child and its reputation adversely, and can also cause problems concerning 
inheritance. Even though today many countries have laws that ensure that children born out of 
wedlock receive protection, and that — especially — they inherit equally in relation to their 
siblings born within wedlock, this is usually not the case in conservative Muslim countries, 
where children born out of wedlock suffer negative consequences. 
It is argued here that treating zina by a ta’zir punishment, enables the judge to take all the 
above mentioned differences into consideration and to assign a penalty that considers the 
                                                 
1066 Al-Zahrani, Yahya Ibn Moosa 'Mafased wa khuturat Al-zena' 12 August 2016 available at 
http://www.denana.com/main/articles.aspx?selected_article_no=6094, accessed on 11 August 2016. 
1067 Egyptian Penal Code as amended by law no 95 of 2003 art 278; Jordanian Penal Code no 16 of 1960 arts 282 
& 283. 
1068 Al-Otaibi op cit note 47 at 11. 
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severity of the offence, the cultural environment, and the individual circumstances. This 
serves justice and thus can contribute to a growing public acceptance of the penalty, and will 
help to protect the image of Islam. It is argued, therefore, that the principle of reality requires 
treating the crime of zina as a ta’zir crime.  
As a matter of fact, even in Muslim countries that apply hudud ordinances, adultery is 
anyway often treated as a ta’zir punishment. This is on account of the difficult requirements 
for a conviction for the crime of adultery, namely, the need to have four eyewitnesses, or the 
confession of the suspect, or clear evidence, such as pregnancy. To provide four eyewitnesses, 
who have seen the actual penetration is almost impossible, and it is very unlikely that a 
suspect will confess to his crime — even if he did, he could withdraw his confession easily. 
This means that pregnancy would be almost the only way to prove that an offence has been 
committed. These strict requirements make it quite difficult to prove the hadd crime of 
adultery; and if the offence cannot be proven without any doubt, it will automatically be 
treated as a ta’zir crime. If a case is treated as a ta’zir crime, the requirements are different 
and it is much easier to convict offenders. Consequently, it can be argued that, also for 
practical reasons, it will be best to treat the crime as ta’zir.  
Treating zina by a ta’zir punishment can also help avoiding different cases of gender 
discrimination that arise from the application of the hadd punishment. One of these cases of 
gender discrimination arises, for example, if a man and a woman are caught in adultery and if 
the man does not confess his ‘sin’, but that the woman is convicted by pregnancy. In such a 
case only the woman will be subject to punishment. This is unjust and discriminatory. Similar 
cases of discrimination and injustice arise from the said prescription in cases of rape, when a 
woman accuses a man of rape, but fails to prove her case by providing four eyewitnesses. If 
the man denies the rape, she is punished and he is not. So a raped woman, in fact, is treated as 
a perpetrator and not a victim of a terrible crime. All these difficulties, including the risk of 
miscarriage of justice and discrimination that can result from the hadd prescriptions, can and 
should be avoided by treating the crime of zina by taz’ir punishment.  
It is suggested, here, that the traditional corporal zina punishments should be replaced by 
assigning admonition and/or community service and/or a fine. This sort of punishment is 
supposed to be sufficient to prevent a repeat of the offence, and an appropriate recompense 
for the harm for the families and the community and/or the public disturbance. Further, the 
suggested punishment is more appropriate than a jail sentence, which would remove a 
breadwinner or caretaker from the family and would thus impact negatively on the 
dependants, if either person has children or dependants. 
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If the woman falls pregnant as a result of the act of zina, it is suggested that the man 
should marry her to prevent the aforementioned negative results from arising. If he marries 
her, it is argued that there should be no further punishment. This is how most moderate 
Muslim countries handle such cases. If, however, the man refuses to marry the woman whom 
he is said to have defiled, he should be made responsible to pay maintenance –– at least for the 
child, if not for the woman also. 
In view of the problem of honour killings in Muslim countries, it could be argued that 
long prison sentences should be assigned for even acts of consensual sexual intercourse 
between unmarried people in order to prevent the woman’s family from taking action. On the 
other hand, however, it can be argued that even a long prison sentence is very unlikely to 
change the mind of family members who believe in honour killings and, therefore, this aspect 
should not influence or dictate the sentence for the crime of zina. (The problem of honour 
killings that can be considered part of customary law needs to be addressed on its own at a 
different level, for example, by criminalising it and treating it as a regular murder with an 
appropriate sentence, not a lower one, as is often the case. A real change in this custom is 
achievable only in the long term through education and a change of mindset.) 
Concerning the crime of rape, it is argued that the crime brings tremendous harm to the 
victim and her family and, consequently, a severe punishment is necessary to bring justice and 
to prevent the offender from committing the crime again. The aspect of deterrence is 
especially important, since the crime of rape is often very hard to prove. The victim is thus 
left in a very vulnerable position and deserves protection from the government. A prison 
sentence of ten to fifteen years is suggested, with the option to extend the sentence 
indefinitely if there are doubts concerning the rehabilitation of the offender. The prison 
sentence can be combined with a fine. It might be necessary for the punishment to include 
specific therapy for the offender. Rape also falls under the crime of haraba. The punishment, 
though, is the same in both cases. 
ii. Flogging for defamation (qazf) 
The punishment of flogging with 80 lashes as punishment for defamation, ie launching false 
accusations of illicit sexual intercourse, is based on a definite text, namely on Surah 24:4: 
‛And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses (to 
support their allegations) — flog them with eighty stripes.’ It is important to note that this 
qur’anic verse explicitly aims to protect women from being falsely accused of illicit sexual 
behaviour. Obviously, the Qur'an did not see the need to protect men from such defamation. 
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Islamic jurists, however, have extended the definition of the crime in a way to protect men 
also from false accusations of illicit sexual behaviour.1069 This extended definition can be seen 
as one of the key factors that have led to the paradoxical situation that the verse is often 
misused in a way to cause the false conviction of innocent women, instead of protecting them 
from a miscarriage of justice. In several Muslim countries, including Pakistan, the 
aforementioned verse is often used against victims of rape, placing the onus of proof on the 
woman who, in seeking justice, accuses her offender. Hence, she will have to provide four 
eyewitnesses to prove her case. Since this is usually impossible, she fails to prove her case 
and, therefore, often ends up being punished for the crime of defamation and/or adultery.  
Such abuse can actually be seen as a violation of the qur’anic prescription concerning 
defamation that aims to protect women from miscarriages of justice. The prevention of such 
injustice should therefore be paramount, and the protection of women from miscarriages of 
justice should remain the main focus. There is insufficient justification to extend the 
definition of the crime in a way to also include the protection of men from defamation of 
illicit sexual intercourse, while the Qur'an obviously did not see the need to do so. Even 
though it could be argued that it would seem fair and serve gender equality to treat men and 
women in the same way, it is important to note that in those countries where hudud 
punishment are practiced, women are usually discriminated against in many ways, while for 
men there is no obvious need to be protected from discrimination, defamation or a miscarriage 
of justice. It is argued, therefore, that the misuse of the verse of defamation has to be 
prevented by all means. The high importance that the Qur'an places on the protection of the 
reputation, honour and security of women and the importance of protecting them from 
miscarriages of justice can be seen in the harshness of the punishment assigned for violations 
against them. In order to prevent its misuse, the qur'anic verse on defamation should never be 
used against women, much less in cases that they report cases of rape. It should be used only 
in the way designed by the Qur'an, namely to protect women.  
Since the traditional hadd punishment of flogging is very harsh and cruel and thus in 
conflict with international human rights standards, it is argued here that it will be more 
beneficial for Muslim society to apply instead a kind of punishment that will fit better with 
international laws of human rights. An appropriate alternative punishment would be a prison 
sentence up to one year and/or fine to be imposed at the discretion of the judge. The suggested 
punishment is appropriate to restore justice, has a deterrent effect, and can serve the 
                                                 
1069 Al-Hin, Al-Bugha & Al-Shurbagy op cit note 520 at vol 8 at 82. 
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rehabilitation of the offender. The punishment thus serves the purposes of Shariah, namely by 
serving society and restoring the honour and dignity of victims and their families. 
iii. Amputation for theft 
The punishment for the crime of theft assigned by Islamic jurisprudence is the amputation of 
the hand(s) for first time offenders, and further amputations of limbs and jail sentences for 
repeat offenders.1070 The punishments for repeat offenders, though, have no justification in the 
Qur'an, and even the qur’anic verse (Surah 5:38), on which the amputation of hand(s) is 
based, is not fully clear and does not necessarily refer to a physical amputation of the hand. It 
is important to note that the qur'anic text in Arabic states that the punishment is to ‘cut the 
hand’; it does not speak of ‘cutting off’ the hand(s), as it appears in most English translations: 
NOW AS FOR the man who steals and the woman who steals, cut off the hand of either of them 
in requital for what they have wrought, as a deterrent ordained by God: for God is almighty, 
wise. (Surah 5:38 Asad translation) 
The wording ‘cut the hand’ could as well refer to just inflicting an injury to the hand, or it 
could even have a metaphorical meaning, referring to stopping the hand of the thief from 
reaching the money or the property of the people.1071 This could be achieved for example, by 
isolating the thief from the society by putting him in jail. An examination of the use of the 
term cutting/cut off (qat’a) in the sacred texts shows that it is repeated 32 times throughout 
the Qur'an and that twenty-seven out of those 32 times it is used metaphorically rather than 
literally,1072 for example, referring to ‘cut off ties of kinship’1073 or to ‘cut off the way’.1074  
The clearest example that supports its meaning as inflicting injury is a verse that 
speaks of women who accidently injured themselves (cut their hands) with the knives they 
held in their hands:  
And when the women saw him, they were greatly amazed at his beauty, and [so flustered were 
they that] they cut their hands [with their knives], exclaiming, "God save us! This is no mortal 
man! This is nought but a noble angel!" (Surah 12:31Asad translation) 
Since this verse also speaks about cutting hands, whilst obviously not in the meaning of 
amputation, it is often used to argue that the punishment for theft assigned by the Qur'an does 
not necessarily refer to the actual amputation of hand(s), but just to inflicting an injury to the 
                                                 
1070 For details see Chapter 4. 
1071 Shahrur op cit note 244. 
1072 Ibid. 
1073 Surah 47:22. 
1074 Surah 29:29 ‘Do ye indeed approach men, and cut off the highway?- and practise wickedness (even) in your 
councils?’ 
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hand(s).1075 Abu Bakr al-Razi for example, declared therefore: ‘The meaning of this verse is 
unclear; therefore it should not be used to shed blood with it.’1076 Since the meaning of the 
punishment is not fully clear and causes doubt, it is argued here that the principle of doubt 
requires averting the punishment of amputation.  
Further, also the principles of reality and necessity justify a rejection of the punishment of 
amputation in view of the realities of life in the twenty-first century, including the morally 
and religiously low standard in most countries from one side, and the commitment to 
international human rights laws from the other. The historical report of Umar Ibn al-Khattab, 
who suspended the hadd punishment for theft during the year of famine,1077 serves as a good 
example to show that hadd can be averted if that is required by the reality of life. Of course, 
this does not mean that crimes of theft should be ignored. The protection of property is so 
important in any society that it is protected by all laws, including international human rights 
laws.  
The punishment of amputation, though, is one of the cruellest punishments and one of the 
main reasons why Islamic law is condemned as being barbaric and backward. It is suggested, 
therefore, that amputations as punishment for theft should be completely rejected and replaced 
with imprisonment and/or a fine, depending upon the value of the stolen object — and taking 
all the circumstances of the offence into consideration.  
Interestingly, all four schools assign the punishment of imprisonment as the last option 
for repeat offenders.1078 This is interesting because usually the last option is supposed to be 
the harshest punishment. This argument prevents any possible claim stating that imprisonment 
is not harsh enough to deal with the crime of theft. Furthermore, it is interesting that all four 
schools agree on the punishment of imprisonment though it cannot be found in the Qur'an. 
Imprisonment has enough of a deterrent effect to prevent a thief from committing the crime 
again and is thus an effective punishment to protect property. At the same time, it complies 
with international human rights standards. 
It is suggested that theft is treated as a ta’zir crime, leaving it up to the discretion of the 
judge to assign the appropriate jail sentence and/or fine, while taking into account the value of 
the stolen object and the circumstances surrounding the theft. In this way the punishment will 
serve the needs of justice, allow for rehabilitation and will protect the reputation of Islam.  
                                                 
1075 Tafsir al-Tabari (2001) vol 13 at 239.  
1076 Fahr al-Din al-Razi Mafatih al-Ghaib (1981) vol 6 at 55. 
1077 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah op cit note 36 vol 3 at 12. 
1078 Ibrahim Ibn Mohammed Ibn Ibrahim al-Halabi Multaqa al-Abhur (1998) vol 1 at 349; Al-Kasani op cit note 
653 at 86. 
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iv. Execution, crucifixion, amputation or exile for haraba 
The punishments of crucifixion, execution, amputation or exile that have been assigned for 
the crime of haraba are among the harshest and cruellest punishments of the entire set of 
hudud ordinances. They have been assigned by the Qur'an in Surah 5:33 and are thus based on 
a definite text. The Qur'an states: 
‘The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with 
might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of 
hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land’ (Surah 5:33). 
There is wide agreement amongst Islamic scholars that the crimes that this verse refers to 
include public robbery, murder, rape and all kinds of violent physical attacks against the 
Muslim society, its government, the public order or safety.1079 The range of crimes that fall 
under ‘waging war against Allah and His Messenger’ also include acts of war against Islam 
and the Muslim community,1080 which can include also terror attacks, the use of bombs, 
automatic guns or chemical weapons, these being crimes that were not even known at the time 
that Islamic jurists defined their understanding of the crime. For these kinds of crimes the law 
of war applies rather than criminal law.1081 
The most critical and controversial aspect of the hudud prescriptions concerning haraba 
is that Islamic jurists have widened the definition of the crime of haraba in a way to refer not 
just to physical attacks but to include even any act or statement that can insult or bring harm 
to Allah or His Messenger, to Muslims or to Islam.1082 It is due to this extension of the 
definition that the harsh haraba punishment will no longer be limited to cases of physical 
attacks against a Muslim nation or its public safety, but can be used to whatever is perceived 
as assault on the Prophet or Islam including statements, literature or films critical of Islam.  
Applying the extremely harsh and cruel haraba punishments for what is perceived as 
insulting Allah or His Messenger, but referring to non-physical actions or statements, violates 
international human rights laws in several ways, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. It is argued 
here that this extension of the definition is not justified by the Qur'an or the correct 
Sunnah.1083 The Sunnah gives a clear picture of the real meaning of ‘fighting against Allah 
                                                 
1079 Mohammed Abdullah Habayballah al-Shanqaiti Tabyeen al-Masalek le Tadreb al-Salk (2013) 520; 
Muhammad Arafa al-Disuqi Hashiat al-Disuqi ala al-Sharh al-Kabir (1978) vol 4 at 348; Mohammed Bin 
Ahmed al-Khatib al-Sherbini Mughni al-Muhtaj ela Marefat Maani Alfaz al-Mihaj (1994) vol 4 at 180;  
Mansour Bin Yunus Bin Idris al-Bahuti Kashf al-Qenaa an Maten al-Eqna (1983) vol 6 at 149–150. 
1080 Tafsir Ibn Kathir (1999) vol 3 at 96. 
1081 Hamad Bin Ali al-Luhaidan Al-Sowar al-Muaseah le-Jaremat al-Harabah (2011) 72–157.  
1082 Ibn Taymiyyah op cit note 381 at 421. 
1083 Ibid at 379. 
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and His Messenger’, namely as a physical fight against the Prophet, Islam or Muslims.1084 
One of the most famous examples is the previously mentioned hadith that tells of some people 
who turned away from the Prophet Muhammad after having heard his report of the night 
journey.1085 They joined the enemy’s camp, this being the Meccan idol-worshipper tribe of 
Quraish, and fought against the Prophet Muhammad in the famous war of Badr, in which they 
were killed by the Prophet and his army ‘along with Abugahel’, the commander of the 
Quraish army. Thus they were killed as a result of participating in a physical struggle against 
the Prophet and Muslims. Hence, they died as fighters (muharibin). This is one of the classic 
examples that describe the meaning of the crime of ‘fighting against Allah and His 
Messenger’, namely as referring to physical attacks on the Muslim community. Other 
examples have been mentioned earlier in this chapter in the discussion of the crime of 
apostasy, where it has been pointed out that the apostates who left the Muslim community and 
turned against it with physical attacks, were not killed for leaving Islam (apostasy), but for 
fighting ‘against Allah and His Messenger’, thus the crime of haraba. 
In summary, it can be said that the crime of haraba includes all kinds of physical attacks 
‘against Allah and His Messenger’, including against Muslim society, Muslim individuals and 
the safety of the public, but it does not include non-physical actions such as statements critical 
to Islam, issued verbally or in other forms, including writings, images or movies. It is 
stressed, therefore, that the haraba punishments should never be applied in cases of non-
physical actions that are perceived as assaults against Islam. It is argued, therefore, that the 
extremely harsh and cruel haraba punishments, if at all applied, should be limited to cases of 
physical attacks. It is argued, further, that they should actually be completely avoided, since 
they violate international human rights law. 
It is important to note that the four different kinds of punishment meted out for the crime 
of haraba in Surah 5:33 are much debated. While the Hanafi, Shafei and Hanbali schools of 
jurisprudence view the four different forms of punishment as gradual and designed to suit the 
different levels of severity of the crime, the Maliki school believes that they are given as equal 
options to freely choose from. Here it is argued that the view of the Maliki school is 
convincing, since the verse indeed lists the different punishments as options to choose from. 
This is indicated by the use of ‘or’ between them: ‘execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off 
of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land’. 
                                                 
1084 Al-Ashmawy op cit note 409. 
1085 Imam Ahmad Musnad al-Imam Ahmad (2008) vol 1 at 374. 
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The punishment of exile, which is one of the four different options of punishment, is 
interpreted by the Maliki and Hanafi schools as referring to imprisonment.1086 This 
interpretation makes sense and is fully compatible with international human rights laws. Since 
the aforementioned verse gives a judge the option to choose one of the four options of 
punishment, and the interpretation of exile as imprisonment fits best with international human 
rights standards and with the reality of the twenty-first century, it is argued, here that it is fully 
legitimate to apply imprisonment as a punishment in all cases of haraba and to completely 
avoid the other three options of physical punishments, including death sentences. 
It is argued here that imprisonment is effective enough to deal with all kinds of crimes, 
and it fits with the principles of modern international laws of war, for these do not include 
cruel and inhuman punishments, such as crucifixions or amputations. A prison sentence is 
very effective in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation; it can be adjusted to fit the severity of 
the crime and can take into account whether the person before the judge is a first-time 
offender or a repeat offender who should be punished more severely. Depending on the exact 
crime and circumstances, the sentence can be as much as life in prison and can be combined 
with a fine.  
Applying imprisonment as the only kind of punishment and not imposing death sentences 
or physical torture is also the best way to reduce the power of dictators, who tend to falsely 
use the verse about haraba to fight their opposition by labelling any oppositional activities, 
including demonstrations, as terrorist attacks. This is what happened, for example, on 2 
January 2016, when the Saudi royal government executed 47 men, including the prominent 
Shi’a Muslim cleric, Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimron, on terrorism-related charges.1087 The 
director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Amnesty International 
commented on the execution, stating that ‘(t)he killing of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in particular 
suggests they are also using the death penalty in the name of counter-terror to settle scores 
and crush dissidents’.1088  
In summary, it can be said that all the suggested amendments are in full compliance with 
Shariah, since they serve Shariah’s purposes and are justified by the principles of reality and 
necessity and the principle of doubt. The suggested punishments can serve those countries 
that apply hudud ordinances as a guideline to reform them, since all the aspects that need to 
                                                 
1086 Al-Jaziri op cit note 190 vol 5 at 360. 
1087 ‘Shia cleric among 47 executed by Saudi Arabia in a single day’ Amnesty International 2 January 2016, 
available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/01/shia-cleric-among-47-executed-by-saudi-
arabia-in-a-single-day/, accessed on 13 March 2016. 
1088 Ibid. 
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be considered, have been pointed out. Nevertheless, the suggested sentences leave enough 
space to consider the environment in the respective country. 
V Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Shariah, known to be flexible enough to suit all times and 
every environment, is indeed flexible enough to reconcile hudud punishment with 
international human rights laws. It has shown that Shariah has provided the necessary tools to 
secure the benefit of the people — its main purpose — and to overcome the seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle created by the fact that hudud ordinances are considered definite 
texts that are immutable. The principles of reality and necessity allow for exceptions, even 
from texts that are considered definite, if these are necessary and required by the reality of life 
to secure the benefit of the people and to protect them from harm. In addition, the principle of 
doubt requires that in cases of doubt the hadd punishment should be averted. The chapter has 
demonstrated that the Prophet Muhammad himself, as well as his companions and successors, 
applied these principles repeatedly to compromise definite prescriptions and to drop or 
suspend hadd punishments whenever this was necessary for the sake of the benefit of the 
people. 
The understanding of what constitutes doubt and thus would justify — or even require —
the suspension of hudud punishments is very wide and encompassing. There are, in fact, 
enough reasons that would justify a complete moratorium on hudud ordinances. This is what 
many moderate Muslim scholars call for. In this thesis, however, it is argued that only 
reforming them can bring a real long-term solution, for if they were simply set aside, they can 
easily re-implemented any time. A call for their abolition is also not very promising, since an 
appeal for their abolition is very likely to be completely rejected as an assault on the Islamic 
identity.  
This thesis does not suggest changing or putting aside any of the qur'anic definite texts. It 
instead calls for a return to the core values of the Qu’ran’s teachings and a focus on the 
purpose of Shariah, namely to serve the benefit of the people and to protect them from harm. 
All the suggestions presented in this chapter ensure compliance with international human 
rights standards. They have been developed in a religiously sensitive manner and in full 
compliance with Shariah. They focus on the core values of Shariah and clear the hudud 
punishment as developed by Islamic jurisprudence from inappropriate interpretations that 
contradict these core values. All the suggested amendments serve Shariah’s purposes and are 
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justified by the principles of reality and necessity and the principle of doubt. 
Since the suggestions to reform hudud punishment as presented in this chapter have been 
developed in full compliance with Shariah, they are supposed to be acceptable to even 
conservative Muslims. Thus, they can help to build a bridge between the conservative Muslim 
countries that view Allah as the highest authority, and that part of the world that hold human 
rights and human dignity as the highest values and guideline.  
This chapter has pointed out that one of the reasons behind some of the harshest and cruel 
hudud punishments is the widespread interpretation of the concept of the protection of the five 
indispensables that focuses on the protection of religion and thereby violates human rights 
principles and some of the core values and teachings of Shariah. It has been pointed out that 
this traditional reading that elevates the protection of religion inappropriately above the 
protection of the individuals’ rights contradicts Shariah and that the protection of religion 
should therefore rather be interpreted in a way to reflect the religious freedom and the 
freedom of opinion promoted in the Qur'an.  
The view that harsh corporal punishments are necessary for the sake of deterrence has 
been refuted in this chapter. The argument put forward is that it would be more beneficial for 
the Muslim society to focus on the rehabilitation of offenders to completely abolish corporal 
punishments, and replace them with punishments that are compatible with human rights laws. 
The proposition that all hudud crimes should be treated by ta’zir punishments has been 
presented as a crucial means for reforming hudud ordinances. In contrast to the fixed hadd 
punishments, taz’ir punishments are left to the discretion of the judge. This allows to treat 
every case individually and to consider, in each case, the severity of the offence, the special 
circumstances of the crime and the offender, and the aspect of rehabilitation. This will help to 
secure justice. The judge should, however, be bound to a limited penalty frame assigned for 
the kind of crime. The punishments suggested in this chapter range from an admonition, 
community service to imprisonment and/or a fine. It is argued that the proposition that all 
hudud punishments should be treated as ta’zir is legitimate and necessary for the benefit of 
the people. The suggested punishments can serve those countries that apply hudud ordinances 
as a guideline to reform them and leave enough space to consider the environment in the 
respective country. 
For those punishments that have been developed by Islamic jurists via the application of 
the method of ijtihad, namely, beheading for apostasy, flogging for drinking alcohol and 
stoning for adultery, this chapter has developed suggestions applying the same method of 
ijtihad to re-interpret them. It is argued that apostasy should not be criminalised at all, since 
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there is no legal justification for it in the Qur'an. For the same reason the stoning for adultery 
should be abolished completely. Also for drinking alcohol, no earthly punishment for it is 
foreseen in the Qur'an. In conservative Muslim countries, though, where drinking alcohol is 
considered a disturbance of public decency, a fine and/or a prison sentence can be assigned 
for it.  
For those crimes that the Qur'an has assigned punishments for, namely, the crimes of 
theft, adultery, defamation and haraba the chapter has developed alternative punishments that 
are compatible with international human rights laws. For theft a jail sentence and/or fine is 
suggested.  
Concerning the crime of zina, it has been pointed out that the common distinction 
between ‘adultery’ (of married people) and ‘fornication’ (illicit sexual intercourse of 
unmarried people) contradicts the Qur'an and should therefore be avoided. It is argued that 
treating the crime of zina by a ta’zir punishment allows to take the differences of the nature of 
each case into account. It is suggested that community service and/or a fine should be 
imposed as the punishment for both adultery and consensual sexual intercourse of unmarried 
people. The latter is not even considered a crime in most countries, but can, in conservative 
Muslim societies, be considered a disturbance of public decency. If the woman falls pregnant 
as a result of the act of zina, it is suggested that the man should marry her. If he refuses to 
marry her, he should be punished with a fine and/or imprisonment and should be responsible 
to pay maintenance for the child.  
Concerning the crime of defamation, it is important to note that the qur'anic prescription 
aims to protect women from an injustice and from the violation of their honour. It is argued, 
therefore, that it is very important that the faulty conviction of innocent women is prevented. 
This is something that frequently occurs in several Muslim countries, including Pakistan. The 
penalty for false accusations against women should be imprisonment and/or a fine. 
The crime of haraba refers to all kinds of violent physical attacks against Muslim 
individuals and Muslim society, including public robbery, murder, and rape. The penalty for 
all of these should be sentenced with imprisonment. Acts of war against Islam and a Muslim 
nation, which can even include terror attacks, should be subject to the law of war rather than 
criminal law. Non-physical actions that are perceived as assaults on Islam or insults of the 
Prophet do not constitute acts of haraba and should not be considered as such. 
All the suggested punishments serve justice, respect Shariah and serve its purposes that 
have the benefit of the Muslim society in mind. This is achieved by helping to restore the 
image and reputation of both Islam and Muslims and by protecting them from harm, namely 
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by protecting their human rights, their human dignity, freedom of thought and religious 
freedom, and protecting the public decency and public safety. The core of the hudud 
prescriptions, namely their legal basis in the Qur'an and correct Sunnah are not violated and 
all the proposed suggestions are legitimate and justified since they serve the benefit of the 
Muslim community. They are thus compliant and compatible with both Shariah and 
international human rights laws.  
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
I Introduction 
This thesis has set out to research whether it is possible and legitimate to reform hudud 
ordinances so that Islamic criminal law can be reconciled with internationally recognised 
human rights, and if so, how this can be achieved.  
Islamic criminal law, particularly the hudud ordinances, with their extremely harsh and 
cruel punishments severely violate human rights. These punishments include beheading for 
apostasy; stoning to death for adultery; flogging for drinking alcohol, fornication and 
defamation; amputation for theft; and execution, crucifixion, amputation or exile for the crime 
of haraba. These kinds of cruel, inhuman and degrading corporal punishments are outlawed 
by international human rights laws. Hudud ordinances also violate the freedom of religion, 
opinion and expression and principles of due process and fair trial, and they discriminate 
against women and non-Muslims. The enforcement of the hudud ordinances also damages the 
reputation of Islam and Muslims in the world. 
Countries like Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Brunei Darussalam that practice hudud 
ordinance are, like most other Muslim countries, signatories of the main human rights 
documents. By enforcing the harsh and inhuman hudud punishments, they violate 
international human rights laws.  
One of the reasons why Muslim countries refuse to subordinate their Shariah-based laws 
to international human rights laws is that they reject international human rights laws as a 
western invention, a human-made and humanistic construct and an assault on the Islamic 
identity. They generally distrust the west deeply and do not approve of the notion of the 
universality of human rights. They defend the harshness of the hudud punishments, since they 
believe that deterrence is their main purpose.  
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At the heart of the problem is that orthodox Muslims believe that hudud ordinances 
cannot be negotiated in any way. They claim that the set of hudud punishments has been 
divinely assigned and is therefore infallible, mandatory and immutable. This argument is used 
to block out any attempt to reform hudud ordinances and sees anyone who dares to question 
any of them as a blasphemer. This claim that the set of hudud punishments is divinely 
assigned, and thus infallible and immutable, has been refuted in this thesis. It has been pointed 
out that the hudud ordinances, as developed by Islamic jurisprudence, are not fully compliant 
and compatible with Shariah, its primary sources, particularly since some of the punishments 
have no legal basis in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. 
It has been stressed that it is very important to distinguish between Shariah as the 
divinely assigned rules and regulations recorded in the Qur'an and Sunnah, and Islamic law, 
for the latter also includes such prescriptions that have been developed by Islamic jurists and 
that cannot be considered fully divine or infallible since they are based on human 
interpretations and opinions. It has been argued that it is, therefore, fully legitimate — and 
even important — to reconsider the hudud prescriptions developed by Islamic jurisprudence, 
to verify in how far they really reflect the will and the word of Allah as recorded in the Qur'an 
and correct Sunnah. It has been pointed out that the core values promoted in them, in fact, 
have much in common with the rights and values protected by international human rights law.  
It has been demonstrated that reformation is not an assault on Islamic identity but it is in 
fact an important Islamic concept deeply rooted in the Qur'an and Sunnah. It can be 
summarised as a call to return to the teachings of the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah, and the 
Islamic core values and requires that Muslims read them in the context of their own time and 
environment. In other words, Shariah requires to consider the reality of life and the needs of 
the people, and allows to interpret its teachings in a way adjusted to their time and 
circumstances. The declared purpose of Shariah is to serve the benefit of the people and to 
protect them from harm. 
The thesis has shown that Shariah — known to be flexible enough to suit all times and 
every environment — is indeed flexible enough even to reconcile hudud punishment with 
international human rights law. This is possible by applying the Islamic principle of reality 
(fiqh al-waqa), the principle of necessity (fiqh al-darurah) and the principle of doubt, all of 
which have been provided by Shariah as powerful instruments to allow considering the reality 
of life and to make exceptions from what is generally prohibited if this is necessary to secure 
the benefit of the people. Based on these principles, this thesis has developed suggestions as 
to how hudud ordinances can be reformed and reconciled with international human rights 
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laws. All the suggestions made in this thesis consider the reality of life of twenty-first century 
Muslims, while they remain fully loyal to Shariah. They have been developed in a religiously 
sensitive manner that respects the authority of Shariah and focuses on its core values and its 
main purpose, namely the benefit of the people. The main findings of the research will be 
summarised in the following section. 
II Main findings of the research 
(a) Questioning hudud ordinances is fully legitimate and necessary 
 
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that it is fully legitimate and even necessary to question 
and examine the hudud ordinances as defined by Islamic jurisprudence.  
The claim that the set of hudud punishments has been divinely assigned and is therefore 
infallible, mandatory and immutable has been refuted on several grounds. The notion of the 
allegedly divinely assigned fixed set of hudud ordinances can, for example, not be found in 
the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. It even contradicts Shariah, since it does not match the list 
of crimes that has been pointed out in the correct Sunnah as ‘the seven most destructive sins’. 
Further, the claim that the hudud punishments cannot be forgiven or amended results from an 
incorrect use of the term ‘hudud’, namely, as referring to the punishments, while the real 
meaning of the term ‘hudud’ is ‘crime’ or ‘limit’, defining the boundary between the 
permissible and the prohibited.  
Another strong argument that disproves the notion of hudud ordinances as a perfect and 
infallible set of divinely assigned crimes and punishments is that there are many differences 
and contradictions between the opinions of the four schools, concerning the exact definitions 
of the crimes and their punishments. The four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence do not 
even agree on the number of crimes to be listed as ‘hudud crimes’. In view of all the 
differences and contradictions it is illogical — and even wrong — to claim that hudud 
ordinances are a divine, perfect, infallible and, thus, a non-negotiable fixed set of crimes and 
punishments. Most importantly, though, the entire set of hudud ordinances, as developed by 
Islamic jurisprudence is not fully compliant and compatible with Shariah’s primary sources, 
the Qur'an and the correct Sunnah. Notably, many of the harshest human rights violations 
result from interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence and have no legal basis in the Qur'an. This 
is particularly true in respect of the death penalty for apostasy, flogging for drinking alcohol 
and stoning to death for adultery —punishments that have been developed by Islamic jurists 
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without legal justification in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah, but mainly based on weak 
ahadith.  
The conflict between the hudud ordinances and the international human rights laws thus 
emerges mainly from rulings developed by Islamic jurisprudence and not from the Qur'an or 
the correct Sunnah. In other words, the main obstacle is not Shariah but Islamic criminal law 
that reflects human opinions and interpretations and cannot be considered infallible or divine. 
The importance of the distinction between Shariah and Islamic law, therefore, has been 
emphasised throughout this thesis.  
  
(b) Shariah promotes human rights and reformation and aims to serve the 
benefit of the people  
 
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that even though many prescriptions of Islamic law are 
in conflict with human rights, Shariah itself can actually be seen as promoting human rights. 
The Qur'an and the correct Sunnah promote human dignity, equality and justice, and the right 
to life, property and privacy. The protection of ‘mind’, as one of the five indispensables,1089 
can further be understood as protection of freedom of thought. Even the important principle of 
presumption of innocence, is well known and highly valued in Islam.  
Further, reformation has been proven to be an Islamic concept deeply rooted in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. It can be described as a call on Muslims to return to the teachings of 
the Qur'an, the correct Sunnah, and the Islamic core values promoted in them. These include 
justice, fairness, forgiveness, reconciliation, peace and harmony, the protection of life, 
equality without discrimination, and religious freedom. The Islamic call for reformation, thus, 
does not aim to change Shariah, but it aims to encourage Muslims to change and improve 
their lives, and to live according to Shariah’s core values.  
The notions of renewal and revival that are included in the Islamic concept of 
reformation, point to the need that Muslims read the Qur'an and the Sunnah in the context of 
their own time and environment. The notion of the restoration of the religion to its original 
condition, further, can be understood as implying the need to clear Islamic law from any 
human interpretation of Islamic jurists that contradicts the Qur'an or its core values or that fit 
no longer with the reality of life of contemporary Muslims. The Islamic call for reformation, 
therefore, can be understood as an appeal on Muslims of all generations, including those of 
today, not to follow blindly the interpretations of early Islamic scholars and jurists, but to 
                                                 
1089 Protection of religion, life, intellect/mind, offspring and money. 
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practice ijtihad and to examine and filter the rulings of Islamic law, including hudud 
ordinances, in the light of the primary sources of Shariah, its core values and its main 
purpose, which is to serve the benefit of the people and to protect them from harm. Any 
sincere orthodox scholar should, consequently, strive to restore the original meaning of the 
primary sources of Shariah and, if necessary, reinterpret them.  
The notion of the protection of religion that is part of the concept of the five 
indispensables (religion, life, intellect, offspring and money/property) is one of the areas that 
require a reinterpretation. This is particularly true since it is the traditional understanding of 
the protection of religion that is responsible for some of the crucial contradictions of hudud 
prescriptions to the Qur'an. The death penalty for apostasy, for example, that contradicts the 
Qur'an, can be seen as a human effort of Islamic jurists to ‘protect the religion’. Another 
example is the definition of haraba. While, according to the Qur'an, the crime of haraba 
refers mainly to physical war against Islam or Muslims, some Islamic jurists have developed a 
definition that is very wide and includes even any criticism of Islam or insult of the Prophet 
Muhammad. This alteration of the definition can as well be seen as an effort to protect the 
religion. As demonstrated in this thesis, human efforts to protect the religion contradict the 
Qur'an, since Allah made it clear that it is up to Him alone to protect the religion. The notion 
of the protection of religion should, therefore, be interpreted rather in a way that reflects the 
qur'anic promotion of freedom of religion.  
As previously mentioned, the Islamic call for reformation arguably includes an appeal on 
Muslims to examine and filter hudud ordinances in the light of Shariah’s primary sources, its 
core values and its main purpose. The appeal to practice ijtihad, further, requires that 
Shariah’s prescriptions pertinent to hudud ordinances be read in a way adapted to the time 
and circumstances of the Muslim community. The principles of reality and necessity and the 
principle of doubt, provided by Shariah, enable Muslims to do so, for these principles allow 
and require the reality of life and the needs of the people to be considered. The principles of 
reality and necessity allow for exceptions, even from definite prescriptions, if this is necessary 
to secure the benefit of the people, and the principle of doubt requires averting the hudud 
punishments in cases of doubt. The Prophet Muhammad himself, as well as his companions 
and successors, applied these principles repeatedly to make exceptions from definite 
prescriptions and to drop or suspend hadd punishments whenever this was necessary for the 
sake of the benefit of the people.  
As demonstrated in this thesis, the understanding of what constitutes doubt and thus 
requires suspending hudud punishments is very wide and encompassing. It includes, for 
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example, the social, moral and economic condition of a country. According to a widespread 
understanding of hudud ordinances, hudud punishment should be practiced only in a perfect 
society. Since in most contemporary Muslim countries, corruption, poverty, and/or social and 
economic injustice are evident, it could actually be argued that hudud ordinances should be 
averted completely in these societies. This is just one of several aspects that can be considered 
to justify or require averting the hadd punishments or amending them based on the principle 
of doubt. The fact that the practice of the hudud ordinances with their harsh and cruel 
punishments seriously damages the reputation of Muslims in the eyes of the world can be seen 
as another aspect that requires to avert the hudud punishments.  
In summary, it can be said that the thesis has demonstrated that it is necessary, legitimate 
and possible to reform hudud ordinances. Shariah — known to be flexible enough to suit all 
times and every environment — is flexible enough to reconcile the hudud prescriptions with 
international human rights laws.  
 
(c) Suggestions for reformation 
 
The suggestions for reformation proposed in this thesis do not require changing or putting 
aside any of the qur'anic definite texts. The thesis does not call to ignore crimes that are 
defined as such in the Qur'an. It rather suggests that all corporal hudud punishments be 
replaced by punishments that are compatible with international human rights laws, namely, 
ranging from admonition or community service to imprisonment and/or a fine.  
The traditional view that harsh corporal punishments are necessary for the sake of 
deterrence has been refuted. It has been pointed out that it would be more beneficial for the 
Muslim society to focus on the rehabilitation of offenders. 
One of the main suggestions for reformation is that all hudud crimes should be treated by 
ta’zir punishments, for in contrast to fixed hadd punishments, ta’zir punishments allow to 
consider, in every case, the severity of the offence, the special circumstances of the crime and 
the offender, and the aspect of rehabilitation. This allows for justice to be secured. The 
suggested limited penalty frames prevent arbitrary judgments and exaggerated sentences.  
All the suggested non-corporal punishments proposed in this thesis have been developed 
in full loyalty to Shariah. As for apostasy, for example, it has been pointed out that it should 
not be criminalised at all, since the Qur'an declares that there is no compulsion in religion. 
Further, the Qur'an has not assigned any earthly punishment for apostasy, but declared that 
Allah would hold apostates accountable in the afterlife.  
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Also for drinking alcohol no legal justification for any earthly punishment can be found 
in the Qur'an or the correct Sunnah. From the Islamic legal perspective it would, therefore, be 
legitimate not to criminalise the consumption of alcohol at all and not to assign any 
punishment whatsoever for it. In conservative Muslim countries, though, drinking alcohol 
constitutes a disturbance of public decency and may, therefore, be treated as such. The 
determination of the severity of the sentence for the public disturbance, however, can differ 
significantly from one country to another. The suggested penalty range, therefore, runs from 
an admonition, to a fine and/or an imprisonment to 6 months. The judge should consider, 
whether the person was actually drunk or not, and whether it was a first or a repeat offence, 
for the main focus should be on rehabilitation of the offender. .  
Concerning the crime of zina (adultery and fornication), it has been pointed out that the 
common distinction between ‘adultery’ (of married people) and ‘fornication’ (illicit sexual 
intercourse of unmarried people) contradicts both the Qur'an and international human rights 
laws. Treating the crime of zina by a ta’zir punishment helps to reconcile this conflict, for it 
allows to assign the same punishment for both crimes and to still consider the differences in 
terms of the severity of the offence and the special circumstances of the crime and the 
offender. The punishment suggested for the crime of zina is community service and/or a fine. 
It is argued that this kind of punishment is more appropriate for cases of zina than a jail 
sentence, which would remove a breadwinner or caretaker from the family and would thus 
impact negatively on the dependants, if either person has children or dependants. If the 
woman falls pregnant as a result of the act of zina, it is suggested that the man should be 
responsible to pay maintenance for the child. For cases of rape, it is argued that a severe 
punishment is necessary to bring about justice and to prevent the offender from committing 
the crime again. A minimum prison sentence of between ten to fifteen years is therefore 
suggested, with the option to extend the sentence indefinitely if there are doubts concerning 
the rapist’s rehabilitation. 
Concerning the crime of defamation, it is important to note that the qur'anic prescription 
speaks only and explicitly of the protection of women from a miscarriage of justice. The 
prevention of the faulty conviction of innocent women — particularly that of victims of rape 
— that frequently occurs in several Muslim countries, including Pakistan, should therefore be 
paramount. In order to prevent the misuse of the prescriptions concerning defamation, the 
qur'anic verse of defamation should never be used against women, much less when they 
report cases of rape. The cruel and humiliating punishment of flogging should be replaced 
with a prison sentence up to one year and/or fine to be imposed at the discretion of the judge. 
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The punishment for theft might seem the hardest to reform since it is based on the Qur'an. 
The exact definition of the qur'anic punishment of ‘cutting the hand’, however, is not fully 
clear. While it is traditionally interpreted as referring to the amputation of the hand, it could as 
well refer to the infliction of an injury, or have a merely metaphorical meaning. This lack of 
clarity brings the principle of doubt into play and requires that the hadd punishment be 
averted. A jail sentence and/or fine are, therefore, suggested as an alternative punishment. 
Concerning the crime of haraba that refers to ‘those who wage war against Allah and His 
Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land’, it has been pointed 
out that this refers to acts of war and includes also all kinds of violent physical attacks against 
Muslim society, its government, public order or safety, including public robbery, murder, and 
rape. While acts of haraba are subject to law of war, for all these crimes, prison sentences are 
suggested to replace the extremely cruel corporal punishments of ‘crucifixion and cross 
amputation to imprisonment and banishment’. The understanding of some Muslim scholars 
who have extended the definition of haraba to include verbal and other attacks on Islam or 
insulting the Prophet has been refuted.  
III Main conclusion and contribution of the study 
In summary, it can be concluded that if Shariah is interpreted and applied correctly, it is 
possible to reconcile the hudud punishments with international human rights laws.  
The main suggestion offered in the thesis is that all corporal hudud punishments be 
replaced by punishments that are compatible with international human rights laws, namely 
ranging from admonition or community service to imprisonment and/or a fine, and that 
perpetrators of hudud crimes should be dealt with by ta’zir punishments. It has been 
demonstrated that the suggested amendment is necessary and legitimate. It is necessary in 
view of the reality of life of Muslim society in the twenty-first century; and it is legitimate, 
since all the suggestions have been developed in respect and loyalty to Shariah and serve its 
purposes. The proposed suggestions are based on the Islamic principles provided by Shariah, 
namely the Islamic principles of reality and necessity and the principle of doubt. These allow 
for the suggested amendments, since they serve the benefit of the people. They help to restore 
the image and reputation of Muslims and protect them from corporal punishments that violate 
human rights. The suggested amendments protect the human dignity and rights, and secure 
public safety and decency and religious freedom. Further, they serve justice, and have the 
rehabilitation of the offender in view. 
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It has been demonstrated, thus, that in order to reconcile the hudud punishment with 
international human rights laws, it is not necessary to change or abolish any of the qur'anic 
definite texts, but it is sufficient to follow the Islamic call for reformation by returning to the 
core values of Islam and focussing on the purpose of Shariah.  
The approach used in this thesis, namely to tackle the conflict from an Islamic 
perspective, and using Islamic arguments, can be path-breaking also for those academic 
researchers who focus on Islam’s relationship with human rights. It can help them reform also 
other areas of Islamic law.  
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that the principle of doubt is so wide and 
encompassing that it would, in fact, justify a complete moratorium on the entire set of hudud 
ordinances, as is suggested by many moderate Muslim scholars. It has been pointed out, 
though, that it is only their reformation can bring a real long-term solution, for if they were 
simply set aside, they can easily re-implemented any time, and an appeal for their abolition is 
very likely to be completely rejected in those countries that practice hudud ordinances. A 
reformation of hudud punishment as suggested in this thesis, in fact, should be acceptable 
even to orthodox Muslims, since all the suggestions proposed in this thesis have been 
developed in a religiously and culturally sensitive manner and in full compliance with 
Shariah.  
It has been pointed out in this thesis that even in moderate or secular Muslim countries 
where the hudud ordinances are not applied, radical Muslim groups that aim to implement 
Islamic law are engaged in a power struggle against the state. These groups aim to overthrow 
secular regimes and replace them with Islamic governments that would implement hudud 
punishment, as is the case with the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Freezing 
the hudud punishment will therefore not fully solve the problem indefinitely.  
This is one of the reasons why a long-term solution for the conflict of hudud ordinances 
with human rights is of great importance. It will therefore be more helpful in the long term if 
Islamic law were reformed rather than ignored. Reforming hudud punishments will help those 
countries that already apply them as well as those who do not, especially since in the latter the 
more radical Muslims might gain more influence in the future. The suggested approach would 
eliminate the threat of the influence of the radical groups who are striving for the 
implementation of the hudud ordinances. 
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(a) Recommendations  
This thesis pleads with orthodox Muslim scholars to follow the call of the Prophet 
Muhammad pronounced in his Farewell Sermon, that being to read and (re)interpret the 
primary sources for themselves, namely in the context of their own time and environment. 
They should consider the reality of life of the Muslim community in this day and age while 
focusing on the Islamic core values and the main purpose of Shariah to serve the benefit of 
the people.  
A recommendation to moderate Muslim academics and advocates of human rights is to 
support efforts to reform hudud ordinances and to seek a constructive discussion about hudud 
ordinances with orthodox Muslims. This thesis can help to counter the objections to 
reformation brought forth by orthodox Muslims, particularly those objections based on the 
false claim that hudud ordinances are a fixed set of divinely prescribed crimes and 
punishments. For such a discussion to be promising it will be important to distinguish 
between Shariah and Islamic law, for a fruitful dialogue will not be possible if Shariah is 
criticised. If, however, the discussion is based on a respect for Shariah, on Islamic arguments 
and on the Islamic principles introduced in this thesis, orthodox Muslims cannot refute such 
arguments easily. 
(b) Suggestions for further research 
A suggested area for further research is the question of how the practical implementation of 
the suggested reform in Muslim countries can be achieved and how an internal discussion on 
the topic can be stimulated. This includes a research on the impact of politics on the current 
enforcement of Islamic criminal law. 
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